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Abstract 
This thesis submits Luigi Giussani’s theological writings to philosophical 
analysis.  Giussani (born in Desio, 1922; died in Milan, 2005) was a prominent 
Italian author, public intellectual, university lecturer, and founder of the international 
Catholic lay movement Communion and Liberation (CL).  My enquiry is motivated 
by the experience of readers who find Giussani’s texts marked by vagueness and 
seeming inconsistencies despite his attempt to respond decisively and sensitively to 
real human problems.  It also presents ideas from those works available only in 
Italian to an English-language readership for the first time.  Rather than criticize the 
author’s style of exposition, or restate his arguments in a manner more suited to my 
audience, I treat the texts’ burdens as symptomatic of the author’s deeper, 
unarticulated concerns.  I reconstruct Giussani’s implicit concerns using history, 
intellectual biography, sources, and the logic of enquiry itself.  I then re-read his texts 
in the light of the explicit rendering of those concerns and, where the texts’ burdens 
still persist, I suggest repairs corresponding to those concerns and to the errant 
behaviours his writings were generated to correct. 
Three themes are examined: judgement, freedom, and beauty.  These were 
prominent in Giussani’s dialogue with students from the 1950s onward and integral 
to his idea of the religious education of youth.  My analysis is conceived as a 
contribution to philosophical theology, rather than to the philosophy of education.  
The areas flagged for repair, however, may nonetheless serve educators.  I conclude 
that Giussani’s account is indeed shaped by his implicit concerns; that their nature 
provokes the essentialist arguments he mounts; and that his attempt to expound 
intrinsic, universal, and timeless claims runs against the pragmatic thrust of his 
writing.  My repairs call for a better account of 1) practical deliberation, 2) discursive 
reason, 3) obedience in relation to autonomy, and 4) habits related to the formation 
of virtues.  I argue that the practical grounds of his project are best anchored in 
robust solutions to the problems of ordinary life formulated from the deepest sources 
of repair from Giussani’s tradition (sacred scripture and sacred tradition, including 
the liturgy) rather than what he calls the “needs and exigencies of the heart,” which 













‘Has mankind failed the Church’ [...] ‘or has the Church failed 
mankind?’  [...] [N]owadays the Christian fact is proposed to the world in 
a profoundly reduced form.  It is not what it should be; namely, the 
presence that battles against man’s destruction.  If it is that presence, it is 
only so potentially.  [...]  The chief observation motivating such a 
judgement lies in the reduction of Christianity to ‘Word’ (‘Word of God,’ 
‘Gospel,’ or simply, ‘Word’).  This reduction entails certain 
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Luigi Giussani at the lighthouse of Portofino, Liguria in 1956 with students from the lycée Berchet.  
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I generally follow M. Camisasca, Comunione e Liberazione: Le origini 
(1954-1968) (Milan: Edizioni San Paolo, 2001). 
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If I had stated these ideas to the leaders of the ‗realist‘ school they would have said, as I have heard 
them say a hundred times, ‗you don‘t mean that; what you mean is ...‘ and then would have followed a 
caricature of my ideas in terms of ‗realist‘ principles, with sandbags for arms and legs; all so 











  Luigi Giussani (1922-2005) is today remembered as one of the most 
prominent figures of twentieth-century Catholicism.  Over the course of five decades, 
he laboured tirelessly, both as a priest and educator, to revitalize the Church through 
new expressions of ecclesial life, not the least of which was his guidance of lay 
movements.  His greatest legacy remains the founding of Communion and Liberation 
(CL), an international movement devoted to manifesting the relevance of religion to 
the questions that arise intrinsically within the human condition.  It is in relation to 
CL, in particular, that the historical and philosophical significance of Giussani‘s 
activity as an author comes to the fore.    
The Church, through the early part of Giussani‘s lifetime, was engaged in an 
intense philosophical campaign against modernity. The ever waning attendance in 
churches and the retreat of religion from the public sphere, despite the vigorous 
efforts of anti-Modernist popes, seemed continually to ask pastorally-minded 
theologians to devise more sympathetic responses to the new conditions obtaining for 
belief and practice.  Many of the convictions and hopes to which Giussani held 
throughout this period, such as the possibility of a rapprochement between secular 
and sacred authors, and according to which he engaged the modernist challenge to 
religion and the Church, coincided eventually with the Church‘s greater openness to 
dialogue with the modern world, as expressed, for instance, in the Pastoral 
Constitution Gaudium et Spes (1965).  Working assiduously within the new climate 
of ―aggiornamento,‖ heralded by the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965), 
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Giussani‘s activities as a teacher and pastor either followed or complemented the 
work of the greatest figures leading the post-conciliar reform, such as Paul VI (1963-
1978) and John Paul II (1978-2005).   
Giussani‘s own unique contribution to the revitalization of the Church in 
modern times, which he recommended to younger generations of Catholics, involved 
the pioneering of a method, eventually embodied in the practices of CL, by means of 
which the ancient faith of the Church might fully regain its role and vitality in 
ordinary life.  This endeavour, philosophical in scope, was accompanied by a vast 
output of speeches, conferences, sermons, articles, and books that drew out the 
universal implications of a natural aptitude for the proposition that God exists.  These 
writings, largely pastoral and first disseminated in Milanese universities, document 
one of the largest and most influential attempts of the post-concilliar period to 
revitalize religion in the contemporary urban milieu of Northern Italy.  In particular, 
they exhibit how the introduction of ―new fonts‖ of theology – e.g., German-
Romantic theology, nouvelle théologie, and ―Louvain Thomism‖ – were used to gain 
particular advantage over modern concerns.   
The ever increasing prominence of Communion and Liberation, even after 
Giussani‘s death in 2005, makes the content of his writings vitally important for 
those interested in gaining insight into the attractiveness of certain philosophical 
claims on contemporary Catholics in Modern Western society.  Giussani‘s writings 
shed light on how the weight of these claims was acquired by different historical and 
contextual pressures exerted from within and outside the Church; and how his 
writings sit within the broader context of the Catholic intellectual tradition, including 
both that which they already assert that is established and that which they have yet to 
assert to ensure their continued longevity as practical counsels for daily Christian 
living.        
 This introduction is in two parts.  First, I will give readers the historical 
background necessary for reading the material contained in subsequent chapters.  
Second, I present the themes from Giussani‘s work to be analysed, their significance 
to modern Church life, the problems and concerns they raise, which motivate my 
own analytical work, and the method I shall use to execute my analysis and suggest 






PART I: GIUSSANI AND COMMUNION AND LIBERATION 
 
Biographical Sketch 
Luigi Giussani was born on October 15, 1922.  His birthplace was the small 
Lombard town of Desio, in the Province of Monza, which was also the birthplace of 
the reigning pope of the time, Pius XI (1922-1939).  Giussani‘s parents were of 
modest means.  His father, Beniamino, an artisan by trade and a lover of belcanto, 
was notably a supporter of the Partito Socialista Italiano (PSI).  His mother, 
Angelina Gelosa, originally a textile worker hired by Gavazzi S.p.A., was a devout 
Christian and a dedicated wife and mother.  She left her job, after marrying, in order 
to raise Luigi and her four following children.   
In 1933, at eleven years of age, Giussani entered the seminary of San Pietro 
Martire, which is located in the near-by town of Seveso.  Four years later, he and his 
classmates were transferred to the newly built seminary in Venegono, an impressive 
neo-classical structure which opened its doors in 1930, only four years after it had 
been commissioned by Abbot Ildefonso Schuster O. S. B. (later appointed by Pope 
Pius XII [1939-1958] as Archbishop of Milan [1928-1954]).  Throughout his life, 
Giussani recalled his years of seminary training frequently and with fondness.   He 
referred to his former professors and spiritual mentors with a deep sense of gratitude, 
crediting them with his education not only in philosophy and theology, but 
attributing to them a generous exposure to culture: works of music, literature, and art.   
On May 26, 1945, one month before the end of World War II, Giussani was 
ordained to the priesthood by Archbishop Schuster. There were very few changes in 
Giussani‘s daily routine immediately after ordination.  His professors had slated him 
to remain at Venegono for teaching and further studies.  Apart from a brief interlude 
due to illness, Giussani spent the next nine years at Venegono, teaching dogmatic 
and Oriental theology and, on weekends and holy days, delivering conferences for 
Azione Cattolica in Milan.  At the same time, he pursued research in American 
Protestant theology, successfully defending his doctoral thesis in 1954.
3
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 Giussani successfully defended his thesis in 1952: ―Il senso cristiano dell‘uomo secondo Reinhold 
Niebuhr.‖  It was first published as Reinhold Niebuhr (Milan: Jaca Book, 1969), and later expanded 
and republished as Teologia protestante Americana (Venegono: La scuola cattolica, 1969).  It was 





Giussani would recall 1954 for years to come with another event in mind.  It 
was also the year he decided to leave academia to teach in high school.  His decision 
was provoked by a conversation he held with some youngsters on a train to the 
Adriatic.  Through it, he learned, frighteningly, how spiritually and intellectually 
bereft the youth of the period were.  Giussani‘s Archbishop, Giovanni Battista 
Montini (1954-1963), later to become Paul VI (1963-1978), granted Giussani 
permission to leave Venegono that summer and reassigned him to the lycée Berchet, 
a classical academy in the centre of metropolitan Milan.  
Meanwhile, Giussani‘s meetings with the students of Azione Cattolica (AC) 
and Gioventù Studentesca (GS) continued with even greater frequency than before.  
And his contact with the university campus was made even more regular in 1964, 
when he accepted a lectureship in theology at l’Università Cattolica di Milano, a 
post he held until 1990.  In the same year, he founded the Centro Culturale Charles 
Péguy which enabled university alumni, who were otherwise taken up with their 
families and jobs, to continue meeting on a regular basis to reflect on life and faith.  
Meanwhile, in 1965, some of Giussani‘s students joined hands with Marxist 
activists.  Unnerved by Giussani‘s sudden – albeit unwitting – proximity to Marxism, 
Archbishop Giovanni Colombo (1963-1979)
4
 offered him a five-month sabbatical for 
the purposes of study.  Giussani was sent to the United States.  The year was 1966.  
When Giussani returned to Milan toward the end of that year, he was asked to desist 
from his involvement with the movements.     
 Only in 1969, after the previous year‘s riots had swept through university 
campuses, did a group of students gather once again around Giussani.  In order to 
rekindle the experience of GS, they invented an appealing title for a promotional 
pamphlet, viz., ―Comunione e Liberazione,‖ by which they would try to attract and 
enlist new members.  The formula Communion and Liberation, by which the group 
                                                                                                                                          
(Milan: Jaca Book, 1989).  A critical edition with three articles published by Giussani between 1967 
and 1968, treating Niebuhr on history and Brightman on personalism, was released with the title 
Teologia Protestante Americana. Profilo Storico, edited by Elisa Buzi (Milan: Marietti, 2003). 
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 Giovanni Colombo was Archbishop of Milan from 1963 to 1979.  In 1965 he was elevated to the 
College of Cardinals by Paul VI.  Prior to his appointment as Archbishop of Milan, Colombo served at 
Venegono Seminary, where he had been teaching since 1931.  From 1939-1953 he was rector of 
Venegono, and in 1953, he was appointed Rector Major of the seminaries in Milan.  At the Second 






officially came to be known, conveyed the image of an embodied Christian presence 
in the universities that was both free and obedient to the Church.  Through the next 
three decades, the dilation of CL into a highly influential and international 
ecclesiastical movement took up much of Giussani‘s life and work.  While he would 
never return to academia as a professional theologian, he read and wrote prolifically 
for the university students and faculty in CL.  He also guided the foundation of a 
number of other movements and communities that sprang from the diverse interests 
and initiatives of CL, vastly extending the reach of his ideas.  Within the Church, 
Giussani is recognized as the founder of Memores Domini – an association of vowed 
lay persons, and is credited with fostering numerous vocations to the Suore di Carità 
dell’Assunzione and to the Cistercian abbey of Vitorchiano.  Beyond the strictly 
ecclesiastical setting, other fruits of CL include the foundation of the Compagnia 
delle Opere (CDO) – an association of business men and entrepreneurs; the 
Fondazione per la Sussidiarietà  – for the promotion of cultural renewal through 
formation; and the Associazione Volontari per il Servizio Internazionale (AVSI) – a 
non-governmental organization established to promote education in the third world.   
In 1983, Giussani was named a monsignor by John Paul II (1978-2005) with 
the title of Honorary Prelate to the Pope.  Giussani died in 2005 after a lifetime of 
service to the Church.  His funeral homily was delivered by Josef Ratzinger, later 
Pope Benedict XVI (2005-present), who took the place of the then ailing pope.
5
  The 
funeral was held in the Duomo of Milan before a gathering of several thousand 
mourners, including high ranking churchmen and state dignitaries.  Giussani had 
spent his final years reflecting on the theme of mercy.  The following remark is 
among the last of his formal statements to CL: ―The most beautiful thing we can say 
is that we have to be merciful; to have mercy toward one another. [...]  Faced with all 
the sins of the world, the obvious thing to say would be ‗God, destroy a world such 
as this!‘  But God dies for a world such as this; he becomes a man and dies for men, 
and indeed his mercy represents the ultimate sense of the Mystery.‖
6
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 Giussani, Appartenenza, notes from Giussani‘s intervention at the ―Beginning Day‖ for the adult 
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Communionis 9 (2000), 4; quoted in Massimo Camisasca, Don Giussani: la sua esperienza dell’uomo 





 One of the main tasks of this thesis is to understand Giussani‘s writings in the 
light of the original question to which he sought to give a sufficient answer – 
sufficient, that is, to withstand rigorous testing.  The philosophically-trained reader, 
familiar with the way theological propositions are formed, will be struck by 
Giussani‘s unusual use of language (e.g., the use of words such as event, encounter, 
presence, and gaze), the variety of non-theological and even secular sources on 
which he draws for inspiration, together with his preference for using punchy 
quotations rather than working through arguments.  None of these idiosyncrasies can 
be adequately explained apart from Giussani‘s original question (or set of questions), 
its origins in history and context, and the influence exerted on him by his audience‘s 
expectations.  Accessing and reconstructing that question means having to 
understand what Giussani feared.
7
  There is no person more suited to giving us that 
understanding than Giussani himself.  I have, therefore, provided, in the Appendix of 
this thesis, the translation of an interview Giussani held for the famous Italian 
journalist Robi Ronza in 1975.
8
  In this interview, Giussani rehearses crucial 
political, cultural, and intellectual turning-points in Italy through the 1950s and 60s, 
furnishing today‘s readers of his texts with an interpretive key.  Giussani, however, 
paints his descriptions in broad strokes.  For this reason, I provide the following 
section to amplify the initial picture provided in that interview.  It will expand on 
areas of intellectual biography, and only those that touch on the philosophical themes 
explored in this thesis.  I have organized the information under these categories: 
Cultural Milieu, Seminary Training, Modernism, and Student Movements.  
 
Seminary training  
a.  Theology at Venegono  
Giussani‘s categories and analytical language derive from a variety of 
authors, secular and Christian, ancient and modern, but the basic premise of his 
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 Cf. ―It is always a significant question to ask about any philosopher: what is he afraid of?‖ (Iris 
Murdoch, Existentialists and Mystics [1950; New York: Penguin Books Ltd., 1999])e. 
8
 Robi Ronza (1941-present) is a freelance journalist and writer, renowned in Lombardy for his 
expertise in political science, international affairs, and institutional problems.  He was an official 
consultant to the Regional Government of Lombardy under President Roberto Formigoni (1995-
present).  He joined Giussani in 1980 to found the Meeting of Friendship Among Peoples in Rimini, 
an annual gathering of over 800,000 participants that unites diverse faiths and cultures together, 





writing, viz., to render the Christian fact significant in ordinary life, comes from 
sensitivities that were cultivated by his professors at Venegono Seminary from 1937-
1945.  The blend of theological opinion expressed at Venegono drew from the style 
of thought of a new generation of professors appointed by Alfredo Ildefonso 
Schuster (1880-1954) between 1931-1938, following the promulgation of Pius XI‘s 
Deus Scientiarum Dominus.
9
  The more influential faculty, such as Carlo Figini 
(1883-1967) and Gaetano Corti (1910-1989), had received advanced degrees in 
theology from the Jesuits at the Pontifical Gregorian University in Rome in the 
interwar period.  The same period at Venegono was influenced by the threat of 
fascism.  Various publications issuing from Venegono addressed Italian political and 
social reform from the point of view of Christian inspiration over and against 
political ideology.
10
   
The intellectual milieu of Venegono was, by all accounts, exceptional for its 
openness to new currents of theology in lieu of the anti-modernist climate still 
prevalent in the Church and through much of which it seems to have operated 
without significant interruption.  Perhaps for this reason, the school of Venegono is 
described as an intellectual movement by Francesco Bertoldi, one of its foremost 
historians.
11
  At least four fonts of theology, all manifest in Giussani‘s writing, 
constituted the theological milieu at Venegono.  According to Bertoldi, these were: 
the theology of John Henry Newman (1801-1890), the Tübingen school of Catholic 
theology, the school of Le Saulchoir, and the so-called nouvelle théologie.
12
  
Newman‘s works were not typically read in Italian seminaries of that period.  Ideas 




 were deemed threatening to the 
infallibility of the pope and the permanence of doctrine.  The school at Tübingen, 
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 Pius XI, Deus Scientiarum Dominus, Apostolic Constitution on universities and faculties of 
ecclesiastical schools (Vatican City, 1931).  Numerous editions. 
10
 See Il Seminario di Venegono 1935-1985, 211-235. 
11
 ―La «Scuola di Venegono» (1935-1955),‖ in Annuario Teologico (Milan: ISTRA, 1985).  See also 
C. Pasini and M. Spezzibottiani, Il Seminario di Venegono 1935-1985 (Milan: Nuove Edizione 
Duomo, 1985). 
12
 For the influence of la nouvelle théologie, the Tübingen School, and the school of Le Saulchoir on 
Giussani‘s seminary, particularly the appropriation of certain categories and methods by his professors 
(e.g., the influence of Marie-Dominique Chenu on Carlo Colombo), see ―La «Scuola di Venegono» 
(1935-1955).‖     
13
 See John Henry Newman, Conscience and papacy: letter to the Duke of Norfolk, edited with an 
introduction and notes by Stanley L. Jaki (Pinckney, Mich. : Real View Books, 2002). 
14
 See John Henry Newman, An essay on the development of Christian doctrine, edited with an 





similarly, incited distinct misgivings within the Roman curia.  Publications from its 
faculty incurred severe criticism from Rome for casting doubt over the institution of 
sacramental confession, the use of Latin in the liturgy, and the historical grounds of 
papal infallibility.
15
  The writings of several professors were delated to ecclesiastical 
censors and some were placed on the Index.
16
  One of Giussani‘s favourites among 
the Tübingen authors, Johann Adam Möhler (1796-1838), had been accused of 
heterodoxy by the cardinal archbishop of Cologne, Count Ferdinand August von 
Spiegel (1824-1835), causing him to be vetoed from a professorship in Bonn.
17
 The 
school of Le Saulchoir had its own fair share of controversial theologians.  To cite 
one example, Marie-Domenique Chenu O.P. (1895-1990), a certain influence on 
Giussani‘s teacher Carlo Colombo,
18
 had published a manifesto in 1937, Une école 
de théologie: le Saulchoir, which in 1942 was placed on the Index.  At the same time 




By the1950s the so-called nouvelle théologie, including the theology 
pioneered at the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, extolled by Venegono‘s Carlo 
Colombo in an article published in 1952,
20
 was subject to the caution extended by 
Humani Generis to new methods in theology.
21
  Theologians drawing on German 
Romantic theology and the fonts of nouvelle théologie in the 1940s and 1950s, i.e., 
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 See James Tunstead Burtchaell, Nineteenth Century Religious Thought in the West, vol. 2, edited by 
Ninian Smart, et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 113. 
16
 E.g., Johann Baptist von Hirsher (1788-1865) wrote De genuina missæ notione (1821), which 
decentralized the notion of sacrifice in the Mass.  The book was promptly placed on the Index.  He 
was criticised for never retracting the book.  When in 1843 he stood for appointment as coadjutor 
bishop of Freiburg, Friedrich Emmanuel von Hurter (1787-1865), his friend, raised the cry of alarm.  
See Georges Goyau, ―Johann Baptist von Hirscher,‖ in The Catholic Encyclopedia, vol. 7 (New York: 
Robert Appleton Company, 1910), http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/07363b.htm, accessed August 6, 
2010. 
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 Burtchaell, Nineteenth Century Religious Thought in the West, vol. 2, 113. 
18
 Francesco Bertoldi, ―L‘atto di fede e il metodo teologico in Carlo Colombo,‖ in Il Seminario di 
Venegono 1935-1985, 30-33. 
19
 For a brief account of the controversy surrounding Chenu‘s theology, see Fergus Kerr‘s Twentieth 
Century Catholic Theologians, 18-21.  For a more ample treatment, favorable to Chenu, see 
Christophe Potworowski, Contemplation and Incarnation: The Theology of Marie-Dominique Chenu 
(Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2001). 
20
 Carlo Colombo,  ―La metodologia teologica dal 1900-1950,‖ in La Scuola Cattolica (1952): 453-
479. 
21
 ―Unfortunately these advocates of novelty easily pass from despising scholastic theology to the 
neglect of and even contempt for the Teaching Authority of the Church itself, which gives such 
authoritative approval to scholastic theology.‖  (Pius XII, Humani Generis, Encyclical concerning 






before the Second Vatican Council and the promulgation of Gaudium et Spes 
(1965),
22
 could not afford to be unmindful of the preceding half-century of 
ecclesiastical campaigning against modernism.
23
   It is worth recalling, for example, 
that only a few years prior to Giussani‘s seminary training at Venegono, the faculty 
of the major seminary of Milan (via Corso Venezia), where his professors received 




As we shall see, Giussani borrows a good deal of vocabulary, including the 
categories of event, experience, and encounter (avvenimento, esperienza, and 
incontro) from the so-called ―new theology.‖
25
  The first of Giussani‘s texts to 
employ such categories was Gioventù Studentesca: riflessioni sopra un’esperienza 
(Milan: Mediolani, 1959), published with the imprimatur of Carlo Figini (1883-
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 By 1965, the authors of the pastoral constitution Gaudium et Spes wanted to address the ―deep-
seated changes affecting modern life and belief.‖  The flowing areas were flagged for consideration: 
(a) changes in what we know about the world, (b) changes in the shaping of society, (c) changes in 
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sciences (not excluding the sciences dealing with man himself).  The following elements give shape to 
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between tradition and today, decline of popular piety, a more critical appropriation of religion.  See 
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1964), notorious in the Archdiocese of Milan, it was said, for his strict ecclesiastical 
censorship.  One of Figini‘s biographers, seemingly naive of the philosophical 
implications of his observation, mentions how he openly displayed in his personal 
library the works of Alessandro Manzoni (1785-1873), Newman, and mirabile dictu, 
Antonio Rosmini (1797-1855).
26
  The openness of Figini (himself a former professor 
of Venegono) to theologies pushing the bounds of Thomism, however carefully, is 
actually a remarkable fact, largely unexplored in his biography and other relevant 
commentaries.  Figini‘s bibliography, I have tried to demonstrate, is not the only one 
to stand out among Giussani‘s early mentors.        
 
b. Philosophy at Venegono 
A second factor which shaped Venegono‘s curriculum, according to Bertoldi, 
was the reaction on the part of Giussani‘s seminary professors to ―la cultura 
scholastica-metafisica.‖
27
  The phrase ―scolastica-metafisica‖ invites pause for 
reflection.   Scholasticism refers to the philosophy of the high middle ages: not only 
the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), but also that of Bonaventure (1221-
1274), Duns Scotus (1265-1308), and William of Ockham (c. 1288 – c. 1348), for 
instance.  The term Neo-Scholasticism, pioneered by Jesuits Joseph Kleugten (1811-
1883) and Matteo Liberatore (1810-1892), refers to the revival of medieval methods 
of philosophy in the training of the clergy and in the response of the Church to the 
problems posed to the Catholic faith by the Enlightenment.  But the ―cultura 
scholastica-metafisica,‖ read in the light of Giussani‘s disassociation from Neo-
Thomism above, while complicating matters on one level, likely refers to the 
Thomism pioneered by the likes of Dominican Thomist Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange 
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(1877-1964): viz., ―the exposition of the principles of ontology […] all too much like 
the exposition, highly abstract and syllogistic, of a set of quasi-Euclidean 
theorems.‖
28
  Neo-Scholasticism and Neo-Thomism, then, fall within the complex 
and diversified revival of Thomas Aquinas‘s thought initiated under Leo XIII (1878-
1903).
29
  The exclusion of Garrigou-Lagrange, a conservative Thomist, dubbed the 
―sacred monster of Thomism‖ by one of his biographers,
30
 from the bibliographies of 
Venegono‘s faculty, is in line with a number of theologians of the time (Marie-
Domenique Chenu [1895-1990], Henri de Lubac [1896-1991], Hans Urs von 
Balthasar[1905-1988]), who revered Thomas, but believed that conservative 
Thomism was beyond the reach of a new generation of Catholics.
31
   
Garrigou-Lagrange, a pupil of Ambroise Gardeil (1859-1931), continued the 
work of his mentor, responding to a variety of problems: ―immanence, voluntarism, 
relativization of the concept in favor of an immediate intuition of being, together 
with a metaphysics of life and mobility rather than a stable metaphysics of being.‖
32
  
Each of these areas represented not only a departure from Thomism, but a concession 
to Cartesian-Kantian philosophy, and a decisive step in the direction of modernism.  
They had been introduced to Catholic theology by Maurice Blondel and Henri 
Bergson, and made more acute by wide-spread interest in William James‘s 
pragmatism and an inaccurate interpretation of Newman‘s theology of faith.
33
  
Giussani, it is worth noting, borrows variously from each of these authors.  Given the 
strong reaction against them in Rome, particularly on the part of Garrigou-Lagrange, 
it is quite remarkable that they should have found their way into Giussani‘s 
repertory.  
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At Venegono, already in 1934, Carlo Colombo, published a favorable, albeit 
cautious, review of Blondel‘s L’Action (1893).
34
  One possible source of Venegono‘s 
―openness‖ to Blondel may derive from the Institute of Higher Philosophy in 
Leuven.
35
  The importance of Leuven as a source of philosophy for the faculty of 
Venegono is highlighted in an article Colombo published in 1946.  He examined how 
certain Belgian-trained theologians, such as Roger Aubert (1914-2009), treated the 
problem of the act of faith (―il problema della fede‖) in light of ―the great merit of 
Blondel, notwithstanding the exaggerations and inexactitudes in which his ideas 
occasionally fell‖ (il grande merito di Blondel, nonostante le esagerazioni e le 
inesattezze nelle quali sono talvolta caduti).
36
  Leuven Thomism, perfectly in line 
with Giussani‘s project, strove to practice a philosophical method that took seriously 
the epistemological question of the act of faith and tried to solve it from within an 
existentialist framework which was sympathetic to the human person: ―Taught and 
written in the vernacular [instead of Latin] by professors who had been students at 
other European universities, it was much less clerical in tone and less oriented 
toward theology than the philosophy of nineteenth-century scholastics.‖
37
 
That Venegono from the 1930s through the 1950s had been allowed to draw 
from other, ostensibly modernist fonts of theology, without undergoing significant 
interruption from the Vatican, is the achievement of a cautious theological 
engagement with modernity, but one still benevolent to modern authors.  The need 
explicitly to reassure certain onlookers that philosophy at Venegono, despite its open 
engagement with modernity, still referred to the perennial philosophy of Thomas 
Aquinas was clearly designed to anticipate censorious interventions from Rome.
38
  
Colombo, in his published commentary on Humani Generis (1950), stated that, as far 
as he was concerned, the term ―nouveaux,‖ concerning which the Vatican had 
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expressed grave reservation, was to be applied only to the dialogue of theology with 





a. Lay Movements in General 
While the raison d’être of lay movements in the twentieth century was, in the 
strictest sense, directed to the ―formation of consciences‖ (e.g., through schooling in 
the catechism and works of charity), their purpose extended to grounding political, 
economic, and social activity in Christian values.  In virtue of this political outlook, 
the lay movements distinguished themselves from the confraternities, pious 
associations, and Third Orders which stood alongside them and often had more 
ancient roots.  An understanding of what that political outlook entailed in more 
precise terms, particularly as Giussani experienced it, goes back to the Church‘s 
struggle for sovereignty in the Kingdom of Italy after the Risorgimento.  The 
dissolution of the Papal States in the 1920s was met with grave concern in the 
Church over the autonomy of religious institutions, such as schools, hospitals, and 
orphanages.  The Lateran Pacts (1929), drafted to work out a peaceable agreement 
between the Kingdom of Italy and the Holy See after decades of conflict and 
concessions after the  Risorgimento, actually did little to halt Fascist encroachments, 
which continued until the ousting of the Partito Nazionale Fascista in 1943.  The 
political struggle with which Giussani identified in this context touched crucially on 
the Church‘s solicitude for religious orders and dioceses involved in education.     
The lay movements in the twentieth century, such as Azione Cattolica, had 
had an active and often incisive role in asserting Christian values in institutions 
where the anti-clerical regime made it difficult to do so.  Yet, more than once, the 
official position of the Church and of the movements themselves regarding the role 
they were to play in society changed.  In 1952, for instance, Azione Cattolica 
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described itself unequivocally as a non-political movement.
40
  But in the era between 
the wars, the case had been different.  In that era, before Benito Musolini (1883-
1945) got around to disbanding the lay movements, such as Azione Cattolica and the 
Sunday oratories, having accused them of conspiracy, they had been instrumental in 
galvanizing support among the agrarian class for the Partito Popolare: a political 
party that took inspiration from the social doctrine of the Church, namely that 
expounded in Rerum Novarum by Pope Leo XIII (1878-1903).  Indeed, had it not 
been for the dangers posed by fascism to numerous religious and clergy, the protests 
of GIAC (Gioventù Italiana di Azione Cattolica) might not so easily have been 
curtailed by Pope Pius XI (1922-1939) and relegated to the private sphere.
41
  
Generally, they regarded themselves as much more than a passing fad and measured 
success in terms of their incisiveness on society.  
In the immediate post-war period (1945-1948), the Church regained its 
influence in Italian politics.  Luigi Gedda (1902-2000), the director of Azione 
Cattolica, organized comitati civici, with the full support of Pius XII behind him, to 
help bring Democrazia Cristiana (DC) to victory in the 1948 elections against the 
―sovietici‖ (Partito Communista Italiano and Partito Socialista Italiano).  However 
conducive the ecclesiastical movements were to DC‘s victory, the line between 
religious activity and political action was consequentially blurred once again.  
Throughout the 1950s, for the majority of protagonists within the ecclesiastical 
movements, the vague rhetoric of ―forming good Christians‖ and ―responsible 
citizens‖ was politically charged and open to various interpretations.  By the 1960s, 
the student movements, primed by post-war existentialism and New Left variations 
on ―Marxism with a human face,‖
42
 co-opted these phrases, reconfigured their 
meanings, and pressed them into new, revolutionary forms of service.  The results, 
according to Giussani‘s archbishop, Giovanni Colombo (1963-1979), were amply on 
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display in the riots that besieged university campuses in 1968: ―a clear compromise 
of Gospel values.‖
43
    
 
b. Student Movements 
From 1951 to 1954 Giussani made weekly visits to Milan where he presided 
at the meetings of Azione Cattolica (AC), while spending the rest of the week 
composing his doctoral thesis at Venegono.
44
  In October 1954, after submitting his 
thesis, his commitment to the Milanese university students deepened as he became 
increasingly involved with Gioventù Studentesca (GS): an organization designed to 
gather the adult members of AC from diverse locations on a regular basis in order to 
organize apostolic outreach to high school and university students.  Giussani was 
immediately struck by the methods of AC, which he deemed inept and ineffectual: 
―[...] the method of doing apostolate was personal and individual, the result of which 
was to tie success entirely to the abilities and educational background of the 
individual.  The call to return [to the Church] was moralistic and sentimental.‖
45
  
Thus, Giussani‘s first instinct was to address what he deemed to be a methodological 
deficiency.  An approach was needed, he said, that neither framed Christianity 
merely as a philosophy of life, nor split what was natural from the supernatural, e.g., 
in the manner of Jacques Maritain‘s dualism (1882-1973).
46
 ―As soon as I realized 
that the majority of persons (including those who still attended church) were 
psychologically or culturally removed from Christianity, I maintained that the 
proclamation had to spread from everything that seemed contingent and secondary in 
order that it might emerge instead from its essentiality.‖  What Giussani catalogued 
under ―contingent‖ and ―secondary forms of life‖ included judgement, freedom, and 
beauty.  Starting from these themes, says Massimo Camisasca, Giussani anticipated 
the rapport between life and faith that was accentuated at the Second Vatican 
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Council, closing the gap between Church and modern man, clergy and laity, nature 
and grace, natural and supernatural, etc.
47
                       
The ethos behind GS and CL and the writings Giussani composed for their 
guidance was, therefore, rooted in life.  As had been the style at Venegono, ―only 
after pursuing [a direct engagement with secularism and atheism], and in a very 
limited way, would we seek to show the positive importance of dogma.‖
48
  Thus, 
Giussani built up the movements in the light of history and current experience, 
assiduously avoiding any a priori schematization that might give way to a 
purportedly sentimental and moralistic grounding in faith.  ―To do theology and to be 
engaged in the immediate activities of an apostolate do not seem, in my opinion, to 
be activities either separate or incommensurable in themselves.  I should say I am 
incapable of understanding how it is possible to do theology if not as a systematic 
and critical self-reflection on an experience of faith in action and, it follows, as an 
engagement with the mystery of Christ and of the Church, thus, of a passion for the 
salvation of the world.‖
49
  Even before the promulgation of Gaudium et Spes (1965), 
the movements exhibited a direct engagement with ―the joys and the hopes, the griefs 
and the anxieties of the men of this age.‖
50
   
Giussani taught his students a method of responding to life‘s challenges 
which entailed making a fundamental wager on the Gospel.  By association, the 
student movements were meant to be, on Giussani‘s insistence, an environment in 
which the enquiring subject could experiment with a set of testable claims derived 
from the Christian tradition.  The content of the faith was also taught, to be sure, but 
ultimately, the meetings of GS and CL were designed to lead to judgements on the 
―Christian hypothesis‖ in response to the real questions and problems of life.  There 
inhered in this method a built-in flexibility conducive to repairing the moralism of 
manualist theology prevalent in the first-half of the century.  In this way, the raison 
d’être of GS and CL compared with the heuristic approaches of other contemporary 
movements in Western Europe at the time, especially Christian Democracy and 
Catholic Action.  As Michael Fogarty put it in his seminal study of Christian 
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Democracy, the movements provided their participants with ―an extra assurance, a 
certainty of touch, and a capacity for recognizing and recovering from their mistakes 
which enable[d] them to grasp and solve the problems of life more completely and 
competently than if they had relied on human reason alone.‖
51
   
Over the course of several encounters with GS in the 1950s and 60s, 
Giussani‘s work with university students brought him into direct confrontation with 
Marxism.  His rebuttals directly engaged Antonio Gramsci and Ernst Bloch, targeting 
the young proponents of the Partito Comunista Italiano (PCI), above all.  At GS 
meetings, he levied strong critiques against social engineering, bourgeois self-
confidence, and scientific rationalism, emphasizing the failure of progress to deliver 
on its promises.
52
  Giussani was unable, at any rate, to save all of the first youngsters 
under his guidance from developing an association with Marxism.
53
  In 1966, on 
account of this inauspicious connection, Giussani gave up his guidance of GS to 
devote himself to theological studies at the request of his Archbishop, Giovanni 
Colombo.
54
  As already mentioned, he was sent to the United States for a brief 
period.
55
  He returned to the universities, only after the turbulence of 1968, with the 
proposal of starting a new movement: ―Communion and Liberation.‖  The new 
name, originally only the formulaic title of a promotional pamphlet, became a 
leitmotif of the movement.  Its significance underscored that true freedom could not 
be separated from communion.  In subsequent years, the philosophical implications 
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of this new name would lead Giussani to reflect on the relationship between doctrine 
and the public sphere, including the role and importance of obedience in relation to 
autonomy.   
In Giussani‘s own time, just as he was becoming involved with the youth 
movements, the encyclical Humani Generis (1950) was promulgated, cautioning 
against ―new‖ fonts of theology, which, according to its author, were most common 
―especially among those teaching youth.‖
56
  In the light of Humani Generis, it is hard 
to imagine that Giussani – a prominent exponent of Milanese church life – would not 
have exercised due caution in the style of theology he expounded within the 
universities and student movements.  His invocation of German-Romantic language 
and categories, not to mention the rapprochement to nouvelle théologie, was effected 
tentatively and over time.  Some of his vagueness is likely the consequence of 
attempting to induct untested methods of theology into the older systems upheld by 
the ecclesiastical hierarchy.  The status of the self in philosophical discourse, and the 
relationship between authority and freedom, the contrast between experiential-
expressivist and cultural-linguistic modes of evangelization, were all areas of 
institutional sensitivity which had to be navigated carefully.  Some of Giussani‘s 
vagueness is likely attributable to his falling on the more contentious side of these 
debates in the years leading up to the Second Vatican Council.  In the last twenty or 
so years of his life, however, Giussani produced clearer and better documented 
writing.  Also, as suspicions of modernism waned following Vatican II, and 
mentalities shifted with greater ease to the theologies previously deemed 
controversial, Giussani found himself in the ―conservative camp‖ of theologians (i.e., 
those writing for Communio, such as Hans Urs von Balthasar, Henri de Lubac, and 
Joseph Ratzinger), and less associated, therefore, with the ―progressivist camp‖ (i.e., 
those writing for Concilium, such as Karl Rahner, Edward Schillebeeckx, and Hans 
Küng).        
 
PART II: PROBLEMATIC AND METHODOLOGY 
  
This thesis aims to produce a philosophical monograph on Monsignor Luigi 
Giussani (1922-2005): priest, university lecturer, high school teacher, public 
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intellectual, and founder of the influential Catholic lay movement Communion and 
Liberation (CL). It is among the first critical studies of Giussani‘s works to appear,
57
 
and only the second world-wide from the philosophical perspective.
58
  Different from 
the prevailing approaches, which attempt either to capture the author‘s philosophical 
vision or to derive a system of thought from his vast and eclectic bibliography, I look 
at Giussani as a teacher in dialogue with modernity.  I have chosen to limit my 
attention to three prominent themes – Judgement, Freedom, and Beauty – and to 
study each one from a different text.  In my opinion, these are the most foundational 
themes in his bibliography and integral to how he understands the religious education 
of young people.  Mine is not an attempt to rehearse Giussani‘s philosophy of 
education, but to analyse the vagueness and ambiguity of his texts, which result as 
problematic for his readers.  I attempt to make a contribution in the area of 
philosophical theology within the ambit of the Catholic moral tradition, and not per 
se to the philosophy of education.  Be that as it may, the reader interested in 
pedagogy may find some of my conclusions relevant to contemporary questions in 
education.   
Giussani‘s writings deserve to be taken seriously if for no other reason than 
that they were written to address the real concerns of an actual audience.  What I 
mean by ―real concerns‖ is that the questions put to Giussani, and which he 
sometimes put to himself, were not paper-generated doubts, but the actual problems 
of an actual community of enquirers.  Most of the time, the enquirers were high 
school and university students; sometimes, often less apparent to his readers, 
Giussani wrote with the concerns of fellow pastors and bishops in mind.  In all cases, 
Giussani never wrote only to be read; he wanted his ideas to be studied, discussed, 
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and tested in advance of any application to life‘s problems.  To this end, a forum was 
set up for the weekly study of his works, Scuola di Comunità (School of 
Community), which continues to convene right up to the present day in groups of 
varying sizes all around the world wherever two or more followers of CL happen to 
be living.  My first intimations of a philosophical monograph on Giussani began with 
my experience of reading Giussani in the School of Community.    
 
The Problem 
I want to articulate a problem that relates to how Giussani‘s interested readers 
experience his texts.  The reception of an author‘s work is an indicator of more than 
one kind of phenomenon.  Textual commentators, such as intellectual historians, for 
example, may examine the reception of an author‘s work to identify an author‘s 
supporters and adversaries, helping them to identify him with different camps or 
schools of thought, or to view different sides of the author‘s life and work through 
the lens of his contemporaries‘ concerns (e.g., ―Christopher Dawson as historian,‖ 
―Dawson as archaeological judge,‖ ―Dawson as anthropologist‖).
59
  Reception serves 
another purpose, as well: one that is more in line with reader-response criticism.  It 
focuses on the reader‘s experience of a text from its subjective and objective sources.  
To the extent that experience is considered from the subjective side, the cause lies in 
the reader.  To the extent that it is seen from the objective side, the cause lies in the 
text.  Since I do not have privileged access to the thoughts of Giussani‘s readers, my 
attention will be directed to the objective cause of experience: features of Giussani‘s 
text that affect coherence and clarity through their own internal relations.       
I seek the causal features of reader-response within Giussani‘s texts 
themselves on account of my own experience of reading them either alone or with 
followers of CL with whom I met on a weekly basis from 2005-2010 at the Schools 
of Community in Montreal, Edinburgh, and Toronto.  The purpose of the School of 
Community, according to Giussani, was to foster reflection, concretely and 
personally, on the meaning of his texts vis-à-vis the actual attempts of readers to put 
his recommendations into practice in daily intercourse.   
                                                 
59
 Joseph Stuart, Christopher Dawson in Context: A Study in British Intellectual History between the 






The young men and women who were invited to participate in the meetings 
were asked to compare the questions arising from their own experience of 
life, that is, to face problems on the basis of a prior experience, with criteria 
or ideals already verified or otherwise through experience.  It is through lived 
experience, attentively reflected upon, and, therefore, through a realistic, 
rather than an abstract dialectic, that the original criteria, the authentic 
exigencies [of the heart] come more clearly to light (MCL, 31). 
 
Giussani wrote many of his texts for the School of Community and used them 
―maieutically‖ as the basis to give birth to the truth planted in the heart of every 
human being, relying on dialogue, intelligent questioning, and ability of his 
interlocutors to exercise reason and make logical connections.
60
  He viewed the 
School of Community as conducive to evangelization because it engaged the 
intellectual abilities of his interlocutors (far more, it was thought, than older styles of 
catechesis based on the memorization of precepts and prohibitions).  Giussani‘s 
method taught readers how to appropriate truth-claims by turning them into 
hypotheses and testing them for existential and human validity.  My experience of 
the School of Community, however, showed that these meetings could easily become 
attempts to alleviate the burden of Giussani‘s texts: viz., unconventional and esoteric 
language, and the appearance of inconsistencies, vagueness, and prolixity.  
Strikingly, attempts to assist Giussani with the clearer delivery of his claims tended 
to reproduce the same problematic features displayed by his writings, delivered in 
highly abstract and theoretical conversation, frustrating the practical and concrete 
aims of the meetings. 
Giussani‘s interest in public life and the activities of CL in the public sphere 
eventually introduced his writings to a wider and more diverse audience than 
originally envisioned.  The most formidable manifestations of CL‘s international 
reach include the presentation of Giussani‘s books at UNESCO,
61
 and the annual 
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Meeting for Friendship Among Peoples (Rimini), organized by CL, which attracts 
politicians and leading scholars across the disciplines.  A number of Giussani‘s 
manuscripts, first published in Italian by Rizzoli, San Paolo, Jaca Book, Marietti, and 
SEI, are now available in French, Spanish, German, Russian, Polish, Portuguese, 
Slovakian, Slovenian, Hungarian, Greek, and Albanian.  Versions in English were 
published through Ignatius Press (San Francisco) and McGill-Queen‘s University 
Press (Montreal-Kingston).  Among his many works, The Religious Sense is perhaps 
the most widely read, now translated in over seventeen languages with multiple 
editions.
62
   
Over the years, CL have invited prominent churchmen to introduce 
Giussani‘s books to diverse audiences: Cardinal John O‘Connor (writing as 
Archbishop of New York), Cardinal Angelo Scola (writing as Patriarch of Venice 
and Rector Emeritus of Pontificia Università Lateranense),
63
 and Cardinal Marc 
Ouellet (writing as Primate of Canada).
64
  And, indeed, most of his books are 
prefaced by members of the ecclesiastical hierarchy: Cardinal Christoph Schönborn, 
O.P. (writing as Archbishop of Vienna),
65
 Cardinal J. Francis Stafford (writing as 
President of the Pontifical Council for the Laity),
66
 Cardinal Josef Ratzinger (writing 
as Prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith),
67
 and Pope John Paul II 
                                                                                                                                          
(Permanent Observer of the Holy See at UNESCO), Rémi Brague (Professor of Medieval Philosophy 
at Sorbonne), and Angelo Scola (then President of the Pontifical Lateran University).  Translations 
have since appeared in numerous languages.  For the English edition see ―Religious Awareness in 
Modern Man,‖ in Communio (Spring 1998): 104-140.  It should be noted that apart from two 
references to Paul VI and one to John Paul II, the only other references in this text are to literary 
sources: Victor Hugo, T.S. Elliot, and Pör Lagerkvist.  Giussani‘s habit of critiquing the predominant 
mentality through literature and sensitizing his audience to religious awareness through secular artists 
is a hallmark of his writing.       
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 Among lay theologians, Christian and non-Christian alike, the 
reception has been equally impressive: Jean Bethke Elshtain (University of Chicago), 
David L. Schindler (John Paul II Institute for Studies on Marriage and Family), 
Rabbi Neil Gillman (Jewish Theological Seminary) and Muslim scholar Wael 
Farouq (The Coptic Catholic Faculty of Sakakini, Cairo).
69
  He is also cited by Tracy 
Rowland (John Paul II Institute for Marriage and Family, Melbourne) in her recent 
book Ratzinger’s Faith: The Theology of Pope Benedict.
70
   
Giussani‘s writings, notwithstanding, present the same kinds of challenges to 
experienced readers of philosophy and theology as to the participants of the School 
of Community.  On the occasion of the publication of the English edition of Alle 
origine della pretesa Cristiana, vol. II del Percorso (At the Origins of the Christian 
Claim, vol. II of The Trilogy), Cardinal O‘Connor was invited to relate his 
impressions of the book at a gathering held at the United Nations headquarters in 
New York.
71
  In his opening remarks, O‘Connor stated:  ―[Giussani] does wonderful 
work with Communion and Liberation and is a straightforward, ordinary person to 
meet.  But he writes with extraordinary subtlety and in a very compressed fashion.  
This time – and I say this with great respect – he has outdone himself in density, 
even in turgidity.  And if you want to grasp this book, you really have to work at 
it.‖
72
  What Cardinal O‘Connor observes concerning Giussani‘s subtle, compressed, 
dense, and (even!) turgid style holds true across his bibliography.  To cite another 
example, Rémi Brague, professor of medieval philosophy at the Sorbonne, was 
―offended‖ by Giussani‘s handling of philosophical materials in Religious Awareness 
in Modern Man, and found that the only way to set aside his scholarly dismay was to 
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―propose a simple, entirely personal, and perhaps subjective reading‖ of the author.
73
  
Brague‘s ultimate approach to Giussani‘s text was not incompatible with the kind of 
engagement Giussani had hoped to elicit from the School of Community: ―a simple, 
entirely personal, and subjective reading.‖  At the same time, Brague‘s non-academic 
reading still leaves the original problem of Giussani‘s handling of philosophical 
materials intact.  To conclude, then, two kinds of problem dog Giussani‘s texts as 
evidenced in the experience of his readers: his handling of philosophical materials, 
and various kinds of vagueness. 
 
Hypothesis 
Over the past several paragraphs, I have tried to convey that Giussani‘s 
project is relevant to a lively community of readers and worthy of continued 
attention; but that it is, at the same time, encumbered by its own rhetorical and 
logical peculiarities: burdened, that is, by areas of vagueness, inconsistency, 
ambiguity, and prolixity.  It is at this point that I intervene to assist Giussani with his 
task and to be of service to his readers.  My purpose, however, is not to say what 
Giussani meant to say according to my own preferred manner of expression.  The 
best metaphor for the work I will undertake is etiological, involving the diagnosis, 
prognosis, and treatment of disease through the analysis of cause and effect.
 74
  The 
disease, in this case, is vagueness.  The differential diagnosis includes the following 
probable causes.  
i. Institutional Sensitivity – the vagueness caused by trying to remain 
orthodox while addressing areas of concern that challenge the 
establishment.  Giussani‘s writing, in this case, would be shaped by his 
sensitivity to its reception by ecclesiastical officials (the unintended 
audience), on the one hand, and his young interlocutors (the intended 
audience), on the other hand.  
ii. Grand Narrative – the vagueness caused by recommending claims to a 
general audience as the ultimate answer to a universal problem.  It 
assumes the same questions, axioms, and beliefs across diverse enquirers 
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irrespective of history, culture, language, and context.  Conversely, to 
recommend claims to a specific enquirer is to offer a precise response to a 
particular question at a particular time and place, which differs from other 
questions of other cases in other times and places.       
iii. Competing Tendencies – the vagueness caused when two or more 
opposing tendencies are applied by a method of analysis to the same 
problem toward a solution, e.g., in the realm of knowledge, to base 
accounts of reality on the ideal image within and, at the same time, to let 
reality reveal itself in itself. 
iv. Philosophical Naiveté – the vagueness caused by the absence of insight 
into a previously-established field of enquiry which leads an author 
cautiously to avoid areas of technicality or otherwise boldly to overstep 
the bounds of his expertise. Symptoms include lacunae, superficiality, 
caricaturing, and the positing of agreement between two or more authors 
or schools of thought with which, in fact, there is profound disagreement.     
v. Expediency – the vagueness caused in the interest of saving time by 
leaping from problem to conclusion.  This is the vagueness of the 
apologist who comes onto the scene with answers ready-made and 
cleverly tries to convince his audience.  It stands in contrast to the 
practical deliberator who meticulously works through problems from 
premise to conclusion, allowing for understandings to unfold with time.       
Over the course of this thesis, each of these probable causes is to be tested against the 
text.  The prognosis, whether the burden of vagueness can be alleviated, and the 
treatment, how to repair the causes of vagueness, will depend on the outcome of a 
pragmatic reading of the text.  It will take some time for Giussani‘s faithful readers 
to come around to a shared understanding of what it means to read a text 
pragmatically.  For the time being, it refers to treating the text as Giussani‘s answer 
to a real question or set of questions.   
A real question, in the sense I am underscoring, contrasts with the 
proliferation of doubt.  It is the kind of question that arises because the answer has 
real meaning for someone.  A clear account is always the answer to a clearly-stated 





let alone articulate in their formulation of answers.  Moreover, the questions some 
authors say they are asking, turn out not to be the ones by which their writing is in 
fact motivated.  A pragmatic reading of a text has to take into account the possibility 
that the author‘s explicit question may not be the only one shaping the account 
insofar as an inexplicit question may lie beneath it.  In all events, to read a text 
pragmatically is to refer an author‘s account to the original question he sought to 
answer, and that question, to repeat the point, is not a paper-generated doubt, but a 
real problem for someone, which deserves to be taken seriously. 
 
The Method for Reading Giussani’s Texts: 
Just as the reconstruction of Giussani‘s question distinguishes between that 
which is stated explicitly and that which is implicit, a deeper understanding of his 
account hinges on accessing two corresponding levels of text: one which is explicit, 
the other implicit.  Accessing different levels of text implies reaching different 
grades of clarity through different methods of reading.  For this purpose, I adopt the 
methods used by Peter Ochs in his reading of Charles Sanders Peirce‘s pragmatic 
writings.
75
  Ochs distinguishes between different levels of Peirce‘s text, and applies 
different techniques of reading corresponding to the content available at each level.  
His overall aim is to use this content to clarify, amplify, and, where necessary, repair 
Peirce‘s writings. 
 
Why Peter Ochs?   
To my knowledge, Peter Ochs is the only scholar who has devised a 
systematic method for clarifying, expounding, and repairing an author‘s writing in a 
way that takes seriously the objectivity of the author‘s text without falling victim to 
the constraints of literality.
76
  Ochs‘ reviewers generally admire his work, despite the 
rigorous demands he imposes on his readers through his highly clinical approach to 
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  Critics also acknowledge the clarity Ochs has specifically introduced to 
Peirce‘s writings, developing Peirce‘s own logic, rather than using Peirce to advance 
his own hidden agenda.
78
    
The principles of Ochs‘ methodology may be applied to virtually any text, but 
they are especially designed to treat texts in which the author‘s deliveries are 
compromised by various kinds of vagueness and competing tendencies.  For Ochs, 
when a community of readers struggles to understand the basic meaning of a text due 
to an author‘s confusing use of language, the burdens imposed by his ambiguity are 
deemed ―irredeemable,‖ insofar as no amount of poring over can serve to dispel the 
text‘s lack of clarity.  The matter of ―irredeemablility,‖ according to Ochs, turns on 
the interpretation of signs.  Signs are normally understood using a complex set of 
inferences through which a rule is posited to interpret a single case.  But the 
introduction of a novelty in a sign system places an author‘s account in a genus that 
is unfamiliar to the reader.  This is precisely the situation with readers handling 
Giussani‘s texts for the first time, even some who are deeply travelled in the Catholic 
tradition, for they are often bewildered by the neologisms and unusual logic he 
deploys; nevertheless, they are urged by him to keep working at the text, trying to 
grasp the essence of its content due to its handling of an urgent problem concerning 
humanity that needs solving.  The points at which readers tend to fall into confusion 
are where I intervene with Ochs‘ method of reading.                 
Ochs approaches the task of re-reading a text not by attempting to establish 
authorial intent, but by uncovering the needs of the author‘s tradition and the worries 
that may have prompted his writing.  What Ochs adds to interpretation is, in his own 
words, ―the activity of diagramming linguistic usage.‖  His premise is as follows: 
―While not essential to everyday practice, writing is in this sense essential to the 
activity of changing everyday practice; practical artisans – who are responsible for 
correcting everyday practice – are prototypically writers.‖
79
   
Applied to Giussani‘s bibliography, Ochs‘ method of re-reading achieves 
different grades of clarity by excavating different levels of text, explicating the 
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meaning, and where necessary, repairing problems.  While my application of Ochs‘ 
method will demand perseverance from my readers, it offers me the unique 
advantage of presenting the plain-sense of Giussani‘s texts, introducing his woks to 
an English-language readership for the first time.  Moreover, the plain-sense gives 
my readers first-hand experience of Giussani‘s vagueness and of the need to 
introduce clarity in his work.  At a later stage of reading, I demonstrate the kinds of 
repair that are required, where precisely they are to be made, and how they may be 
carried out.   
 
Ochs’ Method 
Ochs subjects Peirce‘s texts on pragmatism, which he describes as 
―irredeemably vague,‖ to two methods of reading.  The first method is called ―plain-
sense‖ and is concerned only with the author‘s explicit text.  It attempts only to 
rehearse the author‘s account as he gives it, without adding new materials, tying up 
loose ends, connecting ideas, or completing incomplete thoughts.  The second 
method is called ―deeper plain-sense.‖  This method relates the origin of the account 
to what the author was ―afraid of‖ (to borrow Iris Murdoch‘s way of putting it).  But 
since the motivating force behind an author‘s writing need be neither revealed nor 
conscious, the work of excavating the deeper plain-sense, rendering explicit what is 
implicit, must rely on history, language, and culture.  The use of historical sources 
involves testing ostensible targets against the text.  The driving question, once 
reconstructed, is demonstrably connected to the situation which arose in the author‘s 
context and on account of which he was prompted to set his thoughts to paper. 
The interpretive opportunities afforded by history can often be overlooked by 
readers.  It was R. G. Collingwood who identified the mistake of extricating accounts 
from their contextual origins in order to treat them as though they were rules.  Rules, 
unlike accounts, are forged in predicaments which have been abstracted from 
localized situations through a process of generalization.  This process anticipates the 
application of a rule to all analogous cases in a timeless, universal, and ultimate 
manner.  Pragmatism corrects this typically Cartesian-Kantian tendency, treating 
problems less abstractly.  Re-reading a text pragmatically means treating it as the 





intended for everyone at all times and in all places.  While an author‘s response is 
immediate and tailor-made to the situation that arose, his tendency may be to view 
his project on a more epic scale, recommending his text to everyone.
80
  For the 
pragmatic reader, however, the author‘s writing is seen as his attempt to change the 
errant practices of his localized community.  In order to understand the text in the 
light of the repairs it was generated to effect, the pragmatic reader must reconstruct 
the author‘s original concern.  Only by re-reading a text with this goal in mind may 
the reader introduce clarity where the author has been vague or seemingly 
inconsistent.   
I use the techniques of Ochs‘ deeper plain-sense reading to reconstruct the 
problem that motivated Giussani‘s writing.  This involves reinserting his texts back 
into history.  My intention is to identify what Giussani thought was at stake that 
caused him to put things in one way rather than in some other.  In being able to 
demonstrate why the account took form x rather than form y, e.g., where x stands for 
a vague delivery and y for a clear one, I hope to frame problematic features of the 
account more even-handedly.  The search for an explanation in history, therefore, 
will allow readers to treat the idiosyncrasies of Giussani‘s writings as problematic in 
themselves without dismissing his texts as inadequate writ large, and to announce 
areas of repair without being iconoclastic. 
The process that makes reliable the causal link between audience and account 
is more subtle than relating theses to hypothetical questions and ostensible targets 
(though this is certainly an important first step).  It involves retracing the application 
of the author‘s habits of thought (i.e., leading tendencies, such as Cartesian-Kantian 
habits of enquiry) to their origins in the author‘s training in a tradition.  I identify 
Giussani‘s habits of thought by creating some contrast with other authors, whose 
explicit question is identical to Giussani‘s, but whose accounts differ due to their 
historical particularities.  The choice of leading tendencies in Giussani‘s texts are 
identified with reference to: 1) culture – e.g., the rise of Italian communism, 2) 
context – e.g., the Ambrosian Church of Milan, 3) biography – e.g., Giussani‘s career 
as teacher, pastor, and university lecturer, 4) intellectual history – e.g., Giussani‘s 
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training and sources, and 5) the logic of the argument – e.g., the role and function of 
epistemology in Giussani‘s bibliography.   
 
Chapters and Structure of Analysis  
Each chapter of my thesis deals with a thematic area of enquiry.  There are 
three chapters in all.  My purpose in each chapter, as mentioned above, is to diagnose 
the cause(s) of vagueness and competing tendencies in Giussani‘s writings and to 
identify his problematic handling of philosophical materials, while treating the 
author‘s responses as serious and adequate en face of the problems and pressures he 
faced in charting a new course for evangelization in the university milieu.  The 
diagnosis is achieved by probing history to find the causal links between the 
formulation of the author‘s theses through habits of thought (i.e., leading tendencies), 
and the actual problems that arose from real situations and pressures which impinged 
on his freedom, restraining his responses in certain ways.  Those restraints need to be 
determined from the implicit account.  While Giussani himself relates the explicit 
account, which I rehearse in the plain-sense section, the implicit account, in the 
deeper plain-sense section, is the result of careful research.     
The following chart maps my chapters according to the themes and texts 
under analysis, and indicates the division of labour according to different categories.  
Each chapter is divided into five sections, which I organize procedurally according to 
the scientific method.  I include the subtler distinctions, drawn from my observations 
of the author‘s theses and his explicit questions, including the intended audience, and 
flag possible areas for repair.  The information is offered in broad strokes as an 



















Figure 1.0  Map of My Thesis:  Including the Division of Tasks in Chapters and 
Sections 
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Each chapter also devotes a substantial section to reconstructing Giussani‘s 





applied by the author to a problem that arises in the contextual milieu of his day.  
They are responsible for the generation of theses through the author‘s consideration 
of the objective problem itself, of the intended audience to whom the solution is 
recommended, and of materials selected from his background and repertory to 
formulate responses.  I regard Giussani‘s leading tendencies as his best attempt to 
apply resources available to him en face of the problem he faced.  The following 
chart reviews the leading tendencies of his arguments in three thematic areas 
organized by chapter headings, including relevant sources and targets inasmuch as 
they can be excavated from the investigation of intellectual history, context, 
biography and the logic of enquiry.  Once again, the presentation of information is 
cursory, serving only as a guide for now, attending its fuller explication later. 
 
Figure 1.2  Searching for an Explanation in History 
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Each chapter makes use of insights from select authors to create some 
contrast with Giussani‘s writings and to assist with the initial diagnosis of vagueness.  
Just as it is sometimes easier to say what something is by saying what it is not, the 
precise points at which two or more authors answering the same question diverge can 
indicate areas to be probed for the external pressures exerting themselves on the 
author‘s thought.  The authors used for contrast need not have had a direct influence 
on Giussani to be useful for our purposes: while it is important that their accounts 
share Giussani‘s explicit targets, the difference between them is what facilitates the 
identification of leading tendencies.  Chapter 1, ―Judgement,‖ makes use of Newman 
and Blondel to mark Giussani‘s association with experiential-expressivist theology 
(in contrast with cultural-linguistic theology).  The categories experiential-
expressivist and cultural-linguistic are borrowed from George Lindbeck.
81
  Chapter 
2, ―Freedom,‖ uses Spaemann‘s account of freedom not so much to expound the 
authors‘ shared questions and axioms, but to indicate the implications of Giussani‘s 
belief, different from Spaemann‘s, that intuitions are first nature.  Chapter 3 sheds 
light on Giussani‘s conception of beauty using Hans Urs von Balthasar‘s 
Theodramatics, with which Giussani was familiar.  The contrast highlights 
Giussani‘s pragmatic application of ―synthesis‖ and ―harmony,‖ categories intrinsic 
to the authors‘ accounts of beauty, to the lived experience of his interlocutors.   
The pragmatic reading of each chapter, as indicated above, is followed by 
observations, which similarly enlist the help of theologians to expound the 
implications of Giussani‘s leading tendencies.  These observations are crucial to 
obtaining the prognosis and announcing areas for repair.  The choice of authors, then, 
is directly influenced by the leading tendencies that need to be examined chiefly for 
their effects on the role and importance of the Catholic tradition, to which Giussani is 
leading his readers.  Chapter 1 uses Fergus Kerr‘s insights (following St. Thomas 
Aquinas and the later Wittgenstein) to identify the ostensible effects of Giussani‘s 
epistemology.  In Chapter 2, I examine how Giussani deals with questions of 
doctrine and the public sphere through the lens of Jonathan Robinson‘s critique of 
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Hegel and its effects on the liturgy of the Catholic Church.  Chapter 3 applies the 
same critique to Giussani‘s notion of beauty and protagonism that Ben Quash applies 
to Balthasar‘s concept of drama, viz., concerning Giussani and Balthasar‘s tendency 
to resolve binaries in tidy endings.                   
 
What a philosopher is “afraid of” (Iris Murdoch) 
I share with Giussani a deep debt of gratitude to the various teachers I have 
had over the years, true masters of the tradition, who have helped me, since my 
baptism as an infant, to travel ever more deeply into the Catholic faith.  Along with 
Giussani, I am saddened by younger generations of Catholics, my contemporaries, 
who live in the Church without desiring to deepen their commitment to Christ or who 
abandon religious belief and practice altogether.  I recognize with him the need to re-
evangelize the baptized and of doing so through a more engaging and sympathetic 
method than that afforded by apologetics or rehearsing moral prohibitions.  And I 
certainly agree that beauty – natural and man-made – in its various forms and media, 
has something important to do with truth.  As I explore these shared interests, the 
question I pose to Giussani‘s texts concerns how his writings arise and operate as a 
systematic engagement with philosophical questions turning on a host of worries 
related to the Catholic Church and modern society in the context of his time.  More 
specifically, I highlight how the contents of Giussani‘s writings serve as his 
response, though variegated and experimental, to the changing conditions of belief 
and practice in the Ambrosian Church of Milan from the post-war period through the 
1990s.   
In the sections where I am critical of Giussani, however, certain readers will 
notice that the leading tendencies in my thought draw on twentieth-century 
philosophy in connection with certain axioms and ideas of Thomas Aquinas.
82
  In 
particular, I am sensitive to the significance of how theological claims are made, 
their impact on what it means to be human, and by implication, their effect on the 
role and importance of tradition in education.  In this regard, I am drawing from 
Wittgenstein‘s insights on language- and grammar-acquisition, and their implications 
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for theology, using Fergus Kerr‘s interpretation as my guide.
83
  I am of the firm 
resolve that the deliberating and acting subject cannot conceive of himself outside of 
a tradition, such that beauty (to return to the example just cited), which may serve as 
an analogy for the divine, is not only to be interpreted from within a tradition, but 
serves as a medium for its transmission.  A living and breathing tradition is not a 
fossilised record of prehistory, but a school in which intuitions are formed.  Giussani 
also recognizes the importance of tradition, but on different terms.  I view much of 
Giussani‘s theology from the standpoint of the real impact which that difference 
makes on how we understand education.  This impact needs investigating.  For this 
purpose, we need to turn in detail to Giussani‘s writings, and especially to the most 
representative themes of his bibliography: judgment, freedom, and beauty. 
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Il realismo esige che, per osservare un oggetto in modo tale da conoscerlo, 
il metodo non sia immaginato, pensato, organizzato o creato dal soggetto, 









One of the best ways to access the depths of Giussani‘s thought is to probe the 
meaning of his epistemology. Many of the most prominent themes in his 
bibliography, for instance, recur to his theory of knowledge and method of 
judgement.  He articulates this epistemology philosophically in The Religious Sense 
(RS), a book which is thought by some to be his most creative contribution to 
contemporary theology.  The themes of freedom (Chapter 2) and beauty (Chapter 3) 
are themselves heavily reliant on this epistemology, and, therefore, make important 
use of the interpretive work I will undertake in this chapter.   
Giussani, as a priest and teacher of university and high school students, 
intellectually interested in modernity and concerned to respond to its hostility toward 
religion and morality,
2
 had identified secularism as the tendency of the individual 
uncritically to adopt the opinions of the masses.  On the basis of this conviction, he 
proceeded to treat the problem of the act of faith as an epistemological concern.  The 
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solution, he thought, cried out for a method by which to reignite the practice of 
critical reflection: 
 
[...] in taking the first steps and organizing the first meetings with high school 
students, I was becoming aware that it was untrue to say [that the Christian 
message had run its course].  [...] The need for it was still there: and how!  The 
interest was still there: and how!  The problem, then, seemed clearly to point to 
a question of method.  This meant – I thought – that the content of the Christian 
message was still valid as in the past; it was still interesting... present as it had 
been two thousand years ago, in all of its genetic and historical uniqueness.  
The Christian fact is still interesting: the main challenge, then, involves [having 
at hand] a method for the rediscovery [of Christianity], [and] a modality for 
communication (IPO, 134).  
 
For Giussani, knowing and judging are fundamental acts of human existence.  To 
some extent, they are among the instinctual acts that make us human; they are among 
the capacities that make us ―reasonable‖ creatures.  Giussani‘s method was geared, in 
particular, to recover the practice of critical reflection in order to restore the 
credibility of religion and religious institutions in the modern world.  Thus, he 
submitted the self and society to critical investigation, confident that the one element 
missing from virtually all modern scientific and popular accounts of reality would 
turn up: religion!   
Above all, the ordinary means by which the latent religious contents of the 
mind were to come to the fore was through self-reflection, viz., interior reflection on 
the inner self provoked by external reality.  Of essence to self-reflection was the 
awareness not only of what is intelligible and good, but of what is fulfilling.  Thus, 
the faculty of the heart, whose object is perfect satisfaction, was as important to 
Giussani as the traditional faculties of the intellect and the will.  Giussani considered 
the teaching of his so-called ―method‖ of investigating and evaluating the ―religious 
phenomenon‖ through the heart as the only way to salvage religion.  Moreover, he 
held it up as a crucial contribution in the urgent attempt to rescue Catholicism from 
ideological attack, such as it had been under in Milan through the 1950s and 60s en 
face of Nietzschean and Marxist currents.
3
  While the conditions obtaining for belief 
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and practice, and our understanding of them, have changed since the tumultuous 60s, 
the last edition of The Religious Sense still framed the problem of the act of faith in 
substantially the same way as it had done on its first publication in 1957: ―I refer to 
the urgent necessity not to give a more important role to a scheme already in our 
minds, but rather to cultivate an entire, passionate, insistent ability to observe the real 
event, the fact (RS, 4).‖
4
   
Correspondingly, Giussani pegged ―ideology,‖ ―preconception,‖ ―moralism,‖ 
and ―the common mentality‖ as philosophical adversaries of the ―religious 
phenomenon.‖  His ally, conversely, is ―realism.‖  The rationale for teaching the 
particular method expounded in The Religious Sense lies in what he purports to be 
the epistemological inadequacy of other methods, particularly those more typical of 
academic enquiry (RS, 6).  Realism called for an alternative approach, such as 
Giussani summons in the epigraph quoted above: ―Realism necessitates that, in order 
for an object to be observed and so to be known, its method must not be imagined, 
thought of or schematized and created by the subject: it must be imposed by the 
object (RS, 5 [My translation] ).‖   
In response to the hegemony of the sciences, whose methods require 
supposedly harder proofs, Giussani insists that there are different tools suited to 
different tasks.  With regards to knowing, evaluating, and appropriating the 
―religious phenomenon,‖ the tool, par excellence, is indeed the heart.  Given to each 
one by God, the heart denotes a metaphysical region of the human person, the centre 
of the person‘s emotional-affective responsivity, equipped to evaluate reality on the 
basis of ―original‖ and ―universal‖ ―criteria‖ and ―evidences.‖  If the heart is 
essential to Giussani‘s method of verification, it is the exclusion of the heart from 
other methods of enquiring into the ―religious phenomenon‖ that he finds particularly 
objectionable.  This chapter will delve more deeply into Giussani‘s account of the 
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heart as an epistemological act of judgement.  It will analyse the account of the heart 
both as Giussani‘s universal method of judgement, and as his corrective reading of 
other less adequate accounts of the ―religious phenomenon.‖           
 
Problem 
Several different kinds of material are organized under the heart and the term 
itself is applied to many different contexts, some theoretical and others concrete.  
The following is a list of some of the relations written into Giussani‘s notion of the 
heart, and the functions they play with regards to the affirmation and appropriation of 
religious truth-claims, such as the proposition that God exists.       
The heart, according to one of Giussani‘s more Augustinian senses, is the 
intrinsic source of ultimate questions and infinite longings (RS, 47-48).  Self-
consciousness is the primary mode of reflection in this category, and life‘s 
experiences are the primary point of departure, leading Giussani to borrow the 
vocabulary of existentialist philosophy and the psychology of the self to give 
distinctive shape to his thesis.  Giussani draws out the implications of ―ultimate‖ and 
―infinite‖ as follows.  First, ―ultimate‖ refers to limit situations, such as life and 
death, which have a direct bearing on the meaning and purpose of life and what 
makes life worth living.  The answers to ultimate questions, therefore, give shape to 
decision and action, making the heart‘s instincts paramount to ethics.  Second, 
―infinite‖ has desire as its referent and transcendence as its term.  It is the heart‘s 
colloquy with itself, concerning ultimate questions and the insatiability of desire, that 
eventually puts it into relation with God, the heart‘s final term, its place of solace and 
tranquility, its fulfilment and destiny.  As Giussani says: ―All human beings, 
therefore, inasmuch as they aim toward peace and joy, seek God, the exhaustive 
substance of their lives (107).‖  Giussani does not deny the external influence of 
grace in this process (nor does he explicate it); decidedly, he accentuates the 
indispensability of self-consciousness to the appropriation of religious truth-claims.  
Religious belief and practice, or anything else which must be predicated on ―moral 
certainty,‖ he says, begins necessarily with a conversion.  The whole process of 
knowing and judging is underwritten by metanoia.  It turns on attaining fullness, not 




on accumulating data.  It entails the relation between the desiring subject and the 
fulfilling object, not the cognitive relation between mind, body, and language.     
According to another sense, especially as Aristotle delineates in Metaphysics 
Book I, there is within every human knower, and by natural intuition, a propensity 
toward knowing and reflection; this propensity is directed to determining one‘s 
relation to reality (as distinguished from appearances); and seriously undertaken over 
time, this propensity results in the awareness that reality originates in a transcendent 
Other.  Awe, which leads to the affirmation of a Divine Being, is located in the heart, 
for Giussani.  Following his stance of initial openness to reality, the knowing subject 
realizes through reflection that everything that exists depends on a prior cause.  
Reasoning from effect to cause, he concludes ultimately with a Primary Cause, a 
First Mover.  Analogously, the ―I‘s‖ recovery of ―original awe,‖ Giussani says, is the 
―mature‖ affirmation that God exists from ―the greatest and most profound evidence 
that I do not make myself; I am not making myself.  I do not give myself being, or 
the reality which I am.  I am ‗given.‘  This is the moment of maturity, when I 
discover myself to be dependent upon something else (RS, 105).‖ 
According to a third sense, in line with Heidegger and other varieties of 
phenomenological ontology, the heart plays an important role in evaluating the 
phenomena of the world.  It exercises this function according to a set of innate and a 
priori ―criteria‖ and ―evidences,‖ which are the basis of universal, gut reactions of 
respect and aversion to the objects encountered.  The heart, according to Giussani, is 
the standard by which to evaluate what is better or higher, and presupposes what is 
more desirable, both universally and specifically, in each case.  This highly intuitive 
function is expounded further under the categories of perception, experience, and 
encounter.  In each category, the role of the heart, insofar as it is a tool of moral 
deliberation, adds affection as a factor in deliberation, in addition to the traditional 
importance accorded to the intellect and the will.   
It is not always clear that these functions are commensurable, particularly 
when faced with a tension between the inner life of the self-reflective subject (on the 
one hand) and the outer world of self-revealing objects (on the other hand).  
Nevertheless, Giussani‘s insistence on the concept of ―maturity‖ and ―authenticity‖ is 
the means by which he argues that inner compatibility with outer reality can be 




attained, whatever that may be.  Giussani calls the harmonisation of inner and outer 
spheres ―correspondence.‖  He proceeds, through multiple examples, to illustrate 
how the inner life of the subject and the outer world of real existents are not at odds, 
but made to complete each other.  The term ―correspondence‖ will be defined 
differently at different points in this chapter; for the time being, it will refer to 
Giussani‘s attempt to ground the act of faith in an anthropological principle called 
the ―religious sense.‖  
Giussani‘s term ―religious sense‖ argues that the human person is 
intrinsically structured to receive and express religious beliefs and practices.  
Analogously, Thomas Aquinas posits the human person‘s intrinsic inclination to the 
Divine through knowledge by connaturality.
5
  The term has been variously defined, 
but usually designates the person‘s attunement to and aptitude for the good (bonum).  
For Thomas, this aptitude includes, according to Francis Klauder, ―the experience of 
self-transcending tendencies in knowing and loving things beyond themselves, [...] 
and the awareness of the limitation and finitude of human powers,‖ which all the 
while ―point to an unseen source beyond the self.‖
6
  For Thomas, connatural 
knowledge is rooted in human experience; it extends beyond purely intellectual 
knowledge to include affect and sentiment; and is directed to practical ends.  
Giussani, however, goes a step further, intimating an innate religious core, one that is 
much more specific than religious habit (in my view), arguing that it has exhibited 
itself unequivocally in the devotional beliefs and practices of all cultures across time:  
―To be conscious of oneself right to the core is to perceive, at the depths of the self, 
an Other (RS, 106).‖   
Giussani‘s idea of a religious core is buttressed by the ―empirical‖ findings of 
ethnographer Mircea Eliade (1907-1986), whose careful analysis of cultures, 
Giussani thought, confirmed the presence of an innate religiosity, claiming for 
religion an anthropological basis; meanwhile, Giussani admitted that the term 
―religion‖ could be used so differently at times as to render its meaning trivial.  What 
correspondence proposes hypothetically with regards to religion, which Giussani 
                                                 
5
 See Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, II-II, q. 45, a. 2. 
6
 Francis J. Klauder, ―Connatural Knowledge,‖ in A Philosophy Rooted in Love: The Dominant 
Themes in the Perennial Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas (New York: University Press of America, 
1994), 263-268; here 264-265.   




then invites his subjects to test, is that, despite the semblance of internal conflict, 
there is intrinsically no difference between the inner self and the existence of 
religious truth-claims.  While Giussani does not, at this point, mention the Catholic 
tradition, he argues toward an understanding of religion that harmonises the diverse 
drives and aspirations manifested by a person‘s individual psyche with Catholic 
propositions.  The possibility of this harmony is grounded in the concept of an innate 
religious core, homo religiosus, by which means the religious factor in human 
flourishing is said to be as palpable as any of the survival instincts.  The discovery of 
God, made through self-conscious reflection and thus rooted in the heart, 
accomplishes the correspondence between the inner life of the subject, complete with 
desires and exigencies, and the outer reality of propositional beliefs.   
The notion of correspondence is all the more interesting when considered in 
light of certain theological associations that attach to the inner/outer relation.  Where 
the inner is coterminous with the individual and the outer with scripture and sacred 
tradition, the tension to be resolved is between freedom and authority, the outcome of 
which, anticipated by Giussani, is the harmonisation or assimilation of subjects and 
objects.  From the method of testing all objects against the possibility of a highest 
good, which the heart is naturally predisposed to recognize and love, correspondence 
is a means by which to live Christianly.  To live Christianly is to adhere to the real.  
Giussani prefers this method to that of insisting on adherence to a moral code, which 
he deems degrading of the ―religious phenomenon.‖  Belief construed as adhesion to 
the real, based on a kind of understanding that derives from the heart, is meant to 
carry positive results both for the subject‘s freedom, including the spontaneous 
springing forth of the true ―I‖ from the depths of one‘s being, and for the longevity of 
religious tradition.  It is the dual nature of the category of belief – open to freedom 
and subject to obedience – that makes the role and importance of the heart complex 
and onerous, demanding of philosophical attention.        
  
Purpose 
My purpose is not to take a position on correspondence as a discrete act of 
moral judgement, but to demonstrate how Giussani appeals to correspondence to 
correct other, inadequate definitions of freedom and authority.  Correspondence is a 




method of reasoning that differs from the kind employed by authoritarians and 
individualists.  It is an attempt to correct the latter by positing reality as its ideal 
object.  The heart serves as a reflective and objective point of view from which the 
interpreter has access to reality, the recognition of phenomena as they are, not as we 
would have them be.  To return self-reflexively to the heart for judgement is to place 
the primordial core of humanity in the balance of deciding and acting, correcting 
reductionist approaches that exclude love of being and filling in partial accounts of 
reality with all the intuitable factors at play in qualitative evaluation.  My argument, 
that correspondence addresses problems of freedom and authority, is based on the 
analysis of vaguenesses and inconsistencies in Giussani‘s text.  I refer the leading 
tendencies of Giussani‘s correspondence theory to his primary audience, viz., the 
members of Communion and Liberation (CL), and show that the unique blend of 
philosophical currents on which Giussani draws are meant to equip his interlocutors 
with a reflective method by which to appropriate the traditions to which they belong.   
Giussani‘s approach to standard questions in Catholic theology concerning 
the act of faith is unusual, making it difficult to comprehend his meaning.  Toward 
the task of clarification, I draw on the analytical approach modelled by Peter Ochs in 
his analyses of Charles Sanders Peirce.
7
  Ochs sets out not only to clarify Peirce‘s 
writings per se, but to diagnose problems in his writings, signalled by vaguenesses 
and inconsistencies, intending to correct the way he would be read by a given 
community.  My goal in this chapter is analogous.  I aspire to do more than to 
rehearse Giussani‘s narrative as he delivers it or to reformulate it according to some 
manner of expression more suited to a would-be audience of theologians and 
philosophers.  These considerations are not unimportant to my task, and I do 
undertake them seriously, to a point.  But to relieve the state of confusion in 
Giussani‘s readers, I resort to the significance of the implicit text.  The method of 
reading I deploy is geared toward clarifying Giussani‘s work by making the implicit 
text, concerning questions of freedom and authority, explicit. 
I consider clarifying Giussani‘s notion of the heart for his readers to be a 
worthwhile task for the following reasons: 1) his work responds to a legitimate need 
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in his community to rehabilitate essential practices of the Catholic tradition; and 2) 
his approach is sensitive to younger generations of Catholics whose ideals and goals 
are shaped by the ―Ethic of Authenticity.‖  Charles Taylor coined this latter term in 
his 1991 Massey Lectures, referring to the philosophical sources that converge to 
form ―the ideal of being true to oneself.‖
8
  ―Being true to myself,‖ Taylor observes, 
―means being true to my own originality, and is something only I can articulate and 
discover.  In articulating it, I am also defining myself.  I am realizing a potentiality 
that is properly my own.‖
9
  This is the background that gives ―moral force,‖ he 
contends, to the ―culture of authenticity‖ in which we currently live, ―including its 
most degraded, absurd, or trivialized forms.‖  But if the ideal of authenticity can 
avoid the slide into atomism and instrumentalism, which Taylor argues it can, what 
younger generations are actually striving for in self-fulfilment and self-realization 
remains open to genuine religious transcendence.
10
  Taylor writes: ―Our being in the 
image of God is also our standing among others in the stream of love which is that 
facet of God‘s life we try to grasp, very inadequately, in speaking of the Trinity.  
Now it makes a whole lot of difference whether you think this kind of love is a 
possibility for us humans.  I think it is, but only to the extent that we open ourselves 
to God.‖
 11
  Such is the hope Taylor maintains against the proponents of secularism.  
It is hope that also motivates Giussani‘s writing.      
Giussani‘s pastoral project, if it may be so understood, is partly rhetorical, 
exhibited by his attempt to say old things in new ways, and partly ecclesiological, 
exhibited by his attempt to direct the moral shaping of community around the living 
presence of Christ.  I am sympathetic, therefore, to readers who, attracted by the 
pragmatic features of his writing, are nevertheless confounded by its vague, 
confusing, and, at times, contradictory deliveries.  If a proposal for Christian life, 
which is directed to a given community of readers, is equivocal, it can only be 
applied to actual problems and irritations when at some point it is rendered more 
clearly.  It is to this task that I apply myself in the reading which follows.    
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I claim that correspondence can show itself to a critical reader only insofar as 
that reader understands the narrative as Giussani‘s attempt to correct a real problem.  
What was that problem?  Where Giussani‘s account encourages Christians to verify 
the value of their religious experience in order critically to appropriate it, and where 
he contends that the rehabilitation of Christianity in the modern world depends on 
obtaining a correspondence between inner self (i.e., one‘s desires and exigencies) 
and outer reality (i.e., religious propositions), I believe he is performing a corrective 
reading of freedom and tradition.  The remainder of this chapter is dedicated to 
testing my hypothesis against Giussani‘s text.  I offer my analysis as one way of 
correctively studying Giussani‘s performance, acknowledging that there are other 
legitimate methods of reading him, as well.   
 
Method 
Taking my orientation from the School of Community, my writing is 
stimulated by the desire to understand Giussani‘s pragmatic writing so that it may 
enable his readers to travel more deeply into the Catholic tradition; but since certain 
passages are burdened by vagueness and inconsistency, I have chosen to approach 
his texts etiologically.  My ultimate goal in this chapter is to eliminate vague 
descriptions, confusing arguments, and inconsistent definitions from specific areas of 
Giussani‘s theory of judgement by referring the explicit text to the implicit one.  
Determining the implicit text involves reconstructing the questions Giussani was 
asking in the light of the contexts in which they arose.   
In order to study the notion of the heart in this chapter, I will turn to its 
foundational exposition in The Religious Sense, and, therein, only to core parts of 
chapters 1, 2, 3, 4, and 10, with particular emphasis on the account of ―elementary 
experience‖ in Chapter 1.  But I will also draw from other parts of The Religious 
Sense and other works to the extent that they exhibit more clearly the problematic 
features and implications of the account.  I also take into account the narrative‘s 
conceptual evolution from its first, substantially different, publication in 1958.  




The analysis will cast light on the implications that correspondence carries for 
the relationship between individuality and authority, the subset of which involves 
subjects and tradition.  I am interested in why Giussani recommends correspondence 
as a solution to this dilemma.  Differently put, by taking history into account, I 
determine hypothetically what he thinks to be at stake concerning subjects and 
tradition, which accounts for why things are said in one way and not in some other.  
To understand Giussani‘s account, in other words, is to reintroduce the text into the 
context from which it arose as a sufficient answer to a problem.      
As the methodology section in my introduction explains, I will conduct three 
grades of reading, each one to bring Giussani‘s implicit text into greater focus.  
Following this analysis, in a section entitled ―Observations,‖ I show how some of the 
leading tendencies above vie with each other in the author‘s attempt to navigate 
certain institutional sensitivities in his own times.  To this end, I reconstruct the 
original meaning of the text with respect to its original referents, their worries, and 
Guissani‘s attempt to address their worries.  In my conclusions, I introduce 
theological insights from the philosophy of language and philosophical 
anthropology, through Fergus Kerr‘s writings, to unravel some of the confusion 
Giussani creates in his attempt to grapple with epistemological questions turning on 
the proposition that God exists.  I then suggest how some of the philosophical pitfalls 
behind the author‘s vague deliveries may be repaired.          
Some of the readers already committed to Giussani‘s descriptions will find 
my approach to clarifying the meaning of his texts unfamiliar.  It may take several 
chapters to come around to a shared understanding of what ―reading correctively‖ 
means.  I hope that the connections I am able to draw between the historical 
questions that motivated Giussani‘s writing and the philosophical facets of his replies 
will shed greater light on his noble attempt to dialogue with modernity, and exhibit 
the pastoral energy and sensitivity with which he engaged in that task at a difficult 
juncture in the life of the Church and of the Italian people.  While my own analysis 
refers Giussani‘s texts back to history, it is important to note, contrastingly, that 
Giussani saw himself contributing to a much larger enterprise: viz., devising a 
universal and timeless method for the return of religion to the secular sphere.  
 




The Occasion of the Text 
The Religious Sense has had a long and variegated textual evolution – more 
than any other work published by Giussani.
12
  First appearing in December 1957 
through Fontes Seniores, it was addressed to the adult members of the Gioventù 
Italiana di Azione Cattolica Milanese (GIAC-Milan) and intended to guide reflection 
and study throughout 1958.  In 1959, an anonymous essay, by the same title, was 
published through Fontes Juniores.  It recast the 1957 text according to a more 
didactic style, expounding its basic themes and definitions in nine lessons.  As noted 
in the introductory note of the text (RS [1957], 4 and 22), the idea for the booklet was 
inspired by the archdiocesan letter published for Lent in 1957 entitled Sul senso 
religioso (On the Religious Sense), of which Archbishop Giovanni Battista Montini 
(1897-1978) was the author.
13
  (Montini was elevated to the College of Cardinals by 
Pope John XIII in 1958.  In 1963 he was elected pope and took the name Paul VI.  
He is famous for having re-opened the Second Vatican Council).   
The basic themes of the book are taken up again and elaborated with renewed 
vigour in the 1966 edition, published by Jaca Book (now republished in Il senso di 
Dio e l’uomo moderno. La «questione umana» e la novità del Cristianesimo [Milan: 
BUR, 1994], 7-75).  The basic themes underwent two further amplifications, one in 
1977 (Jaca Book), and another in 1997, with a view to its definitive release as the 
first volume of the PerCorso, Giussani‘s Trilogy (Jaca Book, 1997-2003).
14
  In 1997, 
it was taken up again, worldwide within CL, as a resource for reflection and study at 
the weekly meetings of the Schools of Community.      
 
Exegetical Considerations 
The analysis in this chapter is based on the 1997 edition of The Religious 
Sense published as the first volume of the Trilogy.  While its main audience are the 
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members of Communion and Liberation, Giussani recommends his approach to 
everyone with urgency (e.g., RS, 11).  Consistent with this generalized urgency, the 
character of the text remains essentially didactic, striving to stimulate religious 
reflection on the part of those little acquainted with theology, let alone Catholic 
theology.  While it treats the topic of religion generally, and occasionally cites 
authors such as Augustine of Hippo, Thomas Aquinas, and Dante Alighieri, the 
author‘s attempt to buttress his thesis with secular authors as diverse as Giacomo 
Leopardi, Alexis Carrel, Franz Kafka, William Shakespeare, and Emmanuel Kant is 
one of the book‘s most distinguishing features.  Giussani‘s eclectic use of sources 
reflects his belief that the seeds of Divine Revelation were sown by God all over the 
planet.  Therefore, while God is most amply apprehended from within the (Catholic) 
tradition, He does not wish to hide himself from any person of good will who could 
not have direct access to Him outside the tradition.  The Religious Sense, in this 




This section rehearses the account of the heart in Giussani‘s The Religious 
Sense according to its plain-sense.  I focus primarily on the axiomatic significance of 
the so-called ―First Premise of the religious sense,‖ through which he expounds his 
concept of correspondence, summarizing his epistemology‘s central and explicit 
claims.   
 
The Cry for Realism and the Critique of Ideology 
Giussani‘s subject is the objective verifiability of the ―religious 
phenomenon;‖ but his point of departure is much broader, belonging to what he 
refers to as ―realism‖ (RS, 4).  Realism concerns ―the urgent necessity not to give a 
more important role to a scheme already in our minds, but rather to cultivate an 
entire, passionate, insistent ability to observe the real event, the fact (RS, 6).‖  The 
cry for realism is motivated by the loss of certain truths, especially on matters 
Giussani labels as ―existential‖: questions that bear on the meaning of life, what it 
means to be human, and what constitutes total satisfaction (RS, 5).  These truths are 




pertinent to existence, Giussani maintains, insofar as they inform decision and give 
concrete shape to individual and social action.  The culprit blamed for the distortion 
or occlusion of truth on such matters is ―a mist of ideologies, whims, and appetites 
(RS, 3).‖   
Ideology, for Giussani, is the distortion of reality through casuistic reasoning.    
The casuist exhibits the attempt to evade the ―inconvenience‖ posed by plain moral 
truths using subtle rationalizations.  Giussani roots casuistry in the increasing 
authority of passing fads over and against a passionate commitment to truth (RS, 3).  
A great causality of this weakened sense of intellectual commitment is the ―religious 
phenomenon (RS, 5-6).‖  Its exclusion from reality is consistent with the unwitting, 
but ineluctable, tendency of ideology to caricature the world of real existents (RS, 3).  
All branches of scientific learning have, as a result, suffered from the loss of the 
―religious phenomenon‖ insofar as its exclusion has reduced their ampliative vision 
and grasp of reality – a point Giussani buttresses with a quotation from Alexis 
Carrel‘s Reflections on Life (RS, 3).
15
  Forged by intellectuals, disseminated by mass 
media, and assimilated in the common mentality, ideologies are deemed inept and 
ineffectual authorities on questions of life, including the objective verifiability of the 
―religious phenomenon‖ (RS, 4-5).  The hope by which truth and realism, including 
the ―religious phenomenon,‖ might be reintroduced into the integral fabric of human 
life lies in the method he will expound, which requires the individual‘s adherence to 
nothing less than a pure and unremitting commitment to the quest for certainty (RS, 
21-22).      
 
Knowledge in General 
To think through a problem is no doubt a central function of the human mind.  
This process, however, runs the real risk of projecting the mind‘s deliveries onto fact, 
Giussani contends (RS, 4).  And this risk occurs because a fact lies autonomously 
outside the mind.  At the same time, it is self-revealing and, thus, knowable.  To 
acknowledge the existence of a fact as that which lies outside the mind, showing 
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itself, awaiting its own discovery by the knowing subject, is to be on the path to 
apprehending reality (RS, 4).  And only the apprehension of reality is adequate to the 
intellectual life of the ―sane‖ man (RS, 4).  Fact, reality, phenomenon, and knowable 
object are synonymous in Giussani‘s lexicon. 
 
Different Kinds of Certainty 
The religious fact is distinguished ―statistically‖ as ―the most widespread 
aspect of human activity,‖ especially when it is deemed to exhibit itself in 
―experience or sentiment,‖ and not only in confessions and doctrinal propositions 
(RS, 4).  And yet, what is generally known about the religious fact derives from the 
opinions of others: ―philosophers whom we have studied in school or journalists who 
write in the newspapers or magazines that determine and form public opinion (RS, 
4).‖  When we follow the opinions of others we bypass the opportunity to know the 
fact as it really is and so to apprehend it with ―moral certainty (RS, 21).‖  The nature 
of moral certainty ends enquiry with a personal conviction.  With regards to the 
―religious phenomenon,‖ it permits the knower to assert unabashedly: I understand 
what others may be saying about the religious fact, but I know and testify 
definitively, because I have experienced and verified it for myself, that it is a real 
thing.  Given the pervasive influence of religion as ―an integral aspect of man‘s 
behaviour in all times and [affecting] all human activity,‖ it makes no sense to 
uphold the fact with any other kind of certainty than with ―moral certainty (RS, 4).‖    
 
The Method in General 
Moral certainty, Giussani has just said, is rooted in knowing an object as it 
truly is. And this kind of certainty is especially important on matters that relate to the 
meaning and purpose of man‘s existence (RS, 4).  The religious fact is precisely the 
kind of object requiring moral certainty.  But to know the religious fact as it truly is, 
insofar as this kind of objective knowledge is required of moral certainty, is to use a 
method that allows the object to impose itself on the knower‘s capacity for reflection 
(RS, 5).  Only in this way may they be appropriated as practical truths by which to 
live.  From the object‘s capacity to impose itself and so reveal itself to the knower as 
it really is, follows the indispensability of the knower‘s gaze: ―If I truly wish to know 




[the object], I have no choice but to look down and fix my eyes on the object itself 
(RS, 5).‖  One cannot know the object as it is if one does not perceive it for what it is.              
 
Method as Enquiry into the “Phenomenon of Religious Experience” 
In allowing the ―religious fact‖ to reveal itself for what it is, and, in 
particular, to manifest itself to the knower‘s gaze, Giussani points out that ―the 
method for knowing it must be suggested by the religious experience itself (RS, 5).‖  
Let the ―religious phenomenon‖ be treated as an hypothesis to be tested, Giussani 
recommends.  He resorts to direct experience for this testing, but cautions against the 
study of religion as a ―geological or meteorological event‖ because it concerns 
humanity (RS, 5).  Thus, reiterating the importance of methodology, Giussani adds:  
 
Since we are dealing with something that occurs within me, that has to do 
with my conscience, my ‗I‘ as a person, it is on myself that I must reflect; I 
must inquire into myself, engage in an existential inquiry.  Once I have 
undertaken this existential investigation, I can usefully compare my results 
with the views of thinkers and philosophers on this matter.  At this point, my 
self-examination will be enriched by such a comparison, and I will have 
avoided raising another person‘s opinion to the level of definition.  If I did 
not begin with this existential inquiry [...], I would be uncritically adopting 
from others a conception regarding a problem for my life and my destiny (RS, 
5-6).      
 
Thus, while ―opinions‖ may be sought even on existential matters, the only method 
conducive to moral certainty involves turning opinions into hypotheses and testing 
them for validity against the ―I.‖  Giussani goes on to describe this method next in 
his theory of judgement. 
 
Experience as Judgement  
―After conducting an existential inquiry, we must know how to judge the 
results of this self-examination. [...]  In fact, without the capacity for evaluating, man 
cannot have any experience at all (RS, 6),‖ Giussani writes.  What follows is a brief 
delineation of the difference in experience between ―trying‖ (i.e., experiment) and 
―judging‖ (i.e., evaluation).  Trying looks at experience as ―action,‖ that is, 
―mechanically establishing relations with reality.‖  Judging, however, regards 




experience as ―understanding‖ and ―discovering the meaning‖ of things (RS, 6; cf., 
RE, 52).  The religious phenomenon calls out for experience as judgement.          
 
Positing a Criterion of Judgement for Existential Matters 
A judgement is always the result of a measurement or evaluation against 
some standard.  For Giussani, criteria for judgement exist both in the depths of the 
self as well as in the common mentality (RS, 6-7).  The internal criterion, however, is 
more trustworthy (RS, 7).  To assert that the ground of truth is inherent within the 
self, however, is not to suggest that the individual knower is himself its author, 
making it highly subjectivist (RS, 7 and 9).  Rather, this criterion, which is drawn 
from our nature, is given to us as part of our nature (RS, 7).  ―The word nature,‖ he 
adds, ―evidently implies the word God, a clue to the ultimate origins of our ‗I‘ (RS, 
6).‖  Thus, the criterion by which to judge the experience of the religious 
phenomenon, which is ultimately ―to reflect on our own humanity,‖ has its origin in 
―the inherent structure of the human being, the structure at the origin of the person 
(RS, 7)‖ 
 
Defining the Criterion as “Elementary Experience”                    
The criterion which Giussani goes on to expound, insofar as it is a standard of 
judgement in existential experience, is described as ―the sieve of a primordial 
‗original experience‘ that constitutes my identity in the way I face everything (RS, 
7).‖  From here on, Giussani refers to this criterion as ―elementary experience‖ (RS, 
7).  The component parts of ―elementary experience‖ are ―needs‖ and ―evidences‖ 
(RS, 7).  First, needs have many different faces, but are commonly sought in the 
desire for happiness, truth, and justice.  They are of utmost importance, Giussani 
points out, because humans are goal-directed animals, and these are goals that result 
in action: ―prior to them, there is no movement or human dynamism.  Any personal 
affirmation, from the most banal and ordinary to the most reflected upon and rich in 
consequences, can be based solely on this nucleus of original needs (RS, 7).‖  
Second, evidences are proofs, plain facts, presentments of objects as they really are, 
and, therefore, part of ―elementary experience‖ (RS, 7).  To clarify his definition, 




Giussani notes how ―Aristotle used to remark acutely that it is foolish to seek the 
reason for what evidence shows to be a fact.‖
16
 
Giussani further clarifies his position by contrasting it with the ―reductionist‖ 
tendencies of three other types of knower, each of which he sketches briefly (RS, 8).  
They are: (1) the idealist (who maintains that objects are the product of man‘s spirit 
and energy), (2) the sceptic and sophist (who demand irrefutable proof that x exists 
as a real thing outside the self), and (3) the logician (whose delight is in a game 
which involves reasoning correctly from premise to conclusion) (RS, 8).  The point 
Giussani is making concerns different epistemologies and the distinction between the 
delivery of partial or counterfeit accounts of reality and true accounts of reality.  
Only elementary experience, he argues, is conducive to apprehending reality as it 
really is because it alone allows a ―presence‖ to encounter ―human energy‖ (RS, 8).  
He concludes, here, defining knowing as ―an event where the energy of human 
knowledge is assimilated to the object (RS, 8).‖      
 
Relating “Elementary Experience” to the “Heart” 
Giussani now applies ―elementary experience‖ to theology.  First, he claims 
that when the bible refers to ―the heart‖ it is speaking of ―elementary experience‖ 
(RS, 9).  But one need not rely only on scripture for descriptions of the heart as an 
objective fact.  The heart is a universal concept, he claims (RS, 8).  For example, 
while one may expect the concept of the ―I‖ to differ according to histories, 
traditions, and circumstances, it always includes some reference to an ―inner 
countenance.‖  What else could this ―inner countenance‖ be but the heart?  The heart, 
therefore, is synonymous with ―inner criterion,‖ ―interior stamp,‖ and the authentic 
―I‖ (RS, 8-9).  It encompasses that complex of ―needs‖ and ―evidences‖ that allows 
questions of existential validity to be resolved with moral certainty.  The heart is also 
the source of every kind of enquiry; it is ―the original impetus with which the human 
being reaches out to reality, seeking to become one with it (RS, 9).‖  The assimilation 
of the knower and the object required for moral certainty is achieved by ―fulfilling a 
project that dictates to reality itself the ideal image that stimulates him from within 
(RS, 9).‖      
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Correspondence and Moral Reflection 
The concept of assimilation, mentioned above, is Giussani‘s early (read: still 
undeveloped) articulation of the concept of correspondence.  Correspondence will 
comprise the harmonious unity of subjects and objects, which is an essential feature 
of what the author considers intrinsic to the ideal of moral flourishing (RS, 72).  A 
correspondence, however, cannot be forced; it occurs spontaneously and tends to 
involve an element of surprise.  To the extent that correspondence echoes harmony 
between the inner ―I‖ and outer reality, it is an ontological event signalling moral 
rightness, rather than some spurious or subjective state of mind (RS, 114).   
Correspondence hinges on an ―encounter‖ with the ―phenomenon‖ that is 
external to this or that mind.   Such an encounter leads to a moment of consciousness 
or moral reflection: ―at this point, one makes a fast comparison between [the 
phenomenon and] oneself, with one‘s own ‗elementary experience,‘ with one‘s own 
‗heart‘ (RS, 20).‖  A correspondence is achieved when the result of such a 
comparison permits one to say: ―Up to this point, what I see outside fits with what I 
feel inside, with those needs and evidences that are intrinsic to every human person, 
with what I was made for; therefore, it is true, and I can trust this other human being 
(RS, 20-21).‖  Giussani frequently equates correspondence with the mediaeval 
maxim attributed Thomas Aquinas, adaequatio rei et intellectus (the intellect [of the 
knower] must be adequate to the thing [known]).
17
  In this way, Giussani reiterates 
the concept of adequacy, or rightness, or harmony between the object and the 
knowing subject as the criterion of moral sufficiency (CGC, 216).     
 
The Nature of Knowing Before the Background of the Human Person 
A fact about the human person, observable in daily life, is that, ―by nature, 
man is in relation to the infinite (RS, 9).‖  The infinite need not be God.  The 
―anarchist,‖ for instance, ―affirms himself to an infinite degree (RS, 9).‖  But the 
―authentically religious man,‖ Giussani‘s ideal protagonist, accepts the infinite as a 
principle of completion outside of himself, a goal compatible with the ―I‘s‖ ultimate 
satisfaction (RS, 9).  There is an important distinction to mark, Giussani observes, 
between the anarchist and the authentically religious man.  In the case of the 
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anarchist, the strident attitude which leads him to say ―‗I affirm myself against all 
and everything‘‖ is rooted in self-interest and exhibits ―pure violence (RS, 10).‖   
Love of reality, the ability to embrace what is given, rather than to assert oneself over 
it, is the truer ground of infinitude – the only ground that is life-giving and ultimately 
fulfilling (RS, 10).  It is a matter of course, then, that ―nature‖ should endow the 
human person with a ―fundamental criterion‖ by which ―to face things objectively.‖  
―Nature,‖ Giussani says, ―thrusts man into a universal comparison, endowing him 
with that nucleus of original needs, with that elementary experience which mothers 
in the same way provide to their children (RS, 10).‖   
We are certain that it is nature, and not some other ground, that enables this 
potential to judge according to the universal ideals of ―justice, truth, and happiness,‖ 
because ―men in all ages and of all races approach everything [in this way], enabling 
them to an exchange, of not only things, but also ideas, and to transmit riches to each 
other over the distance of centuries (RS, 10).‖  Giussani reiterates: ―this elementary 
experience is the same in everyone, even if it will then be determined, translated, and 
realized in very different ways – so different, in fact, that they may seem opposed 
(RS, 10).‖   
 
The Conditions of Knowing: “Ascesis for Liberation” 
The terms ―correspondence,‖ ―satisfaction,‖ ―fulfillment,‖ and ―infinite‖ have 
to do with our ―becoming adults without being cheated, alienated, enslaved by 
others, or exploited (RS, 10-11).‖  We do well, then, to ―contradict and avoid‖ certain 
obstacles that obscure and alter our ―original needs and the ‗evidences‘ of those 
primary meanings (RS, 10).‖  Giussani targets the ―common mentality,‖ which, in 
turn, ―is publicized and sustained by whomever holds the reins of power in society 
(RS, 10).‖  ―To ensure the ―I‘s‖ pure authenticity, he concludes, it is appropriate to 
challenge ―family tradition or the tradition of the broader society in which we have 
grown up (RS, 11).‖  This task, he says, is ―neither easy nor popular (RS, 11).‖  The 
heart, instrument of judgement, and ―source of that undefinable unease,‖ is 
―vulnerable‖ when it is treated, for instance, as ―an object of another‘s interest or 
pleasure (RS, 11).‖  Nevertheless, he reiterates, ―judgement is all the more necessary 
because even these occasional opinions are induced by a context and a history, and 




they too must be transcended so that we can reach our original needs (RS, 11).‖  It is 
inconvenient and personally demanding ―to face oneself,‖ ―to go against the current,‖ 
and ―to consider the totality of factors,‖ such as the true apprehension of reality 
demands.  We would rather look only at the evidence that confirms ―a scheme 
already in our minds (RS, 4).‖  For this reason, the task of judging from the heart is 
effectively ascetical: it involves swimming against the tide.  Having said that, it is 
indispensible and inescapable: ―in every era man has had to work to reconquer 
himself, [and] we live in an age in which the need for this reconquest is clearer than 
ever (RS, 11).‖              
 
The Formal Restatement of Giussani’s Thesis 
Giussani‘s thesis concerning correspondence is an imbrication of many thesis 
fragments scattered across his bibliography, otherwise referred to as ―thesis tokens.‖
 
18
  Together, they represent his fundamental response to questions of how to know 
objects in order that one might know whether appropriating and integrating them into 
life would be good.  The formal restatement of the plain-sense reading above 
according to these ―tokens‖ is intended to collect the fragments of the account of 
judgement into a whole and to bring certain features of the act of judgement into 
relief for the analysis that follows.  In line with the nature of plain-sense rehearsal, I 
keep my interpretations to a minimum.  Giussani‘s terms are placed in italics for easy 
identification.  Since Giussani‘s theory of correspondence is directed to moral 
judgement in existential matters, readers may wish to substitute my term p with any 
one of the topics Giussani treats ―existentially‖ (e.g., religion, doctrine, authenticity, 
common mentality, freedom, tradition, friendship, beauty).   
 p must be investigated by a correct method if it is to be known truly, where 
the condition of truth is a) ―It is a fact that p is ... ,‖ and b) the proposition ―p 
is ...,‖ corresponds to the fact.  
 Truth is contingent on letting p show itself through its primary ―evidences,‖ 
in advance of analysis.  To postulate conclusions about p in advance of its 
self-revelation is to misapprehend p (e.g., errors owing to preconception, 
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imitation of the common mentality); ergo, to know p truly is to experience or 
encounter it for oneself.   
 Insofar as truth may be brought to the fore through deeper analysis, the 
method of inquiry must take into account both the kind of phenomenon that p 
shows itself to be (stage 2) and the kind of knowledge that is desired of p.   
 Where the kind of knowledge sought concerning p is ontological, the analysis 
of p must also consider adequately the totality of factors by which it is 
constituted (RS, 20, 59), including the effects of p on the knower‘s primordial 
identity – that complex of ―needs‖ and ―evidences‖ with which nature has 
endowed us (RS, 28).  The knower‘s primordial identity is designated by the 
term ―heart.‖   
 Where p affects the complex of our primary ―needs‖ and ―evidences,‖ the 
category of ontological knowledge sought about p is existential, and entails a 
prima facie duty to include moral certainty.  
 Moral certainty is derived from discriminations that depend on a standard by 
which people evaluate what is better or higher, and presuppose what is more 
desirable. 
 The surprising fact that all human beings have desires and original needs is 
observed; but if it were true that the primordial structure of the human person, 
the heart, were primordially oriented to infinity/destiny, having desires and 
original needs would be a matter of course.  Hence, there is reason to suspect 
that ordinary desires are as yet unidentified desires for the Infinite.  
 Ergo, where the object of moral certainty is to know whether grasping p is 
intrinsically coherent with the kind of being that is oriented toward destiny, 
the criterion against which to measure p is the heart.  And since the heart 
desires the infinite, the ―reasonableness‖ of the ―Christian hypothesis‖ lies in 
its aptitude to satisfy the infinite needs of the human heart. 
 The test of p against the heart is essentially an exercise in self-awareness.  
The results that issue from introspective analysis – e.g., that p corresponds to 
the heart, that p does not correspond, that the correspondence of p is still to 
be determined – are on the level of ―prime-original intuitions” concerning 
what is good for me.  The ―for me‖ collects both the ontological make up of 




the human person as ordained by and destined to return to God, and the 
unique identity given to each one by God (e.g., the talents with which God 
endows the individual; the vocation to which each one is called by God).   
 Given that intuitions about p are grounded in the heart, p acquires an 
anthropological basis for its claim on the knower, and the beliefs and actions 
based thereupon have a primordial assurance about them. 
 To know p truly is to make a ―comparison‖ between p and the ―needs‖ and 
―evidences‖ of the heart.  Such a comparison demands first-hand 
acquaintance with p which cannot be attained except by transcending pre-
existing repertories of knowledge and assiduous intellectual honesty.    
In other words, the layout of Giussani‘s argument according to its ―thesis 
tokens‖ exhibits a process of verification that turns propositions into hypotheses and 
tests them against the heart‘s original ―needs‖ and ―evidences.‖ The purpose of the 
test is to attain knowledge of the proposition‘s adequacy to the human person.  This 
adequacy is both objective (having a dimension that is ―for everybody‖), and 
subjective (having a dimension that is ―for me‖). 
Giussani‘s epistemology, in this sense, is essentially ethical: a kind of 
practical reasoning directed to moral ends, based on universal norms and applied to 
particular cases.  The harmonization of subjects and objects is the ideal state that 
confirms a proposition‘s suitability for appropriation and integration into life.  
Giussani calls this state ―correspondence.‖ Correspondence builds on the following 
conditions: (1) a given proposition is initially suggested by the knowable object, 
rather than by the subject (RS, 5); (2) it includes my conscious awareness of the 
object‘s impact on me (e.g., my innate reactions of awe or aversion before a real 
presence) (RS, 6); and (3) it has been tested against ―elementary experience‖ and 
deemed suitable for me at the level of my ―original needs and evidences;‖ in 
particular, the truth of the matter is settled in the depths of the heart where adequacy 
is rooted in universal intuitions about happiness, truth, justice, and beauty (RS, 7).  
Correspondence, therefore, is the state of an object‘s adequacy to the ideal of 
fulfilment.  It is a copula that links the conscience we ourselves possess to knowable 
objects (RS, 121).  (4) In a subsequent stage of analysis, the knower might also 
compare his inner reactions of respect for and aversion to the longstanding custom of 




the Church; but only after the Church itself has been ―filtered‖ through the ―sieve of 
the heart‖ (RS, 7)  
 
DEEPER PLAIN-SENSE READING 
The interpretation of any text is always dependent on the author‘s choice of 
terminology.  Not only are certain words crucial, but also the manner in which the 
author defines and uses them in the context of a specific intellectual and cultural 
tradition.  The deeper plain-sense reading below brings into relief the areas of 
Giussani‘s epistemological thought that overlap with John Henry Newman (1801-
1890) and Maurice Blondel (1861-1949).  Giussani depended on these thinkers for 
his insights on epistemology and it is back into their theological-epistemological 
tradition that he is speaking when he writes on judgement.   
The influence of Newman and Blondel on Giussani introduces a complex set 
of hypotheses, inferences, a priori conditions, deductions and inductions, 
observations, intuitions, and conclusions which shape his method and consequently 
affect our attempts to clarify its more opaque areas.   My aim in the following pages 
to make some important interpretive connections between Giussani‘s use of Newman 
and Blondel‘s analytical language, the problems he names and how he structures 
them, and the hits afforded by history itself.
19
  At the end of this section, we should 
be in a better position to identify how Giussani‘s investigative methods account for 
certain features in his writing, clarifying those features burdened by vagueness and 
apparent counter statements.   
 
Giussani in relation to Newman and Blondel 
The choice of Newman and Blondel for this task is not at all arbitrary.  Both 
authors exerted a profound influence on Giussani.  That influence, however, is 
nowhere more detectable than in Giussani‘s epistemology, where their insights 
concerning the act of faith are inexplicitly intertwined in complex ways.  Behind the 
thought of Giussani lies the seminal work of another author, Pierre Rousselot (1846-
1924), whose famous essay, The Eyes of Faith, investigated the absolute ground of 
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  I will return to Rousselot in the third chapter of the present work 
on Beauty.  Chronologically, Newman‘s thought was first to exert influence on both 
Rousselot and Giussani;
21
 it is Newman‘s influence, along with Blondel‘s, that is 
most palpable in the text of The Religious Sense, manifesting itself in Giussani‘s 
method of investigation.   
According to John Zucchi, the Canadian historian of the CL movement, 
Giussani had read all the works of Newman that were available in Italian by the age 
of fourteen.
22
 The year of that project‘s completion would have been 1936, and the 
syllabus, therefore, would not yet have included Newman‘s Grammar of Assent (first 
translated in Italian as Filosofia della religione, Guanda, 1943), Apologia Pro Vita 
Sua (Edizione Paoline, 1956), and The Essay on the Development of Doctrine (Il 
Mulino, 1967).  These three important books were likely taken up by Giussani in 
subsequent years (e.g., at Venegono Seminary).  As Zucchi points out, in a book like 
Giussani‘s The Religious Sense, the influence of Newman‘s Grammar of Assent is 
―immediately detectable.‖
23
  Giussani was also very explicit about his personal 
admiration for Newman.
24
  As I will show, Newman‘s influence affects, above all, 
Giussani‘s handling of the problem of religious doubt.      
Another way around to detecting Newman‘s influence is through Blondel.  
Some theologians, such as Nicholas Lash, have already proposed a connection 
between Blondel and Newman‘s thought: ―Of all the major figures in the modernist 
crisis, the one whose thought comes closest to Newman‘s is surely Blondel,‖ Lash 
notes.
25
  Giussani‘s first encounter with Blondel‘s thought occurred while attending 
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seminary at Venegono.  The acquaintance was made through Carlo Colombo (1909-
1991), one of his professors and mentors, later to be named ―papal theologian‖ by 
Pope Paul VI.  Colombo, a supporter of Blondel, cautiously introduced his thought 
into the curriculum at Venegono,
26
 for Blondel was caught up in a storm of 
controversy over modernist charges.
27
  In 1934, Colombo authored one major article 
on Blondel, highlighting the merits of his theory on immanence and transcendence.
28
  
Colombo‘s reading of Blondel encouraged the implementation of Blondel‘s ―new 
apologetic‖ (nuova apologetica), being a method of re-evangelization directed to 
those already baptized who ignored their faith.  The strategy was to exhibit the 
pragmatic purport of religion in reply to people‘s existential concerns.  Giussani, in 
line with Colombo, down-played the controversy over modernism that dogged 
Blondel in order to allow his approach to take root in the ambit of pastoral work with 
youth: ―There was still some doubt regarding Blondel [through the years of my 
seminary training], but there were also already positive appraisals regarding aspects 
of his work: for example, the idea of the historical nature of man (la natura storica 
dell’uomo) being open as such to the supernatural.‖
29
   
The ambit of daily life was Blondel‘s launching point for theological 
reflection, however; and this represented a certain reversal of the Scholastic method, 
which deduced faith from contemplation of the Divine.  From the standpoint of anti-
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modernism, nevertheless, Blondel‘s approach seemed dangerously prone to 
anthropocentrism.  But the rapprochement with daily life was worth the risk, 
Colombo thought, given that deductive proofs (raziocini deduttivi) had not satisfied 
his contemporaries in grounding the act of faith.  Thus, he recommended 
appropriating faith through a comprehensive vision of life (totalità della vita).  
Undertaken with seriousness of purpose, Blondel‘s strategy avoided 
anthropocentrism, Colombo argued, because the supernatural, having been stamped 
into creation, could always be deduced from questions turning on life‘s meaning and 
purpose, and this possibility had been ordained providentially by God in order that he 
might be known even in the remotest corners of the world.  Thus, the quotation from 
Blondel‘s L’Action (1893), with which Colombo opens his article, is also the explicit 
approval of Blondel‘s thesis: ―I have always concluded that a careful study of 
immanence must result in the affirmation of transcendence, not only as a postulate of 
the moral life, but as a truth of the intellectual order.‖
30
  Further elaborating the 
concept of immanence, Colombo concludes with its moral implications on freedom: 
―the method of immanence will tend to demonstrate that man, faced with the 
supernatural, has the freedom to accept it, satisfying, by this means, the intimate 
exigency that lies within him of an ulterior order, or even to reject it, rendering 
himself, by this means, responsible for his own acceptance or refusal of the help 
offered him (IPO, 405).‖
31
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Turning to Giussani‘s correspondence theory, we may see that many of its key 
terms and concepts are derived from Newman and Blondel‘s influence.  The attempt 
to identify some of the main areas of overlap with these authors, as well as areas of 
difference, will assist in the task of excavating Giussani‘s method of investigation.  
For this purpose, I return to Giussani‘s correspondence theory, which he succinctly 
reformulated in Il camino al vero è un esperienza: 
If the proposition with which you are confronted appears after a comparison 
[between yourself and the object] to be the response to your authentic needs, 
respective of your potential, then you should automatically feel sympathy 
toward it, and wish to approve it.  Saint Augustine used to speak of delectatio 
victrix; but the psychological sense implied in this notion can also be 
understood as something Thomas incorporates in his definition of truth, 
adaequatio rei et intellectus; i.e., more or less, the discovery of a 
correspondence between the presentment of the object (or the proposition) and 
the awareness of [its impact] on the structure of your nature (CVE, 143). 
 
The terms and concepts from this paragraph that call out for attention are 
―proposition,‖ ―comparison,‖ ―adaequatio rei et intellectus,‖ ―the object‘s 
presentment‖ and ―the structure of your nature.‖  The first three terms have to do 
with methodology (the organum investigandi), while the latter two are 
presuppositions about reality.  Each of the terms is related to Giussani‘s attempt to 
reinstate the relevance of the religious fact, as he explicitly states.  They are 
underwritten by the claim that religion is part and parcel of man’s natural life and 
habitat.  Everything that Giussani points to by way of ―experience‖ goes back to this 
one claim.  Its overarching implications for reality make it the guiding rule of 
investigation, be it for the problem of religion, or any other matter generally calling 
out for ―moral certainty.‖   
Giussani‘s notion of correspondence, therefore, is derived from a method of 
investigating problems that presupposes and is guided by the rule that religion and 
man are the same.  Giussani was not the first to postulate this kind of rule, nor the 
first to derive a method of investigation from it.  Newman and Blondel, also wanting 
to establish the absolute grounds of religion, and faced with similar kinds of 
―scientific‖ pressure to prove its validity, postulated the same rule and derived from 
it a method by which to establish the ―certitude‖ of propositions. In doing so, they 




established what Giussani refers to in his own lexicon as the ―reasonable‖ grounds 
for the faith of ordinary believers.   
 
Newman 
In Newman‘s case, the rule which articulates that religion inherently belongs 
to the structure of man’s life and habitat is borne out in the structure of his Grammar 
of Assent.  It is itself forged from Newman‘s original question, which is not the 
abstract question concerning the modes of ―holding and apprehending propositions‖ 
with which he opens the Grammar.  Rather, as Thomas Norris has pointed out, the 
opening question is in fact at the service of a deeper concern, provoked by hostility 
towards religion, regarding how to write about ―the structure of believing and faith-
life in order to vindicate the faith of ordinary believers.‖
32
  ―From Aristotle, he knew 
of phronesis as the faculty of practical judgement and he wondered if it might be 
indicative of a way in which people know concrete facts.  Of course, this could not 
be a privileged route to truth, but one coincident with the universal one.‖
33
  The 
concrete fact in question to which the concept of phronesis would be applied was 
religion. 
Through phronesis, Newman wanted to investigate whether ―in the dictate of 
conscience, without previous experience or analogical reasoning,‖ a child could 
gradually ―perceive the voice, or the echoes of the voice, of a Master, living, 
personal, and sovereign‖ from within, which would come to him ―like an impulse of 
nature.‖
34
 Were certain beliefs not ―congenial‖ to the mind, if not ―connatural‖ with 
human action, Newman thought, a child of five or six would be incapable of 
―mastering and appropriating thoughts and beliefs, and in consequence of their 
teaching, handle and apply them familiarly, according to the occasion, as principles 
of action.‖ Often to the dismay of his interpreters, Newman set out to broaden the 
concept of reason, striving to include within the repertoire of ―respectable thought‖ 
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the validity of ―intuitive‖ reactions to various phenomena in the world, for he 
believed these stemmed from and signalled an innate religious core.
35
   
Newman‘s next step was to propose an organum investigandi, a universal 
method, by which to establish certainty about the ―connaturality‖ of religion, such as 
he had already done through his observations of its instantiation in children.  The 
method, he realized, did not concern some formal syllogism still to be worked out, 
but the nature of inference as different from certainty.  In formal inference, Newman 
noted, ―the conclusion is necessary, but its truthfulness is contingent on the 
truthfulness of the premises.‖
36
  Thus, the validity of a conclusion, such as: ―Hence 
there is reason to suspect that A is true,‖ lies in the presupposition that every 
instance of C follows from an instance of A.  Regarding the religious phenomenon, 
Newman‘s method concludes with the view that religion is fitting to the structure of 
the human person because every instance of belief in the child postulates an intrinsic 
inclination to the Divine.  The ―connaturality‖ Newman infers is the premise of his 
investigation into religion.  He states: ―that such a spontaneous reception of religious 
truths is common with children, I shall take for granted, till I am convinced that I am 
wrong in so doing.‖
37
  Moreover, Newman was not interested in investigating the 
origins of ―connaturality‖ according to the issue concerning inference, namely, 
whether reaching a conclusion depends on understanding the terms of the premises.
38
  
He chose instead the following line of enquiry: ―I am not engaged in tracing the 
image of God in the mind of a child or a man to its first origins, but showing that he 
can become possessed of such an image, over and above all mere notions of God, 
and in what that image consists.‖
39
       
What inference cannot accomplish in the act of faith, assent can.  Inference is 
not yet the acceptance of truth, while assent is.  Inference does not require that the 
terms of the premises be understood for appropriation, while assent does.  The 
acceptance of truth, the proper object of the intellect, enabled by understanding, 
occurs after one has become attuned to his or her innate religious dispositions.  Thus 
– very much in line with Giussani – what can be inferred about religion in the fast 
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comparison between an external phenomenon and one‘s moral reactions of respect or 
aversion to it (i.e., conscience) is a precursor to the mature appropriation of the 
claims one translates into living action.          
 
Blondel 
With Blondel, similarly, the method of investigation concerning the validity 
of religion exhibits the same inner-outer dynamism of Newman‘s approach.  
Formally stated, the approach converts instances of the religious phenomenon into 
hypotheses in order to test the validity of religion‘s central claim, viz., that the 
human person is innately religious.  The condition for establishing the validity of 
religious propositions, then, compares the religious phenomenon with the (interior) 
fact of man‘s innate religiosity.  But that innate religiosity is suspected precisely 
because the religious phenomenon is both externally manifest and observable in 
man‘s action.  Thus, the innate religiosity of man is both the premise and the 
conclusion of the investigation.   
The religious phenomenon, according to Blondel, instantiates itself not only 
in doctrine and practices, but initially in the self-conscious awareness of the 
disproportion that lies between the ―I‖ and the need to attain a certain metaphysical X 
in absence of which the ―I‖ is left wanting.  He writes:   
To reach ‗the one thing necessary‘ [i.e., God], we do not grasp it in itself, 
where we are not; but we start from it within ourselves, where it is, in order to 
see better that it is by understanding a bit what it is.  [...] As we come to 
define better for ourselves what we are not, through a more complete 
experience and a more penetrating reflexion, we come to see more clearly 




The thought of God within us depends on our action in two ways.  On the one 
hand, it is because in acting we find an infinite disproportion in ourselves that 
we are constrained to look to infinity for the equation of our action.  On the 
other hand, it is because in affirming absolute perfection we do not ever 
arrive at equalling our own affirmation, that we are constrained to look for its 
compliment and its commentary in action.  The problem that action raises, 
only action can resolve. 
41
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With Blondel‘s method, the desire for infinitude voiced from within our being is an 
instance of the religious phenomenon.  Infinite desire, therefore, is the phenomenon 
which he submits to testing in order to secure the validity of religion.  If the 
hypothesis of an innate religious core were correct, then the absence of religious 
belief or practice in a person‘s life would necessarily reveal the feeling of a 
fundamental absence or void vis-à-vis the ideal of fulfilment.  Giussani makes the 
same point: ―the more an individual is implicated in an attempt to respond to these 
[ultimate] questions, the more he perceives their power, and the more he discovers 
how disproportionate he is with respect to the total answer (RS, 46-47).‖ Formally 
stated, if the innate religiosity of man were true, the need to satisfy the constitutive 
needs of the self via religion would be a matter of course; it would be, as Giussani 
says, ―something structural (RS, 46-48).‖  Hence, there is reason to suspect that 
religion is valid from the point of view of man‘s structural needs and exigencies.  As 
Giussani so poignantly puts it:  ―Only the hypothesis of God [...] corresponds to the 
human person‘s original structure [...] if the structure of a human being is, then, this 
irresistible and inexhaustible question, plea [...] (RS, 57).‖   
Carlo Colombo‘s approval of Blondel‘s method of immanence (il metodo 
d’immanenza), as a sure path to the supernatural, is identical to Giussani‘s insistence 
on an inner principle by which to arrive at certitude about the external fact of the 
religious phenomenon.  Action issues in experience; reflection on experience evokes 
within us a response which is a qualitative evaluation of the experience vis-à-vis the 
goal of ultimate fulfilment, which is stamped on our being.  If the external 
phenomenon is in fact true, as reflection on inner needs and exigencies is bound to 
turn up, the result necessarily gives direction to action.  Newman considers the effect 
to belong to the category of assent, where the understanding of doctrine takes on 
importance.  ―Under whatever form it presents itself before consciousness, the 
thought of God is brought there by a determinism that forces itself upon us: it springs 
necessarily from the dynamism of interior life, it necessarily has an effect; it has an 
immediate influence on the organization of our conduct.  It is this necessary action of 
the necessary idea of God that we must determine: we shall see how the voluntary 









Conclusion to Deeper Plain-Sense Reading 
The method employed by all three authors mixes historical and what we 
would now call ―phenomenological‖ analysis.
43
  This method dispels doubt or 
establishes the validity of propositions by means of the same logic underlying the use 
of inference, formally exhibited by Newman and Blondel as follows:   
The surprising fact, C, is observed; 
But if A were true, C would be a matter of course; 




In Giussani‘s thought, I take A to stand for ―the nature we have in ourselves‖ and C 
to stand for ―the object’s presentment [to the knowing subject].‖  The Religious 
Sense substantially concerns itself with A.  As Giussani says, ―the centre of the 
problem is really a proper position of the heart, a correct attitude, a feeling in its 
place, a morality (RS, 30).‖  A is the motive for enquiry; the real existence of A is 
what the author sets out to prove; ―A‖ is crucial because it is the cause of C, and all 
instances of C, therefore, point back to A.  Thus, the occurrence of the ―religious 
phenomenon,‖ the focus of Giussani‘s investigation, which human history and 
literature bear out, as he illustrates with examples from Mircea Eliade (1907-1986) 
and Rudolf Otto (1869-1937), gives reason to suspect the existence of an inner core 
that is respondent to and inclined toward religious expression.
45
  Giussani calls this 
inference a ―moral certainty,‖ and refers to the means by which it was reached as an 
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―intuition.‖  Commenting on the method of inference, he states, ―to arrive at 
certainties about relationships we have been given the fastest of methods, almost 
more like an intuition than a process (RS, 19).‖  Defending intuition from rationalist 
hostilities, Giussani insists that reason is ―not as arthritic or paralyzed as has been 
imagined by so much modern philosophy, which has reduced it to a single operation 
– ‗logic‘ – or to a specific type of phenomenon, to a certain capacity for ‗empirical 
demonstration‘ (RS, 17).‖  Intuition, he reasons, concurs with the basic idea that there 
is, so to speak, more than one way to skin a cat: ―Reason is much larger than [logic, 
theory, and empiricism]; it is life, a life faced with the complexity and multiplicity of 
reality, the richness of the real.  Reason is agile, goes everywhere, travels many roads 
(RS, 17).‖    
 
LEADING TENDENCIES 
An author‘s method is displayed by his intentional application of languages 
of analysis in a systematic manner to resolving particular problems.  Leading 
tendencies differ from methods insofar as they are basic rules of enquiry that, 
through the agency of methods, guide the production of theses.
46
  In the Introduction, 
I considered how the genesis of Giussani‘s texts could be referenced to the real 
problems he set out to address, such as: (1) correcting, as a priest and Catholic 
educator, the tendency of younger Catholics to be influenced by Nietzschean and 
Marxist currents of thought; (2) restoring the importance of religion in daily life and 
repairing the idealism of scientific notions of progress; and (3) responding 
intelligently to religious hostility without making concessions along the way.  
Having thus considered The Religious Sense in light of these historical and 
contextual pressures, I should now like to excavate how the production of theses 
stems from Giussani‘s unique perspective on these problems as exhibited by his 
specific habits of interpretation.  To this end, I trace the production of theses in his 
theory of judgement to three leading tendencies: Anti-Idealism, Augustinian-
Thomism, and Non-Philosophical Romanticism.  
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Anti-Idealism is the tendency that requires the knowing subject to let some as 
yet unintelligible object identify itself as a knowable entity by its own self-revealing 
capacity.  Giussani calls this a ―realist‖ approach to knowledge, recommending it 
against the view that objects can be known only insofar as the inquirer is able to 
think about them and only insofar as thinking is the externalisation of what the mind 
furnishes and reveals according to its own contents.  
 
Analysis 
(i) Giussani‘s anti-idealist tendency follows a habit of thought that, through the 
influence of Martin Heidegger (1889-1976), has found its way into the works of 
Hannah Arendt (1906-1975), Hans Urs von Balthasar (1905-1988), and Romano 
Guardini (1885-1968) – all of whom Giussani had read.
47
  There is no need to pin 
down Heidegger‘s direct influence on Giussani in order to appreciate how Giussani‘s 
interpretative habits arose from the same philosophical concern over real knowledge 
with which Heidegger was explicitly preoccupied.  Since both Heidegger and 
Giussani shared a common philosophical heritage, including the Reformation, the 
Enlightenment, German Romanticism, and Idealism, their concern for real 
knowledge was coincident with the retrieval of Thomistic and Augustinian 
epistemologies to address the problem of real knowledge.
48
  As twentieth-century 
thinkers, however, their concerns differed in kind from the questions that generated 
the epistemologies of Thomas and Augustine.     
Just as Heidegger‘s writing arose in response to a growing suspicion over 
Kant‘s theory that all that is discovered in the world is already in our thinking, so 
Giussani‘s writing arose in response to reductive accounts of religion which he 
blamed on the errant tendency to know objects based on ―schemes already in the 
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  Giussani writes, ―to think something is an intellectual, ideal, and 
imaginative activity regarding the object and often, in giving too much weight to 
thought, without even realizing it – or, in reality, even justifying it – we project what 
we think onto the fact (RS, 4).‖  As Giussani saw it, a correct theory of knowledge 
had to respect the observation that objects were of such a nature as to reveal 
themselves spontaneously to a knowing-subject without suffering the limiting effects 
either of (a) the extraneous imposition of the knower‘s ideas on the object, to which 
Giussani refers as ―ideology,‖ or (b) the induction of the object under the schemes 
already present in the mind, to which Giussani refers as ―preconception‖ (RS, 97).  
For Heidegger, similarly, the object was not to be held under the knower‘s sway in 
order to be known, but freed of the encumbrances which impede intelligibility 
through the knower‘s readiness to be surprised by the object‘s spontaneous self-
revelation of itself in a community of self-revealing objects. 
The attempt to arrive at a pure knowledge of the object lead both Heidegger 
and Giussani to transcend psychologistic and anthropocentric philosophical 
prejudices.
50
 Their writings express concern that truth is occluded when such phrases 
as ―what makes p true‖ are denied a worldly reference.  For a philosopher like 
Heidegger, or a theologian like Giussani, certain psychological verbs, notably 
―mean‖ and ―think,‖ provided one of the strongest incentives to put a realist 
epistemology to work.
51
 Thus Giussani writes: ―Shall we study what Aristotle, Plato, 
Kant, Marx, or Engels say about [the religious sense]?  We could do this, but, as a 
first step, the method would be incorrect.  When we deal with this fundamental 
expression of man‘s existence, we simply cannot abandon ourselves to the opinions 
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of others, absorbing the most fashionable views or impressions that determine our 
milieu (RS, 5).‖   
In order to obtain knowledge of the world, Heidegger and Giussani return 
their subjects from the mind to the world; for it is in the world that knowledge of the 
world is to be sought.
52
  Giussani writes:  ―By realism I refer to the urgent necessity 
not to give a more important role to a scheme already in our minds, but rather to 
cultivate an entire, passionate, insistent ability to observe the real event, the fact (RS, 
3).‖  The search of the subject-knower, however, is an act of dwelling alongside the 
other, an acquiescent loving of being, a passive attending to the Other‘s self-
revelation, rather than a dissection of reality or the superimposition of an idea onto 
reality.  ―To dwell,‖ Heidegger writes, ―means to remain at peace within the free, the 
preserve, the free sphere that safeguards each thing in its presence.‖
53
  What 
Heidegger calls ―poetically dwelling,‖ Giussani calls ―affezione e dimora‖ (affection 
and dwelling).  In dwelling, truth‘s concealment is unconcealed in the object‘s self-
revelation. The object‘s self-revelation is the ―bringing-forth-hither (Her-vor-
bringen).‖ By existing, the object emanates its identity: ―bringing-forth-hither brings 
hither out of concealment, forth into unconcealment.  Bringing-forth comes to pass 
only insofar as something concealed comes into unconcealment.  This coming rests 
and moves freely within what we call revealing (Entbergen).‖
54
    
Heidegger charges that the ―philosophy of life,‖ ―personalism,‖ 
―metaphysics,‖ and ―mechanization‖ – each being shaped by a definition of the 
human person as a thinking being (homo rationalis) – have tragically overlooked the 
ontological foundations of being, precipitating the flight of Dasein’s Being from the 
world of real things.
55
  ―In this way,‖ Heidegger writes, ―the impression comes to 
prevail that everything man encounters exists only insofar as it is his construct.‖
 56
  
This impression is the stance of the ―anarchist,‖ which Giussani deplores (RS, 9).  
Heidegger, who sees in this tendency the temptation to dominate, exhorts his readers 
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to let reality speak for itself, allowing it to make its claim upon the knower.
57
  
According to Giussani, when it comes to knowing the ―real event,‖ ―the fact,‖ since 
the tendency to ―project what we think onto the fact‖ reduces what we are able to 
know about it, the method of knowing must begin with an awareness of the fact as 
existing both independently of the mind, in relation with other objects, and in self-
manifestation through its own act of being.  Thus, Giussani states: ―Realism requires 
a certain method for observing and coming to know an object, and this method must 
not be imagined, thought of or organized and created by the subject: it must be 
imposed by the object (RS, 5).‖ Giussani lends urgency to his recommendation by 
implying that idealism has dominated inhumane approaches to life: ―the sane man,‖ 
he says, is the one who ―wants to know about the fact, to know what it is, and only 
then can he also think it (RS, 4).‖  Thus, Giussani, in line with Martin Buber (1878-
1965) and Emmanuel Levinas (1906-1995), exhorts his readers to address reality 
with the hieratic ―Thou.‖ Referring the I-Thou relation back to the question of the act 
of faith, Giussani writes: ―Religious awe is something other than the wonder from 
which according to Aristotle, philosophy is born.  When otherness emerges before 
one‘s eyes, the human person is not given to posing speculative inquiries, but to 
venturing, to pleading, to entreating, to invoking, to contemplating.  This remains 
firm, that it is the different-from-oneself and the meta (=beyond) natural (RS, 102).‖         
 
(ii)  The sense according to which Giussani and Heidegger advance their theory of 
knowledge holds that truth is ―the adequation of intellect to the thing.‖  The term 
―adequation,‖ from the Latin adaequatio, as it is used by Giussani, implies a 
fundamental relation between the inquirer‘s intellectual faculty and the knowable 
objects that stand alongside him, are received by him, and are accorded to him, as 
measured by the objects themselves.  Giussani summarizes this approach using the 
formula adaequatio rei et intellectus, translating the word ―adaequatio‖ as 
―correspondence.‖  He writes: ―the correspondence of the proposition or of the 
provocation to the constitutive exigencies of the heart is the criterion of truth.  This 
[notion of correspondence] is a non-literal translation of a phrase from St. Thomas 
Aquinas that defines truth as ‗adaequatio rei et intellectus‘: truth reveals itself 
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through the experience of a correspondence (adaequatio) between the proposition 
and one‘s self-awareness [la coscienza di sé], of that which we are originally.‖
 58
  In 
his attempts to define this formula further, Giussani focuses mainly on describing 
what it is not.  First, correspondence, such as it is concerned to describe the subject‘s 
act of knowing, does not entail anything quite like the subjectivization of truth.  
Second, while Giussani feels indebted to Thomas, and calls his method Thomist, he 
adds that it is not neo-Thomistic.
59
  Responding to a question about his method in an 
interview, he stated: ―[…] I would have to say that our movement [i.e., CL] is 
Thomist (I said Thomist, and not neo-Thomistic).  The definition of truth given by 
St. Thomas Aquinas [adaequatio rei et intellectus], which I have reiterated, 
constitutes one of the foundations on which our whole experience is founded; it is 
pure existentialism: therefore, it already contains what might specifically be 
recovered from Augustine (MCL, 29).‖   
 
(iii)  A ―traditional Thomist‖ might see the question Thomas poses about truth, 
which gives rise to the adaequatio formula, as turning on the epistemic relation of 
created things to God‘s mind, where the relation between God‘s mind and the world 
is a path to comprehending the relation of the human mind to the world.
60
   
[...] if an adequatio between mind and thing, which Aquinas takes to be the 
primary definition of truth, is possible, the measure of truth must be located 
in either term of the adequatio formula.  In theoretical reason, the measure is 
given by the thing, and in practical reason it is given by the mind.  The mind 
is called true when, theoretically, it conforms to the thing, but the thing itself 
is said to be true when, practically, it conforms to the mind.  The truth of the 
thing in conformity with mind occurs most radically in creation, in which the 
being of things arises from their ‗conformity‘ to the divine mind.  This divine 
‗practical‘ conformity is what accounts for ontological truth, and this in turn 
is what makes possible the transcendentality of truth, that is, the truth as a 
‗rational‘ relation between being and the soul (intellect).
61
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When Giussani and Heidegger adopt the adaequatio formula, the attempt to 
understand the human mind via analogy with God‘s mind is dropped.  The new 
problem, purportedly caused by Kant, concerns attaching content to an object before 
verifying whether such content intrinsically belongs to it.  In the following 
commentary from his well-known essay ―On the Essence of Truth,‖ Heidegger 
explains his own definition of adaequatio over and against Kant‘s radical turn to the 
subject.  As we shall see, Giussani‘s polemic against the common mentality and 
ideology, his rallying cry for a return to realism, and his use of the term 
correspondence, are each in line with this critique of Kant.    
 
The true, whether it be a matter of proposition, is what accords, the accordant 
[das Stimmende].  Being true and truth here signify accord, and that in a double 
sense: on the one hand, the consonance [Einstimmighkeit] of a matter with 
what is supposed in advance regarding it and, on the other hand, the 
accordance of what is meant in the statement with the matter.  This dual 
character of the accord is brought to light by the traditional definition of truth: 
veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus.  This can be taken to mean: truth is the 
correspondence [Angleichung] of the matter to knowledge.  But it can also be 
taken as saying: truth is the correspondence of knowledge to matter.  
Admittedly, the above definition is usually stated only in the formula veritas 
est adaequatio intellectus ad rem [truth is the adequation of intellect to the 
thing].  Yet truth so conceived, propositional truth, is possible only on the basis 
of material truth [Sachwahrheit], of adaequatio rei ad intellectum [adequation 
of thing to intellect].  Both concepts of the essence of veritas have continually 
in view a conforming to ... [Sichrichten nach ...], and hence think truth as 
correctness [Richtigkeit].   
 
Nonetheless, the one is not the mere inversion of the other.  On the contrary, in 
each case intellectus and res are thought differently.  In order to recognize this 
we must trace the usual formula for the ordinary concept of truth back to its 
most recent (i.e., the medieval) origin.  Veritas as adaequatio rei ad intellectum 
does not imply the later transcendental conception of Kant – possible only on 
the basis of the subjectivity of man‘s essence – that ‗objects conform to our 
knowledge.‘  Rather, it implies the Christian theological belief that, with 
respect to what it is and whether it is, a matter, a created (ens creatum), is only 
insofar as it corresponds to the idea preconceived in the intellectus divines, i.e., 
in the mind of God, and thus measures up to the idea (is correct) and in this 
sense is ‗true.‘62 
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According to Heidegger, the predicate ―true,‖ as applied to knowable objects, refers 
to ―correctness‖ and ―intrinsic intelligibility.‖ When applied to propositional truth-
claims, the test of correctness always has ―conformity‖ as its standard, be it in the 
―correspondence‖ of the matter to knowledge, or in the ―correspondence‖ of 
knowledge to matter.  The medieval meaning of matter‘s conformity to knowledge, 
Heidegger explains, refers to the conformity of God‘s intellect to creation, i.e., 
thought created by an Infinite Mind.  On the medieval view, things in themselves 
measure up to what they are in their totality only in relation to the divine origin 
(aliquid existens in Deo).
63
  Kant‘s theory of knowledge runs directly contrary to this 
view.  With Kant, Heidegger notes, not only are predicate and subject inverted, but 
the notion of human knowledge and knowable objects is conceptually different from 
the medieval view.  On Heidegger‘s reading of Kant, objects conform not to God‘s 
intellect, but to the human mind.  Differently put, the problem with Kant is the view 
that the human mind is introspectively aware of its own contents in a manner 
analogous to the perception of external objects.
64
   
For Heidegger, the general condition of truth, be it with propositions or 
existent objects, turns on the relation of subjects to objects where getting the correct 
account of the relation is crucial to a correct epistemology.  Heidegger‘s reference to 
Kant, particularly to the Kantian revolution from object to subject, gestures at the 
limits imposed on intelligibility when a knowable object is not brought under the 
conditions of objective judgement.  For the medieval philosophers, there are two 
types of relation corresponding to two types of minds.  First, to the divine mind: 
created things match up to the ideas in God‘s mind where they were conceived and 
sustained, insofar as they are ever before God‘s consciousness (and this is consistent 
with Heidegger‘s gloss); and second, to the human mind, for as created things have 
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their origin in the infinite mind, their intelligibility is limited by the condition of a 
finite human intellect (and this is not mentioned by Heidegger).  But Heidegger 
would be in agreement with the conclusion or ontology to which the medieval notion 
of a finite intellect leads: what is given to the human mind in an object is not an 
appearance of which ideas are in some way antecedent copies; rather, what is given 
is the object itself through its own active manifestation of itself.  What an object is in 
itself is known from its active and self-revealing presence to the knower.   
 
(iv) The Heideggerian style of Giussani‘s insistence on ―observing and coming to 
know an object ‖ does not differ from Thomas‘s use of adaequatio insofar as 
knowledge presupposes the need of the intellect to receive the object‘s self-
revelation.  Thomas holds that our intellect, in this life, ―has a determinate 
relationship to the forms that are abstracted from sensations.‖
65
  He concludes that 
―each and every thing shows forth that it exists for the sake of its operation; indeed 
operation is the ultimate perfection of each thing.‖
66
  Whereas for Heidegger and 
Giussani the insistence on the relation of words to world is revolutionary, for 
Thomas, the insistence states no more than the obvious. Where else would one go for 
knowledge of the things in the world other than to the things themselves?   
At several points, Giussani seems to be following Thomas closely, 
presupposing the obvious; viz., that the kind of truth found in the mind is related to 
the thing that is known.  He proceeds on the basis of a commitment to Thomas‘s 
ontology: namely, the doctrine that being is intrinsically self-expressive and self-
communicating, inherently disposed to manifesting its own presence and open to 
receiving that of others.  This doctrine is exhibited in the following passages from 
The Religious Sense:          
 
[The word] ‗thing,‘ [...] is a concrete and, if you please, banal version of the 
word ‗being.‘  Being: not as some abstract entity, but as presence, a presence 
which I do not myself make, which I find.  A presence which imposes itself 
upon me.   
 
He who does not believe in God is inexcusable [...] because that person must 
deny this original phenomenon, this original ‗experience‘ of the other.  
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[...] the very word ‗given‘ is also vibrant with an activity, in front of which I 
am passive, and it is a passivity which makes up my original activity of 




A theory of knowledge where ―action is exerted on the knower by external objects,‖ 
and which ―presupposes intuitions and operations in subjects that are alongside 
objects‖ may be either Thomist or Heideggerian, or, in this case, Giussanian.  The 
activities of the object are active: to be present, to give itself, to be; while the 
activities of the subject are passive: to let oneself be struck. 
 
(v)  Both Heidegger and Giussani, at any rate, insist on adherence to the real, 
which is the world of existents outside the mind.  Heidegger does not mention in the 
passage quoted above the standpoint from which he would survey the content of self-
revealing objects; but this can be inferred from the complaint running throughout his 
bibliography that propositions grounded in the subject may misidentify reality.  
Heidegger, not unlike Giussani, obtains truth from reality.  One kind of knowing is 
ontic, becoming aware of something as a fact; another kind of knowing is 
ontological, becoming aware of something that has its own essence.  The latter 
involves the relation between subjects and objects and includes a meaning that is for 
someone.  Ontology presents itself as a concern, Heidegger believes, precisely when 
the knowable object is considered in relation to the question: ―Who am I?;‖ and since 
the answer to that question is: ―I am an existing being in the world,‖ it follows that 
ontology is derived from surveying the landscape occupied by oneself and all 
knowable objects.  The object comports itself to the knowing subject on that 
landscape in the ―encounter‖ (begegnen) where the significance of the object for the 
subject comes to the fore.  For Heidegger, ―phenomenon‖ and ―sign,‖ like ―fact‖ and 
―interpretation,‖ are part of one and the same ontology that begins in the object‘s 
encounter with the subject and is completed in the subject‘s self-reflexive awareness 
of his relation to the object.  The process of knowing concerns a habit both of the 
object to show itself, and of the subject to ―encounter,‖ ―care for,‖ ―stand alongside,‖ 
and ―use‖ the object. 
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As for Heidegger, so for Giussani, ontological knowledge initially poses itself 
in the question ―Who am I?‖  The awareness of the vast unfolding of the universe is 
inseparable from questions turning on the meaning  and purpose of life and the 
discovery and actualization of one‘s true ―I,‖ as Giussani repeats time and again.      
 
What type of phenomenon is the religious experience?  It is a phenomenon that 
concerns human reality and therefore cannot be studied as a geological or 
meteorological event.  It involves the person.  How then must we conduct our 
inquiry?  Since we are dealing with something that occurs within me, that has 
to do with my conscience, my ‗I‘ as a person, it is on myself that I must reflect; 
I must inquire into myself, engage in an existential inquiry.  [...] external 
consultation must confirm, enrich, or contest the fruits of my personal 
reflection (RS, 5).   
 
Aquinas said: Anima est quodammodo omnia (―the spirit of a man is in a 
certain way all things.‖).  The more that one is a person – human – the more he 
embraces and lives in the present instant all that has preceded and surrounds 
that instant.   
The religious factor represents the nature of our ‗I‘ in as much as it expresses 
itself in certain questions: ‗What is the ultimate meaning of existence?‘  Or, 
from another point of view: ‗What does reality consist of and what is it made 
for?‘  Thus, the religious sense lies within the reality of our self at the level of 
these questions: it coincides with the radical engagement of the self with life, 
an involvement which exemplifies itself in these questions (RS, 45). 
 
So then [the inquirer] would have to conclude: There is something in the 
universe, in reality, that corresponds to this want, my need, and it does not 
coincide with anything that I can grasp, and I don‘t know what it is  (RS, 116). 
 
Just as a sign demonstrates the thing of which it is, as a sign, so the world in its 
impact with the human being functions as a sign, ‗demonstrates‘ something 
else, it demonstrates ‗God‘ (RS, 116).  
 
But Giussani‘s enquiry into truth, unlike Heidegger‘s, unfolds on a distinctly 
theological landscape.  Giussani conceives the subject‘s direction upon the object not 
in Heidegger‘s vague sense of Dasein‘s always being somehow ―directed 
(ausgerichtet) and on-its-way,‖ but in the specific, Christian teleological sense of the 
soul‘s journey (percorso) toward God (Homo Viator).  This can be seen more clearly 
in his use of the Christian concept of pilgrimage, as also employed, for instance, by 
Dante in the Divine Comedy (―nel mezzo del camin’ di nostra vita‖), rather than in 
Heidegger‘s concept of the ―world‘s worlding.‖  For Giussani, ontological 




knowledge – viz., knowledge of entities that, as Heidegger says, ―thrust themselves 
to the fore in the state of ready-to-be-known‖ – is not enough to determine the 
direction of the subject‘s gaze or movement.  What is also needed is ontological 
assurance, ―moral certainty,‖ of the object‘s adequacy to be grasped and loved.  Not 
all objects, in other words, are apt to be pursued by the knower for knowledge and 
apprehension.  Judgement is a prerequisite for action, therefore, precisely because 
human flourishing depends on none other than the apprehension of the good.   
The analogy with Heidegger, having been discussed now for several 
paragraphs, can only be carried so far.  Teleology turns Giussani‘s theory of 
knowledge into a theory of moral judgement, rendering it capable of assimilating 
theological content (RS, 23-33).
68
  Notions of desire, destiny, and the heart are bound 
up with the anthropological claim that agents have a built-in goal-directedness, 
which, in the long run of enquiry, amounts to an instinctive and intellectual capacity 
for God (capax Dei).       
 
Augustinian Thomism is the tendency in Giussani‘s writings to frame the 
Aristotelian-Thomist doctrine of final causality according to St. Augustine‘s notion 
of the heart‘s restless desire for God.
69
  The shift in Catholic thought from a pure and 
unadulterated Thomism to an Augustinian hybrid began to take root in the nineteenth 
century with the revival of patristic scholarship.  In a published interview, Giussani 
identified Johann Adam Möhler (1796-1838), John Henry Newman (1801-1890), and 
Romano Guardini (1885-1968) – each of which fall within the nineteenth-century 
Augustinian revival – as having had a decisive influence on his thought (MCL, 29).  
Some of the same authors show up in Carlo Colombo‘s account of the reception of 
Augustinian theology at Venegono Seminary, where from 1932-1942 Giussani 
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underwent theological training for the priesthood: ―The nineteenth century was a 
fruitful period of theological study, which is especially obvious when compared with 
the previous century.  One of its characteristics, in fact, was undoubtedly the 
emergence of certain forms of theological reflection that carried new content and a 
new method of Christian thought, alongside the perdurance [perdurare] of the more 
classical approach to traditional theology: I allude to German theological thought of 
the first half of the century and especially to Möhler and Kuhn, to Newman, to 
Scheeben, and [...] [Carlo] Passaglia.‖
70
  
Pushing the bounds of fin-de-siècle Catholicism and its intolerance toward 
subjectivist philosophies, theologians following Augustine wished to explore the 
pastoral benefits of his self-reflective spiritual path to God.  With due respect for 
Thomas (if not for Neo-Thomists themselves),
71
 some theologians, such as Balthasar, 
felt his philosophy was ―more open-ended and patient of innovatory interpretations 
and developments than the closed systems of theology ad mentem sancti Thomae 
suggest.‖
72
  In addition to injecting the dry and rationalistic character of nineteenth-
century Scholasticism with the personalist appeal to the heart and desire, Augustine‘s 
epistemology served technical ends as well, such as to solve the problem spawned by 
Kant concerning the grounds of objective truth in the knowing-subject: 
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The content of scholastic universal ideas was obtained by abstraction from 
contingent sensible realities.  Metaphysically considered, the universal ideas 
themselves were no more than intentional species.  They were simply 
representations of contingent reality, spiritual modifications of a contingent 
mind.  They were ontologically incapable of bringing the mind into contact 
with the unconditioned necessity of absolute metaphysical reality.  
Scholasticism could not overcome Kant‘s sceptical objections to the possibility 
of objective metaphysics and the subjectivism to which that scepticism led.  
The Christian philosopher could find a way out of this dilemma, however, 
through the Augustinian anthropology in which God‘s immediate presence to 
the mind justifies its apodictic certainty that there is objective truth.
73
     
 
If Scholasticism seemed at the dawn of modernity incapable of leading the masses 
back to God, Augustine assured modern theologians of a conceptual framework 
suitable to new pastoral needs by placing desire and love at the centre of 
metaphysical reflection on God.  Be that as it may, the concept of God‘s immediate 
presence to the mind, along with the attempt to open philosophy to a world of moral 
action in which God could freely reveal himself personally and existentially to the 
subject, put into question Thomas‘s approach to natural theology.
74
  Traditional 
Thomists, backed by popes from Leo XIII (1878-1903) to Pius XIII (1939-1958), 
upheld Thomas‘s approach to natural theology, presupposing God‘s existence and 
casting light on the antecedent role of revelation in the act of faith.
75
  In neither 
attempting nor even alluding to any kind of natural theology as envisaged by the 24 
Thomistic Theses (1916), Giussani‘s approach was clearly a departure from Neo-
Thomism.   
In following Augustine, however, Giussani was far from alone.  Another 
eminent disciple of the Augustinian school was Joseph Ratzinger (elected Pope 
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Benedict XVI in 2005).  His approach to teaching the word God, identical to 
Giussani‘s, displays an aversion to logical demonstration.   As Fergus Kerr points 
out, the new emphasis in natural theology is on anthropology: ―[…] where a 
traditional Thomist would expect natural theology, metaphysical arguments for the 
existence of God, and so on, Ratzinger appeals simply and solely to anthropology 
and the history of religions.  To understand what the word ‗God‘ means we need to 
recall and analyze the sources of religious experience. […] Demonstrating here that 
the solitary subject does not exist – always an exercise early in the neoscholastic 
philosophy courses – Ratzinger offers some interesting reflections, insisting that 
mind depends on language – not so common in neoscholastic philosophy.  He is very 
much in tune, here, with philosophy at the time (1960s), with Heidegger, Merleau-




(i) Augustinian Thomism in Giussani forms around the topics of teleology and 
causality.  The standard account of final causality holds that every agent acts for an 
end.
77
  The central question concerns why the agent produces one effect rather than 
some other, and not what we must know to be able to attribute meaning, truth 
conditions, and goal-directedness to efficient action itself.  The argument, briefly, is 
induced from observation of both the agent and the caused effect.  From the side of 
the agent, observation suggests that a caused effect, which is p and not q (i.e., 
determinately this and not that, not vague or indefinite) is the determinate end of an 
agent‘s focussed intention and action.  The focus is exhibited in the harnessing and 
sublimation of an agent‘s energies under the preponderance of an effect to be 
produced.  Analogously, Jesus says: ―The good man out of the good treasure of his 
heart produces good, and the evil man out of his evil treasure produces evil; for out 
of the abundance of the heart his mouth speaks (Lk. 6:45).‖  It follows, from the 
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agent’s action to the determinate effect, that the agent, before or at the moment of 
action, is executing his plan – an intention which is an interior determination or pre-
ordination toward a determinate mode, p and not q.  Differently put, the effect p 
reflects ―the mind‖ of the agent.  Analogously, Jesus says: ―You will know them by 
their fruits (Matt. 7:16).‖  
There are three related aspects to final causality, and a corollary.  1. Final 
causality directs the agent‘s energies toward a goal. It does not supply the energy per 
se.  2. The end sought for keeps the agent‘s attention focussed, grounding a 
determinate course of action in a sufficient reason.  Sufficiency, broadly speaking, is 
satisfied by the requisite desire of the agent.  The goal, then, is also a good insofar as 
it is sought for. 3. Why the agent does something can be distinguished from what the 
agent does.  The latter, the immediate goal sought for (finis operis), is often 
subordinated to the former, the personal reasons motivating the agent‘s activity 
toward the goal sought.  Corollary: The determinate ends of human agency, in 
particular, presuppose the workings of a specific kind of intelligence or 
thoughtfulness, different in important respects from that exhibited in the goal-
directed activities of dolphins and chimpanzees and the Sphex wasp.  As Alasdair 
MacIntyre points out: ―[...] when a species, such as our own, is able through the use 
of language to become reflective about its reasons, it is not only the having of 
reasons that is now on occasion causally effective in guiding behaviour, but the 
having of reasons for taking this set of considerations rather than to be in this 
particular situation [as] genuinely reason-affording that is causally effective.‖
78
   
Thomas, who also reasons from effect to cause, similarly determinates that 
action resides in some designing intelligence, either the immediate agent itself, if 
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free, or else the first cause/God.
79
  Giussani‘s reasoning, however, takes a distinctly 
Neo-Platonic/Augustinian turn, delving inwardly, with the understanding that God, 
the intelligent planning cause, has constructed human nature so that it has an innate 
natural tendency to recognize the Good through self-reflection and to desire it.  This 
self-reflexive turn and its corresponding themes – the restless heart, Plotinian ascent, 
delectatio victrix, free will, the problem of sin, and so on – gives a distinctly 
Augustinian bent to Giussani‘s theology.  Under the preponderance of Augustine‘s 
influence, Giussani‘s teleology presupposes a self-love that finds its truest expression 
in the love of God.  On the whole, Thomism remains only in the background of his 
epistemology. 
Following Augustine, Giussani concludes the explication of his method (his so-
called ―Third Premise of the Religious Sense‖), reasoning from effect to cause, only 
to say more explicitly and again a posteriori that the heart is the dynamic principle of 
human consciousness.  It is the heart that directs the will to seek unlimited truth and 
to rest in an unlimited good:  
 
That something moves from one position to a different one means that 
‗something else‘ makes this passage possible.  To say that ‗a person becomes‘ 
or ‗life passes‘ implies the existence of something else.  Otherwise, the 
statement would be a self-negating affirmation, because by not admitting that 
there is a hidden factor determining the passage, you end up having to concede 
– as has already been said – that A and    are identical.  And this, in turn, 
would negate the formula, which is a description of our experience in action 
(RS, 58). 
 
Man is, in fact, moved solely by love and affection. It is primarily love of 
ourselves as destiny, the affection of our own destiny that can convince us to 
undertake this work to become habitually detached from our own opinions and 
our imaginations [...], so that all of our cognitive energy will be focussed upon 
a search for the truth of the object, no matter what it should be.  This love is the 
ultimate inner movement, the supreme emotion that persuades us to seek true 
virtue (RS, 33).   
 
The idea of the Good is implanted by God in his human creatures along with the 
desire for self-flourishing and self-reflective intelligence.  The Good is desirable – an 
object to be possessed by the agent as somehow perfective of it – through an 
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appetitive nature or natural tendency for fulfilment infused deeply within the nature 
of the human person.  Thus, desire for the Good, as desire for Truth, is love.   
 
(ii) In Giussani's terminology, the dialectic of desire and fulfilment is the ―inner  
countenance‖ of the human person – ―a ‗heart,‘ as the bible would say (RS, 9)‖ – 
even though at times unconscious, because it is the ―interior stamp‖ of the ―I.‖  The 
heart, as ―interior stamp,‖ is the principle of personal identity and a common 
humanity that exhibits itself externally and can be recognized in the pursuit of 
common goals: truth, beauty, goodness, and so on.  Initially, one is aware only that 
all human movement is directed by the desire for fulfilment (RS, 141).  On closer 
self-reflection, one begins to realize that desire is inexhaustible, such that it can only 
be fulfilled by an Infinite being.  ―The inability of the answer to satisfy the 
constitutive needs of our self is something structural; in other words, it is so inherent 
to our nature that it represents the very character of our being (RS, 49).‖  Attraction 
to the Good turns out to be inexhaustible; that is, until it finds its satisfaction in God, 
of which all other goods, material and spiritual, are aspects.  Consciousness, Giussani 
writes, ―is aware that it is destined to a task, and this awareness is the encounter 
between God and the individual (JTE, 90).‖  When the soul encounters some 
phenomenon that reflects the divine essence, it is sent on something of a Plotinian 
journey, ascending ever higher to its proper object of contemplation, the divine 
essence itself: ―this reality into which we collide unleashes a word, a ‗logos‘ which 
sends you further, calls you on to another, beyond itself, further up (RS, 109).‖    In 
the long run of inquiry, one may proceed from the self-awareness of infinite desire 
for infinite fulfilment, through the ―hypothesis of revelation,‖ to belief in God as the 
first and final cause (RS, 139 ff.).   
 
(iii) For Giussani, the practice of verification turns out to be an ascetical-
epistemological endeavour to cultivate a ―state of soul‖ or habit of thought that 
consciously judges whether the goods which source our happiness (among the beliefs 
and actions of everyday life) are adequate to the needs of the heart-in-relation-to-
destiny.  Something that seems good, is even believed to be good, may turn out not to 
be good when tested against the heart and destiny.  To cultivate a habit of 




discernment about goods requires transcending the common mentality, ideology, and 
preconceptions in order to ask whether x, which displays the class characters of 
happiness, fulfills the innate needs of the heart, which are infinite.  Only if x passes 
this test may it be called a fit object of love; for x is not good if in grasping it one 
feels bad, nor is it enough if in loving it one is left wanting.   
 
(iv)  Giussani‘s phenomenological ontology presupposes an intuitive awareness of 
the difference between higher and lower, better and worse, true and false.  It also 
presupposes an innate awareness of standard moral behaviour, such that certain 
actions which take one across the bounds of what one considers to be ―normal‖ strike 
one with compunction.  What counts as ―normal,‖ Giussani insists, is ―inscribed in 
the law of the heart (RS, 107).‖
80
  The attribution of ―goodness‖ to some object on 
the basis of what makes one truly happy (the heart‘s needs) is a sufficient reason for 
deciding and acting insofar as the heart is given to each one by nature for the 
achievement of true satisfaction, a fuller expression of humanity in God.  ―The 
source of our being places within us the vibration of good and the suggestion, the 
remorse of evil.  There is a voice within us (RS, 107).‖  The heart is a repository of 
truth, a ―critical principle,‖ against which the presentment of objects themselves is 
tested for their aptness to human flourishing.  The good resides in its depths, as ―an 
idea [...] we find within ourselves which allows us to say of someone, ‗he is good‘ 
(RS, 40).‖ As Giussani says elsewhere, the Good, which gives direction and content 
to man‘s projects and the completion of the ―I,‖ is ―dictated‖ by the ―ideal image that 
stimulates [man] from within (RS, 9).‖  Or elsewhere, ―The more a value is vital and 
elementary in its importance – destiny, affection, common life – the more our nature 
gives to each of us the intelligence to know and judge it.  The centre of the problem 
[of morality] is really a proper position of the heart, a correct attitude, a feeling in its 
place, a morality (RS, 30).‖   
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(v) A problem arises – informed by the Catholic doctrine of original sin
81
 – 
insofar as human beings are fallen and, thus, fallible creatures.  First, they are apt to 
misattribute and misidentify what is truly good insofar as they fail to distinguish 
between appearance and reality.  Second, even though human beings, by a 
spontaneous impulse, tend to their flourishing, and while they are endowed with the 
capacity to test the adequacy (correspondence) of goods in relation to the infinite 
needs of the heart, human effort requires divine grace to adhere to truth or moral 
certainty.  In Giussani‘s words:  
 
There is a hiatus, an abyss, a void between the intuition of truth, of being – 
given by reason – and the will, a dissociation between reason, the perception of 
being, and will, which is affectivity, that is to say, the energy of adhesion to 
being (Christianity would point out in this experience a wound produced by 
‗original sin‘).  Because of this, one sees the reasons, but still does not move, 
that is to say lacks the energy to be coherent.  ... Coherence is the energy with 
which man takes hold of himself and ‗fastens on‘ to what reason lets him see.  
On the contrary, a break occurs between reason and affectivity, between reason 




So while the agent is endowed with the capacity to intuit and perceive the noxious 
effects of clinging to what is finite or morally evil, human conduct displays that such 
recognition is not enough to render the agent‘s actions coherent with proper moral 
ends.  The defect, to be clear, is not in the heart per se, insofar as it is oriented to the 
Good and God, but in the intellect‘s darkened understanding and the will‘s weakened 
ability of adhesion to the true.
83
  For this reason, human beings must be educated to 
use the heart and continually reminded that therein lies their true identity, the basis of 
a common humanity. 
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Non-Philosophical Romanticism refers to the tendency in Giussani‘s 
correspondence writings to opt for intuition over ordinary rationality, to understand 
the world and its significance in the style of the poets and other creative geniuses, 
rather than through the analytical language of philosophers or logicians (RS, 14).  
Announcing this kind of philosophical programme, Giussani writes: ―The truly 
interesting question for man is neither logic, a fascinating game, nor demonstration, 
an inviting curiosity.  Rather, the intriguing problem for man is how to adhere to 
reality, to become aware of reality.  This is a matter of being compelled by reality, 
not one of logical consistency. [...]  Logic, coherence, demonstration are no more 
than instruments of reasonableness at the service of a greater hand, the more ample 
‗heart,‘ that puts them to use.‖  In a similar vein, he quotes from Hamlet: ― ‗There are 
more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, than are dreamt in your philosophy‘ (RS, 
51).‘ ‖
84
   
Non-Philosophical Romanticism registers both in terms of the rhetoric and 
content of Giussani‘s argument.  With respect to the former, namely pathos, Giussani 
draws on symbolism and allegory to enliven the analytic statements of dogmatic and 
moral theology, and, most of all, to stir the ―intelligent,‖ ―dramatic,‖ and ―inevitable 
emotions‖ of his young interlocutors to a conscious awareness of their desire for the 
Infinite (RS, 46).
  
In this endeavour, Giussani is following in the steps of a former 
teacher, Giovanni Colombo (1902-1992), whose philosophy of religious education 
promoted the use of literature as a propaedeutic to systematic theology and 
catechesis.
85
  With respect to the latter, Giussani traces the recurrence of Romantic 
leitmotifs (desire, melancholy, self-discovery and self-expression) through a variety 
of the Romantic poets (e.g., Giacomo Leopardi [1798-1837], Giovanni Pascoli 
[1855-1912], Rainer Maria Rilke [1875-1926]), and in so doing means to support and 
universalize one of the basic anthropological claims of his theological reflection: 
―Only the existence of mystery suits the structure of the human person, with its 
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mendacity, insatiable begging, and what corresponds to him is neither he himself nor 
something he gives to himself, measures, or possesses (RS, 57).‖ 
 
Analysis 
(i) Under the aegis of ―Non-Philosophical‖ Romanticism, the notion of capax 
Dei is presented as a case of the contingent knower‘s heightened awareness of self 
and universe.  Such a view holds that theological propositions are derived from 
within as well as from without, but that in both cases, consciousness is the necessary 
precondition both of knowing and of certainty (viz., as in the intuitive exclusion of 
error).  Concerning the knowledge of God from within, Giussani writes: ―to be 
conscious of oneself right to the core is to perceive, at the depths of the self, an 
Other.  (RS, 106, my emphasis).‖  Concerning the knowledge of God from without, 
Giussani writes: ―Kant once confessed that the moment in which he doubted his 
Critique of Pure Reason – the book that denied that one can move from reality on to 
another presence – was when he went out from his house, and lifting up his head, 
gazed at the starry sky (RS, 103).‖  The flash of insight with which Kant was struck 
not only casts doubt on his previous views but demonstrates that another presence, 
presumably God‘s, can be intuited from the starry sky, Giussani believes.  
Giussani also observes that the knowledge of God is contingent on the 
relation of consciousness to the other-as-infinite-fulfilment.  To become gradually 
aware of that which lies at the depths of one‘s being (in Augustine‘s sense) coheres 
with authentic self-discovery; to externalize that presence in belief and practice (in 
St. Paul‘s sense) coheres with self-expression.  Giussani presents the epistemological 
problem of fulfilment as a case of existential groping for the authenticity of the ―I,‖ 
which results, after serious self-examination, in the self-liberating realization that 
one‘s infinite needs are most adequately met in an Other. The narrative at these 
points often turns to the disproportion between our infinite needs and the limitedness 
of the objects of this world as means to their fulfilment.  For Giussani, Leopardi‘s 
impassioned (though ultimately failed) attempt to conquer the love of his life 
exemplifies best the ―sublime sense of the soul,‖ which is the ardour that drives us to 




know and to love to the very end.
86
  The condition of Leopardi‘s pursuit, when 
returned by Giussani to the realm of theological reflection on desire, picks up on 
Augustine‘s theme of the restless heart, with the emphasis that love for the fleeting 
objects of this world is inordinate, as exemplified in Leopardi‘s finitude, while care 
for the genuine needs of one‘s life, exhibited in the universal desire for truth, justice, 
happiness, and beauty, anticipates the fullness that lies beyond (RS, 116). 
 
(ii) The resonance with Romantic expressivism, beyond the category of desire 
and fulfilment, strengthens as the epistemology of correspondence is likened 
repeatedly to the prophetic genius of the poet or artist to perceive the truth about 
humanity and about its destiny.  Giussani speaks of the knower as an artist who, 
through signs, proceeds to the perception of the true (RS, 19), and he attributes this 
capacity to natural endowment, the possession of which exalts an otherwise prosaic, 
earth-bound, and superficial approach to reality: ―Here we are speaking of the 
intuition, which, in every period of history, the more intelligent human spirits have 
had.  It is an intuition of this mysterious presence, which endows the instant, the ‗I‘ 
with substance (solidity, density, foundation) (RS, 105).‖  Authenticity is often 
characterised in this context as the measure of the contingent knower‘s heightened 
level of consciousness, the depth of his engagement with reality, the seriousness with 
which he lives life: ―The mark of great souls and persons who are truly alive is an 
eagerness for this search, carried out through their commitment to the reality of their 
existence (RS, 109).‖  And authenticity recurs to the journey inward, to the seat of 
the authentic ―I,‖ to the heart, to the criterion of a correspondence between the true 
self and the object of desire: asking ―Who am I?‖ and ―What does this object mean to 
me, to the fullness of my humanity, to the freedom and authenticity according to 
which I wish to live?‖  Precisely because correspondence is a question of verifying 
objects against the heart, it presupposes self-knowledge and, hence, the antecedent 
self-discovery prompted by questions of meaning and identity.  The greater and more 
frequent the correspondence, the greater and more ample the results for 
transcendence: ―The more one lives this level of consciousness in his relationship 
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with things, the more intense the impact with reality, and the more one begins to 
know the mystery (RS, 109).‖  Since nature has endowed the contingent knower with 
the interpretive ability to perceive the truth, Giussani is able to frame the moral 
imperative of adhering to the real as the responsible, free, and expressive act of self-
discovery and to anchor the results of such adherence in the moral certainty that 
comes with being in full possession of the self.    
 
(iii) Moral certainty as regards the self is now a case of following the voice of 
nature within. Whereas with Augustine the heart is inclined to God by means of its 
very weight,
87
 now, under the aegis of Romanticism, teleology is presented as the 
case of following the inner voice, a prime original intuition, with which nature has 
endowed us. ―There is a voice within us,‖ says Giussani, ―the vibration of good and 
the suggestion, the remorse of evil,‖ as Giovanni Pascoli also confirms, Giussani 
shows, in his poem ―There is a voice in my life (RS, 107).‖  Giussani calls this 
phenomenological ontology ―elementary experience;‖ he roots it primordially in the 
heart, and describes it as ―immanent in our nature, the complex of ‗needs‘ and 
‗evidences‘ that our mother gave us at birth (RS, 8).‖  Giussani‘s epistemology is 
based on understanding primordial feelings or intuitions that well up from the depths 
in the ―impact with the real.‖  As he puts it: ―[...] it would not be human, that is to 
say, reasonable, to take our experience at face value, to limit it to just the crest of the 
wave, without going down to the core of its motion (RS, 108).‖   In addition to 
resembling the Platonic doctrine that real ideas ontologically pre-exist in the minds 
into which they enter, Giussani‘s terminology confers on his theology a naturalist 
patina.  The intimation of naturalism is mitigated only by the addition of theistic 
affirmations: ―Now to state this criterion is inherent within us is not to argue we 
alone provide it.  Rather, it is to assert that it is drawn from our nature, it is given to 
us by our very nature (where the word nature evidently implies the word God, a clue 
to the ultimate origins of our ‗I‘). (RS, 7)‖   
The prospect of self-discovery would be impossible, Giussani believes, 
without recognition of the moral importance of the emotions.  While the idea of God 
as self-subsistent being, first cause, and sustainer of the universe can be deduced 
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from his effects, as Thomas would maintain, for Giussani, the idea of God flows 
from the contingent knower‘s attraction to beauty and the capacity of nature to arrest 
and possess the mind.  The hermeneutical relation between knower-as-interpreter and 
creation-as-referrant is proleptic of theological claims to come: ―A true seeker‘s 
disposition is laden with a prior evidence and an awe: the wonder of the presence 
attracts me, and that is how the search within me breaks out (RS, 102).‖
88
 From 
wonder and the ―attraction of harmonious beauty‖ (e.g., ―the starry sky‖) the knower 
moves to self-expression  (i.e., ―the search within me breaks out‖) and comes upon 
the intuition at his very depths that he is made by an Other (―I am you-who-make-
me‖).   
This connects with another leading tendency found in Giussani‘s concept of 
friendship, viz., to affirm corporeality rather than to transcend it.
89
  In earnest, 
Giussani expands the idea of reason with the intuitive power of knowing self, which 
could reach to mystical heights.  He never relinquishes his supreme allegiance to the 
object and he never promotes a private religion. Giussani felt the need to distinguish 
between affectivity (on the one hand) and sentimentalism (on the other) to preserve 
the human act of faith from being grounded excessively in the emotions.  
Emotionalism, as distinct from the subject‘s loving response to reality, was thought 
to compromise the objectivity of the fact of Christ and the givenness of revelation. 
 
OBSERVATIONS 
The claim that pre-linguistic reactions of respect and aversion to the objects 
of the world leads to theological propositions about God, as Giussani believes, has 
important implications for Revelation-Tradition and theological anthropology.  The 
problem turns on the epistemological priority of the heart in matters of doubt and 
belief, as seen in Giussani‘s method of turning propositions into hypotheses and 
testing them for truth against the heart.  The neo-Platonic notion that a real idea 
ontologically pre-exists in the hearts into which it enters is the philosophical basis of 
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Giussani‘s claim of an innate religious desire which is met by and completed through 
the event of God‘s self-revelation.  Thus, Giussani seems to formulate the argument 
for tradition in contradictory terms.   
 
Revelation 
(i) Giussani‘s account of revelation must accommodate the axiom that God has 
endowed his human creatures with the instinctual aptitude for ―religious experience‖ 
(cf. RS, 143 ff).  He describes the journey to the proposition that God exists as 
follows:  
 
The human being becomes aware of himself as ‗I,‘ recovers this original 
awe with a depth that establishes the measure, the stature of his identity.  
At this moment, if I am attentive, that is, if I am mature, then I cannot 
deny that the greatest and most profound evidence is that I do not make 
myself [...] I am ―given.‖  Here we are speaking of an intuition, which, in 
every period of history, the more intelligent human spirits have had.  [...] 
When I examine myself and notice that I am not making myself by 
myself, then I [...] turn to the Thing that makes me, to the source that 
causes me to be in this instant, and I can only address it using the word 
you. [...] To be conscious to oneself right to the core is to perceive, at the 
depths of the self, an Other.  [...] All human actions, therefore, inasmuch 
as they aim toward peace and joy, seek God, the exhaustive substance of 
our lives.  [...] The mark of great souls and persons who are truly alive is 
an eagerness for this search, carried out through their commitment to the 
reality of their existence (RS, 109). 
 
Giussani goes even further, describing the human body as genetically constituted to 
anticipate religious faith.  Commenting on the Incarnation in Luke 1:34-7, he speaks 
of God‘s taking on of human flesh as evidence of the structural compatibility of the 
human person to Divine manifestation (RS, 144).  Furthermore, of man‘s religious 
core, Giussani writes: ―we are speaking of that manner of going forth [into the world] 
religiously, a bit mechanically, whereby the aura, the natural religious sentiment, 
which in some way, every person maintains by nature, even beneath the ashes of this 
word, is hidden away and is still able to hide (IPO, 134).‖  On this basis, he is able to 
maintain that ―faith is born from the recollection of an exceptional presence.‖  That 
―recollection,‖ intimating Plato‘s pre-existing forms, concerns God‘s hidden 
presence in the soul.  Indeed, recollection is the central feature of Giussani‘s account 




of faith: both in arriving with certitude at the proposition that God exists and in being 
able to give it assent.    
The possibility of religious experience lies in the presuppositions Giussani 
makes about subjects and objects in his theory of recollection.  Similarly, for 
Romano Guardini (one of Giussani‘s foremost influences), ―religious experience is 
no mere state of excitation; it is not a feeling without an object, nor is it a subjective 
function.  It is a true state of apprehension, awareness, and certitude; in it something 
that is ‗given‘ and the person who has the experience knows a definite object just as 
a man who sees knows an object under the light.  The object is real.‖
90
  For Giussani, 
the encounter presupposes these same features as outlined in Guardini‘s account of 
religious experience: viz., that each term in its otherness is endowed with a particular 
identity, nature, and inclination that combines into a single reality.  All subjects, 
primitively motivated by the need of fulfilment, have the capacity for ―religious 
experience.‖  Beyond the capacity, all that is required is the exceptionality of a 
presence.  The presence may be general and universal, such as in the subject‘s impact 
with the arresting beauty of the sea,
91
 or specific and particular, such as in the 
―hypothesis‖ of the God-made-man or the calling to a vocation like the priesthood.  
Giussani associates the former with poets, artists, and musicians, and the latter, 
paradigmatically, with the encounter of John and Andrew with Jesus.
92
   
The presence is religious not only by giving itself in order to be known, but in 
so doing, by speaking to the subject‘s need of fulfilment.  Thus, the exceptionality of 
the encounter is measured by what the subject deems to be essential to his survival 
and his flourishing.  This relation can be felt in different ways, as pointed out by 
Guardini: viz., ―as creative, formative, permeating, and dominant; as filling, 
inspiring, fructifying, purifying, making blessed, as obligation, transformation, and 
promise; as anger, threat, judgement, punishment, absorption, annihilation – but 
always in such a manner that it reveals a significance of its own that lends a positive 
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value to what might have appeared negative.‖
93
 The criterion by which to measure 
the meaningfulness of the encounter is not chosen, but given (by God).  Thus, 
Giussani speaks of the needs and evidences of the heart as having a divine origin.  
The discovery of the criteria and their fulfilment, then, lead to the one who inscribed 
them onto the heart.   
The rightness – i.e., the ―exceptionality‖ – of the encounter, having the 
quality of ―moral certainty,‖ warrants the subject‘s allegiance to God.  The 
ontological nature of this certainty is positive, for it supplies what has hitherto been 
absent in the subject‘s pursuit of fulfillment.  What is more, the presence, as God, is 
recognized by the subject as the particular something of which he was fundamentally 
in need.  With the fulfilment of that absence having been achieved, the quest of the 
subject draws to a close.  The quest would only continue, in other words, if the 
presence showed up as inept and ineffectual before the ideal of fulfilment.   
 
(ii) What role, then, does the emphasis on encounter leave to revelation?  
Giussani says: ―[...] revelation means a possibly real fact, an historical event, which 
the human person may or may not recognize.  In fact, neither Judas, nor the majority 
of those who saw it, recognized it (RS, 143).‖  Revelation is significant because it is 
God‘s answer to humanity‘s cry for purpose and meaning: ―At the extremity of life‘s 
experience, at the edge of this passionate hard-won consciousness of existence, in 
spite of man himself, this cry of the truest humanity breaks out as an entreaty, a 
begging.  And then emerges the great hypothesis ... This is the exceptional 
hypothesis, revelation in a strict sense of the word: that the mystery that reveals itself 
through a factor of history with which, as in the case of Christianity, it identifies 
itself (RS 143).‖ Thus, if the purpose and meaning of life can be accessed through an 
experience in advance of learning the truth-claims of revelation, Giussani would 
seem to conclude that religious faith need not depend so heavily on our teachers in 
faith.       
 
(iii) What effect does emphasising ―comprehension‖ and ―conscious recollection‖ 
on the ―exceptionality of a presence‖ have on revelation as a communicative act?  
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The sense seems to imply that human beings and their activities are to be understood 
in terms of consciousness.  Reactions to material signs, such as Scripture and 
tradition, are, on this account, attended by deliberation and reflection.  To presume 
otherwise would be to diminish the standard of acting ―reasonably‖ as self-conscious 
rational beings.  As a result, revelation is something that is judged and appropriated 
with moral certainty, not primarily as an axiom that is learned unreflectively through 
the longstanding custom of the community, but through experience and testing.  How 
one is educated to interpret signs seems to diminish in importance in comparison 
with the construction that one is already endowed with ―needs and evidences‖ and 
self-consciousness in order to be able to reflect on what ―corresponds.‖
 94 
 Giussani‘s 
unwitting indebtedness to Descartes and Kant cannot be overlooked here, much as he 
himself would be dismayed to find it.  Indeed, ―elementary experience‖ does not so 
much include revelation or tradition within its own structure, but stands in advance 
of and above revelation and tradition as the critical and primordial principle of 




(iv) There is something odd in saying ―We seek, and behold: God is there to be 
sought,‖ when surely it is because God is, that we seek.  Thomas Aquinas would 
likely have had a hard time imagining how a theologically-generated doctrine, such 
as the existence of a transcendent being or God as self subsistent being, could be 
discovered in purely metaphysical reflection, as Giussani‘s epistemology 
maintains.
96
  Giussani, however, is not alone among twentieth-century Catholic 
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thinkers to base a great deal of moral theology on the presupposition of an a 
prioristic religious core.  Etienne Gilson, Fergus Kerr points out, had once 
recommended that Christian philosophy penetrate beyond the abstruse philosophical 
theses on which it had relied for centuries to the underlying ―deep religious life and 
secret fervour of a soul in search of God.‖
97
   
The problem with soul-searching teleology lies in the contentious claim that 
God can be recognized before a language of signs is imparted.  Such claims must 
defend themselves not only against Thomas, but against anthropologies based on 
linguistic dependency, from the later Wittgenstein through cognitive psychology to 
field teleology.
98
  Thomas explicitly and consistently maintains that the notion of 
God as transcendent self-subsisting being presupposes God‘s primitive self-
revelation: ―This sublime truth Moses was taught by our Lord.‖
99
  According to 
Fergus Kerr, Gilson concludes his long preamble concerning God as Pure Act of 
Being in The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy without demonstrating explicitly the 
significant fact that ―it took God‘s self-revelation to Moses to get the thought going 
in the first place that God is the ‗to be‘ which we cannot know.‖
100
  Gilson‘s oblique 
a priorism, Kerr finds, is sealed with his explicit references to a ―deep religious life 
and secret fervour of a soul in search of God.‖  What Gilson fails to point out is that 
God‘s self-revelation as Pure Act of Being, through the statement ―I AM WHO AM‖ 
(Exod. 1:13-14), tells a different story concerning the genealogy of theologically-
generated propositions than the claim that God may be known by reflecting on the 
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secret depths of the soul.  The alternative narrative, to which Kerr gestures but 
Gilson omits, resorts to the fact that Moses heard the voice of God.  By extension, 
what we are able to say about God derives from what we are taught.  Language is 
inescapable.  To imply that the notion of a transcendent being is intuitively 
perceptible is not necessarily incorrect as it is conjectural.  To represent theory as 
fact is of course problematic.   
A tension begins to emerge in Giussani‘s treatment of Revelation-Tradition 
between objectivity, of the kind promoted in Giussani‘s Heideggerian tendency to 
return to the things themselves, and subjectivity, of the kind promoted in his Non-
Philosophical Romantic tendency to accord moral importance to the emotions.  
Analogously, the tension is between a prelinguistic capax Dei, of the kind derived 
from the notion of a restless heart in search of its unlimited rest in God, and of a 
linguistically-dependant capax Dei, of the kind derived from the notion that 
cognitive reflection on the identity of God requires training in a language of signs by 
which to recognize God. 
 
Intuitions 
The account of tradition is equivocal and inconsistent, it would seem, owing 
to two competing tendencies in the account of intuitions. The most problematic of 
the accounts is the second, which replicates the characteristics of Cartesian-Kantian a 
priorism. 
 
(i) In his early writings (imprimatur and nihil obstat 1960), addressing the 
relationship of CL to the hierarchy of the Church, Giussani correctly ascribes 
importance to the longstanding customs of the community: ―Any version of the 
Christian experience, no matter how personal, must at least imply [an] encounter 
with the community and reference to authority (JTE, 105).‖  On this account, 
intuitions are formed in specific contexts and can be taken as a reliable basis for 
responsible deciding and acting in daily life without self-conscious appropriation, 
even though the possibility of their interruption by unexpected events always exists.  
As Giussani writes:  
 




Our encounter with a vital Christian community [...] brings us tidings that 
spring from a life lived through the centuries, through tradition.  Each of us 
emerges from a stream that is born of this human and Christian solidarity.  
Thus, to love the community and the encounter that has generated it means to 
love this tradition of which we are born, to acknowledge this age-old reality 
that makes possible the Christian existence within us (JTE, 95).   
 
A vestige of this emphasis remains in The Trilogy where tradition is the formative 
influence into which subjects are born and outside of which they cannot be conceived 
(RS, 37ff., OCC, 20).  Giussani teaches his interlocutors to appropriate the culture 
and tradition into which they are born as a matter of common sense judgement, rather 
than through rigorous testing, discouraging scepticism or doubt in their regard.  For 
Giussani, it would be folly, for instance, for a Buddhist arbitrarily to abandon his 
tradition in pursuit of another: ―the suggestion that we follow the religion of our own 
tradition remains a basic unpretentious directive.  In this sense then, all religions are 
‗true.‘  Man‘s only duty is to be serious in adhering to them (OCC, 20).‖ Similarly, it 
would be insufferable either for a child arbitrarily to call into question her mother‘s 
love for her (RS, 14), or for a philosopher to doubt the existence of the United States 
of America simply on the basis of not having been there in person (RS, 15ff.).  The 
thrust of each of these examples highlights the unreflective aspect of intuitions, and 
shows that the spontaneous appropriation of tradition through all kinds of activities is 
a respectable mode of behaviour: ―[the regard for tradition] requires keenness – not 
destruction, not intelligence, not pettiness, not a complaint for what is not found, but 
joy at what is found, and a ready openness to acknowledge the correspondence (JTE, 
138).‖   
 
(ii) The continual recurrence to the theme of correspondence suggests that the 
appropriation of tradition is a conscious act of judgement relying on the recollection 
of a priori criteria.  While tradition, for Giussani, is a repository of past wisdom, 
correspondence requires that its relevance to the present and the future be a 
conscious determination of its moral standing en face of the human problem. Quite 
apart from the authority given to tradition through a longstanding custom of the 
community, it is something that acquires moral force to the extent that it has been 
judged as a ―working hypothesis.‖  Understanding tradition means applying it to the 




most important questions of life.  Judging its pragmatic purport vis-à-vis the human 
problem is the preferred mode of loyalty to unreflective – blind – following.  The 
longstanding customs of the community take hold of our interpretations only after 
they have been judged objectively/essentially by the critical principle referred to as 
elementary experience.   
Thus, applying ―elementary experience‖ as a critical principle requires 
tradition to be turned into an hypothesis and subordinated under the preponderance 
of the heart where it is tested for its adequacy as a solution to the human problem 
(RS, 38).  The tradition which is adequate to the exigencies of the heart is either the 
externalisation of the ideal image from within or something exogenous and wholly 
different, though complementary to man‘s original structure.  Throughout, Giussani 
insists – presumably on the assumption that there is a strict correlation in the knower 
between intellect and will
101
 – that verification establishes tradition‘s longevity.
102
  
The emphasis on conscious appropriation also leads him to the conclusion that 
tradition, having been understood and tested, can also be ―profoundly changed‖ in 
―meaning,‖ ―structure,‖ and ―perspective‖ (RS, 38); that its content is suited to the 
temperament of the age.  The emphasis, only a few sentences later, reiterates the 
theme of loyalty: ―using tradition critically does not mean doubting its value – even 
if this is what is suggested by the common mentality (RS, 38).‖   
 
 Anthropology 
(i) Verification, directed to doctrinal certainty, is concerned not only with 
ontology (the phenomenon p as such, the ―quiddity‖ of p, being qua being, p in 
itself), but with epistemology (how p is known), and this has implications for 
Giussani‘s theological anthroplogy.  Formally stated:
103
 p is observed to display the 
feeling of moral certainty, the authentic I, and so on.  But correspondence is assumed 
to display the feeling of moral certainty, the authentic I, and so on.  Given that p 
displays the class characters of correspondence, by hypothesis p is a case of 
correspondence.  Since correspondence is general with respect to p, this inference is 
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only possible if the class characters of correspondence are habitually in the heart.  
Differently put, p is good in virtue of some positive quality in itself and in relation to 
some appetitive dynamism of someone who can seek, desire, and love it.
104
 The 
needs of the heart – truth, intelligibility, the Good, the Beautiful (each to an infinite 
degree) – add to that which a given p might have as a matter of its own internal 
structure.  The ontological goodness of p is one thing, the ontological goodness of p 
for me is another.  The ―for me‖ gestures at the needs of the heart implanted and 
oriented by God toward God himself.  As a result, correspondence is an intuition 
about the good of p with reference to the needs of the heart, where the heart‘s needs 
are infinite and (as taught by revelation) can only be fulfilled by God, who is infinite.   
 
(ii) As a theory of morals, the result of correspondence based on intuition implies 
that p is believed or done instead of q; and this is grounded in a sufficient reason of 
the kind that p is more adequate to the problem of desire and my destiny than q.  The 
reason comes as a flash of insight, like an intuition, comparable to ―the approach of 
the artist or genius, who, through signs, proceeds to the perception of the true (RS, 
19).‖  It settles the problem with an imperative proposition: ―I cannot but believe or 
do p instead of q, because p, as far as I can see, corresponds, at the depths of my 
being, to the very person that I am.‖  Differently put, the feeling that p is right for me 
is a sign that p is adequate to my heart and destiny.  Such a feeling is an intuition that 
signals the end of inquiry, the removal of the doubt which got the epistemological 
ball rolling in the first place.  Giussani writes:  ―In applying this method, it is as if 
one makes a fast comparison with oneself, with one‘s own ‗elementary experience,‘ 
with one‘s own ‗heart,‘ and says: ‗Up to this point, what I see corresponds with my 
heart, with those needs and evidences, with what I was made for; therefore it is true, 
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and I can trust [...] (RS, 20-21).‖  Belief replaces doubt.  Coherence is supplied by an 
equation between belief and the directional movement of the agent.   
 
(iii) The anthropological implications begin to emerge when Giussani probes the 
kinds of entities that humans are who know p truly.  The proposition ―I want to know 
p‖ implies ―insofar as p is knowable;‖ and the proposition ―I want to know p insofar 
as it is knowable‖ gives rise to the question ―How is p knowable to me qua human 
being to the extent that it is knowable at all?‖  The condition of ―to me qua human 
being‖ leads Giussani to comment on the human capacity for knowledge and the 
methods by which it may be possessed.  Given that the question of p is abstracted 
and universalized, then the account of knowing p is correspondingly abstracted and 
universalized.  As a result, the theory of knowledge becomes the universal account of 
how human beings know at all; and the knowledge of p, having been determined 
through a method that is in accordance with human nature, is recommended to all 
without reserve.  What is lost in the epistemological procedure is the fact that 
interpretation of signs follows from one‘s education in a tradition.  Moreover, the 
human enacts this hermeneutic primarily as a conscious being, rather than a 
communicating and communicative being.  Giussani will recover a communicative 
anthropology when he comes to writing excellently on affection and friendship.  In 
the realm of belief, however, so intrinsic is the theory of knowing to resolving doubt 
that recommending p to oneself or to others without having verified it is to act 
unreasonably (RS, 21ff.).   
 
(iv) Giussani may be unaware that his insistence on verification reproduces the 
rationalist (―reductionist‖) anthropology he explicitly seeks to overcome.  Perhaps he 
has not sufficiently considered, as the case would appear, that traditions generate 
varieties of intuitions, some of which are contradictory and incommensurable.  
Nevertheless, for failing to consider contexts and rival intuitions, he leaves his 
interlocutors without the tools of argument.  His overly optimistic account of 
verification, based on the heart as ―interior stamp,‖ sees all practitioners agreeing on 
the ultimate opinion concerning p, settling the matter not through discursive reason 
(of which there is no account), and not through one‘s education in a tradition (which 




is suggestive, for Giussani, of behaviourism), but by sharing the recurrence of the 
same insights which bind all human knowers who have freed themselves from the 
sway of ideology.  In the worst case scenario, argument in search of truth is replaced 
by apologetics, where proponents entrenched in their positions vie for supremacy in a 
battle of mutually exclusive illuminations.
105
   
 
CONCLUSIONS 
For Giussani, serious Christian living is always accompanied by a special act 
of meaning that is rooted in the heart.  While affection is the ultimate level of free, 
autonomous, and trusting obedience to tradition and authority, the method of 
attaining to this commitment involves the mental act of interpretation and 
understanding; i.e., seeking ―adequate reasons,‖ as Giussani puts it.  So far, so good.  
The act of obedience, like the act of faith, however, goes one step further: it is 
construed as adherence to reality, such that reality and tradition, or reality and 
religious propositions, are the same.  While the ―sane person,‖ therefore, may 
experience tension between his freedom and obedience to authority, that tension 
ought to be treated as a surface appearance distracting from the harmony between 
subjects and tradition that lies at the deepest level of the ―I,‖ the heart.  What is more, 
since the heart is ―the same in everyone,‖ it is the faculty of affective intelligence 
that unites everyone around universal objects of correspondence, such as the Church.      
In the discussion above, I identified certain Cartesian-Kantian tendencies in 
the author, signalled primarily by the emphasis on self-reflection and the a priori 
categories of the heart.  This tendency militates against Giussani‘s attempts 
elsewhere to overturn Cartesian-Kantian approaches to truth, which he feels have 
entrenched themselves in his native culture against religious belief and practice.  As 
we saw above, Giussani‘s theory of correspondence is the method he recommends as 
the conduit of phenomenological ontology (knowing the object itself), which 
transcends the common mentality and assures the practitioner that his belief is also a 
―moral certainty.‖  Correspondence is also based on a neo-Platonic theory of 
knowledge, different from Thomas‘s meaning of adaequatio, which takes its 
viewpoint for judgement from the ―ideal image from within.‖  Nevertheless, being a 
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strong proponent of tradition, Giussani is forced to back-peddle on his 
epistemological claims centred on the heart – reinforced by non-philosophical 
Romantic notions of authenticity – when he equivocates on the authority of tradition, 
reproducing the narrative of Rahner‘s transcendental subject, which he earnestly 
wants to challenge.
106
  His response, albeit unusual, is to assimilate subjects and 
tradition, basing the possibility of harmony on the correspondence between inner 
truth and outer reality.  On this account, subjects and tradition agree and subjects are 
united in their agreement over tradition. Angelo Scola, commenting on Giussani‘s 
theology, evaluates this synthesis positively, indicating that Giussani‘s method 
achieves – at least in theory – ―the capacity to regain the best results of 
transcendental thought about freedom.‖
107
  The subject and authority, on this 
account, are of one voice.     
Despite the tidy ending, readers are often confounded when confronted in the 
same text by the importance (on the one hand) of forming the heart in a community 
where masters impart the tradition of centuries to novices, and (on the other hand) 
trusting the heart as already ready to recognize the truth on immediate impact.  
Similarly, his readers are at certain points trained (on the one hand) to test the 
validity of magisterial propositions against the primordial needs of the heart (for 
Giussani is certain of a fast correspondence insofar as the Magisterium is the 
guardian of truth and truth is one of the heart‘s needs), and (on the other hand) of 
obeying the ancient tradition with ―affection,‖ knowing that it was bequeathed after 
two thousand years of faithful devotion to the truth.  As these tendencies compete 
with one another, the challenge that lies before Giussani‘s interpreter concerns how 
to introduce clarity, without ignoring the concerns that led him to frame his 
discussion of freedom and authority in this way and not in some other.   
Giussani‘s argument also calls for certain philosophical repairs, which lie 
beneath the surface confusion.  First, it is problematic that Giussani makes no 
provision for the possibility of rival intuitions.  The matter concerns the 
interpretation of signs.  There are signs whose meaning can be unproblematic and 
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signs whose meaning is problematic.  Giussani‘s focus is on the former, to the 
exclusion of the latter.  Not only are there no disputes, there is also no doubt.  Where 
rival intuitions arise – as inevitably they must – the certain result of resorting to the 
heart for judgement unwittingly levels tradition and renders the tools of history, 
language, and culture unavailable for the repair of real problems in localized 
situations.  Second, the effect of the heart on tradition carries important implications 
for the status given to Scripture as the deepest source of repair.  For instance, given 
that the exigencies of the heart are the primary reality, and the Incarnation a response 
to them, Giussani fails to account for how the Incarnation directs the heart when 
educated in a tradition, making the Incarnation appear as an add-on to an already 
complete anthropology.  The subject is then exalted as the ―reasonable‖ (if not 
altogether rational) defender of tradition, rather than as the dependent pupil of its 
wisdom.   
The vaguenesses generated by Giussani‘s epistemology, and the essentialist 
claims he makes about tradition, result from his desire to want to settle the ultimate 
opinion of an indeterminate community of enquirers concerning the question of 
religion.  Giussani‘s audience, of course, are a real group of people in a localized 
situation and the problems they raise with him are concrete and particular.  The over-
generalization of his thesis, however, leads him to rely on a dubious epistemology 
which not only sits awkwardly with the role he wants to assign to tradition, but 
replicates the Cartesian-Kantian tendencies he seeks to escape, viz., of addressing 
particulars with universals.  Any attempt to reclaim Giussani‘s thesis and to save the 
members of the School of Community from strenuously testing and retesting 
religious hypotheses requires resituating Giussani‘s epistemology in the light of 
history and context.   
The possibility of repairing the epistemology‘s entrenched a priorism 
requires addressing the concerns of his audience whose adscription to Romantic 
ideals of individualism and authenticity have a direct bearing on their engagement 
with the propositions of faith, as Giussani realized.  By referring Giussani‘s theory of 
judgement back to his audience, namely younger generations of Catholics in the 
1960s, of which the majority were high school and university students, it is possible 
to appreciate the authority that tradition must have posed for him.  The years of 




Giussani‘s first engagement with students were marked by protests against the 
establishment, culminating famously in the student riots of 1968.  It seems Giussani 
proceeded on the assumption that the heart might save the individual from losing his 
identity to the community.  At the same time, wanting to avoid a Nietzschean 
solution, he attempted, perhaps with a certain philosophical naiveté, to accord the 
tradition with the heart.  The heart, Giussani famously said, could not disagree with 
tradition.  In this way, the problem of freedom and authority, just as the act of faith, 
found a natural basis in the inclination for the good and the aptitude for God.  While 
Giussani correctly recommends the heart to his readers to correct reductionist 
approaches to reason, it seems he overextends his claim by positing the unity of 
hearts accorded to a single tradition.  A more limited claim would take seriously the 
possibility of disagreement.  
How, then, might one proceed with the repair of Giussani‘s theory of 
judgement?  To proceed along the lines of a more limited claim, allowing and 
making provisions for the possibility that disagreement and doubt in the 
interpretation of a sign do arise within communities, must not be motivated by 
rational scepticism, i.e., if Giussani‘s anti-Cartesian stance is to be upheld more 
consistently.  The evaluation of a proposition of faith must occur only when the 
existing meaning of a sign fails to function according to the longstanding 
expectations of the community.  The importance Giussani accords to the heart in this 
process is acceptable – to a point.  The heart, his codeword for intuition, is generally 
a solid basis of decision and action, as long as the unexpected does not arise.  The 
unexpected, in this case, would be doubt over the meaning of a sign.  In order to 
resolve the problem of rival intuitions over an equivocal sign, discernment of 
different options would be required, as well as an account of discursive reason (e.g., 
the Dominican tradition of disputatio).  To this end, it will be my task further along 
to suggest how the method of elementary experience might be expanded to include a 
possible logic of discernment that already exists within the Catholic tradition, but 
which perhaps needs to be explicated with greater clarity in Giussani‘s account.     









Il lavoro è l‟espressione del nostro essere.  Questa coscienza dà veramente respiro all‟operaio che 
per otto ore fatica sul banco di lavoro, come all‟imprenditore teso a sviluppare la sua azienda.  Ma il 
nostro essere – ciò che la Bibbia chiama „cuore‟: coraggio, tenacia, scaltrezza, fatica – è sete di 
verità e di felicità   Non esiste opera, da quella umile della casalinga a quella geniale del progettista, 
che possa sottrarsi a questo riferimento, alla ricerca di una soddisfazione piena, di un compimento 







This chapter takes up Giussani‟s account of freedom.  The principle point of 
access will be through L‟io, il potere, e le opera (IPO), a collection of writings in 
political theology.  For analysis, I have grouped speeches from the second part of 
IPO, Le Opere (pp. 97-161), which deals explicitly with intermediate communities in 
the political sphere.
2
   
(i)  “La libertà alla radice dell‟opera” [Freedom at the root of an oeuvre] 
(pp. 99-123),  
(ii)  “Dacci un cuore grande per amare” [Grant us a generous heart with 
which to love] (pp. 124-133), 
(iii)  “Di fronte al bisogno, un‟ipotesi positivo” [In the face of need, a 
positive hypothesis] (pp. 134-147),  
(iv)  “La compagnia si dilata in libertà” [Companionship flourishes in 
freedom] (pp. 148-164).   
I will also make reference to a fifth essay, “Senso religioso, opere, politica,” 
famously presented before the Assemblea della Democrazia Cristiana lombarda at 
Assago in 1987, which is the basis of the speeches cited above.  It is a suggestive text 
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rather than a detailed exposition, and therefore unsuitable for in-depth analysis.  
Together, these five pieces represent Giussani‟s central concerns and reflections on 
the role and importance of institutions in society.  Their genesis occurs rather late in 
Giussani‟s career, from 1992-1995, and may be seen to synthesise many years of 
experience and reflection on the topic of freedom and authority, as he himself says 
(IPO, 171).  Moreover, as the editor points out (IPO, 278), parts of these speeches 
are rewoven into other important texts authored by Giussani, such as The Risk of 
Education (1995).         
Giussani‟s conceptualization of freedom in IPO lends itself to a division of 
materials according to questions of freedom in politics and questions of freedom in 
the Church.  I introduce this division more explicitly than Giussani, labelling the 
categories Freedom 1 and Freedom 2, in order to facilitate the exposition of 
materials over five different essays.  Having said that, since one of Giussani‟s central 
arguments concerns the intrinsic value of religion to culture, what is said of freedom 
in one category is very often of significance to the other.   
Under the category of Freedom 1, I organize Giussani‟s materials pertaining 
to freedom in the public sphere.  Descriptions that fall here presuppose the universal 
importance of specific kinds of freedom, such as religious freedom, freedom of 
conscience, and freedom of association.  Giussani seems to single out these kinds of 
freedom because he believes they are under threat from the overextension of 
government.  Giussani, therefore, identifies the political conditions required for the 
actualization of these kinds of freedom, particularly by promoting the intervention of 
intermediate communities.  He redefines political entities (e.g., a state, a people, and 
a constitution) according to the Principle of Subsidiarity in order to argue that the 
absence of intermediate communities is a grave impediment to political health.  
When the norms for which he is arguing might be called into doubt, he refers to the 
basic philosophical description of what it means to be human.  Giussani, therefore, 
authoritatively and prescriptively invokes the language of “fundamental freedoms” 
used both in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and Pope John 
XXIII‟s (1958-1963) encyclical on religious freedom, Pacem in Terris. In doing so, 
he implies that the limitation of these kinds of freedom is a humanitarian concern, 




putting him in a position to advance his argument with urgency to all men of good 
will.   
Under the category of Freedom 2, I consider Giussani‟s account of the role 
and importance of freedom in terms of its relationship to the act of faith.  He seeks a 
principle by which to explain how obedience to doctrine and to the longstanding 
custom of the community, including obedience to the moral law, might be intelligent 
obedience, consistent with our nature as rational beings.  He recovers the principle 
for which he is searching in his definition of the heart, as expounded in The Religious 
Sense (1997), presupposing an anthropological relationship between religion and the 
human person.  In this sense, Giussani argues that the human person naturally attains 
his or her fulfillment through the arrival of religious propositions, even if one may be 
unaware of this fact.  Religious propositions, such as the proposition that God exists, 
are mediated by an “encounter,” e.g., the impact with the real (generally), or the 
Church (specifically).  They manifest themselves as true in the heart‟s intimation of 
the infinite for which it longs, traditionally culminating in the “beatific vision.”   
Given that Giussani postulates a strict correlation between person and 
religion, he classifies the tension that may arise between moral obedience and 
individuality as a problem of understanding.  Once a moral fact is known and judged 
for what it is, de natura and in relation to reality, any initial resistance to obedience – 
rooted, perhaps, in an errant inclination to radical individualism – gives way to an 
intellectual conviction which shapes decision and action.  Differently put, insofar as 
Giussani presupposes that subjects and objects are essentially the same, the act of 
understanding shows that obedience anticipates the harmonious completion of the 
subject through the moral law and the theological sources from which it stems, and 
this cannot but have an effect on deciding and acting, including the shaping of 
civilization, in a manner more suited to God‟s design of the world and the human 
person.  The category of Freedom 2 is completed with Giussani‟s reading of John 
8:32: “the truth will set you free,” where adherence to God, Christ, and the Church – 
each of which are synonymous with truth – are the only paths to freedom insofar as it 
can be authentically conceived.   
  





Giussani‟s explicit aim in these speeches is to address certain problems in the 
Italian cultural context of his day using a quite untheoretical apparatus.  Indeed, his 
whole project from 1954 to 2005 was described by him as a “pastoral and educative 
attempt,” backed by Gaudium et Spes and the concept of “New Evangelization,” to 
render theology more immediately relevant to the ordinary concerns of daily life.
3
  
This aim is clearly stated at various intervals in the speeches on freedom, such as 
when Giussani calls attention to his desire to equip his audience with a “new 
approach to life,” which is also capable of resolving “concrete concerns” in a manner 
that is both “realistic” and “prudential” (see especially IPO, 168-170).  Giussani 
proceeds to deliver practical solutions to real problems by formulating maxims, 
which he deems to be concrete, such as “Politics is an affair that concerns the human 
person,” (IPO, 173), and “Freedom is a word that must be learned by observing one‟s 
own nature.”  The “concrete” nature of these maxims is captured in their aversion to 
abstract and utopian philosophy (IPO, 175), it seems to Giussani, by way of their 
existentialist and personalist content.
4
  They are for the author practical-theories-to-
live-by.    
There is, on the one hand, something compelling in Giussani‟s attempt to 
repair real problems in this way.  His audience, on the other hand, have on occasion 
deemed his approach to be “unusual” (insolita) and “unuseful” (non usuale), as 
revealed by the responses to the Assago speech (IPO, 171).  For instance, one of 
Giussani‟s friendlier interviewers noted that none of the content from the address 
ever made its way into concrete political deliberations, nor did it ever impact social 
policy (IPO, 172).  In reply, Giussani admitted that his speech might indeed be 
difficult to comprehend.  He offered as reasons both the “accentuation of elementary 
human considerations” and “the mentality of certain individuals which is so far 
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removed from what it means to be human that the very meaning of the words was 
lost on them (IPO, 172).”  Apart from the obvious antagonism with which 
representatives of the church are met in the increasingly secularized milieu of Italian 
politics, to which Giussani is surely gesturing in his reply, some criticism of the 
text‟s pragmatic purport is warranted, I contend, on the basis that Giussani‟s maxims 
fail to equip his audience with tools to achieve the concrete results they intend to 
deliver.  
It is not uncommon for experienced members of Communion and Liberation 
(CL) to have difficulty comprehending Giussani‟s texts.  Moreover, their attempts to 
elucidate his writings, at the meetings of the School of Community, for example, 
often reproduce the kinds of vaguenesses that characterize his writing.   
Among others, Giussani‟s strategy is replicated by Bernhard Scholz, 
president of the Associazione Compagnia delle Opere (CDO).
5
  The following 
remarks, delivered to businessmen and entrepreneurs at the outset of the financial 
crisis in 2007, capture Scholz‟s essential response to the potential meltdown of the 
global economy:  “Your labour is an oeuvre.  Labour, be it yours, mine, or ours, has 
a value which does not have as its term success, profit, career, or power.  The value 
of work is a matter that concerns the heart.  It is the heart that expresses itself, that 
risks in order that reality be transformed into a dwelling (dimora) more adequate to 
its needs.  That dwelling is a place where charity and beauty abide.”
6
  Scholz‟s 
remarks recall Giussani‟s response to earlier concerns that had troubled his audience.  
It is, however, important to note how substantially different those earlier concerns 
had been; namely, “Whether the experience of work, with all its toil and fatigue, can 
be lived as an experience of fullness?” and, in a related sense, “What conditions in 
the public sphere are needed for agents to exercise their creative potential so as to 
express the desire for truth, justice, beauty, and unity, in accordance also with their 
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historical, religious and cultural backgrounds?”  Whether the kind of response Scholz 
forged from Giussani‟s texts was applied either to Giussani‟s concerns or to the 
global financial crisis has little bearing on the outcome if the benefit is to be 
measured in terms of concrete results.  The vagueness displayed here, as elsewhere 
through the speeches, is irredeemable, only if further material, not present in the 
original formulations, is introduced into the discussion: no amount of poring over 
would suffice to introduce clarity.  While Giussani seems to be identifying the right 
problems, the tendencies which generate the problem are left intact.     
       
Hypothesis 
There are many different kinds of problem Giussani attempts to address in 
IPO; e.g., how can freedom be secured with truth claims which must be held?  In the 
concrete decisions and actions of ordinary life, how is adherence to truth compatible 
with freedom in its self-expressive dimensions, particularly the discovery of the “I”?  
How is the Church‟s account of obedience to the Magisterium compatible with 
freedom?  Can freedom be ascribed to the subject whose defence of truth leaves him 
standing alone in the public square?  What description of freedom would permit 
religious institutions to be autonomous and also to flourish in civil society?        
In general, there are two principal ways of addressing these problems: 
treating them either as “why” questions or treating them as “how” questions.  “Why” 
questions in the realm of religious belief and practice follow this pattern: “Why 
should I hold x to be true, adopting it as a principle of decision and action when y is 
the case, where y represents disagreement with x or inconvenient circumstance 
impeding the implementation of x?”  “How” questions, instead, follow this pattern: 
“Given that I am already inducted in the tradition which holds x to be true, how in 
light of my disagreement with x or inconvenient circumstances impeding x‟s 
implementation am I to hold it and use it as a principle for decision and action?”     
Thinking of Old Testament texts as models, one can call “why” questions 
“law” questions (of the kind addressed in Exodus, Leviticus and Deuteronomy), and 
“how” questions “wisdom” questions (of the kind addressed in Psalms, Job, 
Proverbs, etc.) 




Problems are compounded when “law” questions are given “wisdom” 
answers and vice versa.  “Law” questions are universal and prescriptive.  In the case 
of freedom, they draw on a previously established rule to ask whether p counts as a 
legitimate exercise of freedom.  “Wisdom” questions, instead, are casuistic: they 
involve the application of universal principles to particular cases.  For example, 
Christ‟s command to “love your enemies and pray for those who persecute you,”
7
  is 
a clear rule against which infractions are immediately recognizable.  And yet, to 
absolve one‟s detractor, for example, without some sign of contrition and reparation 
would be foolishly to place oneself in harm‟s way where one‟s integrity could 
continue to be compromised.  To respond by estrangement, minimally, would seem 
to redress the injustice suffered and prevent its recurrence.  Thus the command to 
“love one‟s enemies and pray for those who persecute you” becomes a question of 
“how” this is to take place in a particular case with its own complex set of 
circumstances.  So while “law” questions are suited to recovering the ultimate 
purpose and meaning of something, “wisdom” questions concern how something is 
to be done, say, to realize a desire, but more commonly, to decide what is to be done 
in a given situation, where it is not a desire that presents itself as the focus of 
attention, but a problem that arises en face of the desire.
8
   
Giussani tends to give “law” answers to “wisdom” questions.  This tendency 
frustrates the pragmatic purport of his texts.  For example, why I should forgive my 
enemy who has caused my great suffering comes down to “what I have met,” e.g., 
Christ in the Movement, which is the place where I have encountered reality in its 
fullness and become more human.  Laws themselves are as good and fundamental to 
human nature as their practical counterpart, wisdom: they assist the mind when it is 
uncertain to seek the right relation of means to end by keeping clear what is true and 
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 yet, as universals, they can fit particular circumstances awkwardly.  Thus, 
according to Thomas Aquinas, it is not that law or universals are unimportant; rather, 
in the hurly-burly, where the agent is to identify particular actions through which to 
approach a problem, the character of the knowledge sought is not like the knowledge 




The account is most often vague when it offers “why” answers to “how” 
questions.  Giussani‟s preference for “why” answers can be traced historically to 
tensions in the Italian cultural context of his day involving concerns that turn on 
questions of autonomy and obedience.  I will define Giussani‟s attempt to navigate 
these concerns differently throughout this chapter.  For the time being, they refer to 
his attempt to ground law in an anthropological principle.  When, for instance, 
someone‟s daily experience of work overwhelms her with a sense of 
meaninglessness, and she is wont to ask how her discomfort may be relieved, 
Giussani expounds why work is intrinsic to the definition of what it means to be 
human, as seen in the epigraph above (IPO, 91).  When Giussani frames the problem 
as a “why” question (why work is important), he views the problem as related to 
questions about the meaning and purpose of life.  Any other manner of solving the 
problem, according to Giussani, is philosophical, and, thus, obtuse.  The interlocutor 
eventually learns to trace all concrete problems not to their particular origins, but to a 
personal failure (e.g., of immaturity, superficiality, or pusillanimity), that prevents 
her from seeing the depths of reality.  It is not unusual, therefore, for members of CL 
to meet some rather complex human problems with dogmatic replies.  
Regarding Giussani‟s reply, two issues cry out for determination.  First, the 
recurrence to maxims about reality, which presume the individual‟s complaint is over 
a case of existential ennui, overlooks other potential sources of unhappiness, such as 
a superior‟s unkindness.  The original question asked of Giussani, however, may not 
pose the problem of the theoretical understanding of work, but of how obedience 
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may be thoughtful obedience, and of what course of action to take in a situation that 
is morally difficult because one is Catholic (e.g., how to deal with an unkind 
superior).  Second, to the extent that a theoretical understanding of work casts light 
on the concrete problem, Giussani‟s recurrence to maxims about reality do not offer 
a strong impersonal account on which the interlocutor can depend for a robust theory 
of the value of work.  Here, Giussani‟s choice of a poetic mode of exposition, rather 
than a systematic one, while consistent with his ongoing polemic against “logic” and 
“abstraction,” compromises the integrity of the impersonal account, insofar as it 
exists.   In summary, the assumption Giussani makes about his own approach to 
problems, namely, that he is addressing real problems with practical-theories-to-live-
by, is undermined by buying into impersonal accounts which he fails to complete.  
The impersonal accounts would themselves be conducive to the pragmatic aims of 
the text were they permitted to run their course; but the urgency Giussani imposes on 
himself and his interlocutors to remain concrete short-circuits this process.   
 
Purpose 
The aim of this chapter is to help Giussani achieve the pragmatic delivery of 
his insights concerning freedom by clarifying areas of vagueness.  Vaguenesses in 
the speeches of IPO, however, cannot be addressed simply by bypassing the 
impersonal account in order to develop the pragmatic one.  To introduce clarity, a 
distinction in genre must be marked –which Giussani fails to observe – between 
uttering an impersonal account (on the one hand) and a practical-theory-to-live-by 
(on the other hand).  While both theory and praxis are relevant to the problems 
Giussani is addressing, the unwitting conflation of genres invariably affects the 
overall clarity, consistency, and coherence of the work.  Consider the relevance of 
this distinction through the following analogy: 
Science undertakes to offer impersonal accounts and the theory of evolution 
is one such account.  If evolution were cited as a practical-theory-to-live-by, the 
results in ethics would be disastrous.  It would be unreasonable for human beings to 
carry on as though they were primates on the basis of their evolutionary ancestry.  
Conversely, practical-theories-to-live-by undertake to address problems in ordinary 
life.  If they are invoked to challenge scientific accounts, such as the theory of 




evolution, they undertake a task which they are too ill-equipped to handle.  It would 
be odd, in other words, to reject the theory of evolution on the basis of a worry that 
its promulgation would lead human beings to act like primates.  There is a reason for 
the impersonal account, and it is scientific, not practical.  Impersonal accounts have 
one role, similar to law, and practical-theories-to-live-by have another, similar to 
wisdom.  Neither kind of account is hermetically sealed from the other.  
Considerable overlap might even be desirable between them.  In the end, both seek 
sufficient answers to different kinds of question.        
A second aim of this chapter, then, involves carrying out some of the 
theoretical work Giussani side-stepped.  For this reason, the impersonal account must 
be taken seriously.  At the same time, while the first aim of this chapter is to help 
Giussani deliver a more focussed account of freedom, particularly with regards to the 
protagonism of Christians in the public sphere, the existing emphasis on why 
Christians should take “protagonism” seriously must not overlook how this end is to 
be achieved in the cultural, linguistic, and historical context of the day.  Such a 
consideration would not attend the arrival of a rule by which to govern every 
conceivable problem that could arise everywhere and at all times, but an account of 
discernment and discursive reason, derived from the deepest sources of Giussani‟s 
tradition, which accommodates particularity.     
       
Method 
This chapter will move through successive stages of reading to bring 
Giussani‟s account of freedom into greater focus.  I suggested above that the 
account‟s vagueness can only be redeemed by introducing further material that is not 
present in the original.  I propose to make use of a stronger account of freedom with 
Robert Spaemann‟s assistance.  In reading Spaemann alongside Giussani, I will 
attend especially to the few areas of difference that separate the accounts.  The 
precise points of difference will be traced to a set of leading tendencies that stem 
from one of Giussani‟s unarticulated worries.  Using history, context, and intellectual 
biography, I will reconstruct that worry so that the explicit text can be referenced to 
Giussani‟s original question.  At the same time, I will address certain areas of 




vagueness, which owe to both competing tendencies in the account and areas of 
philosophical weakness.          
 
The Occasion of the Text 
IPO collects Giussani‟s reflections in political theology spanning from 1970 
to 2000.  Many of the most important texts are addressed specifically to the 
Compagnia delle Opere (CDO), an association of investors, businessmen, and 
entrepreneurs engaged in the twofold objective of facilitating the exchange of 
resources between small enterprises (especially non-profit organizations), and 
directing businesses toward “the creation of a more adequate dwelling for the human 
heart.”  The CDO was established in 1986 under Giussani‟s guidance, and draws on 
the language and content of many writings published for CL.  Through its initiatives, 
the CDO promotes the cooperation of Church and state, bringing the perspective 
promoted by CL to secular contexts through extra-ecclesial vehicles.  The content 
and style of the speeches, described as maieutic, are intentionally tailored to reach 
university-educated Catholics whose exposure to the Catholic intellectual tradition is 
minimal and even tainted, the author fears, by the common (secularist) mentality.      
 
Exegetical Considerations 
The interpreter faces certain difficulties caused by the dense and compressed 
nature of Giussani‟s speeches.  For instance, as is typical and proper for a speech, the 
author displays a preference for lapidary statements rather than the slow development 
of complex arguments; sources are not consistently cited; and the choice and 
organization of materials are subject to rhetorical technique.  Giussani poses 
additional difficulties by using technical terms unconventionally (e.g., “evidences”); 
coining neologisms (e.g., “communital”); using single terms to mean different things 
(e.g., heart means reason, intuition, and instinct); and creating the appearance of 
agreement between the authors, between whom, in fact, there are deep differences 
(e.g., Thomas Aquinas [1215-1274] and Vladimir Solov‟ëv [1853-1900]
11
).              
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This section aims as plainly as possible to convey Giussani‟s explicit account 
of freedom.  Since the account is reconstructed from four different speeches, I have 
organized materials under three of Giussani‟s categories in order to avoid repetition: 
desire, social responsibility, and belonging.   
    
Desire 
Desire is an important facet of freedom, according to Giussani, because 
freedom secures a sphere of action for the individual, and action originates in desire 
(IPO, 104, 168).  Giussani conducts his discussion around three themes: teleology, 
natural theology, and realism. 
The term desire, with respect to action, gestures at the importance of goals 
and presupposes that persons are goal-directed (IPO, 168).  Persons act for reasons 
and desires are reasons for acting.  Desires may stem either from base reactions or 
from self-conscious reflection (cf. USD, 117).  The latter, with which Giussani is 
mainly concerned, stem from the heart‟s needs and exigencies, manifested in the 
desire for happiness, truth, justice, satisfaction, and beauty (IPO, 52-53).  Through 
these goods the soul ultimately tends to God.  For this reason, desires rooted in the 
heart are expressive of a “religious sense,” namely: “[the moment when] the thirst for 
truth and happiness relates to the ultimate good, to the total significance of things, 
which exceeds our imaginations or our ability to define them (IPO, 92).”  A 
“religious sense,” moreover, represents the highest expression of human rationality, 
“the vertex of reason,” insofar as reason is consciousness of reality according to the 
“totality of its factors” (IPO, 92).  The “totality of factors” reminds the reader that 
the awareness of God takes in the whole of reality, while everything else is only part 
of that reality (IPO, 118).  For Giussani, as for Augustine, God alone satisfies desire 
completely (IPO, 113-114).  In God all our motion ultimately finds its rest. 
Desire, as a principle of action, is related to freedom in another way.  Desire 
impels us to act, and only in acting (in actu exercito) do we become aware of 
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ourselves and of the ultimate horizon of things (IPO, 119).  Action secured by 
freedom is not only the means by which to improve the condition of life in society 
according to our goal-directed nature, it is the means through which the authentic “I” 
comes to light (IPO, 119, cf. 53, 99).  Giussani makes his argument from authority, 
citing Thomas Aquinas: “In hoc aliquis percipit se animam habere et vivere et esse, 
quod percipit se sentire et intelligere et alia huiusmodi opera vitae exercere [One 
perceives oneself as having a soul and as living and as being inasmuch as one 
perceives oneself as feeling and understanding and exercising other similar tasks 
related to life] (IPO, 119).”
12
  Thomas‟s dictum leads Giussani to make two further 
claims, one related to the “I,” the other to God.  First, to impede action, and 
particularly to deprive the human person of the opportunity to make a personal 
contribution and so to be incisive on society, is to deprive him of the opportunity to 
know himself (IPO, 103, 119).  Second, the consciousness we gradually attain of our 
ultimate needs and exigencies, which leads eventually to the proposition that God 
exists, is discovered by running up against the limitations of human action: the 
disproportion between what we ourselves can accomplish and the infinity that every 
heart structurally requires for its satisfaction (IPO, 118, 123).  The limitation of 
freedom would impede access to the proposition that God exists insofar as it would 
prevent persons from realizing that action has a limit that calls out for completion in 
someone greater than the self and society at large, namely God (IPO, 117).               
Reality is the “I‟s” field of action; the “I” and reality unite harmoniously in a 
synthesis called action of which desire is the catalyst (IPO, 101-102).  Reality is, at 
the same time, bounded by the real: actors mould their movements from reality, not 
from some imagined ideal.  Once desire gets concretized in action, it can only be 
adequate to the extent that it corresponds to the “needs” and “exigencies” of the heart 
(IPO, 102).  The object of labour, then, is to realize in society a dwelling more 
adequate to the heart (IPO, 108, 129-133).  Through action, one also comes into 
contact with “the Mystery” (IPO, 106).  This is because action is real prayer and 
there is no prayer that does not originate in or express action (IPO, 102).  And since 
prayer expresses the “I‟s” love for Christ, action, which is prayer, expresses the same 
thing.  The love of Christ, sought and received, helps us to grow, to become mature 
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and wise; the attainment of these ends differs radically from the cynical, accusatory, 
and despotic action that dominates the present cultural climate, which is reinforced 
by mass media (IPO, 102). 
 
Social Responsibility 
Giussani, addressing his generalized reflections on freedom to the CDO, 
applies the concept of social responsibility to the problem of cultural decline.  The 
term “provocation” (provocazione) marks a crucial distinction for Giussani in this 
part of the account.  One can only be “provoked” by real problems, not paper-
generated doubts or second guessing.  Freedom is related to truth or infinity insofar 
as it is satisfied in the heart, not the will (IPO, 114).  Thus, discourse about freedom, 
insofar as it concerns action and intervention, entails a vaster horizon: the infinite 
desire for goodness, beauty, justice, etc. (IPO, 126).  Social responsibility, it follows, 
entails the acquisition and protection of actual goods and includes a religious 
dimension insofar as individual goods, including the goods of ordinary life, 
participate in the all encompassing goodness of God (IPO, 100, 105, 168).  Giussani 
invokes social responsibility as a fulcrum by which to encourage members of the 
CDO to take stock of and address the problem of cultural decline.  His 
recommendation for renewal cites the perspective of Alasdair MacIntyre as outlined 
in After Virtue (IPO, 158-159).
13
  Giussani also incorporates T. S. Eliot‟s (1888-
1965) modern historical survey in The Choruses from the Rock, which paints a 
devastating before-and-after picture of Modernity, to add greater urgency to his cry 
for religious freedom and the freedom of religious institutions (IPO, 103, 104).
14
    
The quotation Giussani takes from After Virtue diagnoses cultural decline, 
compares it with the decline of Roman civilization, and delivers a prognosis for 
effective renewal.  According to MacIntyre: First, individuals need to come around 
to a shared understanding that a real problem needs addressing.  To this end, a 
heightened awareness of the current situation and a willingness to evaluate it 
truthfully from within a moral tradition must be cultivated.  Second, local forms of 
                                                 
13
 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, 2nd ed. (1984; Notre Dame, IN: Notre 
Dame University Press, 2003), 263.  At IPO 159 Giussani quotes the Italian edition, translated by M. 
D‟Avenia as Dopo la virtù. Saggio di teoria morale (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1993), 313. 
14
 Especially T. S. Eliot, “Coro VII,” in Cori da “La Rocca,” tr. Roberto Sanesi [“Chorus VII” in 
Choruses from the Rock] (Milan: BUR, 1994). 




community need to be erected and sustained as the principal loci for supporting the 
intellectual and moral life on the basis of which reflection takes place.
15
  Third, 
communities cannot flourish without the cultivation of the virtues; forgetfulness of 
the virtues results in the kinds of ills and fragmentation seen at all levels of society.  
Fourth, since the tradition of the virtues managed to survive the “horrors of the last 
dark ages,” the current state of cultural decline could be reversed if we were to 
reinstate at the centre of society the teaching and practice of the classical virtues.  
Christianity, it should be recalled, was the vehicle through which the virtues were 
preserved and transmitted when civilization was last under threat.  Perhaps again, 
through Christianity, civilization might be saved.  Giussani finds a “strict 
correspondence” between MacIntyre‟s argument and the motives behind social 
intervention in CL and the CDO, even if he feels for himself that the “terms [of 
engagement?]” are “not exactly the same (IPO, 158-159; 208-209).”  
Faced with the same problem, Giussani and MacIntyre agree on the role and 
importance of “intermediate communities,” above all (IPO, 169).  Giussani 
introduces the Catholic definition of subsidiarity in order to justify the intervention 
of the CDO, and similar kinds of “intermediate communities” (IPO, 117, 176-177)  
He presents the case for subsidiarity through the same dichotomy used to describe 
freedom‟s two sides: the first involves freedom from something (e.g., ideology, the 
common mentality, the over-extension of government [i.e., statalismo], etc.), and the 
second involves freedom for something (e.g., the erection of religious schools, 
deciding not being decided for, the construction of a dwelling more adequate to the 
heart, etc.).   
In the realm of freedom from, Giussani names specific adversaries from 
whom the subject is to be emancipated: Ernst Bloch (1885-1977), blamed for “the 
abstract and futuristic hope of Marxism” (IPO, 20; 175),
16
 and Antonio Gramsci 
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(1891-1937), a social activist, under whose influence the younger Giussani himself 
had briefly fallen sway (IPO, 134), blamed for prioritizing systems over the 
individual.
17
  Giussani buttresses his attack on Gramsci with help from Romano 
Guardini (1885-1968), whose reflections on authority and power lead Giussani to 
compare the problem of big government to totalitarianism (IPO, 9-10, 166, 175).
18
        
In the realm of freedom for the subject pursues goals such as truth, justice, 
and beauty – transcendent values secured through the efforts of intermediate 
communities, such as CL and CDO (IPO, 180 ff.).  The particular goal to which the 
pursuit of truth, justice, and beauty leads is the creation of a dwelling more adequate 
to the “needs” and “exigencies” of the heart (IPO, 41 and dozens of other 
references).  All other forms of freedom – the freedom to associate, the freedom to 
decide and not to be decided for – refer back to the values inscribed by the heart to 
the objects submitted to its scrutiny.  And since the heart has an innate aptitude for 
God (IPO, 135), the standard of perfection in society – if freedom is considered to be 
part of that perfection – is that which accommodates heart‟s needs: promoting 
religious belief through education, ensuring the visibility of the Church, allowing 
religious movements, supporting religious institutions, and so on (IPO, 104).  
Giussani seals this argument with John XXIII‟s encyclical Mater et magistra, where 
the freedom of association is “essentialized” using the secular language of 
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“inalienable rights” (IPO, 94, 104).  Giussani is happy with the language of 
“inalienable rights” because the heart involves a set of problems that are humanly 
interesting, by virtue of which they are also theologically interesting.          
 
Freedom  for Humanity 
Quoting Emanuel Mounier‟s Lettere sul dolore, Giussani states: “It is 
necessary to suffer lest truth be fossilised in doctrine and prevented from giving life 
in the flesh (IPO, 160).”  The significance of the flesh is reinforced by the 
Incarnation (la carne).  That God chose to reveal himself in the flesh speaks to the 
fact that we are conditioned to receive truth in a certain way given the kind of 
creatures we are (IPO, 160).
19
  Since it is our humanity that needs completing, it is at 
the level of flesh and bones that desire is manifested and by means of which it is 
satisfied (IPO, 81).  This emphasis on flesh and bones militates against abstract 
theology and reinforces the principle of subsidiarity with essentialist claims about the 
human person‟s need to work with others: “the flesh [Christ] took on, through which 
he chose not to abandon us, is the human companionship that recognizes him and 
invests itself entirely, without compromise, in the reality that it lives every day, 
because the design of the Mystery unfolds through our daily life, the reality which 
incites us daily (IPO, 102).”   
The ancillary role played by religious associations and movements ultimately 
requires governments to roll back in order that the creativity and artisanship of the 
ordinary worker be permitted to have an incisive effect on society (IPO, 197).  By 
directing talent and energy to the problems of society, the individual‟s authentic “I” 
comes to the surface.  Giussani writes: “It is through the realization of my work that I 
understand myself as free.  [...] Man does not come to know himself by thinking 
about himself (this would require an level of objectivity that few are capable of 
reaching even with good philosophical training), but perceiving the value of his self, 
his talents, his abilities; i.e., working, in actu exercito, as Thomas Aquinas says.  A 
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man only knows himself in action, through action, while he is acting (IPO, 119).”  It 
is in acting (in actu exercito) that the person discovers herself.  Freedom for 
association, therefore, is also freedom to discover one‟s true “I.”  The CDO was 
founded precisely with this objective in mind (IPO, 160).  By means of the 
encouragement and support it lends local projects, the CDO fosters in its members an 
understanding of the human person as a protagonist in the realization of a society 
more adequate to the heart.  In the same way the CDO is the means through which its 
members discover and express their true “I.”  Whereas some would contend that the 
emphasis on the person might destabilize the centrality of God in the moral shaping 
of society, Giussani believes a true and profound understanding of the human person, 
acquired through action, cannot but conclude in the proposition “I am You-who-
make-me” (cf. RS, 109). 
 
Belonging (appartenenza) 
Belonging plays three important roles in Giussani‟s account of freedom.  
First, the passion of individuals for justice and mercy (e.g., “better living 
conditions,” and the “meeting and solidarity of peoples”) is motivated in large part 
by the phenomenon of belonging (IPO, 127).  It is because someone or something 
has claimed one‟s allegiance that the question arises as to how this or that action 
might promote the well being of the beloved.  The desire to improve conditions for 
humanity, above all, is an impetus for Christian charity (IPO, 180-181).  By the same 
token, the willingness to undergo suffering for an other is a sign of fidelity (IPO, 95).  
Thus, obedience, insofar as it entails self-denial, is motivated by love, not 
punishment (IPO, 152).  Obedience is also a test of true communion, particularly in 
the context of friendship (IPO, 93-93,129) and life in the Church (IPO, 89, 178, 
182).  Second, community is the agent‟s source of strength and encouragement where 
the task of adhering to the truth and doing what is right is toilsome.  Witnesses are 
“inevitably” required to undertake “risks” and “sacrifices” which are mitigated by the 
companionship of others who are willing to undergo the same trials to achieve the 
same ends (IPO, 159).  A moral companionship, which Giussani deems a “necessary 
dimension and condition” for risk-taking, is called the “communital phenomenon.”  
It is within the “communital dimension and condition,” the state of “communiality” 




(communitalità), that an oeuvre is born (IPO, 157 ff.).  What “communiality” adds to 
decision is the “energy and freedom” that militates against complacency and 
pusillanimity (RS, 131), counteracting any philosophy that suggests that man can 
exist and act in isolation from a community (e.g., Kierkegaard‟s high-minded and 
solitary religious commitment).  Third, the desire to meet our desires with others is a 
sign that we were made for companionship (IPO, 93).  The heart of the human 
person is intrinsically structured for self-giving and receiving (“[...] ci definisce come 
uomini, stabilise una «appartenenza»”) (IPO, 93).  And the concept of charity also 
stems from this principle (IPO, 126-127, 128).   
 
Formal Restatement of Giussani’s Thesis      
To conclude, truth marks the difference between real freedom and false 
freedom, and the essence of false freedom is immediacy: the inability to raise one‟s 
eyes from this world (l‟aldiqua) to “the beyond” (l‟aldilà) (IPO, 123).  Nevertheless, 
one acts out of the impetus to fulfill the heart‟s desires – an impetus provoked by 
objects in this world, which attract and so direct our attention.  In taking a certain 
course of action, the surprising fact is observed that truth, beauty, justice, etc. alone 
satisfy the heart.  But since John 8:32 holds true, the relation of truth, beauty, justice, 
etc. to satisfaction occurs as a matter of course.  Hence, there is reason to take 
satisfaction as the litmus test of freedom (IPO, 114) and the heart as a compass for 
moral action (IPO, 92).  At this point, Giussani posits the infinite, interchangeable 
with the word God, as the ultimate ground of human action de natura (IPO, 127-
128).  It is because man‟s structure demands the infinite that God is “necessary” 
(IPO, 18).  Only in a rapport with God, then, is social action truly liberating and 
coincident with the standard of what it means to be human (IPO, 18, 105).  Far from 
being an obstacle which hinders action, a rapport with God multiplies possibilities, 
improving the effectiveness of human intervention.  Freedom based on ultimate 
satisfaction, therefore, counteracts the alternative point of view that one‟s assent to 
the proposition that God exists circumscribes and diminishes the field of legitimate 
and coherent action (IPO, 114).  For this reason, Giussani asks secular governments 
to roll back, allowing religious belief and practice to have free reign, and for the 




talent and generosity of individuals to take root in local communities toward the 
creation of dwelling more adequate to the heart.           
 
DEEPER PLAIN-SENSE READING 
In this section, I will reconstruct Giussani‟s thesis as the answer to a question 
about the significance of John 8:32 for civil society.  I use a set of artificial 
categories: integralism, dehumanization, essential humanity, the acting person, and 
truth, which I extrapolate from his sources.  
 
Integralism 
Giussani‟s disappointment with philosophers affected certain choices he 
made in constructing his account of freedom.  Above all, Giussani was disappointed 
in the way philosophers had handled, or had failed to handle, the day-to-day run of 
the mill concerns that mattered to people and that inevitably touch on questions of 
freedom and authority.  The tendency to abstraction, however, manifested itself on 
all sides: on the one hand, the deliveries of Neoscholasticism, the dominant mode of 
philosophical thinking in the Church, resembled “the exposition, highly abstract and 
syllogistic, of a set of quasi-Euclidian theorems;”
20
 on the other hand, the trajectory 
of modern philosophy, from Descartes through Kant, ended in nothingness: “today 
philosophy is built on nothingness, that is, it is constructed as the affirmation of 
nothingness (which even as a proposition or definition is contradictory) (AC, 26).”
21
  
For this reason, at a decisive meeting in 1968, where priests gathered at Subiaco to 
formulate a pastoral response to the student riots that swept through universities, 
Giussani called for “a new structure of man, a new ontology that signifies a change 
in [the conception] of relations; a new relation, a new conception and way of using of 
things.”
22
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Giussani‟s training in theology at Venegono through the 1940s had already put 
him within reach of a “new ontology.”  In those years, interest had been growing 
around certain Catholic philosophers – not without suspicion of modernism and 
considerable controversy – whose thought seemed capable of engaging an ever more 
secularized audience.  The success of their writings involved using an existential and 
personalist approach to expound, if not to recover, the essential thought of Thomas 
Aquinas.  One of the favourites at Venegono seems to have been Maurice Blondel 
(1861-1949), which is perhaps surprising given the highly controversial nature of his 
thought until the Second Vatican Council.
23
  In an article on Blondel published from 
Venegono in 1936, Carlo Colombo quoted with admiration a passage that illustrates 
the possibilities afforded by a new philosophical vision.  The passage can be seen as 
laying out the philosophical programme he recommended to his own seminarians, 
including Giussani:     
 
In order that philosophy may be applied not only to possibilities, or essences, 
or concepts, but to all real things found in the concrete; that it be able to speak 
to our experience and shape the history of actual people; that the example and 
practice of Christianity be known and lived to the utmost, producing a 
philosophical surcharge that can be assimilated to ideas, sentiments, 
aspirations, of which a state of life can be born (il est bon de faire état) [...].  
Let the subtleties of sentiment, different kinds of heroism, types of suffering 
enrich human consciousness and make us take advantage of moral 




The purpose of Blondel‟s philosophical programme, according to John Macquarrie, 
was to point out God‟s relevance to daily life, and thus “to turn the attention of the 
apologist or pastor from abstract, metaphysical thought to actual experience in all its 
fullness and richness.”
25
  Just as Blondel spoke of a “human-divine synthesis in this 
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world,” Giussani worked through various examples to illustrate a human-divine 
connection in daily life:  “I am a Christian because I cannot conceive of my faith 
apart from life‟s challenges [vicende della vita]; and nothing is more correspondent, 
more adequate, in terms of a response, than that which can galvanize all my energies 
through the events of life, such as my faith (IPO, 137).”  The attempt to recover the 
relevance of religion to daily life, however, did not arise initially from pragmatic 
concerns, but from epistemological questions pertaining to the pure act of faith.  
Given both authors‟ aversion to rationalist philosophy and moralism, a preamble of 
faith was sought in the natural world and the concept of humanity (cf. RVU, 183).  
The strategy, which came to be known as “integralism,” involved either “naturalizing 
the supernatural,” as exhibited by German theologians, or “supernaturalizing the 
natural,” as exhibited by the French, including Blondel.
26
        
The concept of freedom, in Blondel‟s strain of integralism, is bound up 
dialectically with the subject‟s relation to Infinity.  As Macquarrie points out, for 
Blondel “human action is already directed beyond the phenomenal order.  To will all 
that we do will is already to have the action of God within us.  Yet this quest for 
realization would be a fascinating one were it not that God in turn moves toward us 
in transcendence, and human action is supported and supplemented by divine 
grace.”
27
  Freedom, on account of this relation, has three terms: the immanent 
(Giussani‟s “impact with the real,” RS, 108), the transcendent (Giussani‟s 
“Mystery”), and the human-divine synthesis (Giussani‟s concept “I am You-who-
make-me” concretely manifested in “realistic and incisive social works” directed to 
“the needs that man lives in the present,” IPO, 131”).  The subject‟s posture in this 
relation is fundamentally self-reflexive: “As we come to define better for ourselves 
what we are not [...] through a more complete experience and a more penetrating 
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reflexion, we come to see more clearly that without which we would not be.”
28
  In 
running up against limits in our action we come to realize our dependency on 
someone greater than ourselves, who in the long run of enquiry turns out to be God 
(IPO, 107).  “The thought of God within depends on our action in two ways,” 
Blondel proposed.  “On the one hand, it is because in acting we find an infinite 
disproportion in ourselves that we are constrained to look to infinity for the equation 
of our action.  On the other hand, it is because in affirming absolute perfection we do 
not ever arrive at equalling our own affirmation, that we are constrained to look for 
its complement and commentary in action.  The problem that action raises, only 
action can resolve.”
29
  Similarly for Giussani, human action is always already 
directed beyond the phenomenal order: Freedom is man‟s rapport with the Infinite-
Other addressed personally as Thou – a Thou that is encountered not only in the 
beyond, but in the immanent sphere of ordinary life (IPO, 104). 
 
Dehumanization 
Giussani defines freedom predominantly from the stance of freedom from.  
The story he tells is effectively a critique of power (il potere) provoked by the 
problem of oppression and dehumanization, so Giussani says.  Power, of course, is a 
vague term that can denote anything from the brute force of nature, through the 
exercise of legitimate authority, to the Promethean struggle to be greater than God.  
Giussani‟s preoccupation with oppression touches on the latter‟s relation to power.  
The problem of oppression, more precisely, occurs when the Promethean struggle 
extends to government.  Here, Giussani quotes John Paul II on the invention and use 
of military and technological power.
 30
  He also quotes Romano Guardini on the 
modern attempt to subsume persons and the natural world into systems: “„When we 
examine the development of [the modern world] as a whole, we cannot escape the 
                                                 
28
 Maurice Blondel, Action (1893).  Essay on a Critique of Life and a Science of Practice, translated 
by Olivia Blanchette (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2003), 322. 
29
 Blondel, Action (1893), 324. 
30
 Cf. “In spite of „humanistic‟ declarations [...] contemporary man, therefore, fears that by the use of 
the means invented by this type of society, individuals and the environment, communities, societies 
and nations can fall victim to the abuse of power by other individuals, environments and societies. The 
history of our century offers many examples of this. In spite of all the declarations on the rights of 
man in his integral dimension, that is to say in his bodily and spiritual existence, we cannot say that 
these examples belong only to the past” (John Paul II, Dives in misericordia, Encyclical on the Mercy 
of God [Vatican City: 1980.  Numerous editions.], §11; quoted in IPO, 11).     




impression that nature as well as man himself is becoming ever more vulnerable to 
the domination – economic, technical, political, organizational – of power.  Ever 
more distinctly our condition reveals itself as one in which man progressively 
controls nature, yes, but also men; the state controls the citizens; and an autonomous 
technical-economic political system holds all life in thrall.‟”
31
  Giussani‟s critique of 
political power, going further than Guardini‟s, attacks overreliance on structures 
derived from Marx (IPO, 86) and futuristic hope derived from Bloch (IPO, 20, 175), 
which subordinate tradition, personal conscience, and social responsibility of the 
many under the a priori agenda of a dominant and enlightened few. 
At base level, the Promethean struggle – “man as the measure of all things 
(WC, 51)” – is posed as a universal problem that can only be explained by original 
sin (AL, 188).  Its predominant manifestation, however, occurs in “the pretence of 
science, viz., man‟s unlimited possibility of discovery, which becomes the pretence 
to eliminate God (AL, 188).”  According to Giussani, “the blasphemous presumption 
[of science] finds its osmotic conjugation in all men.  For this reason, the use of 
scientific power and of knowledge tends to be identified with political power (AL, 
188).”  When science and knowledge are given the ultimate say on the meaning and 
purpose of life, political power readily associates itself with them to establish its own 
grounds for authority. The wholesale accommodation of governments to science and 
social science is in fact the adscription to a highly determinist anthropology that 
reduces the person to little more “the sum total of his biological, chemical and 
physical antecedents [antecedenti biologici chimici e fisici] (IPO, 53).”   Applied to 
real problems, this determinism attributes evil not to “the misuse of freedom,” but to 
“the situation in which man finds himself, which man can escape by means of a 
progressive mechanisation [un progressivo meccanismo] (RG, 135).”  The slogan of 
the CDO – Meno stato, più società! – a constant refrain through IPO, asks 
governments to roll back in order that individuals may assume responsibility for the 
moral shaping of society, but this itself results from the stance that man is not 
manufactured.  “To treat society as a machine, oppressing man and exasperating the 
                                                 
31
 “Power and Responsibility,” in The End of the Modern World, translated by Elinor C. Briefs and 
Henry Regnery (1956, 1961; Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 1998), 163.  Originally published as Ende 
der Neuzeit (1950). Italian edition “Il potere,” in La fine dell‟epoca moderna (Brescia: Morcelliana, 
1993).   




consciousness of freedom, impedes the necessary realization of the ideal of progress 
and justice (RG, 134).”   
Behind the problem of power lies a false conception of the ideal of progress 
and justice.  According to Guardini, power and progress go hand-in-hand when “we 
create our own world, shaped by thoughts and controlled not merely by natural urges 
but by ends that we set to serve ourselves as intellectual and spiritual beings, an 
environment that is related to us and brought into being by us.”
32
  The ravaging 
effects of progress were everywhere present in Giussani‟s native Lombardy, where 
industrialization, incidentally, had also provoked Guardini‟s excoriation of 
technology – known to Giussani through Guardini‟s famous Letters from Lake 
Como.
33
  The economic and technological revolution that followed the Second World 
War had transformed Lombardy from a relatively agrarian culture to Italy‟s leading 
region in finance and manufacturing.  The new demands of industry and commerce 
caused rural habitants to migrate to Milan, where bourgeois humanism posed a direct 
threat to the more provincially-minded Catholicism of the pre-war era.
34
  The rise of 
political activism among the youth of Catholic Action (GIAC) and Giussani‟s own 
Gioventù Studentesca, along with the interventions of the Holy See both to regulate 
the position of the Church in the Italian State
35
 and to address the technological 
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 account for the thematic prominence of freedom in Catholic theological 
reflection through the 1960s.
37
   
The first approach to the problem of freedom takes shape around nostalgia; 
the second, building on the first, around the recovery of what was lost.  Giussani 
often expressed his lament as a nostalgia for beauty – natural beauty, artistic beauty, 
even the beauty of a dream – which he often conveyed through the words of his 
favourite authors: Leopardi, Pascoli, Péguy, Arendt, Miłosz, Eliot, and Pavese; or 
otherwise through music: Pergolesi, Mozart, Beethoven, Schubert, Chopin, Dvořák, 
and Rachmaninov.
38
  Reflecting nostalgically in Leopardi‟s voice, he writes: “„If you 
are that beauty which, when I was young, I believed I could find in the streets...; if 
you are that beauty, that idea of Plato which lives in the Hyper Uranus, ... or perhaps 
you live on some other planet happier than earth, ... why do you not condescend to 
robe yourself in the garments of the flesh?‟”
39
  That which passed for progress during 
the industrial revolution and beyond severed the link between man and nature and 
left a totally artificial substitute in its place.  A dwelling more adequate to the heart 
was lost.  As Guardini put it:  “Once there was an order, a living space, which made 
possible a human existence in a specific sense. We can no longer be seafarers in the 
first and special sense in which seafaring is a basic form of human existence filled 
with its own content.  The crew members of a liner are not essentially different from 
employees on the assembly line of a factory.”
40
  The dawn of the new Dark Ages, 
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which MacIntyre descries in a key passage of IPO, coincides with Guardini‟s 
assessment, half-a-century earlier, of the modern predicament: “The sphere in which 
we live is becoming more and more artificial, less and less human, more and more – 
I cannot help saying it – barbarian.”
 41
    
 
Essential Humanity 
The other side of barbarism is the recovery a “pure humanity.”  For Giussani, 
the recovery is a matter of uncovering the personality, the true “I.”  Giussani 
emphatically insists, at different points through his bibliography, that what he means 
by “uncovering” differs from what is meant by the same term in psychology.  
Giussani taught his interlocutors to frame questions concerning identity around two 
goals.  As summarized by a former pupil: “In the first place, the capacity to cultivate 
a position regarding my „I‟ through which the radicality [demanded by faith] might 
be possible, viz., a capacity for that simplicity with which I might recognize the 
datum in respect of which I decide, and therefore, also take a stance on [the value] of 
our companionship; secondly, [...] to cultivate a description of our companionship, a 
climate that fosters freedom, in order that anyone who joins us will be confronted not 
by [charismatic] personalities, but by a people oriented to the truth (CGC, 194).”  
The answer, Giussani believes, lies in the personality, which is at once a way of 
conceiving the self, of generating self-understanding, of living out a fundamental 
decision [to believe] from a stance taken on affection for one‟s own humanity 
(sentimento di sé).  While some brands of psychology elude Giussani‟s description of 
the “I,” it is hard to grasp the implications of his account without acknowledging the 
presuppositions on which modern psychology rests, such as those described by 
Guardini:    
 
We think of the new research into the bordering territories of bodily and 
intellectual happenings, the sharp discussion aimed at grasping the puzzling 
level on which these happenings interact.  We think also of psychoanalysis, 
which has discovered beneath the sphere of the soul – which has claimed 
almost exclusive attention thus far – a further sphere of which only masters of 
the life of the soul, artists and others, have been aware.  [...]  It has brought to 
light a new sphere of the living soul and has indicated profound relationships.  
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[...]  Take also the discipline of religious psychology.  Here wide fields have 
come into the light of public consciousness that previously were purely 




Guardini‟s concept of the “I,” like Giussani‟s, delves inward in order to climb 
upward.  Both authors draw on a pre-Wittgensteinian insight concerning personality-
development, which holds that the self and culture are the courageous and mature 
externalization of the inner “I.”  The upward motion is the expression of a “new 
self,” the courage to say “I” (il coraggio di dire io), which comes to be embodied, 
ultimately, in forms of culture, and is essentially “the art of bringing everything into 
a possible relationship that is also essentially the right one (IPO, 99).”
43
   
The right relationship on the basis of which culture is founded presupposes 
the harmonization of nature and humanity: “Perhaps the word „culture‟ is the best 
word for considering [the harmonization of factors in a nation],” Giussani writes.  “A 
culture ties the particular to the universal; a position is „cultured‟ if it tends to tie the 
passing moment with the total horizon of things (thus, by its nature, every culture 
should strive to be catholic, universal; otherwise it is not a real culture) [IPO, 126].”  
On account of harmonization, a “simple gesture of solidarity, which originates 
reactively from the goodness of human nature, ties itself to something more vast, it 
becomes assimilated to and redirected by a vaster horizon (IPO, 126).”  Guardini 
expresses the same idea through the word urbanitas: “[...] this word means strictly 
„city living,‟ a city atmosphere, yet one in which a nobly shaped humanity can 
flourish.  Here nature can pass over smoothly into culture.  There is nothing alien or 
antithetical to culture that must wither away if this humanity, this urbanitas, this art 
of living is to come to being.  I cannot find a way to express how human this nature 
is and how we feel in it the possibility of being human in a totally clear but 
inexhaustibly profound sense.”
44
  The only reason to infuse culture with more than 
purely instrumental purpose – i.e., the only reason to consider transcendence as its 
ultimate goal – is for external action to coincide with the inner dynamic of human 
person.  This inner dynamic necessarily predisposes the person to the proposition that 
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God exists, which obviously makes a difference to one‟s self-conception and one‟s 
conception of society. 
The restoration of culture, then, rests on securing what Guardini refers to as 
“the purest humanity.”
45
  The retrieval of what it means foundationally to be human 
is similarly important in Giussani‟s concept of freedom: “The concreteness of life is 
given by the concept of person, because it is the person that gives a global sense to 
all of man‟s needs, what they are and their unity (IPO, 86).”  Applied to the concept 
of freedom, the idea of person must act “to realize one‟s humanity, to fulfil his 
calling to be a person which is his by reason of his very humanity (IPO, 92),”
 46
 
independent of the objective content of the creative act, the burden of labour, or the 
inevitable sacrifice this demands.  
    
The Acting Person 
Giussani firmly holds to the rule that a person discovers herself in terms of 
her ultimate relation to God only through action (in actu exercito) (IPO, 144). This 
thesis, attributed by Giussani to Thomas,
47
  coincides with John Paul II‟s notion of 
the acting person, expounded in IPO through the social encyclical Laborem Exercens 
(1981) [On Human Work] (IPO, 92), which also happens to be coincident with 
Giussani‟s earlier grounding in Blondel‟s ontology acquired at Venegono through 
Colombo‟s promotion of Action (1893).  The actor in Wojtyla‟s notion of the acting 
person, like the actor in Blondel‟s, is not primarily someone in whom something 
happens (from the Latin pati); rather, he is someone who acts (from the Latin agere).  
The concept of action that sees the person as efficacious in seeking a resolution to 
problems is essential to the aims of the CDO, Giussani insists.
48
  The so-called acting 
person, with respect to these aims, serves as “a litmus test for the possibility of true 
human participation by the individual human person in economic and social 
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  In other words, the acting person is a concept that casts into relief forms 
of alienation which result from mechanization, structuralization, and similar 
manifestations of progress achieved on determinist grounds. 
A decisive statement of the importance of the notion of action to the 
safeguarding of humanity, resonant with the epigraph I quoted at the head of this 
chapter, is found in John Paul II‟s “Milan Essay,” deployed by McNerney as the 
“hermeneutical key” to Laborem Exercens:  
 
[...] whatever we make in our action, whatever effects or products we 
bring about in it, we always simultaneously „make ourselves‟ in it as 
well (if I may be permitted to put it thus).  We express ourselves, we 
in some way shape ourselves, we in a certain sense „create‟ ourselves.  
In acting, we actualize ourselves, we fulfill ourselves.  We bring to a 
certain – albeit partial fulfillment (actus) both what and who we are 
potentially (in potentia).  From the perspective of experience and 
phenomenological insight, this is the meaning of the term action in the 
category of actus: actus humanus.
50
     
 
Three canons follow from this assertion, all of which sustain Giussani‟s freedom-
narrative in IPO: First, the embedded and embodied individual experiences himself 
as a self-determining I, and experiences the other as another I.  Second, the concept 
of the embedded and embodied individual introduces in the economic sphere a 
primitive concept of personhood that corrects the inevitable alienation of Marxian 
structures and programmes.
51
  Third, human action has an effect within the person, as 
well as outside the person.  The actor is not passive, simply allowing himself to be 
affected by the passing show, but active, efficacious in seeking solutions, improving 
conditions, constructing a home more adequate to the heart.  That is why sadness, 
dissatisfaction, running up against the limits of progress are integral to the leap of 
faith.  The importance of action, ultimately, concerns belief in God.  And since the 
appeal to religion could not be made on moral grounds, Giussani thought – for that 
would unduly impose extraneous limitations on freedom – he proceeds to make it on 
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humanitarian, anthropological, and psychological grounds.  Doctrine, therefore, may 
be rationally and affectively appropriated by the individual, who is an actor 
motivated by the primitive desire for truth. 
 
Truth 
The condition of freedom, truth, is realized through two factors, according to 
Giussani, viz., epistemology and community.  In terms of epistemology, truth is the 
achievement of the self-reflective “I‟s” affirmation of the conditions for self-
discovery and development (and not the tendency to follow personal predilection or 
the herd mentality).  The epistemological argument runs something like this:  The 
basic need for truth, justice, beauty, joy, and the like, is a structural need of the 
human person (IPO, 139).  At the core of this hypothesis lies the idea of predicating 
the essence of an object through an intuitive, almost instinctual, sense of its value 
vis-à-vis the person‟s structural needs.  The word “correspondence” denotes the 
satisfaction delivered by an object with respect to these needs.  The predication of 
reality, consequently, follows a heuristic method: the inquiring subject tests for a 
correspondence by judging the value of an experience or encounter against the 
objective standards of the heart.  First, all problems and questions arising in ordinary 
life are interpreted in the light of the fundamental desire for fullness or satisfaction 
(the religious sense). Then, through a process of elimination, the inquirer moves from 
one hypothesis to another until he has found the ultimate answer to the question of 
human satisfaction, viz., God.  The underlying premise here is that there cannot be an 
adequate response to a real problem that does not take infinity as the basic ground of 
human action.  The awareness of infinity, which signals the subject‟s structural 
relation to God, deepens or enriches one‟s predication of reality, thus marking a 
distinction between true and false predication, rendering all responses as coincident 
with the truth.      
The immanent provokes reflection on the infinite and awaits the subject‟s 
return to action (the affairs of family and state) after her reorientation to the truth (cf. 
IPO, 107).  Action that proceeds from the awareness of the self-in-relation-to-infinity 
has been grounded in “a love for humanity, an esteem and affection for the human 
person fully alive” (rather than in rational obeisance to law or some claim to 




objectivity).  The ethical life, where decision and action take root, founds itself on a 
prior moment of conviction, a belief about morality and doctrine.   Three corollaries 
follow: (i) Governments are to interpret their role in society with respect to a correct 
anthropology (viz., Giussani‟s epistemology), and to intervene only when the 
absence of human or material resources impedes the realization of projects that foster 
a dwelling adequate to that same anthropology (IPO, 175-76); (ii) The journey to 
truth is an experience, which, undertaken with courage, produces positive results for 
identity (sei protagonista di te stesso [you are the protagonist of your own becoming] 
), making one mature approaching life and its challenges.  The journey is decisive in 
consolidating the I and integrating it with other elements of the tradition and culture 
into which one is born; (iii) An adequate response to human problems must take 
stock of the religious factor(s) within human experience, viz., that God exists to be 
found and that we are innately oriented to seek Him. 
Giussani‟s epistemology, while geared to achieve the deepest level of 
religious commitment and action from his interlocutors, complete with a full account 
of the concomitant results on personality, maturity, and character, does not want to 
achieve its ends by relativizing the community.  Giussani‟s subject, in other words, 
who in so many ways resembles Kierkegaard‟s Knight of Faith, is not in every way 
the paradigm of the solitary individual contra mundum.  And yet, adherence to truth 
may pit the subject against the common mentality (which flinches from its light), 
landing him in the most vulnerable of predicaments.  But the role of the “communital 
phenomenon” comes into play precisely at this moment: to accompany, support, and 
encourage the subject in the same manner that the CDO sustains the charitable works 
of its members. Indeed, Giussani‟s subject is embedded and embodied in “a 
companionship” from which he receives the strength, courage, and moral 
wherewithal to speak and act in the name of the truth. 
The “communital phenomenon” also helps the individual actor undertake 
sacrifice and suffering for the good of a project insofar as the community‟s survival 
depends on it.  The very concept of a nation, for which so many have died 
throughout history, can be traced back to the same collective sense of what really 
matters.  As Blondel writes: “attachment to the countryside, to the steeple, the home, 




prepares and warms the heart for love of the broad country (la grande patrie).”
52
  
Attachment rooted in the heart, “belonging to someone or something,” as Giussani 
puts it, is the necessary precondition for action insofar as action is to be infused with 
more than a purely instrumental purpose.   And so there is a second source, in 
addition to the heart, from which we may retrieve the conditions adequate for the 
“I‟s” dwelling, namely the community.  For this reason, obedience to the 
Magisterium, the official teaching-voice of the Church, is indispensible as a litmus 
test of fidelity to the truth (communion) (IPO, 178, 189).  Indispensible, too, is the 
importance given to human relationality as an ontological reality, as evidenced, for 
Giussani, in the fact that “being human dictates that desires, needs, and exigencies be 
met in association with others (IPO, 102).”  Here, Giussani touches on the concept of 
communio, which had been a key feature of the Jesuit Thomism he was taught and 
was given renewed emphasis with John Paul II: “The concept communio does not 
refer just to something in common, to community as a certain effect or even 
expression of the being and acting of persons.  It refers rather to the very mode of 
being and acting of those persons, which is made of being and acting in mutual 
relation to one another (not just „in common‟ with one another) such that through this 
being and acting they mutually confirm and affirm one another as persons.”
53
  
Giussani‟s own version of the I-You relation, as expounded, for instance, in his 
accounts of friendship (i.e., «Tu», o del amicizia), draws support from the same 
concept of communio.
54
  It is through the community‟s own orientation to God, and 
its inability to replace God, above all, that the individual realizes she was made for so 
much more – she was made for infinity.           
 
LEADING TENDENCIES 
The aim of this section is to accentuate the unique features of Giussani‟s 
account of freedom by creating some contrast with other authors.  I intend to test the 
areas of difference, in particular, as potentially generating vagueness and 
incoherence. 
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Cartesian/Kantian tendencies are practices an author exhibits in referring the 
problems he is addressing to the cognitive act of verification and judgement.  
Giussani adopts these practices for his account of freedom and makes John 8:32 its 
central axiom.  Since it is at times easier to say what something is in terms of what it 
is not, and for the purposes of contrast, I have chosen to read Giussani‟s 
epistemology alongside Robert Spaemann‟s account of freedom in Persons: The 
Difference between „Someone‟ and „Something.‟
55
  I proceed on the basis of a basic 
compatibility between these two authors.  Spaemann and Giussani, both 
contemporaries and well-formed Catholics, have played important roles in academic 
circles at the Vatican.  As the CL magazine Tracce has pointed out, they also seem to 
be working in similar areas of enquiry: religion, culture, politics, and ethics, drawing 
on the same philosophical sources of the Catholic intellectual tradition, such as 
Aristotle, Plato, Augustine and Thomas, to formulate robust answers to 
contemporary problems.
56
  In the realm of freedom, both authors are motivated by 
the need to repair the individualist separation of truth from freedom.  Adhering to 
John 8:32, Giussani and Spaemann formulate arguments that restore God‟s 
transcendence to society and secure the individual‟s existential decision to live 
according to the practices of the community so that obedience may be thoughtful 
obedience.    
The one difference that separates these men is what makes them indispensible 
to each other: Spaemann works as a professional philosopher and addresses an 
academic audience; Giussani works as a pastor and educator, engaging younger 
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generations of Catholics and Catholics whose faith needs stronger intellectual 
underpinnings.  Whereas Giussani uses a quite untheoretical apparatus to expound 
freedom, Spaemann is aware of its philosophical genealogy and has a more finely-
tuned sense of the conclusions to which certain lines of logic lead.  Spaemann is able, 
therefore, to reason from premise to conclusion, avoiding conceptual pitfalls and 
faulty logic, offering the kind of account he believes supports the definition of 
freedom according to John‟s text.  Giussani, by and large, is able to do the same 
drawing on materials from the same categories – albeit less systematically.  At 
certain theoretical junctures, however, Giussani takes different turns and pursues 
different lines of argument.  In a subsequent section, I will refer the features of 
Giussani‟s account back to his original question and the history and context from 
which it arose.  For the time being, my purpose is to use Spaemann‟s account as a 
diagnostic tool in order to identify areas of difference with precision and to allow the 
contrast to bring Giussani‟s accentuations and their effects on clarity and coherence 
into plain view.  To this end, I organize pertinent materials under two categories: 





When it comes to deciding and acting autonomously, particularly along self-
determining lines, both Giussani and Spaemann find it important to explore what the 
idea of person adds to the idea of freedom.  The question is framed in terms of 
whether individual freedom should turn on the axis of choice or whether there is 
some other principle, higher and more worthy of respect, by which acts of the will 
can be determined.  The predominant mentality in their own contexts would likely 
settle the matter on choice, for choice favours self-interest, and self-interest would 
seem to carry implications for vitality and autonomy.  Certainly, there is no reason to 
attack choice on its own grounds, for a vital self-interest serves both natural and 
morally neutral ends.  A difference is marked, however, between living and 
flourishing.   The latter relates to serious reflection on who I am and what I want 
fundamentally, all of which can “direct my attention to an object, fill my imagination 




with it, regardless of life‟s necessities, and concentrate more protractedly on it than I 
would have done without a definite resolve (IPO, 219).”  Reflective self-evaluation 
on my identity, then, would seem to have the capacity to enable me to turn attention 
from myself to someone or something else, not because self-reflection carries with it 
a store of energy, but because of who I am fundamentally and the response that the 
person or thing demands in itself and in that light.  Reflection on the self and on the 
object is what makes the alternative to self-interest possible.  But only a carefully 
wrought description of self-reflection will preserve both the validity of a naturally-
given vital self-concern, on the one hand, and its submission in certain cases to a 
moral imperative also given by nature, on the other hand.     
Both Spaemann and Giussani agree that love – rather than self-fulfilment and 
moral obedience – is the alternative to egoism.  The will must be moved by an Other, 
and the achievement of reason is modest in comparison with those operations that 
countermand and replace concrete acts of the will.  Nevertheless, ideas, if not the 
ideals, are what our hearts attend to.  What I am able to know about who I am and 
what I want fundamentally is crucial to judging the worthiness of action.  As a higher 
court may overturn the decision of the lower court, bringing into view what was 
previously overlooked (Spaemann 220), so the “I” can challenge an action among 
different options, which while naturally inclined to care exclusively for the self, may 
still be persuaded by reason to act altruistically. 
Since who I am and what I want fundamentally bears crucially on love, the 
intervention of reason toward self-giving simply reinforces the true “I.”  The “I” in 
relation to love operates like an instinct, at the level of first nature, both limiting 
autonomy and making it possible.  The “I” makes my being unable to avoid willing 
some things and unable to will other things (Frankfurt).  What comes up with the “I” 
is the content of what it means to be a person.  That is why the idea of person is 
bound up with the idea of freedom and communion (Spaemann 197).  And this 
differs importantly from other accounts of freedom which relate freedom of will to 
natural subjective interest.   Freedom is not freedom to choose our identities, but 
freedom to act in certain ways because we are who we are.  And our identities are 
given to us by God.  As Spaemann puts it: “It is given that we are who we are, that 
we act in this or that way, and not in some other.  What we do voluntarily is to act 




within the frame of this horizon, this or that is what seems to us should be done, 
given that we are who we are.  „Can‟ is different from „must‟: if all the conditions are 
met, it rests with us either to act or not to act.  Persons are aware that they could have 
done things that they actually do not do.”
57
 
Freedom of will is also related to the kind of interest that grabs our attention 
altruistically.  The matter in question concerns cases where objects are the reason for 
the attention they attract.  The term attention, in this sense, concerns our interest in 
the givenness of objects.  In spite of any natural inclination to assert oneself over 
their presentment, the nature of the object invites the “I” to recognize a value that 
inheres in the object as important even at the risk of incurring a consequential 
inconvenience.  The “I‟s” receptivity to this givenness, come what may, is due not 
only to the fact that the interests of a particular human being are not in question with 
such an object, but on account of the kind of interest the object attracts.   The 
character of that interest is selflessness.  Spaemann brilliantly brings this into focus: 
 
What kind of interest do we have in preserving the last tigers in Russia from 
extinction?  We shall never see them anyway!  What kind of interest moves 
an artist to labour at perfecting his masterpiece without thought for his 
strength or life expectancy, though hardly anybody, perhaps, will ever 
appreciate it?  What kind of interest drives someone to keep a promise when 
there are attractive prospects in view, with nothing to stand in the way except 
the promise and the trust another has placed in it?  What kind of interest 
makes a man, even on his deathbed when the deception is inconsequential, 
want to know the truth rather than accept the consolation of a well-
intentioned lie? 
 
What, then, is the nature of the interest that grabs the “I‟s” attention in each of these 
cases where the object matters more than a natural subjective interest?  In all such 
cases, the interest relates to the truth of the idea.  Openness of the “I” to the object‟s 
truth demands a letting go of autonomy, a renouncing of the natural demands of self-
concern.  This letting go, which is always a leap, is the condition of personal 
freedom.
58
  Meanwhile, the truth of the idea could not have the mobilizing force it 
did were it not also for the primitive constitution of the person.  Concerning the kind 
of constitution in question, Spaemann adopts Harry Frankfurt‟s proposition, which is 
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also perfectly in line with Giussani‟s, viz., “the capacity [of persons] not merely to 
have desires, preferences, or motives (which capacity human beings share with 
animals) but to want to have (or not to have) certain desires, preferences, motives.”
59
  
What we are inclined to seek at this level stems from our original identity as persons.  
In Giussani‟s account, this original identity is known as the heart.  The idea of heart 
is bound up with the idea of freedom just as the idea of person is bound up with the 
idea of freedom.    Both authors are able to agree insightfully with John 8:32 that we 
determine ourselves as persons only by acting in the light of truth.          
  
(ii) Intuitionism 
For Giussani the strongest case against every kind of determinism – 
mechanical, psychological, and historical – is the heart‟s incessant plea for 
satisfaction.   The Greeks had referred to this as the longing for eudaimonia.  Its 
logic requires that freedom not be reduced to selecting ends on a utility-calculus, but 
that each end be placed in a wider context of an overarching goal.  For Christians, 
God is that goal.  In Giussani‟s account, the fact that the plea for fullness only finds 
its answer in God is itself bound by a kind of necessity, for God put the desire for 
himself in us and only in God is every desire totally satisfied.  Along the same lines, 
Blondel writes: “Under whatever form it presents itself before consciousness, the 
thought of God is brought there by a determinism that forces itself upon us: it springs 
necessarily from the dynamism of interior life, it necessarily has an effect; it has an 
immediate influence on the organization of our conduct.  It is this necessary action of 
the necessary idea of God that we must determine: we shall see how the voluntary 
inevitably takes on a transcendent character, and how this necessity is the very 
expression of freedom.”
60
   What is necessary in the case of God, however, does not 
make one unfree.  The encounter with God is always a gift, which one is able either 
to accept or reject.  As one of Giussani‟s professors put it, citing Blondel‟s opinion 
on the matter: “the method of immanence will tend to demonstrate that man, faced 
with the supernatural, has the freedom to accept it, satisfying, by this means, the 
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intimate exigency that lies within him of an ulterior order, or even to reject it, 
rendering himself, should this happen, responsible for his own acceptance or refusal 
of the help offered him.”
61
  Spaemann agrees that we are bound by a kind of 
necessity only to will certain goods and reject others.  He also challenges directly 
other kinds of determinism, which mitigate human responsibility, using analytical 
and systematic argumentation.
62
    
Let us take for granted the authors‟ general stance against determinism and 
the reliability of Spaemann‟s claims against it.  What subsequently presents itself to 
all concerned is the problem of decision-making.  Deliberation, however, is not a 
concept Giussani develops.  His method appears not to allow for it insofar as he 
relies either on a prior set of convictions about good or evil, or an instinctive sense 
about right and wrong, both of which make it possible to decide and act without 
having first to deliberate.   
Formally stated, if x is the All that encompasses the truth of y in all times and 
in all places in exactly the same way, then any uncertainty that arises concerning y 
could only be perpetuated either by some misunderstanding concerning x or the 
methodological misapplication of x to y.  The only kind of problem that could arise, 
then, either stems from second guessing the convictions to which one has already 
given assent or one‟s gut reactions of respect and aversion.  There are certainly 
precedents for this prescriptive line of thought.  Take the epistles of St. Paul, for 
instance, and perhaps most famously the verse he addressed to the Colossians: “Here 
there cannot be Greek and Jew, circumcised and uncircumcised, barbarian, Scythian, 
slave, free man, but Christ is all, and in all.”
63
  But it is important to take note of the 
tone and language of the epistle.  Paul‟s letter is written in a prescriptive genre much 
as the official pronouncements of the Church are. This genre may be applied well or 
badly to practical problems depending on the case.  In general, however, practical 
problems await more particularized solutions.   
Spaemann not only applies the Christian critique of stoicism to obtain 
practical solutions, he identifies the different kinds of problem that could arise and 
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thus anticipates the possible outcomes that attend the acting subject.  Therefore, 
belief in a personal God, on the one hand, opens new attitudinal possibilities, many 
of which are expressed in the Psalms: “questioning, petition, thankfulness, alienation, 
reproach, and the choice between defiance and trusting love.”
64
  On the other hand, 
Spaemann allows that a problem may elicit different responses from different 
subjects, and he appreciates, therefore, the role of argument in seeking a best account 
possible.  In addition, he makes provision for the two-pronged dilemma: the feeling 
of inadequacy in the absence of a good and sufficient reason concerning which road 
to take.  Moreover, he also recognizes that contingency and chance may sometimes 
force decisions, foreclosing on the possibility of working through to solutions.   
In each of these scenarios, excepting the last, Spaemann finds intuitions a 
useful means of approach.  The use of intuitions requires the willingness to take a 
risk; but that does not diminish their reliability in most instances, barring the 
unexpected.  Risk, for Giussani, poses a different kind of problem: one of courage, 
which calls for the energy derived from one‟s participation in a community, the 
“communital phenomenon.”  But what does Giussani say about intuitions?      
Indeed, Giussani has an account of intuitions, which is his account of the 
heart.  In contrast to Spaemann, he considers the heart‟s functions to be first nature, 
like instincts.  Spaemann recognizes the influence of intuitions in day-to-day living 
and even warrants their designation as first nature to the extent that, being habits of 
thought, they are experienced as such.  For both authors, gut reactions are bound up 
with authenticity of the will and an ordered perception of reality, with what ought to 
be desired and with what is worthy of humanity, with a standard by which to 
evaluate practices and a sentiment that nature appears to have given humanity.
65
  The 
functions of first nature, in short, are a standard of conscience for the second.   
Indeed, secondary systems “can establish and sustain themselves unless they are 
compatible with the flexible nature of the first.”
66
  Spaemann includes among the 
individual‟s most important intuitions the sense of who I am and what I want 
fundamentally, making the willing of some things and the not-willing of others 
unavoidable.  He also recognizes that a single problem can elicit as many intuitions 
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as there are persons confronting it, not all of which are necessarily commensurable.  
A moral dilemma will depend for its solution on argument, and argument will draw 
on the virtues.  Formally speaking, however, since habits and virtues are acquired 
through education and experience, the definition of intuitions along these lines 
belongs to second, not first nature. 
It is not likely that Giussani would disagree entirely with the formal account 
of intuitions given by Spaemann, considering his enthusiasm for MacIntyre‟s idea of 
achieving cultural renewal through the erection of communities dedicated to forming 
consciences in the tradition of the classical virtues.  Giussani‟s account of moral 
judgement, however, does not provide a strong account of habits and virtues or the 
role of tradition in their cultivation.  Moreover, in saying that the interventions of 
CDO are motivated by cultural decline but that they are delivered on different terms 
than MacIntyre‟s (IPO, 159), he may indeed be isolating the difference that the 
centrality of the virtues makes to MacIntyre‟s account.  Giussani would not say that 
conversion is organic, however, but that the deliveries of the heart are a “reasonable” 
criterion of judgment as long as there is a prior resolve to adhere to and act on the 
basis of an inner law.  In this sense, Giussani argues, intuitions are fully in line with 
the medieval dictum agere sequitur esse (action follows being) (USP, 276-277), 
where the heart is the essence of man and in acting (in actu exercito) man becomes 
conscious of himself to the core (IPO, 119).  In the case of persons, however, the 
logic can run in the opposite direction too: actions affect what we are, as Spaemann 
suggests, which makes the role of tradition in the transmission of culture all the more 
important.
67
  Giussani, of course, is quick to acknowledge the influence teachers 
have had on his own cultural formation, and obedience, for him, is a matter of 
affection for the teachers from whom one has received the law.  But all this sits 
rather awkwardly with the idea that the deliveries of the heart are innate and 
universally applicable.  Furthermore, the idea that subjects and tradition always agree 
on the basis of the heart leads him to greet rival intuitions with some quite dogmatic 
replies, such that perfect obedience (to the Magisterium here or to the “method of the 
Movement” there) is recommended universally and in all cases as the standard of 
ecclesial fidelity and communion (IPO, 178 and 189).                         
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Hegelian Tendencies will refer to the author‟s development of the idea of the 
Christian community in relation to the secular public sphere along the lines of 
Hegel‟s notion of civil society.  The term “civil society” will be clarified as we 
proceed.  For now, it refers to the free association of individuals for the construction 
of “a dwelling more adequate to the heart,” and advocates the minimisation of the 
government‟s sphere of activity, such as through the principle of subsidiarity.  I am 
motivated to test Hegelian tendencies as the cause of vagueness regarding the role of 
prayer and tradition in shaping society, including what the idea of the human person 
adds to the “passion” that incites action and generates culture.  In what follows in 
this section I aim to be largely descriptive.  Critique will follow in a later section 
towards the end of this chapter. 
Hegel‟s influence on modern Catholic theology has been widespread, if at 
times indirect.  There were several translations of and commentaries on Hegel‟s 
thought and Hegelian Marxism circulating throughout Italy during Giussani‟s 
lifetime.  At various points in this section, I will make reference to the ideas of 
Hegelian provenance with which Giussani was acquainted, some of which he 
endorsed, others of which he repudiated.  Giussani, himself, was not a deep reader of 
Hegel and, in fact, considered himself diametrically opposed to the idealist tradition 
to which Hegel belonged.  He rejects Hegel‟s immanent theology (AD, 347; DMT, 
24) and evokes the rhetoric of ultimate satisfaction to gesture instead at a “vaster 
horizon (e.g., IPO, 126).”  Furthermore, not unlike Emmanuel Mounier (1905-1950), 
whom he quotes on occasion (IPO, 156-157 and 160), Giussani associates Hegel 
with the modern architects of systems of thought and impersonal structures.
68
  Along 
these lines, Giussani vigorously opposed the proponents of Marxism and Liberation 
Theology, who owed Hegel a debt of gratitude, and dissociated characteristic acts of 
Christian charity, such as the redress of injustice, from theories of religion based on 
social and economic processes.  But Giussani was also well acquainted with the 
philosophical writings of Maurice Blondel, Hans Urs von Balthasar, and Karol 
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Wojtyla, for instance, all of whom drew from Hegel, differently indeed than Marxists 
and Liberation theologians, but with decisive outcomes for their theologies, 
nonetheless.  Throughout this section, I will consider the Hegelian influence of these 
three authors on the formulation of Giussani‟s theses concerning freedom, making 
good use of history and context to reconstruct the original questions Giussani was 
trying to answer by turning to their insights.   
Throughout this section, I will use Jonathan Robinson‟s interpretation of 
Hegel from The Mass and Modernity: Walking Backward to Heaven.
69
  In a chapter 
entitled “Hegel: God Becomes the Community,” Robinson evaluates Hegel‟s 
influence on Catholic theology, particularly since the Second Vatican Council, and 
deals with certain issues concerning the relationship between doctrine and the public 
sphere, including the role and importance of tradition in relation to autonomy – all of 
which touch on Giussani‟s account of freedom. 
 
Analysis 
i) The Shaping of Society 
Robinson notes both the pervasiveness and subtlety of Hegel‟s influence on 
theology, particularly with regards to theological reflection on the shaping of society.  
The point of Robinson‟s description, quoted below, is to highlight the contemporary 
arrangement of key theological terms, viz., God, human genius, and the public 
sphere, which is arguably Hegelian.  Robinson‟s reconstruction of this one Hegelian 
paradigm, I believe, casts some light on Giussani‟s theological endorsement and 
interpretation of MacIntyre‟s idea concerning “„[...] the construction of local forms 
of community within which civility and the intellectual and moral life can be 
sustained through the new dark ages which are already upon us;‟” to which Giussani 
adds,  “Even if not precisely in these terms, we [the CDO] also belong to this same 
floodtide of new life (IPO, 159).”  Giussani‟s project, to which he sometimes refers 
as “the miracle of change,” matches up nicely to Robinson‟s description of Hegel‟s 
influence on Catholic thought, even if Giussani would likely have greeted the news 
of Hegel‟s influence on his own thought with a sense of failure:  
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A good deal of [Hegel and Marx] has influenced thinkers in the [Catholic] 
Church.  It is not always very clear whether those who write theology are 
aware of the source of their ideas or, if they are aware, just how frank they 
are prepared to be about the real foundations of their thought.  For example, 
when a contemporary theologian writes that „Transformation, therefore, 
constitutes an important hermeneutic tool for opening the Eucharistic mystery 
to contemporary religious consciousness.  It is also more in tune with a 
modern-day dynamic interpretation of the person as part of the creative 
process at the heart of humanity itself and of human history‟, I contend that 
such passages are based on a philosophical view that owes more to Hegel and 
Marx than it does to Christianity.
70
 (Robinson‟s gloss).  
 
Robinson illustrates the effect of Hegel on Catholic theology using a passage from 
Signs of Freedom: Theology of the Christian Sacraments by German Martinez.
71
  
Martinez‟s logic of “transformation” implicitly subscribes to a thesis, attributed to 
Hegel, that society is a nation when the norms of a people‟s tradition can be 
harmonized with the laws of public life, recalling the lesson learned from Antigone‟s 
tragic fate.
72
  “Perhaps the word „culture‟ is the best word for considering the 
harmonization of factors [that builds up civilization],” Giussani writes.  “A culture 
ties the particular to the universal; a position is „cultured‟ if it tends to tie the passing 
moment with the total horizon of things (thus, by its nature, every culture should 
strive to be catholic, universal; otherwise it is not a real culture) (IPO, 126).”  This 
thesis is a prescriptive feature of communitarian thought, which has gained 
momentum in Catholic circles over the last century, at least.
73
   
Before visiting the theological implications of Martinez‟s Hegelian debt, we 
do well to list different kinds of communitarian thought that sprang up during 
Giussani‟s lifetime and with which he would have been acquainted.   
                                                 
70
 Robinson, “Hegel: God becomes the Community,” 117-118. 
71
 German Martinez, Signs of Freedom: Theology of the Christian Sacraments (New York: Paulist 
Press, 2003), 178. 
72
 Hegel, Hegel‟s Philosophy of Right, translated by T. M. Knox (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1967), 114-115.  Spaemann explains the significance of Antigone‟s predicament in light of the ancient 
conception of freedom: “Second nature, the custom of living appropriately, was what eleutheria, 
freedom, amounted to for the Greeks of the sixth century BC.  Someone who stood in the way of it was 
reckoned a tyrant.  Antigone was not deprived of freedom by the ancient requirement that she should 
bury her brother, but by Creon‟s innovative demand that she should not do so” (Persons, 198). 
73
 See: Robert L. Philips, “Communitarianism, the Vatican, and a New World Order,” in Ethics & 
International Affairs, 5.1 (2006): 135-147.  See also: The Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the 
Church (Rome and Washington DC: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2004), §§ 417-420. 




(i) Reflection on freedom in the Anglo-American world, by Catholic thinkers 
such as Michael Novak, Richard John Neuhaus, and George Weigel, has 
turned to communitarian prescriptions to critique the over-extension of 
government, and, thus, to promote civil society and liberal capitalism, as 
David Schindler has indicated.
74
   
(ii) The Principle of Subsidiarity, shaped in part by the subjugation of the Church 
in Italy during the Fascist period, has had the autonomy of religious 
institutions in view, as well as the harmonisation of Church and state.
75
   
(iii) Through his development of the concept of communio, John Paul II 
identified “creativity” and “receptivity” as indispensable facets of any society 
that calls itself communitarian, thereby adding the concept of person to the 
concept of free will.
76
   
Giussani‟s recommendations to the CDO are a synthesis of the Anglo-American idea 
of civil society, the Church‟s teaching on subsidiarity, and John Paul II‟s idea of 
communio.  Giussani aligns himself with the Anglo-American style of 
communitarian thought through the CDO‟s promotion of a free-market economy; he 
aligns himself with the Principle of Subsidiarity through the idea that individuals can 
unleash a “floodtide of new life,” acting as catalysts for the “miracle of change” (la 
compagnia si dilata in civiltà); and he aligns himself with John Paul II through his 
valuation of artists, artisans, human creativity, and a generous spirit of sacrifice, all 
of which support the communitarian thesis that “the embedded and embodied 
individual is a truer and more accurate model, a better conception of reality, than, 
say, liberal individualism, or atomism, or structuralist Marxism.”
77
   
Each of these versions of communitarianism posits a sphere of activity for the 
CDO, largely economic in its relations and distinct from the life of the family, where 
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the continuity of a tradition is secured through the ordinary exchange of social and 
economic relations.  Hegel called this sphere “civil society” (bürgerliche 
Gesellschaft).  The term civil society grew out of the family.  Its genealogy, Jonathan 
Robinson notes, goes back to “the sphere where family members work with other 
families to pursue ends that are directly related neither to the family, on the one hand, 
nor to the state, on the other. [...] Through this system, [the member of a family] 
becomes an individual person who is neither only a member of family nor a citizen 
of the state.  He now pursues his own particular aims, and he does this in union with 
other individuals who are also doing the same thing.”
78
  At the heart of civil society 
is the idea that the human person is an actor, a protagonist for change. 
 
ii)  Protagonism 
Thus Giussani arrives at his bold proclamation concerning cultural 
protagonism: “man is the creator, inventor, and catalyst of an oeuvre (IPO, 127).”  I 
argue that this idea and its corollaries fit the Hegelian paradigm Robinson excavates 
from Martinez‟s conception of the Eucharist; viz., according to an “interpretation of 
the person as part of the creative process at the heart of humanity itself and of 
human history.”  The centrality of the human person, within this particular 
arrangement of God and society, directs action to achieving the best conditions for 
human flourishing in the immanent frame.      
 
Your companionship is directed to seeking a more habitable dwelling for the 
human person.  [...] And this is because the human person is, by means of his 
obvious concreteness, the object of your passion.  That is to say, man who is 
needy.  In fact, need is the condition in which man has existence and 
rediscovers his real self.  It is today‟s needs [that matter].  To think of 
resolving today‟s worries tomorrow or within a year is highly equivocal if it 
does not immediately organize factors in a manner that responds best to 
hunger and thirst, to the needs which are felt today (IPO, 131). 
 
The gathering of a people, the channelling of gifts and talents into concrete 
projects, coalesces around the felt need, like an instinct, to improve the 
conditions of human flourishing.  The person is at the heart of humanity and 
human history; she is the protagonist for “the miracle of change” (IPO, 159). 
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The arrangement of a stable and flourishing society unfolds, for Giussani, through 
human protagonism – one which is motivated by everything that matters to what it 
means to be human. Balthasar thought along the same lines, situating human action 
at centre stage, when developing his concept of theodramatics.  Ben Quash notes: 
 
Balthasar is [...] living and breathing Hegel‟s analysis of drama.  [...]  
Individual characters (like the apostolic witnesses and catechists of 
Balthasar‟s scheme) and their aims are important inasmuch as they generate 
action.  They are dramatically significant for the sake of the action.  And the 
action is significant, in turn, inasmuch as it is penetrated by and fitted to the 
characters and their aims.  The intentions and aims of acting characters are 
not to be separated from external happenings and deeds.  There is a striking 
interdependence of the subject‟s mind and character (on the one hand) and 
the telos of the action (on the other), and this last point in particular (about 
the telos) is something that Balthasar‟s understanding of drama has inherited 
very substantially from Hegel.
79
   
 
Similar to Balthasar, Giussani‟s account of culture, with its emphasis on protagonism 
(in actu exercito), follows Robinson‟s Hegel.  From a passion for humanity, the 
gathering of a people and their subsequent movement into action “dilates into 
civilization (IPO, 157-160).”   Balthasar alone need not be Giussani‟s inspiration 
here.  Blondel put forth a similar rationale for the founding of a nation and national 
sentiment:  
 
We do not come together simply to come together.  We cannot contain between 
two individuals this torrent [of common action] which flows from the will.  
The unity of the lives joined together must be more than the sum of the lives in 
isolation.  This surplus must spill over and the superabundance of multiple 
beings must engender a work that will become its reason for being.
80
 
   
Thus, from the idea that an oeuvre rides on “action that is penetrated by and fitted to 
the characters and their aims,” Giussani arrives at the idea that the Christian fact is 
something which must be created or engendered through human protagonism: “The 
reality of the Church in the world passes through some factor, however small, which 
is our presence at the factory, at the firm, wherever it is that we find ourselves (IPO, 
87).”  Perhaps this results from a tacit belief – signalled by Giussani‟s epistemology 
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– that modern religious consciousness, as Hegel had seen, “requires an account of 
how its communal, reflective activity of taking something as authoritative can serve 
as a ground for taking something to be sacred.”
81
  By means of harmonising inner-
subjectivity and outer-world, a simple gesture of solidarity, “which originates 
reactively from the goodness of human nature, ties itself to something more vast, it 
becomes assimilated to and redirected to a vaster horizon (IPO, 126).”   
 
Concrete, not abstract answers 
By reading Giussani‟s account in light of its origins in history we are able to 
catch sight of the concerns that shaped it in various ways, including why he 
disparaged abstract philosophy; it also brings us to some preliminary conclusions 
about the extent of Hegel‟s influence on his thought.  Giussani had realized, at a 
meeting in Subiaco in 1968, that the Marxist sensibility at the heart of the student 
riots of ‟68, while wreaking havoc through Europe‟s universities, had substantially 
expressed to the pastors of the Church “a real and positive need that demanded a 
response.”
82
  Reflecting on the incident some twenty years later, he wrote: “I have 
always referred to ‟68 as an „anti-authoritarian rebellion‟ which had a sincere first 
impulse (un moto iniziale sincero).”
83
  The alienating structures of modern life, 
apparently, were a real problem and the riot‟s justification.  Giussani was not alone 
in holding this point of view.  In a context different from Giussani‟s, the political 
philosopher Eric Voegelin (1901-1985) deemed Marxism‟s influence as unfortunate, 
but necessary: “[Marx] laid his finger on the sore spot of modern industrialized 
society [...], that is, the growth of economic institutions into a power of such 
overwhelming influence on the life of every single man, that in the face of such 
power all talk about human freedom becomes futile.”
84
  Back in 1968, the infiltration 
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of Marxism in the Movimento Studentesco, which Giussani had been appointed by 
Archbishop Montini in 1954 to direct, seemed unstoppable, even threatening to the 
establishment.  The Subiaco typescript speaks of “a force already organized and 
structured, [...] a vertex that is gathering in the formation of a political party with a 
Marxian logic.”
85
   
Giussani clearly repudiated Marx‟s vision of freedom as the emancipation of 
man from labour.  At the same time, he wanted to address his audience concerns over 
alienation. The path here, similar to that taken by the proponents of the nouvelle 
théologie, was to make life the starting point of theological reflection, bypassing, as 
much as possible, the dry and abstract metaphysics typified by Garrigou-Lagrange.  
For priests of Giussani‟s mentality (e.g., Chenu, Balthasar, de Lubac), the “I” 
afforded the most engaging point of reflection to their contemporaries, ushering the 
concept of person to centre stage.  And that is why the community, envisaged by 
Giussani – be it GS, CL, or CDO – fostered moments of self-reflection, such as the 
Scuola Quaderni, or School of Community, or the Meeting of Friendship Among 
Peoples (Rimini), such that questions turning on identity and the meaning and 
purpose of life could be explored.  The integral vision of the person, including his 
personal and social dimensions, coincided with accounts of the acting person.  
Meanwhile, the epistemology makes the heart (its innate criteria, including values) 
the basis of organizing society.  The epistemological process relies on the 
community‟s self-reflective activity to affirm theological propositions which are 
taken to be self-evident, rather than on a deep training in a tradition to render clearly 
what would otherwise be opaque.  Theological propositions, according to the former 
alternative, are reached heuristically, after the long run of enquiry, vis-à-vis the 
ultimate answer to man‟s quest for meaning, thereby “supernaturalizing the 
natural.”
86
  While Giussani‟s approach to freedom successfully avoids charges of 
behaviourism in its intended application to the act of faith, aligning him with de 
Lubac, Arendt, and others with whom he shared this concern, it carries consequences 
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for tradition, practical deliberation, and discursive reason, all of which impact his 
anthropology, as we will see in the following section.      
  
OBSERVATIONS 
I find that the abstract deliveries of Giussani‟s epistemological tendency, the 
results of which are unwittingly compounded by the tendencies I have classified as 
Hegelian, compete with his overarching goal to provide his readers with practical-
theories-to-live-by.  These competing tendencies, in turn, generate vague 
descriptions in Giussani‟s attempt to articulate the notion of freedom in the 
relationship between doctrine and the public sphere, as well as between tradition and 
the individual “I.”  Since Giussani‟s attempt at reconciling these tensions is itself 
abstract, contrary to his explicit intention to remain concrete, the implications are 
problematic for each term in their practical applications to real problems.  For as long 
as these vaguenesses are left undetermined, Giussani‟s account may be expected to 
continue generating answers that weaken the pragmatic purport of his writing.   My 
observations anticipate the kinds of problem that may result from the practical 
application of the account to real questions, and do so with a view to highlighting the 
areas calling for urgent repair.   
 
Concerning Epistemology 
The goal of transcendence, to which Giussani orients his readers, is not so 
easily achieved insofar as it is epistemologically-driven.  I argue, following Charles 
Taylor, that epistemology plays into one of the principal features of secularization 
theory.
87
  It is responsible for “disenchantment” – the waning of sacramental 
sensibilities typified in the Middle Ages, including the declining sense of inhabiting a 
spirit-filled world, which follows a shift from embodied religion to intellectualized 
religion.
88
  The intellectualization of religion, in other words, “goes with the bent of 
certain theoretical practices and insights that make us see ourselves as living in an 
impersonal order [...] capable of being grasped scientifically, empirically, and 
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  We noted earlier Giussani‟s tendency to buy into 
impersonal accounts at the expense of practical-theories-to-live-by.  We are now in a 
better position to see that the tendency is epistemological, stemming from the 
pastoral desire to want to give the act of faith the benefit of the supposedly harder 
proofs of science.    
Giussani‟s account of the act of faith begins to equivocate when the attempt 
to ground religion in the aspiration for certitude, of a scientific kind, is required to 
look beyond the immanent to the transcendent.  The path to transcendence relies on a 
self-reflective method that makes conscious the inward desire for infinity, which is 
innate.  For this reason, Giussani refers to “needs and exigencies of the heart,” and 
lists among them truth, beauty, justice, happiness.  At the same time, the heart 
presents a direct challenge to the Enlightenment critique of the emotions.  Giussani 
writes:  
 
Reason is not as arthritic or paralyzed as has been imagined by so much of 
modern philosophy, which has reduced it to a single operation – „logic‟ – or 
to a specific type of phenomenon, to a certain capacity for „empirical 
demonstration.‟  Reason is much larger than this; it is life, a life faced with 
the complexity and multiplicity of reality, the richness of the real.  Reason is 
agile, goes everywhere, travels many roads (RS, 17).    
 
To strengthen the viability of the heart as a criterion of judgement, i.e., to “broaden 
reason,” Giussani takes up the cause against Enlightenment rationalism, joining the 
likes of Romano Guardini and Hannah Arendt.  As part of his strategy he invokes 
realism (over and against the self-made individual or our holding inner 
representations of outer reality); he posits persons as actors freely and thoughtfully 
attending to the background of their native surroundings, choosing what counts as 
authoritative in determining the self and society (over and against the behaviourist 
thesis that we are determined); and he directs the gaze to something that lies beneath 
surface appearances, not only to help us cope with questions of meaning and identity, 
highlighting what is purposeful in life without treating reality as an end in itself, but 
to open the heart to a vaster horizon of meaning.  At each pass, the emotions and 
affectivity are restored to the moral life and the agent believes and obeys because he 
                                                 
89
 Taylor, A Secular Age, 541. 




is more than the sum of his thoughts: he feels, desires, and loves.  Moral obedience 
rooted in the heart is no longer duty before an impersonal order; rather, obedience is 
the person‟s free and loving response to a presence, a companionship that is an 
authority.
90
   
And yet, while Giussani‟s epistemology may address the Enlightenment 
challenge to religious belief and practice, his attempt to do so by grounding the act of 
faith in a scientific kind of certitude, leaves the original problem intact.  Beyond the 
attempt to reach a secular audience by using a non-threatening language, to teach a 
method by which to render obedience thoughtful obedience – all of which is good in 
itself – the epistemology claims a special role for the “I” and posits special ends for 
the “I.”  But the emphasis on the “I” accounts for Giussani‟s unwitting recurrence to 
an Enlightenment logic, whereby the goals of actors are separated from the tradition 
in which they are embedded and embodied.  Now Giussani‟s achievement, in great 
part, was precisely to call for the integration of the customs, rubrics, and practices of 
the Church into ordinary life and civil society precisely when they came under 
attack.  His reference to tradition, however, is not a point of departure, as a source 
from which moral deliberation draws, but the outcome of trial and error.  When 
tradition returns as a trustworthy principle after rigorous testing against the heart, it is 
tacked-on from the outside, as a seal of fidelity and serious living.  It may become a 
source for the formation of conscience, however; when it does, the replies become 
dogmatic, rather than nuanced by particulars.   
Thus, we return to Giussani‟s description of the deliberating subject who is 
the self-reflective subject of the Enlightenment and its aftermath.  This is the person 
who sets out heuristically to test hypotheses, seeking truth in the correspondence 
between heart and world – the assimilation of inner self with outer reality– and to 
deem what he finds authoritative as the ground for what is sacred and worthy of 
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being grasped.  In so doing, the subject replicates the rationalism that Giussani wants 
him to evade, signalled by the attempt, almost always dogmatic, to fit universal 
solutions to particular problems.  Stated formally: if x is true, y is to be done, not for 
the sake of x, but for z; where x is God, y is the law, and z is the ideal of ultimate 
satisfaction.   
According to this logic, after Giussani reinstates epistemology, grounding the 
act of faith in a judgement based on the self-discovered “I,” the existential relevance 
of the transcendent seems less robust, even feeble; for the logic of the argument 
separates God from the truth about oneself.  Once this separation occurs, the 
individual is faced with confusion about what he thinks he would like to be, which 
might differ from what God would rather have him be, and what he really is.  This 
line of questioning, however, leads unnecessarily to self-doubt.  Once it is clear even 
to Giussani that the heart can be confused, obedience resurfaces as the answer to 
questions of self-realization: I become myself by following an Other who is an 
authority for me concerning my destiny.  Depending on one‟s perspective and the 
case at hand, Giussani‟s solution of following an Other turns out either satisfying or 
disappointing results for freedom.
91
  It would seem that Giussani‟s recommendation 
to obey precisely to avert a moment of uncertainty or crisis, as I have pointed out 
above, can seem precipitous or even decisive, running counter to the thrust of his 
argument on the freedom of “I” for the “I‟s” self-realization.  The serious reader, at 
this point, cannot help but pose again the original question with which Giussani 
began: how can one obey and still be free?   
The answer, if it is to avoid the pitfalls I have just highlighted, must be less 
reliant on epistemology.  Consider the following alternative which distinguishes 
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between obedience as asceticism and obedience through discernment: (1) If the 
matter concerns divine faith, e.g., where y is the dominical obligation, for instance, 
and x is the deepest source from which y derives, such as Holy Scripture and the 
Church Fathers, action-y ought to be performed because x is the case; for the 
Catholic cannot begin to conceive of his “I” outside the tradition.  Obedience in this 
example is a matter of ascetical discipline and is carried out in accordance with one‟s 
conscience, even if it runs counter to the will.  (2) Where the matter concerns 
practical living, action-y ought to be performed according to a certain manner after 
rational discussion and deliberation have reached their conclusions.  Such discussion 
and deliberation will have used the deepest sources and tools of the tradition: e.g., the 
logic of scripture, wise counsel, historical precedent, foresight, etc.   
The importance of tradition, according to (2), is stressed in relation to how an 
obligation might be met given that one faces a morally difficult circumstance, i.e., 
not as the disengaged and impartial agent motivated by duty, but as the recipient of a 
language, culture, history, and tradition without which the I could not be conceived.  
The adequacy of one‟s formation, of course, is crucial to the effectiveness of that 
judgment.  At any rate, there is no need to probe the confused inner world of the 
heart self-reflexively for a judgement on reality, nor to resort to blind obedience so as 
to avoid the discomfort of having to work through problems or to settle in the 
discomfort of their occasional insolubility.  The answer to practical problems, in 
other words, is neither the result of ascetical obedience, nor loving sacrifice (at least 
not primarily).  Practical answers are prudential answers formed from the perspective 
of a tradition.  They require patient and careful interpretation of particulars.  Patience 
and care bring time, discursive reason, and rational deliberation into play.  Only by 
the use of these methods can obedience be called thoughtful obedience.  But there is 
always also a prior dependence for the use of these methods on the tradition itself, 
which is their source, the consent to which is a kind of obedience and the 
appreciation of which is the recognition of one‟s indebtedness to it.    
Faced with his readers‟ confusion, Giussani‟s proclivity to probe 
epistemology to achieve more clarity about the act of faith – a move owed to the 
disengaged and universalizing expectations of his scientifically-minded interlocutors, 
not to mention the distance he himself seeks from behaviourism and structural 




Marxism – issues unwittingly in intellectual statements about x and z and abstract, 
universal, and prescriptive approaches to y.  In addition to subverting his own 
purpose to render revelation accessible and vital for the formulation of practical-
theories-to-live-by – a move motivated by his terror of “abstract phrases” (AD, 112-
113) – Giussani unwittingly excludes discursive reason and the tools of practical 
deliberation, such as memory, reason, understanding, teachability, ingenuity (on the 
cognitive side), and foresight, circumspection, and caution (on the normative side).  
Furthermore, he fails to mention the role of the intellectual and ethical virtues, 
relying instead on the intuitions of the heart, which afford no guarantee in particular 
situations that his readers will show excellence in judgement. 
 
Concerning Robinson‟s Hegel 
So far, I have considered philosophically how Giussani‟s emphasis on 
epistemology maintains the abstract, prescriptive, and universalizing tendencies he 
wishes to overcome.  I will try, in this section, to relate these effects to the debt 
Giussani owes Hegel.  I should like, at this point, to make a few observations 
pertaining to Giussani‟s description of the self-reflective practices of the community.  
This Hegelian tendency, I contend, generates many of the same kinds of ambiguities 
for tradition and institutions as the epistemological tendency described above.  The 
cause, however, is different, as are also some of its new effects.  Once again, I use 
Robinson‟s critique of Hegel as my guide.     
 
Protagonism as Epic Transformation 
With Giussani‟s Hegelianism, it is not the essentialist claims he stakes for 
intuitions that put traditions and institutions on the line, but the shaping of history 
and time through self-reflection and human agency, where what counts as 
authoritative is also the ground for what counts as sacred.
92
  Moral reflection, then, 
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comes to be focused on reconciling the secular-sacred divide, so that various other 
oppositions tearing at the fabric of a culture and civilization (e.g., inner/outer, 
reality/appearance, truth/myth) might be assimilated to a vaster horizon, the 
infinite.
93
  The acting person is the protagonist of culture and civilization, tying the 
needs that he feels within himself and that impinge on him from without to that 
vaster horizon where binaries are united in a harmonious whole.  Whether acting on 
one‟s own, or with others through a movement, the kind of protagonism that has the 
human person as its passion always unleashes a “floodtide of new life,” leading to 
the dramatic and epic transformation of society into a “dwelling more adequate to the 
heart.”  Strikingly, the dramatic unfolding of social transformation through the 
subject‟s protagonism does not ask how or whether a course of action ought to be 
taken, but why it ought to be pursued, which is, of course, to ask an epistemological 
question about the value of ends and the certitude for their grounds.  The answer to 
this kind of question, within CL or CDO, tends itself to be cast in dramatic, if highly 
abstract and universal terms; as one long-time member of the Movement once 
explained to me: “Either what I encountered in the Movement is real, or everything is 
false.”
94
   
 
Corollaries 
While a deeper communion and spiritual liberation are good in themselves 
and encouraged by the Church, they can lead individuals to equate participation in an 
ecclesial movement with incorporation in the Church.
 95
  In the following quotation, 
taken from the spiritual Exercises of the Fraternity of Communion and Liberation in 
2009, the President of CL, Julián Carrón, generalizes his own experience of the 
Movement, recommending Giussani‟s method universally as the absolute grounds of 
authentic belief and practice in the Christian faith: 
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I met the Movement about twenty years ago, but only in these circumstances, 
in this fact, has the Mystery of the great Presence been revealed to me (p. 28). 
 
I remember that for me this was perhaps the most salient question in my 
encounter with the Movement: it put tools into my hands for following my 
human path. Without this, you cannot understand even faith. Thus, let us take 
a moment to begin again from here, because this is not the last footnote of the 
last page of the twentieth book of Father Giussani! This is the beginning of 
the Trilogy: what experience is (p. 52). 
 
[...] not having understood that we have comprehended the principles and 
values [of Christianity] thanks to the encounter we have had with Christ in 
the Movement, which has filled our life with meaning, we often change the 
method [of the “religious sense”] (p. 65). 
 
Encountering the Movement and taking Giussani‟s method seriously, for Carrón, are 
the sure means to and benchmark of serious Christian commitment.  Carron correctly 
intuits that his own faith is a response to a prior initiative, but he attributes this to 
Giussani rather than the workings of Holy Spirit through the Church!  The ordinary 
means of formation in the tradition – e.g., Scriptural study, contemplation, 
observance of the liturgical calendar, Sacramental devotion, Mass, spiritual direction, 
acquaintance with the lives of the saints, and so on – affecting heart, mind, and will, 
receive attention insofar as they further the purposes of the Movement, capturing the 
thrust of its protagonism.  Older charisms in the Church (e.g., Benedictine, 
Franciscan, Dominican, etc.) become interesting to the extent that their practices 
overlap with those of the Movement.   
Catholic journalist Robi Ronza gave Giussani the opportunity to comment on 
typical descriptions of Catholicity from within CL, where participation in the 
movement can sometimes be the measure of religious seriousness (in contrast to the 
ancient view of a living rapport with the Church as “mother and teacher”).
96
  Such 
questions implicitly ask Giussani to explain how his method (i.e., self-reflection on 
the “I”) squares with a formal education in the moral life and the spiritual worship of 
the Church.  The point would be to determine whether identification with the 
Movement ultimately replaces the Church and God, such that the grounds for what 
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counts as sacred are the grounds for what the community finds is authoritative in its 
self-reflective practices (e.g., Giussani‟s method of verification).  Giussani replies so 
as to safeguard the deposit of faith: “One can do as he pleases, but if he calls himself 
Catholic, there are things he must do.  Therefore, we [in the Movement] do not say: 
„If you don‟t do as we are doing you are not Christian;‟ but „You are not a Christian 
if you do not respect the essential factors of the Christian fact, as indicated by the 
Magisterium, for instance.‟”
97
  Giussani recognizes that certain kinds of 
identification with CL could mitigate the role and importance of tradition.  His 
answer attempts to repair the way some CL members see themselves within the 
Church.  While he does not clarify here what the encounter with the Movement adds 
to the Church that the Church does not already have, one might expect Giussani to 
cite his epistemology.  But if the hallmark of the movement is a method for testing 
reality against the heart, what does that suggest about Christians who cannot see 
themselves anywhere else but inside the tradition before any comparison with the 
heart?  Surely he would not chare them with unreasonableness.   
Giussani‟s answer exhibits his attempt to reclaim the role of the Church by 
assimilating subjects to tradition de jure, which is its most striking feature.  To this 
end, it has recourse to positivist language: the authority dictated by “facts” and 
“factors.”  The upshot turns the original question about the formative role of tradition 
in the life of a Catholic into a question of disciplinary training – one that aims, as 
Michel Foucault had observed of modern power-structures, “at producing „docile 
bodies‟: bodies that not only do what we want but do it precisely in the way that we 
want.”
98
  Herein lies the crux of the problem: if Giussani successfully brings CL and 
its members in line with the Magisterium, thereby securing their orthodoxy, he 
recasts the role of the Magisterium as juridical body and downplays its role as a 
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“loving mother.”  The role of the Magisterium as loving mother, according to the 
Catechism of the Catholic Church (1994), is to help the Christian faithful to fulfil 
their vocations; to receive the Word of God and the grace of the sacraments that 
sustain them on the way; to learn from the example of holiness and to discern in the 
Church the authentic witness of those who live it; and to discover in the Church the 
spiritual tradition and the long history of the saints.
99
  Giussani, of course, 
appreciates the crucial difference between receiving a tradition (on the one hand) and 
knuckling under its dictates (on the other); just as he appreciates the difference 
between moral guidance (on the one hand) and the fact of gravity as containing it 
own law (on the other hand).  And yet his account of tradition is generally more 
attuned to positive law than moral theology, making it somewhat intolerant of 
ambiguity and unfolding understandings.    
Two different lines of enquiry can be pursued at this juncture, one probing 
the consistencies internal to Giussani‟s account, the other probing the consistencies 
between his account and the tradition in which it is embedded and embodied.  Is 
Giussani‟s reference to obedience consistent with his own aim to foster obedience 
which is thoughtful obedience?  Does his self-reflective epistemology and the 
community‟s self-reflective practices on what counts as authoritative train his 
interlocutors to face moral questions by formulating robust answers – answers which 
are properly their own because they themselves draw from the tradition‟s deepest 
sources of repair?  Is Giussani‟s obedience here in line with his wish to foster the 
ability of youngsters to want to be moved by the highest of desires, such as the 
universal call to holiness?  Or does the emphasis on the method of self-reflection 
make the reality of God‟s existence contingent on community, time, and history?  Is 
there a tendency to identify oneself more with the immanent than with the 
transcendent order, to be formed more by one‟s mature and serious approach to the 
existential questions that arise, and to attend the eventual encounter with the 
undeniable presence, or to read life‟s questions from one‟s prior induction in the 
practices of the Church and keeping the Ten Commandments?   And to the extent 
that the experience of an encounter remains a central feature of Giussani‟s account, 
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what role does it give the proclamation of revelation and the prayerful worship of the 
Church?  There can be all sorts of “befores” that prefigure one's discovery of the 
Church.  The problem is more serious: the Movement can begin to seem a substitute 
for the Church. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
To understand that from the 1950s, within large segments of Italian society, 
individuals began to find it incomprehensible to see themselves as Catholics in the 
way their parents had, preferring to think and act on Marxist terms, and to recall that, 
ever since the Risorgimento, Northern Italy had grown increasingly anti-clerical and 
secular, is to understand why Giussani avoided expounding the faith from tradition, 
adopting the human person – his cares and worries – as his primary point of 
departure instead.  Giussani‟s approach, existential and ultimately more sympathetic 
than its scholastic forerunners, was deemed a viable path to the transcendent, one 
which was able also to secure the best results for the subject‟s freedom.  
Methodologically, in posing the question of transcendence in terms of why one 
should assent to the Catholic faith, Giussani pursues an epistemological line of 
enquiry.  Certitude, the goal of this enquiry, necessitates the application of a method 
suited to its goal.  And since religion deals with what is most resonant with the 
constitutive needs of the human person, the method for knowing the religious fact is 
to reflect on one‟s “I.”  By extension, doing what a Catholic does in the moral 
shaping of society is contingent on knowing and understanding why the religious 
point of view is authoritative from the human point of view.  The consummate shift 
from liturgy to politics, to cite one example, plays into the effort of individuals and 
small enterprises to harmonize the clash of secular and sacred points of view (civil 
society).   
Giussani builds his argument for religion in the secular sphere around the 
authoritative deliveries of self-reflection.  First, all questions of meaning and purpose 
are religious questions; real questions in civil society are religious questions; 
therefore questions pertaining to civil society are religious questions.  Second, all 
religious questions are humanly relevant questions; questions that arise in civil 
society are religious questions; therefore civil society questions are humanly relevant 




questions.  The process ultimately takes the individual or community‟s self-reflection 
for taking something to be authoritative as the grounds for taking something to be 
sacred.            
For reasons tied to history and context, Giussani seeks an intrinsic ground for 
the moral shaping of society: “a society more adequate to the needs of the heart.”  
Rather than make provisions for rival intuitions, such as discursive reason and 
practical deliberation, the community provides the “energy” by which to remain 
faithful to the original encounter.  The experience, then, assumes priority over 
language, history and culture.  But outside of language, history, and culture, moral 
deliberation and argument would be inconceivable.  Persons learn how to be 
Christian in practical terms through Scripture and tradition.  And this differs from 
tackling moral dilemmas on the grounds of knowing that one is a Christian because 
of an encounter, or acting Christianly because of the duty owed to the “presence” 
encountered.  Indeed, it is through Scripture and tradition that the conception of 
communion is understood in terms of the prayerful worship of Christ in the liturgy 
and contemplation on the Divine Word.  These practices, intrinsic to the tradition, are 
the ordinary ambit of theological reflection on freedom and the moral shaping of an 
organized society.       
  Truth, in the sense underscored in John 8:32, is indeed the object of rational 
thought, which freedom serves.  But Giussani adheres to the epistemological side of 
truth, and therefore, its general side, having to do with explanation and 
understanding, rather than with thought directed toward action.  Its practical side is 
not negated, to be sure.  He would agree with Aristotle, for instance, that “for the 
theorist, truth is a scientific explanation, for the ethical deliberator, it is a good 
rational choice, for the craftsman, it is right technical decision.”
100
  Giussani, 
however, does not consider what the practical attainment of different ends in relation 
to an undeniable truth might require.  Such a consideration might have demonstrated 
the relationship of truth to human character, for instance; i.e., whether a person has 
the wherewithal to stand by the truth even at grave personal cost, rather than to 
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abandon truth for convenience, rests on habits acquired rather than rational grounds 
attained through rigorous testing of hypotheses, i.e., seeking a correspondence with 
the “I.”  The simple predication of action on self-reflection can be a means to 
avoiding commitment in a grave moral dilemma most of all, “dressing up as moral 
choice what is really a de facto preference.”   Thought directed to action concerns the 
relationship of intermediate ends to the ultimate horizon of things.  Pondering 
alternatives ascertains where our obligation ultimately lies.
101
  Tradition equips its 
progeny with resources and tools with which to evaluate the worthiness of 
intermediate ends to final ends.  But it also presupposes that persons are more than 
just the subjects of appetite (epitumia), temper (thumos), and wish (boulēsis).  In 
other words, we attribute to persons the ability to form “second-order desires,” i.e., to 
want to be moved by certain desires, or “second order volitions,” i.e., to want certain 
first-order desires to be the ones which move them to action.
102
   
“How” questions, concerning the practical attainment of particular ends, 
attend the answers of wisdom, while “why” questions, concerning principles of 
action, attend the answers of law.  Wisdom too is thoughtful, but in a manner that 
differs from experience, intuition, and rational testing.  The questions wisdom 
handles do not concern why we hold to be true that which already unites us, but what 
we ought to do in a morally difficult situation in light of what we already hold to be 
true.  Wisdom presupposes one‟s prior induction in language, culture, history, and 
tradition (for where else would the embedded and embodied individual be?), while it 
does not exclude rival intuitions or disagreement among its interpreters.  Its own 
tools, however, afford the possibility of deep reflection and argument.  Wisdom 
draws on historical precedent, foresight, fact-gathering, and good counsel, in addition 
to prayer, intuition and consensus about the good.  For Catholic theology, not one of 
these is available from outside of the institutional framework of the Church, 
comprising the systematic and logical use of Scripture as a key to understanding and 
answering practical and concrete human problems.    
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The account I have just given of deliberation and argument in moral 
dilemmas could pass as a description of Giussani‟s intended account of freedom 
where the acting person is an agent whose choices reflect his depth, the seriousness 
with which he takes life.  Throughout this chapter I have tried to excavate the 
tendencies frustrating Giussani‟s attempt to provide practical and concrete answers 
by which to live regarding questions of religion, politics, and God.  Giussani‟s 
indebtedness to self-reflective epistemology and Hegel have given us insight into the 
problem and its hard won resolution.   On the one hand, the “I” and “humanity” 
introduce into moral dilemma a standard of reflection that deploys “the language of 
evaluative distinctions,” as Charles Taylor puts it; e.g., “noble or base, integrating or 
fragmenting, courageous or cowardly, clairvoyant or blind, and so on.”  And this 
means that qualitative reflection, such as between two different ways of conceiving 
of an organized society, can be characterized contrastively; and indeed, as Taylor 
says, “it can be the case that we must do so if we are to express what is really 
desirable in the favoured alternative.”
103
  To avoid the contrast on the basis of some 
utility-calculus or for lack of nerve is to evade the truth and so to choose unfreedom, 
for one is not free by avoiding an inconvenience posed by adhering to the truth.  The 
depth Giussani cultivates in his readers by introducing the language of strong 
evaluations is effective, to a point.  The account fails to hold up, on the other hand, 
where Giussani assimilates first nature and second nature so that the distinction 
between „second-order‟ desires (e.g., to want to be married) and „second-order 
volitions‟ (to want to act honourably and courageously in a morally difficult 
circumstance) is levelled.  The result generates confusion in the deliberations of the 
practitioners of Giussani‟s method, creating the need to invoke the Magisterium 
against moral chaos.  Moreover, the absence of an account of virtue-cultivation 
presumes more of human beings than is often possible when the conditions of belief 
and action are compounded by unforeseen circumstances and grave dangers.  And 
yet, the depth Giussani cultivates in his readers is capable of inspiring enough 
interest in the transcendent ideals of Christian life that practitioners of his method 
find it “reasonable” – attractive even – to deepen their encounter with the Church, to 
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allow the Church to draw them into its life where the work CL does not carry is 
received through the Church as gift and grace.    
 
           
   
 









Don Giussani era cresciuto in una casa – come dice – povera di pane, ma ricca di musica, e 
così dall‟inizio era toccato, anzi ferito, dal desiderio della bellezza e non si accontentava di 
una bellezza qualunque, di una bellezza banale: cercava la Bellezza stessa, la Bellezza 
infinita, e così ha trovato Cristo, in Cristo la vera bellezza, la strada della vita, la vera gioia. 








Beauty, both as charism and concept, survives as one of Giussani‘s most 
distinctive legacies to the movements and associations he founded.  Giussani was 
first ―struck‖ by beauty in his youth, as Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger pointed out at 
Giussani‘s funeral, where his exposure to music, art, and literature, particularly 
Leopardi‘s poem Alla sua donna, made plain the intrinsic relation of beauty to truth.
2
  
Ratzinger was effectively echoing an earlier observation he had made in the 
―Introduction‖ to Camisasca‘s history of the CL movement: ―The blade of beauty, so 
to speak, cut [Giussani] to the point of opening within him a metaphysical wound.‖
3
  
Beauty was a determinant in the decisions and actions of Giussani‘s life.  Giussani 
often summarized the essential importance of beauty borrowing the phrase from St. 
Thomas Aquinas: pulchrum splendor veritatis.
4
  With time, this phrase would be 
elaborated through countless examples in lectures, articles, and books, and embodied 
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in the ―gestures‖ of Communion and Liberation and Memores Domini,
5
 where it 
remains a staple of theological reflection.
6
  Thus, from his own experience, Giussani 
strove to attune his young interlocutors, through teaching and example, to the 
affective and emotional dimension of living critically, rendering the ―possibility of 
beauty‖ intrinsic to the definition of the human person, and by extension, to the 
authentically religious man or woman.   
Beauty, according to Giussani, applies, above all, to the possibility of an 
encounter between two subjects that gestures at something beyond them – a beyond 
that is infinite, the existence of the Infinite Original.  At the annual Meeting for 
Friendship Among Peoples in Rimini, for instance, art, music, and natural beauty 
refract through Giussani‘s account of beauty in order to connect the most satisfying 
experiences in life with God.  In this sense, beauty is a gift, a gratuitous sign, adapted 
to man‘s emotional and affective needs and demonstrative of God‘s preferential love 
for man.  In humanitarian projects, such as those undertaken by the Fondazione 
Cometa in Como, an arm of CL, beauty is communicated through a variety of media 
(painting, sculpture, and garden) to evidence God‘s love to children who hail from 
troubled backgrounds, far removed from gratuitous expressions of love.  Beauty, 
therefore, never instantiates itself in CL sentimentally, as ars gratia artis, but as a 
means to accessing life‘s most important intuitions concerning destiny, as well as to 
transforming concrete cases of daily hardship into opportunities for hope and human 
growth.   
Giussani‘s Italian biographer, Massimo Camisasca, names three factors that 
shaped Giussani‘s development of the concept of beauty: an innate predisposition to 
seek the beautiful from an early age; his long and vast exposure to music, art, and 
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literature, particularly the Romantic artists, poets, and composers; and his instruction 
under Gaetano Corti at Venegono Seminary.
7
  The latter influence, which had the 
greatest impact on beauty‘s conceptual development, provided the hermeneutical 
lens through which Giussani interpreted encounters, recommending it a posteriori to 
his audience on the presumed basis of their sharing his questions and concerns.  
Giussani summarized Corti‘s insight into beauty, and its indebtedness to St. Thomas 
Aquinas, as follows:  
 
through [Don Corti‘s] style we came to understand the phrase he so often 
quoted from Thomas Aquinas, ―beauty is the splendour of truth‖ (pulchrum 
splendor veritatis).  [...]  This phrase was at the heart of what made Corti‘s 
lectures so fascinating: the heart‘s exultation for Christian truth.  He spoke of 
this exultation as running through one‘s entire being: intellect, feeling, and 
will.  Inspired by this saying, Corti himself delivered his own lectures with 




Furnished with this framework, Giussani proceeded on the conviction, confirmed 
heuristically from childhood through seminary, that the propositions of faith, which 
involve truth and goodness, and appeal respectively to mind and will, could just as 
easily strike the heart through beauty.  If this were so, grasping the truth would be a 
matter of the heart.  According to Giussani, the heart was a higher faculty than the 
understanding and the will, because it was responsible for generating the innate 
desire for God.
9
   
Faith, which stems from the heart, according to Giussani, is infused with a 
―personal reason,‖ if reason means man‘s capacity to acknowledge an exigency for 
transcendence that reverberates from the depths of the homo interior, i.e., beyond the 
operations of logic alone.  Faith is a response given to man by an external Reality, 
Giussani would say, tailored to his most profound needs and exigencies – needs and 
exigencies, he might say, that are personal insofar as they include an emotional and 
affective component that have a for me and a for you quality.  Giussani‘s sensitivity 
to questions of personal relevance leads him to approach the act of faith existentially 
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(rather than only doctrinally).  His focus on existence opens transcendence to the 
immediate concerns of daily life, rendering faith humanly sympathetic, and allowing 
him to repair, according to his expressed intent, the abstract philosophical tendency 
of Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment philosophy to reduce doctrine to law. 
The effort Giussani makes to depict Christianity as an embodied presence in 
the world – one capable of meeting the emotional and affective needs of the human 
person – is typical of the school of ―incarnational theology‖ to which Marie-
Domenique Chenu (1895-1990), Henri de Lubac (1896-1991), and Hans Urs von 
Balthasar (1905-1988) belonged.  In the writings of Marie-Dominique Chenu (1895-
1990), for instance, with which Giussani was familiar, the concept of Incarnation was 
both a process and a law of history (and not only the event in Bethlehem where God, 
the Word, became flesh).
10
  A central feature of Chenu‘s theology, the law of 
Incarnation rules the whole of history and especially the role of the Church in the 
world.  It was used to describe the ecclesial effort through the ages to incorporate the 
concrete character of existence (e.g., space and time, particular and universal, 
humanity and society) into theology.     
Beauty, a constituent of incarnational theology, serves as the affective 
stimulus by which to measure the tangibility (i.e., relating to the flesh) of the 
Christian response to man‘s existential needs.  While the concept of beauty, in 
Giussani‘s account, retains its scholastic status as a transcendental in relation to 
unity, goodness, and truth, it announces an ―incarnational‖ theme, as it were, by 
means of which modern consciousness is permitted to achieve a transcendent state in 
the world through the senses (i.e., ―with the fullness of humanity‖).  The act of 
gazing at reality is to unveil its beauty from the depths and so to dwell in the present 
moment before a real presence.  The subject‘s basic stance of openness is one of 
―original awe.‖  His awe before a presence that both strikes and fulfils is what 
permits him to look at reality with ―affection.‖  The depth of the subject‘s gaze draws 
a deeper meaning out of everything that happens, generating hope, deepening faith, 
and completing the human person in the process through the manifestation and 
reception of love. 
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Just as beauty serves to render the act of faith a significant event in the flesh, 
it addresses Giussani‘s pastoral concerns centred on impersonal representations of 
the Church.  Attempts to transcend the body, to extricate feeling and emotion from 
the act of judgement, have long dogged Catholic theology.  Beauty stands as a 
reminder of the important role that our emotional and affective responses have for 
the act of judgement and the search for truth and certainty.  The capacity of beauty to 
strike awe in the person is analogous to the capacity of God to reveal himself.  
Moreover, since revelation entails an emotional and affective response (carried 
through the vehicles of experience, encounter, and event), beauty is an ingress to 
God‘s temple in time (il tempio nel tempo).  In the most concrete situations of 
ordinary life, beauty opens the possibility of reading experience (good and bad) as 
ordered and harmonized within God‘s plan from all eternity.  ―Synthesis,‖ Giussani 
says, ―is the condition for [life‘s] analysis (TA, 44-48)!‖ 
 
The Occasion of the Text  
The chapter will draw mainly from Affezione e dimora (AD), a collection of 
informal conversations which Giussani held with the women‘s branch of Memores 
Domini from 1990 to 1991.
11
  They belong to a series entitled Quasi Tischreden, a 
name Giussani chose to highlight their stylistic resemblance to Martin Luther‘s 
―table-talks.‖  The conversations in Affezione e dimora were occasioned by questions 
concerning fraternal life in community, such as affective attachments.  Beauty 
addresses many of the concerns in an informal manner.  The style of the text reflects 
Giussani‘s use of the maieutic method – the attempt to draw answers out of the 
audience by interrogating them on answers that exist already in their minds and 
hearts, either innately or from prior experience.  
 
Exegetical Considerations 
As with the other texts of the Tischreden series, the conversations in 
Affezione e dimora are meandering rather than systematic.  Their content is eclectic, 
drawing from many disparate sources, including secular authors.  Strands of high 
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scholastic philosophy, for instance, which treat beauty as a transcendental and divine 
attribute, are interwoven with modern threads, such as authenticity and socialization, 
ideology and preconception, behaviourism and the ideal of objectivity in judgement.  
The phenomenological categories of perception, emotion, cognition, space, time, and 
aesthetics are used to expound post-war existential themes such as absurdity, anxiety, 
and identity, only to be amplified by medieval concepts such as being, essence, 
movement, contingency, and reciprocity.  Thus, Martin Heidegger (1889-1976), 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961), Henri Bergson (1859-1941), Hannah Arendt 
(1906-1975), Charles Péguy (1873-1914), and Vladimir Solov‘ëv (1853-1900) are 
made to join hands with Augustine of Hippo (354-430), Peter Lombard (1100-1160), 
Thomas Aquinas (1215-1274), and Duns Scotus (1265-1308).  While the Tischreden 
make only passing reference to these sources, their appearance in Affezione e dimora 
and in other parts of Giussani‘s vast bibliography testify to the  author‘s attempt to 
demonstrate the instantiation of religious insight at every moment of human genius – 
musical, literary, scientific, and philosophical.   
 
Problem 
Giussani‘s manner of answering questions, as just described, meets two of his 
objectives: He bolsters pastoral theology with the more robust appearance of 
impersonal accounts, drawing the attention of academic audiences who, following a 
seventeenth-century approach to natural science, seek to explain effects in terms of 
universal and axiomatic causes called the laws of nature.  No doubt, this tendency 
accounts for CL‘s popularity among a certain intellectual élite, in the scientific 
community, above all.  The call of Gaudium et Spes to adapt the ancient wisdom of 
the Church to modern times was a significant benchmark for Giussani.
12
  His 
insistence that faith stems from a living encounter, i.e., from an experience of 
original awe ―in front of a presence,‖ the presentment of the beautiful in the Other, 
recommends a manner of worldly dwelling that joins faith and life, repairing the 
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attempt to dichotomise the spiritual and the temporal that some interpreters of 
Gaudium et Spes had mistakenly attempted (MCL, 57-58).  Moreover, Giussani 
universalized his claims with the firm belief that the Christian fact generated 
humanizing insights for those both within and beyond the Christian tradition, as seen 
by the incorporation of the capax Christi, as it were, into his theological 
anthropology (AD, 124).  The attempt to revitalize Christianity in all of these ways 
runs counter at times to the pragmatic thrust of his engagements with young 
interlocutors.  For that reason, it is not uncommon to hear Giussani‘s readers in the 
School of Community digress from concrete discussions of how to live ordinary 
experiences in the light of faith, around which the meetings are supposed to be 
centred, to over-generalized descriptions of how to understand faith and life 
according to some dubious epistemology.  
 
Hypothesis 
At the exegetical level, concern arises with Giussani‘s tendency to conflate 
two diverse modes of delivering answers to his audience.  Giussani‘s readers came to 
him with pragmatic concerns related to their daily efforts to live as Christians, such 
as he had wanted.  Giussani crafted answers to their problems from his vast repertory 
of philosophical, theological, and literary knowledge.  He was asked to address a 
variety of issues covering mainly two areas: the theoretical understanding of the 
existential act of faith, and the attempt to reach the ideals of authenticity and 
fulfilment through practical steps in concrete situations.  Giussani proceeds to 
address these concerns, he claims, by avoiding theory.  In actual fact, however, he 
only restrains theory.  The thrust of his efforts here, as throughout his bibliography, 
involve teaching his interlocutors to judge situations, seeking truth and certainty, 
through the heart.  Nowhere does he systematically treat free will, grace, providence, 
and God‘s foreknowledge, let alone the relationship between heart, reason, and will.  
And yet, he relies on an implicit impersonal account of each of these to ground his 
delivery of practical-theories-to-live-by.  Thus, in an explicit attempt to interweave 
theology with the concrete concerns of existence, his conversations vacillate between 
impersonal account and practical-theory-to-live-by.  This vacillation renders certain 
passages inconsistent and vague.   




If Giussani‘s readers are to find his texts satisfying, they must first adjust 
their expectations by acknowledging a number of conflicting techniques that render 
his writings vague.  First, the feeble impersonal account mitigates the text‘s 
pretention of being philosophically robust, though the reader must realize that 
Giussani was a pastor and teacher, in primis, not a philosopher.  Second, the attempt 
to answer concrete problems with practical-theories-to-live-by is accompanied by the 
tendency to theorize problems and seek solutions in universal and timeless truths, 
though the reader must realize that priests accustomed to the pulpit often speak in the 
mode of encyclicals and apostolic letters (not as counsellors, mentors, or intimate 
friends).  Third, the attempt to mobilize universal and timeless truth by over-
generalizing actual problems so as to fit them better to universals compromises the 
pragmatic purport of the text, undermining Giussani‘s effort to elaborate tailor-made 
solutions from the sources of tradition, though the reader must realize that, for 
Giussani, to mobilize universal and timeless truths was actually to set Christianity in 
motion, liberating it from stagnation and the mounting threat of relativism.        
 
Purpose 
In this chapter, I ask whether Giussani‘s concept of beauty – including the 
related aspects of ―existence,‖ ―dwelling,‖ and ―duration‖ – does not, in the end, 
make too much sense of human nonsense, evacuating time, circumstance, context, 
and language from real problems that arise and, with that, foreclosing on the 
possibility that life‘s untidier aspects may be addressed with the more sophisticated 
tools of his tradition.  Giussani undertakes a necessary and difficult task in aiming for 
an existential theology.  As generations of modern philosophers have recognized, 
particulars tend to upset projects strongly oriented to universals.  If beauty is to serve 
certain pragmatic ends in the modern ecclesial setting, the account must also take 
into account the relationship of particulars to universals.   
Giussani‘s explicit task also aims at moderating the drive for pure objectivity 
in the attempt to revitalize the Church.  It can be argued that his emphasis on the 
subject‘s emotional and affective responses to the objects of the world, as conveyed 
in his account of beauty, go a long way to humanizing the relevance of doctrine.  
And yet, his account exhibits an endless striving for certainty, disambiguation, and 




clarity that empties problems of their particular contents.  What kind of emotional 
and affective reaction can there be to an answer that is wrought from an over-
generalized problem?  Can theology, say through beauty, still speak meaningfully as 
an over-resolved solution?  Would Giussani ever be willing to settle in the unsettling 
shadows of sin and human fragility?  Does he ask how we are to achieve determinate 
ends given that we are where we are, rather than ask why we are here and not there?  
And if he does not want to face the prevalence of crisis and uncertainty in the human 
predicament – in order, perhaps, to secure the ideal of transcendence – does he not 
dichotomize life and faith according to the very manner he finds alienating in the 
modern ecclesial setting?   
 
PLAIN-SENSE READING 
The plain-sense reading of Affezione e dimora reveals multiple definitions of 
beauty operating in the text.  I rehearse each one, culling data strewn over hundreds 
of pages and allocating them to categories deduced from Giussani‘s own writings.  In 
order to amplify the plain-sense rehearsal of the text, I occasionally import materials 
from other parts of Giussani‘s bibliography.  To adhere faithfully to the plain-sense 
alone, I reconstruct his account in a way that would be reasonably recognizable to 
any reader of the School of Community and to which any such reader could 
reasonably be expected to assent.   
 
Definitions of Beauty in Giussani‟s Texts 
What is beauty?  Giussani uses the term in four different ways throughout his 
bibliography.  The most foundational definition is worked out in Affezione e dimora.   
1. ―Beauty is that ultimate correspondence anticipated by the heart: the 
splendour of truth (AD, 68).‖  Once again, still in connection with truth, 
Giussani writes: ―beauty brings you to truth, to desire and seek what is true, 
that truth which is final, which is destiny (AD, 68).‖ 
2. In another work, expounding a brief quotation from Gregory of Nyssa (viz., 
―Concepts generate idols; only wonderment recognizes [Christ].‖), Giussani 
defines beauty as ―...the motivation for saying ‗yes‘ to something which 
introduces itself into one‘s life, over and above every preconception: beauty 




is a goodness that we may well be unable to define, but which we feel is the 
content of our rationale for making a more ‗serious‘ decision [concerning 
something] which itself conveys beauty, i.e., faith, because faith is born from 
the recognition of a reason (USD, 151).‖   
3. Giussani illustrates the function of beauty in the life of the free and acting 
subject by interpreting the encounter of John and Andrew with Jesus in John 
1: 35-40 (AD, 86-87).  When Jesus enjoins John and Andrew to ―come and 
see,‖ his words, according to Giussani, have the character of an invitation to 
be accepted, not of an ordinance to be obeyed.  Thus, when John and Andrew 
decide to follow Jesus, it is not a command that wins their allegiance (for this 
would only be ―moralistic‖), but an encounter with a Presence whose essence 
reveals beauty (AD, 87).  Accordingly, the episode in John 1: 35-40 
demonstrates that the sequela Christi begins in a sense of belonging enabled 
by perception and recognition (AD, 135); that beauty is the object of that 
perception (cf. AD, 210); and that the act of following is initiated by a reflex 
of the heart provoked by the encounter with a presence that conveys beauty 
(AD, 180), even if later it requires the intellect and the will.  Every vocation is 
born in this exact way, Giussani says: ―A calling to discipleship does not 
depend on particular conditions, but comes about through an encounter with 
an exceptional presence in space and time.  Il tempio, nel tempo (TT, 6).‖  
Laws or rules, such as the Constitutions of the Memores Domini Association, 
or the Ten Commandments, enjoin on the individual only after a prior 
encounter has taken place through which the heart has been claimed by the 
beauty of a presence (AD, 160).  In this way, Giussani grounds religious 
belief and practice in affection (affezione) for a presence, which is more 
certain, and thus more effective and lasting, than would be any abstract 
notion of truth or goodness (AD, 59-60).       
4. In a biographical comment, Giussani equates beauty with being, describing it 
as a totalizing force in his life.  He writes: ―whether [beauty] had served as a 
memory persistently stimulating my thought, or as the stimulus for re-
evaluating the banality of daily existence, my life as a youngster was totally 
invested by it.  Every instant, from then on, was no longer banal for me.  




Everything that existed – everything that was beautiful, true, attractive, 
fascinating (even only potentially so) – found its reason for being through 
beauty, as the certainty of [an undeniable] presence and a ennobling hope 
(speranza nobilitatrice) that wanted to embrace all that existed (AC, 33).‖   
 
From Giussani‘s statements on beauty, we learn that his question concerns 
what motivates the act of faith; viz., the reason for saying ―yes‖ to a presence which 
introduces itself into one‘s life (AD, 456).  That presence, for him, is ―the nexus 
between Christ and everything that happens to me; the nexus of everything I 
encounter (AD, 97).‖   And the fruits of that encounter, he goes on to say, are always 
―existential‖ and ―operative.‖   Giussani‘s examples show that an encounter can be 
specified as a divine vocation, such as the call of John and Andrew to discipleship or 
the call of the Memores Domini to virginity (AD, 131).  In each instance, the memory 
of the presence encountered results in ―serious‖ claims on freedom (grave 
responsabilità) (AD, 231).  Such claims come only from the truth that makes an 
ultimate claim on the subject‘s heart (AD, 65).  ―Beauty is the splendour of that truth 
(AD, 65).‖  Indeed, beauty is the first feature of the presence to strike the subject and 
so to intimate that truth which reverberates as the desire for ultimate satisfaction 
(AD, 69).  (I shall return to the epistemological implications of this claim below).  
The subject‘s reaction to a presence, the desire to grasp and possess it, is his reaction 
to beauty and the motivation for deciding and acting in accordance with truth.  
Beauty‘s pragmatic function is to highlight the ultimate significance of everything 
that exists, in spite of suffering (AD, 115), so that through affection one‘s entire life 
may be shaped by truth.  The relationship of beauty to life is underscored in the title 
of Giussani‘s longest reflections on the topic: Affezione e dimora (Affection and 
Dwelling).     
       
Beauty in relation to Sacrifice             
Giussani almost always discusses beauty in connection with sacrifice (esp. 
AD, 127-221).  Sacrifice is mentioned in connection with uncovering the underlying 
origin and significance of things, lest the perceiving subject reduce goodness, in the 
act of apprehension, to some aesthetic and abstract value (AD, 211).  Giussani 




recommends affirming beauty according to the ―order that it has with all things, not 
forgetting anything (AD, 85).‖  The word sacrifice itself, for Giussani, denotes the 
ascetical practice of detachment (distacco) required to seek and adhere to the truth 
(AD, 84).  He illustrates the problem of attachment in friendship when it manifests 
itself as the desire to possess the other (AD, 250).  True friendship, Giussani 
recognizes, can slide in the direction of possession, because it entails a ―preference,‖ 
i.e., an attachment to and interest in the other.  And yet, a ―true‖ friendship, i.e., one 
generative of freedom and the discovery of the authentic I, can only flourish if the 
subject‘s interest in the object is in some sense detached (AD, 84).  He refers 
elsewhere to detaching oneself from pre-conceived notions of truth or reality, 
allowing what shows itself to be (AC, 76).  This kind of detachment involves the 
subject‘s ―consciousness‖ of the relationship that preceded the friendship between 
the object and the one who made it (OCC, 90); namely, God. The convergence of 
subject, object, and God in time and space is the harmonious whole that includes all 
particulars (AD, 86).   
 
Truth precedes sacrifice 
Giussani is at pains to suggest that truth leads to sacrifice.  Putting the order 
this way, he says, revolutionizes the common belief that sacrifice yields truth (AD, 
84).  If sacrifice is the condition for perceiving truth, Giussani does not say that it is 
demanded for the sake of truth.  Truth exists apart from sacrifice; but sacrifice is the 
ascetical practice of detachment without which the true identity and value of an 
object, i.e., its beauty, cannot be seen (AD, 65, 89, 128).  Truth is threatened by 
―attachment to falsehood‖ (attacamento alla menzogna), the ―manipulation‖ of 
reality, and the ―resistance to beauty‖ (resistenza alla bellezza) (AD, 66).  Elsewhere, 
Giussani levels a more direct attack, specifically targeting political ideology: 
―Preconception confines itself to the familiar and expected, while ideology tends to 
attribute an aura of redemption and salvation to outlooks and practices which are 
well determined, dominated, and manipulated: ‗scientific,‘ they say (RS, 97).‖  
Truth‘s victory over ideology, he explains, lies in beauty‘s motivating power, its 
ability to persuade the subject, satisfying an ultimate desire, which is manifested in 
one‘s affection for someone, and is consummated in the affirmation of the good 




introduced into one‘s life through that someone (AD, 88).  ―Affection,‖ he hastens to 
add, ―is not a wave (un onda), though it may be that as well, but adhesion to the 
truth, ceaseless submission to the attractiveness of truth, becoming prisoners of the 
true, the beautiful, the good (AD, 88).‖  Sacrifice follows truth, then, specifically as it 
is motivated by the desire for beauty, i.e., ―according to the order [beauty] shares 
with all things, its harmony, not forgetting anything (AD, 86).‖   
 
The self-revelation and recognition of beauty in someone or something 
The plain-sense reading of beauty also marks the distinction between five 
epistemological moments.  While these are not organized in sequential order, an 
order seems implied in the functions they perform in the text.  For instance, it seems 
logical that something cannot be known, apprehended, and affirmed without first 
being encountered.  At the same time, it is unclear that a sequence must be rigidly 
adhered to in executing Giussani‘s epistemology.  My own organization of these 
epistemological moments need not be taken sequentially; their placement, however, 
was indeed derived from the logic of Giussani‘s discussion.       
 
Encounter (incontro) 
The encounter between a subject and an object is conducive to knowledge 
and truth.  In this sense, an encounter constitutes the subject‘s intelligent rapport with 
reality (USD, 112).
13
  First, the subject is ―struck‖ (colpito) by someone or 
something, after which, with time and reflection, the true identity and value of the 
object comes to light.  The biblical paradigm for such an event, according to 
Giussani, is found in John 1: 35-40, where John and Andrew meet Jesus (AD, 332).  
This passage, with its explicit relevance to Christian discipleship and vocation, 
illustrates what Giussani means by the term ―encounter.‖  First of all, the encounter 
is not a linguistic event; it is perceptive.  Second, it involves an affective reaction to a 
presence, not an intellectual one.  The interaction is meaningful when it takes on the 
character of an ―event,‖ i.e., by providing an orientation for decision and action 
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  The term ―encounter‖ also extends to the meeting of a non-believer 
with a believer (IRI, 263).  That which is decisive for the eventual conversion of the 
non-believer is not what is said (apologetica); but the presence that is met in the 
believer.
15
  A conversion (con-vertere) is so called because it provides the non-
believer with a new orientation terminating in a reality.  Through it the meaning of 
all subsequent history refracts (RVU, 107, IRI, 263). 
 
Gaze (sguardo) 
―The gaze takes notice of the presence by which the heart is struck (AD, 
333).‖  Through the act of gazing, Giussani assigns a role to perception that goes 
beyond its mere ability to help us know objects and differentiate between them.
16
  
Gazing enables the subject to intuit a reality beyond this world, of which this world 
is but a sign (AD, 92-93).  Gazing entails ―going to the depths,‖ ―seeing the totality,‖ 
―shattering the stone [that covers truth],‖ ―perforating our resistance [to the truth],‖ 
and ―detaching ourselves‖ from preconceptions, false-truths, and ideologies (AD, 
211).   
Giussani uses two biblical episodes to illustrate the freedom of the subject 
correlative to the gaze.  First, the call narrative of Andrew and John illustrates the 
subject‘s freedom to accept or reject reality.  The question of whether to accept 
Christ‘s invitation to follow him is determined not by a conversation (some appeal to 
the intellect or the will), but by a unique quality emanating from Christ himself, 
which John and Andrew saw through the manner in which he approached them: 
―John and Andrew – who did not speak with Jesus! – were stupefied there as they 
gazed at him as he was speaking: it was the Mystery that was communicating itself to 
them and they were beginning to understand a mere syllable, and it took nothing 
more than a mere syllable to bowl them over so that they could barely walk home 
(AD, 332).‖   The other biblical episode that brings the gaze into relation with 
freedom is that of Zacchaeus (Lk. 19: 2, 5, 8).  This time, Giussani considers what it 
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means for two subjects to gaze into each other‘s hearts.  ―Jesus looks at a man and 
selects him: in this way Zacchaeus discovers Christ and follows his face (va dietro alla 
sua faccia) (TA, 248).‖  Giussani notices the reaction of Zacchaeus to Jesus‘ gaze and 
underscores the power that another‘s gaze can have on us.  More specifically, from 
Zacchaeus‘ reaction, Giussani intuits that the gaze of Jesus touched a desire in 
Zacchaeus‘ heart.  What moved Zacchaeus, Giussani clarifies, was the need to be 
loved by ―one who knew and loved him for who he was (OCC, 54).‖  To deprive 
ourselves of the gaze with which Zacchaeus looked at Jesus and vice-versa, Giussani 
argues, is ―to lose sight of the wondrous fact that everything is an event, i.e., that 
everything [that happens] is replete with meaning (AD, 210).‖          
 
Awe (stupore) 
Awe, by its very nature, is the subject‘s first posture in front of reality, where 
reality is conceived as ―presence‖: ―If I were to open my eyes for the first time in this 
instant, emerging from my mother‘s womb, I would be overpowered by the wonder 
and awe of things as a ‗presence‘ (RS, 100).‖  The subject‘s capacity to wonder at a 
presence is a ―mystical attitude, which is the most natural to man, the most 
elementary aspect of awareness (OCC, 90).‖  It is the impetus behind the search for 
truth, beauty, and goodness (AD, 299), and it is manifested in the subject‘s constant 
groping for the foundation of truth: ―‗What is the ultimate meaning of existence?‘ or 
‗Why is there pain and death, and why, in the end, is life worth living?‘  Or from 
another point of view: ‗What does reality consist of and what is it made for?‘ (RS, 
45).‖  All of reality is undergirded by a greater and richer meaning that must be 
tapped: ―Reality solicits me to engage in a search for something other – something 
beyond immediate appearances.  It latches on to my consciousness, enabling me to 
pre-sense and perceive something else.  Faced with the sea, the earth, the sky, and all 
things moving within them, I am impassive – I am animated, moved, and touched by 
what I see (RS, 101).‖   
  For Giussani, awe is a ―religious attitude,‖ which surpasses the role Aristotle 
gives it in Metaphysics I (RS, 102).  Bound up with the heart, awe is more than 
intellectual admiration, it is the ―affirmation and development of attraction; [...] the 
wonder of a presence [that] attracts me (RS, 102).‖  Giussani names that presence a 




gift (donum); first, because it is gratuitous, and second, because it acquires its 
significance to the extent that it is worthy to be an object of love (RS, 101, AD, 63).  
The gift‘s connection to the ―religious sense‖ is sealed with the ―I‘s‖ affirmation of a 
presence as gift (AD, 179).  Through self-reflection, the subject becomes aware that 
he is not complete ―unless [his consciousness] reaches the Foundation from which 
life springs; the span of reflection does not accomplish its whole dimension unless it 
arrives at the Point from which the ‗I‘ springs forth with its gesture (OCC, 90).‖  God 
can be deduced from a presence, Giussani says, because ―something cannot impact 
human intelligence without that very intelligence perceiving how something is, in 
some way, the sign of another reality [...] (USD, 112, cf. AD, 112-113).‖   
 
Affirming the True (affermando il vero)       
Each of the moments discussed up to now leads to the great occasion when 
truth is either affirmed or rejected.  Giussani‘s focus is on the existential invitation to 
affirm truth with a ―yes‖ (dire «si»), or to acknowledge it with a ―Thou‖ (dire «Tu») 
(AD, 91).  In either case, affirmation, for Giussani, is ―adhesion to being‖ and 
―affection for reality‖ (cf. AD, 238, 377).   
Truth‘s affirmation operates in two spheres of a single reality.
17
  The first 
sphere is theological, and derives from faith (AD, 83).  The second is scientific, 
philosophical, mathematical, or what have you, and is but a part of the reality known 
through faith (AD, 94).  The distinction between primary and secondary, then, 
underscores the foundational priority of theological truth in grasping the ―fullness of 
reality‖ according to the ―totality of its factors‖ (AD, 83, 94).  In Affezione e dimora, 
and throughout his bibliography, Giussani writes about the kind of reality that may 
be known through faith, which is theological.  In this sense, he uses the term ―truth‖ 
as it is given in St. John‘s Gospel – though he is neither always explicit about this 
source, nor aware (it would seem) that he should also consider the different ways 
John himself uses the term.  Nevertheless, Giussani clearly applies ―truth‖ in some of 
the same ways John does: e.g., Truth as Christ (cf. Jn. 1: 17), Truth as the Word (cf. 
Jn. 1: 14), Truth as telos of action (cf. Jn. 14: 6; cf. Jn. 8: 12; 12: 35, 46), Truth as the 
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only faith that, changing the way you deal with reality, makes true the rapport you have with reality 
(AD, 94).‖ 




Light amidst darkness (cf. Jn. 1: 5;1 Jn. 1: 6), Truth and witness (cf. Jn. 5: 33; 19: 
35), Truth as the litmus test of community (cf. Jn. 4:23; 17: 8), and Truth as 
indwelling Spirit (cf. Jn. 14: 17).  Most significantly, Giussani links truth to freedom: 
i.e., the subject is fully free when faced with a truth he can either affirm or reject.  
While it is a matter of decision to affirm or reject the truth, freedom in the fullest 
sense is only realized with truth‘s affirmation (cf. Jn. 8: 32).
18
   
Giussani also confronted the philosophical currents impeding the role of faith 
in post-war Italy by drawing on Hannah Arendt (1906-1975), whom he likely 
thought would be greeted favourably by his anti-clerical adversaries (USD, 112-113).  
The post-war philosophies, he observed through Arendt, obscured modern man‘s 
perception of reality (by which he also intended the Church and its teachings).  A 
naive optimism was abroad, a kind of utopianism which was to be fully realized 
through the centralized implementation of perfected systems and structures (USD, 
112-113).
19
  The critique of ideology Giussani borrows from Arendt, still suggestive 
of the Johannine axiom that freedom is begotten from truth, supposedly replaces the 
language of systems and structures – be it Nietzschean/nihilist, 
Sartrean/existentialist, or Marxian/socialist – with common-sense realism.   
 
Grasping the True (la possessione del vero, del bello, del giusto, dell‟amoroso, del 
felice) 
Once the subject has affirmed the real, he must integrate the truth it teaches 
into life.  Giussani speaks of this moment as ―possession;‖ namely, acquiring truth 
under the aspect of the beautiful.  Only by possessing truth may one draw on it as the 
basis for decision and action.  ―Possession,‖ in connection with the beautiful, then, 
refers to the special manner in which truth itself is integrated into life (AD, 144-145).  
The word ―possession,‖ like ―preference,‖ has negative connotations in common 
parlance, which Giussani recognizes (AD, 144).  He purposefully discusses both the 
positive and the negative, particularly with regards to inter-personal relationships, to 
repair the errant idea that truth and beauty only result from stoical detachment (AD, 
402).   
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The care and interest one has for a friend, so Giussani says, is itself a form of 
possession, insofar as possession is a form of affective attachment, preferenza (AD, 
68).  According to another sense, possessiveness, which is excessive attachment, 
threatens freedom and destroys friendship.  Detachment, then, is the ascetical 
practice (sacrificio) of loving the other with all the possessiveness that love entails 
without subsuming the other under one‘s own desire to determine history (AD, 66); 
or, in Bergson‘s sense of ―duration‖ (durata), giving the other time and space to 
grow on his own terms (AL, 77).
20
   
An object, then, may be possessed well or badly.  The good or evil from 
which one acts in possessing is based on an ordered or disordered relationship with 
the object.  An ordered relationship is established by one‘s concern for the other‘s 
destiny (cf. AD, 137).  A disordered relationship results from the desire to manipulate 
(AD, 69, 363, 417).  The case of possession in friendship turns out to be analogous to 
that of truth.  If reality is possessed in such a way as to predetermine the outcome of 
a moral question before it has been asked, it is possessed badly.  If reality is 
possessed in such a way as to allow for the dramatic, mysterious unfolding of truth, it 
is possessed well (AD, 173).  In practice, the disordered possession of reality is false, 
moralistic, rationalistic, rule-bound, oppressive, violent, exclusive, and reductive 
(AD, 68-70).  Its ordered possession is true, free, embodied, inclusive of human 
affect and emotion, and intrinsically generative and communicative (AD, 68-70).   
Affection for reality, finally, is the ordered possession of truth (cf. RVU, 115).  
Love infuses the cognitive act of understanding and judgement with an emotional 
and affective response, rendering the act of faith, the love of a Presence, an act of 
obedience to the heart (AD, 194).  Given that the truth must be loved, and not only 
obeyed, its integration into understanding through beauty is a higher level of 
appropriation than any Kantian call to duty (cf. AD, 149).  The human desire to 
―possess‖ and ―touch‖ reality is made possible precisely because the Truth, the Word 
made flesh, is ordered through beauty to inspire a tangible love (not to say ―carnal‖), 
rather than to motivate action through rational criteria (cf. RVU, 115).   
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DEEPER PLAIN-SENSE READING 
Giussani‘s account of beauty makes distinctions that locate him within the 
matrix of numerous philosophical debates at a particular moment in the history of the 
Church and in the post-war Italian cultural milieu.  His place within this matrix has 
to be determined with reference to the question of a determinate community of 
enquirers to which he was responding.  The deeper plain-sense reading in this section 
attempts to reconstruct that question making use of history and intellectual 
biography.   
 
Revitalizing the Church through the Concept of Beauty 
Hans Urs von Balthasar (1905-1988) worked out an account of beauty with 
which Giussani had familiarized himself by the time he composed the talks in 
Affezione e dimora.
21
  For both authors, beauty, a transcendental in the order of 
being, afforded the Church in its modern predicament a sympathetic way of 
revitalizing Christianity.  This revitalization, Giussani and Balthasar agreed, 
depended in great measure on renewing life and faith within the institution first. 
Beauty responds to a specific concern over the dwindling ability of the 
Church to address real questions in the lives of its faithful.
22
  The Church had lost 
sympathy with its modern subject through heavy-handed authoritarianism and was 
slipping out of relevance in cultural and human matters due to a highly abstract and 
arguably outdated approach to reality (Giussani).  Balthasar and Giussani both 
distanced themselves from the Thomism instituted in the seminaries through the anti-
modernist campaign, which they believed was responsible for producing irrelevant 
theological commentaries on questions nobody was asking except, perhaps, the 
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metaphysicians themselves.  The systematic attempt, mobilized by Aeterni Patris 
(1879),
23
 and subsequently reinforced through Pascendi (1907), the Oath against 
Modernism (1910), Doctoris Angelici (1914), The 24 Thomistic Theses (1914), and 
Humani Generis (1950), to safeguard the realm of speculative theology on the basis 
of metaphysical system-building resulted, from Balthasar‘s point of view, in the 
production of an entirely irrelevant and impersonal theology: ―sawdust Thomism.‖   
Neither Giussani nor Balthasar ever directly criticized the papal 
pronouncements on the ―perennial philosophy‖ of Thomas Aquinas, but both had 
difficulty digesting ―metaphysical system-building‖ in light of questions facing the 
Church in the modern world.  Those questions, asked by the Church‘s faithful, 
seemed to cry for a more existential and personalist approach to expounding the faith 
– one ultimately more sympathetic to the human person.  Interestingly, both Giussani 
and Balthasar wished expressly to remain ―faithful‖ to Thomas.  Giussani once 
referred to CL as a specifically Thomist-inspired lay movement, to emphasise that it 
was specifically not of Neo-Thomist provenance (MCL, 29).
 24
  Certain 
interpretations of Thomas, above all – very likely the Suarezianism taught in Jesuit 
seminaries of the time – were found inept and ineffectual before the secularist 
challenge to religion and religious institutions.  Giussani‘s ongoing polemic against 
abstract philosophy, the category to which he consigned Neo-Thomism, could be 
seen in his open esteem for Bergson and other philosophers who ventured far beyond 
the 24 Thomistic Theses.   
While Thomas‘s own treatment of beauty was marginal,
25
 the prominence of 
the concept of beauty in twentieth-century theological reflection grew in significance 
contemporaneously with Balthasar‘s and Giussani‘s reflections.  Modern theologians 
who turned to the concept of beauty looked to it as a stimulant for the renewal of 
faith in the lives of thousands of Catholics alienated by an approach to faith that had 
become, through institutional practices, impersonal and sterile.  Beauty, a 
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humanizing element running against the grain of Soviet communism, was a major 
point of reflection through the writings of Karol Wojtyla (1920-2005).  Joseph 
Ratzinger (1927- ), from the cultural and liturgical perspective, however, sought to 
reintroduce the concept of beauty in the life of the Church.
26
  While it is hard 
precisely to calibrate Wojtyla and Ratzinger‘s influence on Giussani,
 27
 each of these 
theologians treated the desire for and attraction to beauty as a means to rekindling the 
desire for and attraction to truth and God. 
For Giussani, beauty provided a way to ground the act of faith in the heart of 
the human person as an intrinsic answer to innate needs and exigencies.  Not only 
was beauty a transcendental in the ontological order of being, connected to the search 
for truth and the attraction to the good; what made it a generative area of theological 
reflection, for Giussani, was the obvious fact that nobody wished to live without 
beauty – that beauty, somehow, seemed to respond to an inner need for... something 
more.  Balthasar, in similar fashion, appealed to beauty to make allowance for 
affection, imagination, and desire in the act of faith, expanding the parameters of 
epistemology beyond the limited, though more traditional, focus on the intellect and 
will.   The faculty of the heart, for both authors, played a significant role in the 
attempt to restore ―dynamism‖ to the Catholic understanding of faith (AD, 183). 
Giussani‘s pastoral sensitivity to younger generations of Catholics, in 
particular, presented him with the task of rendering revelation and sacred tradition 
pertinent to the concerns of daily life.
28
  Balthasar was motivated by a similar set of 
concerns in his revitalization of theology over and against ―sawdust Thomism.‖  In 
both cases, what originally began as a specific answer to a particular problem in the 
institutional life of the Church was ultimately recommended to a universal audience.   
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The shape and organization of materials in the theological texts of both 
authors retrieve the existential and pragmatic purport of faith with a view to 
conveying the Church‘s sympathetic regard for the human condition.  Beauty 
targeted two areas calling for repair: (1) the intellectualistic grounding of belief and 
practice, as typified by the abstract conceptualism of ―sawdust Thomism‖ mentioned 
above; and (2) the grounding of belief and practice in moral criteria as emphasised in 
the manualist tradition of moral theology, particularly its suspicion of the affections 
and emotions, and its unhealthy focus on the Fourth and Sixth Commandments.
29
  
Beauty addressed both targets by allowing our affective/emotional reactions to factor 
into the act of faith.  Beauty was meant to do repair to this defective area of theology 
without detracting from the traditional importance accorded to understanding and 
obedience.  Giussani‘s conversations on beauty explicitly address the relation of 
affection to understanding and obeying.   
 
Transcendental Thomism and the Act of Faith 
A variety of interpretations of Thomas Aquinas flourished in the wake of the 
Thomist revival initiated by Pope Leo XIII.  The Jesuit philosophers at the Institut 
Supérieur de Philosophie in Leuven had developed an interpretation of Thomas that 
became known as Transcendental Thomism.
30
   
The thrust of Transcendental Thomism, such as it was given by Pierre 
Rousselot (1846-1924) and Joseph Maréchal (1878-1944), involved restoring the 
existential dimension to the act of faith.  The novel approach taken by these Jesuits – 
derived from Kant rather than Thomas – attempted ―to search out the necessary a 
priori conditions for the possibility of the inner life and the human spirit in its 
activities of thinking and willing.‖
31
  The emphasis was on understanding the form 
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rather than the content of human thinking, just as in Giussani‘s case, through The 
Religious Sense, the method of investigation is emphasised more than the theological 
truth-claims of the tradition itself.  Emphasis on the form of thinking led to the role 
of intuitions in positing God ―as the necessary a priori condition of the dynamism of 
human intelligence.‖
32
  But this was only made possible by presupposing the 
desiderium naturale videndi Deum – a concept recovered from the excavation of 
Patristic sources.
33
  Balthasar, a former Jesuit, made his own use of the concept of an 
intuition for God.  And those of Giussani‘s professors who had received their 
philosophical training at the Pontifical Gregorian University (Rome‘s Jesuit 
university), such as Gaetano Corti (1910-1989), as well as those discussing intuition 
in their publications, such as Carlo Colombo (1909-1991), seem to have exerted the 
most influence on Giussani.
34
   
In developing the concept of beauty, particularly, both Giussani and Balthasar 
(himself a Jesuit by training) drew inspiration from Transcendental Thomism.   Its 
focal point was the nature of being and the relation between beings generally and 
Being in principle.  It incorporated into the understanding of being the whole 
Platonic conception of the emanation of the good (bonum est diffusivum sui), and, 
therefore, also of the beautiful and the true.  Under this lens, all objects were seen as 
self-sharing, self-revealing, self-communicating.  The philosophical foundation of 
community, communion one could say, so prominent to the writings of both authors, 
was also based on the self-communicative structure of being.  Giussani and Balthasar 
appropriate this ontology and credit Thomas Aquinas with the insight, rather than his 
Jesuit interpreters (AD, 234).
35
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The reworking of Thomas‘s philosophy on the basis of the transcendental 
properties of being, became the basis of Balthasar‘s ―theological aesthetics.‖   David 
C. Schindler reads Balthasar‘s Thomism through Heidegger,
36
 from whom 
Transcendental Thomists drew some of their insights.  Schindler roots beauty‘s 
significance in the act of faith, which is also Giussani‘s principal theological interest.  
From the idea of being as self-positing gift, Balthasar and Giussani both centre the 
act of faith on beauty.  Beauty, a central feature of the gift‘s self-communicative 
structure, is integral to perceiving and apprehending reality.  In a particular way, 
Balthasar‘s concept of Gestalt, in the scholastic sense of splendor  formae, is based 
on this self-communication and is directly related by both authors to the affective, 
and not simply to the intellectual grasp of reality.  The salient propositions in 
Balthasar‘s thought that cast light on Giussani‘s are the following:   
1. The nature of being is self-revelatory.  Hence, being axiomatically posits an 
act of ―unveiling between subjects and objects,‖ and thus involves ―an 
analytical relation to someone who recognizes it in its unveiling.‖
37
   
2. The concept of being‘s self-revelation leads to a presupposition about truth: 
―Truth is apprehensible and, in a more limited sense, rational, insofar as being 
discloses itself and, in so doing, really gives itself as it is.‖
38
   
3. The necessary and especially close connection between axiom and 
presupposition leads to a conclusion concerning beauty as a mode of being, 
viz., ―[...] this radiant property of truth, which overwhelms by its splendour, 
its indivisible integrity, and its perfect expressive power is, in fact, none other 
than beauty.‖
39
  Balthasar goes on to extol beauty‘s virtues in more poetic 
terms: it is apprehended only in direct intercourse; it is ever ancient and ever 
new; it radiates to the surface from the centre of being; it renders truth always 
intrinsically a matter of grace; it is a gift that could never thoroughly be 
digested or systematized.
40
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The features of Balthasar‘s explicit or plain-sense logic of beauty can be detected in 
the plain-sense of Giussani‘s account.  And yet, the deeper meaning of Giussani‘s 
text, namely the worry he is addressing, still needs to be brought out.  In addition to 
relying on a shared ontology for clues, I solicit Balthasar‘s help both because he and 
Giussani make use of the same categories when discussing beauty, and because the 
presence of signs within the text indicate that both authors appeal to beauty to 
address the same kinds of pragmatic concern.  These are the concerns taken up by 
Catholic theology in the years surrounding the Second Vatican Council and listed in 
Gaudium et Spes under the rubric of existential anxiety, and which found expression 
in a basic openness to modernity.
41
  The categories I set out to examine in relation to 
existential anxiety are ―gazing‖, ―asceticism‖, and ―the heart.‖  But before going on 
to discuss these items in detail, I want briefly to touch on the specific historical 
context out of which the discussion on beauty emerges.  
Within this triadic relation, what role does beauty play and what importance 
does it have en face of Giussani‘s sensitivity to the pastoral needs of the young?  I 
have listed three areas.  (1) Beauty offers a new way of articulating what is 
understood by the act of faith that obviates a reduction of faith to rational assent.  (2) 
The concept of beauty was meant to salvage the particular dreams and desires of the 
individual by incorporating them into the universal goals of the community, meaning 
the local Church or the Church at large.  Such incorporation was not to be achieved 
by making a series of easy trade-offs.  Giussani, I will show later, does not spell out 
his alternative to easy trade-offs, leaving his reader without the tools to achieve 
practical ends.  (3) Through beauty, Giussani hoped to equip theology with a 
concept, in addition to understanding (the intellect) and action (the will), capable of 
including body and senses, desires and imagination. The point was not only to 
redeem the person from alienating and deterministic systems, but to let the truths of 
Christianity refract through the lens of problems turning on the meaning and 
significance of life.   
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Loving Being in Giussani and Balthasar 
The basic metaphysical presupposition underlying Balthasar and Giussani‘s 
analysis of gazing, asceticism, and affection is reinforced by Transcendental 
Thomism.  Both authors drew from this source to give the Christian fact real 
meaning in their own contexts.  The multiple manifestations of Christ‘s abiding 
presence in ordinary life – friendship, community, social action, etc. – were 
evaluated in terms of their ability to manifest beauty.  Giussani writes: ―that which is 
true, beautiful, good, loving, [and] joyous renders itself present in [Christ‘s] human 
flesh.  This flesh perdures [prosegue] through the ages (AD, 97).‖  With regards to 
God‘s self-revelation, to which Giussani gestures in retelling the narratives of John 
and Andrew, and of Zacchaeus, absolute Being makes its appearance known through 
the beautiful via ordinary encounters and events.  Of course, once they are 
interpreted with the depth of the gaze, the ordinary becomes extraordinary.  The 
beautiful is here taken to be a quality that provokes an innate reaction of awe and 
respect.  The revelation of Christ across space and time is mediated by reality when it 
passes through a sensible object of apprehension as the beautiful.
42
  It is the 
experience of a felt presence, which reaches the heart through the gaze, that brings 
the sensatio of divine beauty to the fore.
43
  Through beauty, the act of faith is an 
embodied and embodying event.  It depends on sense provocation, and thus 
embraces the emotions and affections – both of which are corporeal, not spiritual 
faculties.   
As Giussani tried to exhibit by quoting the phrase pulchrum splendor 
veritatis, the deeply unified conception of man in Thomas was the authoritative basis 
for his own reflections on beauty.
44
  When Giussani ventures to comment on the 
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Incarnation, he is expounding Thomas‘s definition of man – a thinking, acting, and 
feeling being – with particular emphasis on the emotions.  The Incarnation, Giussani 
believes, reveals God‘s sympathy for the human predicament and, by the same token, 
challenges those body-soul dualisms that try to extricate the emotions from the body.  
Giussani looks at the Incarnation through the problem of body-soul dualism in two 
ways.  For one, the act of faith is assent to the Word made flesh and to all that 
follows in decision and action from that singular event in history.  But since the 
Incarnation does not mean that the act of faith should be defined only in terms of 
knowledge, understanding, and appropriation, a second way in which it is made 
meaningful in life is by reference to ―flesh and bones.‖  That the concept of the 
saequela should require a bodily experience – if not a tangible one, then one that is at 
least sensible, versus an intellectually assimilated fact – is deduced from the 
humanity of Christ (AD, 283).   
The ―presence‖ through which beauty passes, the Other, as it were, is the 
manifestation of an extraordinary Presence that invites recognition, appropriation, 
and exultation, Giussani says.  Along the same lines, Aidan Nichols summarizes 
Balthasar on the metaphysics of beauty, indicating the areas of overlap with Thomas.  
Balthasar‘s fascination with beauty, it seems, lies in how the person can use the 
world‘s self-disclosure as the pathway to apprehending the divine via analogy. 
 
[Balthasar‘s concept of beauty is] the beauty of finite dependent being as 
reflecting the glory of the infinite subsistent being from whom it receives 
everything it has.  It is the Thomas who knew how infinitely the divine 
Essence transcends common being yet for whom that common being is 
no commonplace thing but something irradiated by glory.  It is the 
Thomas who grasps, moreover, that revelation does not nullify a natural 
theology but raises and completes it as the glory of the Son elevates by 
his saving grace the beauty of the world.
45
   
 
For Balthasar, as for Giussani, the relation of one being to another is intrinsically 
reciprocal.  Being is made for self-giving and receiving.  The perfection of our 
likeness in God‘s image is likewise achieved by an opening up of our being to other 
beings – to each other and to God.  Union with God, then, is achieved through this 
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aperture.  Love is demystified as an abstract concept through concrete acts of 
openness, and being becomes a gateway to the mystical life.
46
  Mystical, here, does 
not refer to ―extraordinary experiences of union with God.‖  Rather, it is the union 
with God ―open to all men,‖ as Balthasar and Giussani see reflected in the theme of 
Johannine theology.
47
  A radical openness to reality, they maintain, allows the person 
to sanctify time and space and to open himself more to God (il tempio nel tempo – 
God‘s dwelling place in time).   
The time has come to reread Giussani‘s concept of the gaze, asceticism, and 
the heart in the light of Balthasar‘s theological aesthetics. 
 
Giussani in the Light of Balthasar‟s Theological Aesthetics 
The Gaze 
One aspect of beauty concerns deeply gazing at reality and asking that of 
which the object is a sign.  To deprive oneself of the gaze‘s penetrating depth (la 
profondità di questo sguardo) is to lose the wonderment that everything is an event, 
that is, we lose the sense of the richness of things.  The aspect of seeking something 
other is an important facet of Giussani‘s notion of the act of faith.  Before getting to 
this point, I want to plumb the phenomenological experience of the gaze – that same 
gaze that is applied to John and Andrew (AD, 332), as well as to Zacchaeus (TA, 248, 
OCC, 54, AD, 210).    
 
That face which emerges from the crowd and attracts you like a source of light 
(according to Tarkovskij‘s page on Rublev), that face which differentiates itself 
from everything through its sudden luminosity and leaves its imprint in you to 
differentiate itself from everything – and the more you look at it, the more it 
differentiates itself from everything – that face is there for the sake of what it is 
prophesying, not for what it gives you (AD, 293).‖
48
   
 
There are several points of similarity between Giussani‘s description of ―the gaze‖ 
and Balthasar‘s theological aesthetics.  For Balthasar, two features constitute 
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theological aesthetics: vision and rapture.  In the ―Introduction‖ to The Glory of the 
Lord (Vol. 1), Balthasar specifies: ―...theological aesthetics must properly be 
developed in two phases, which are: 
1. The theory of vision (or fundamental theology): ‗aesthetics‘ in the 
Kantian sense as a theory about the perception of the form of 
God‘s self-revelation. 
2. The theory of rapture (or dogmatic theology): ‗aesthetics‘ as a 
theory about the Incarnation of God‘s glory and the consequent 
elevation of man to participate in that glory.‖
49
 
What we are dealing with in theological aesthetics (in this passage and scores like it) 
is, according to Aidan Nichols, ―the study of how we come, enraptured, to see God, 
the world, and ourselves in relation to God and the world with new eyes, thanks to 
our perception of the form of God‘s self-disclosure.‖
50
  The general sense of 
theological aesthetics leads us to take Balthasar‘s term vision as the whole dynamic 
played out in the object‘s appearance, which ultimately entails the coming to light of 
the object‘s primeval Creator; and the term rapture as the form of the subject‘s 
spontaneous act of freedom, which, in a finite sense, is to grasp what is good, and in 
an eschatological sense, to cooperate with Christ in his mission of salvation.  The act 
of faith, i.e., the existential ―yes‖ of the subject, it follows, occurs as an inspired and 
free movement toward what is apprehended, the beginnings of which are in the 
gaze.
51
  In light of Balthasar‘s two-fold distinction, and its impact on the act of faith, 
Giussani‘s notion of the gaze can be reread in the following way:  
The gaze is an instrument of perception that leads to a fuller knowledge of 
things  
and their meaning.  As light cast on an object in obscurity, the gaze brings 
particularities into view.  The coming into light of particularities enables individuals 
to distinguish parts within the single object itself and differentiate between objects. 
The gaze, moreover, is penetrating: it is able to go beyond surface appearance to 
excavate a more ample meaning from the depths.
52
  Balthasar speaks, in this 
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connection, of revelation from the created things – a notion which Giussani echoes in 
the collection of his talks on beauty entitled Affezione e dimora.  As spelled out by 
Balthasar, the theological significance of the subject‘s reading God from within the 
world comes about as follows: 
 
In order to read even a form within the world, we must see something invisible 
as well, and we do in fact see it. In a flower, a certain interior reality opens its 
eye and reveals something beyond and more profound than a form which 
delights us by its proportion and colour.  In the rhythm of the form of plants – 
from seed to full growth, from bud to fruit – there is manifested an essence, 




From the depths, the significance of the part is disclosed in relation to the whole.  
The whole is greater than the sum of its parts and the parts cannot be maximally 
understood apart from the whole.  To consider the ―totality of factors‖ – to use 
Giussani‘s phrase – which is to consider the relation of the part to the whole, is also 
to grasp the essential meaning of things as created by an Other.  And yet, Giussani 
cautions, whatever more of the surface we are able to see from the depths, the 
disclosure is not yet the disclosure of the beatific vision, and, therefore, it is not yet 
the fulfilment of perfect joy.  What it intimates, instead, is the rational proposition, 
acquired from the gaze (la razionalità dello sguardo), that all being springs from a 
first mover, an uncaused cause (siete razionali se affermate questo qualcosa d'altro 
[AD, 358] ).  The Christian, in a second movement, might also intimate from the gaze 
something of the particularity of Christ.  ―We [in CL] say that Christ is a presence in 
the gaze.  Whatever it is that we look at, Christ is in the gaze (AD, 326)‖ – an insight 
derived, according to Balthasar, from the fact that ―[the Incarnation is] an event 
which in a supereminent sense may be called an ‗appearance‘ or ‗epiphany.‘‖
54
 
The gaze brings the subject into contact with an object that makes a claim on 
his will.  One cannot be passive before an intimation of God‘s existence or the fact of 
Christ‘s abiding presence and still be fully authentic: ―The gaze discloses a presence 
by which the heart is struck and called back to itself, by means of which everything 
is put into motion, cast into action, and penetrates the unknown [sussulto e in azione, 
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e assalta l‟ignoto] (AD, 333).‖  Or as Balthasar says: ―the truth is in motion, it 
presses upon the mind and calls the conscience to decision.‖
55
  And this occurs 
because ―[...] the all-encompassing act [viz., the gaze] that contains within itself the 
hearing and the believing is a perception (Wahrnehmung), in the strong sense of a 
‗taking to oneself‘ (nehmen) of something true (Wahres) which is offering itself.‖
56
  
The invitation to accept what is offered means, for Balthasar, that ―the concept of 
will is an integral part of the concept of knowledge.‖
57
   
For Giussani, similarly, gazing involves both intellection and a decision to 
action.  The freedom of the subject comes fully into play with decision.  The subject 
can chose to reduce and restrain reality to its parts, ignoring the presentment of 
something calling from the depths.  Such an attitude would be characteristic of 
ideology and preconception; as Balthasar puts it: ―It is only when such progress rests 
on the presupposition that the mystery of Being may be fundamentally dissolved by 
progressive stages [...] that the blindness sets in which is no longer capable of seeing 
the objective phenomenon.‖
58
  But, to gaze is to do the opposite: it is to be willing to 
open oneself to ―the totality of factors,‖ the whole in which all intellection on 
particulars takes place.  There is no way of beholding the universe as beautiful, in the 
final analysis, without already having consented to seeking a provocation that is 
more than the surface appearance.       
 
Asceticism  
In a host of discussions related to perceiving, desiring, grasping, possessing, 
and loving the beautiful, Giussani refers to sacrifice and detachment, which he 
specifies is directed to the subject‘s perception of and participation in the Mystery, 
i.e., the Infinite.  Asceticism helps the subject mature without having to transcend the 
corporeal world of real beings by recommending sacrifice as a means to achieving a 
greater goal.  The terms sacrifice and detachment, nevertheless, are used in multiple 
ways.  In each case, a parallel can be found in Balthasar‘s conceptual development of 
asceticism.     
                                                 
55
 Balthasar, Theo-Logic 1: Truth of the World, 145. 
56
 Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord, vol. I, 120. 
57
 Balthasar, Theo-Logic 1: Truth of the World, 112. 
58
 Balthasar, The Glory of The Lord, vol. I, 446.   




Sometimes Balthasar uses sacrifice and detachment interchangeably to mean 
the same thing: namely, the practice of taking distance from an object to judge its 
inherent goodness or to perceive the whole of which it is a part, and, in this manner, 
to ensure the object‘s spontaneous self-revelation.  According to Balthasar‘s notion 
of the Gestalt, the objective of asceticism, such as Giussani intends, concerns the 
desire both to know the object and to see it properly in order that it may be known as 
it is rather than as one would have it be.
59
  The kind of distance both authors 
recommend corrects a tendency (on the one hand) to over-determine an object, to the 
point of excluding mystery, and (on the other) to abstain from judgement entirely, to 
the point of relativising truth.  Proximity and possession are exercised 
unproblematically, then, only when the object takes possession of the subject by its 
own self-revelation (echoing a theme in Martin Buber, Emmanuel Levinas, and 
Karol Wojtyla, among others
60
).  Giussani identifies the following features of 
detached attachment (AD, 68-70): (i) attachment establishes the ground for the 
simple recognition of beauty, which leads, through desire, to ultimate truth, i.e., God; 
(ii) if attachment does not stem from the recognition of a simple beauty, it is the sign 
of something one wants to have for oneself; (iii) once a true attachment has been 
formed it is a matter of course that everything else will be seen from within the 
framework of the I-Thou relation; (iv) in embracing the object of attachment, you 
embrace the whole world.                   
The more restrained definition of sacrifice, equally ascetical in practice, has 
an existential application.  It recommends that the subject open himself to the 
possibility of being surprised by beauty when confronted by difficult circumstances, 
or daily hardships, or a general state of angst.  Beauty apart from hardship is simply 
too aesthetic and sentimental to be the kind of beauty Giussani wishes to underscore 
(AD, 211).  Along these lines, Giussani reminds his audience that all worthy projects 
come at a personal cost.  The cost, which entails sacrifice, is ascetical in kind insofar 
as it demands self-denial for a greater goal (AD, 152).  The existential significance of 
sacrifice should not be lost at the expense of the transcendent goal: Giussani does not 
merely recommend cultivating the habit of sacrifice to attain or secure a transcendent 
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goal.  Sacrifice, for him, is the transformation of daily hardship into an occasion for 
reading beauty out of any circumstance in order to make this life meaningful (AD, 
157), and, thus, for perceiving God‘s mysterious design in the things that happen in 
the present (AD, 146 and 193).   
Balthasar explores a similar line of thought, applying it to the full gamut of 
the Gestalt.  At no point is beauty merely directed to sensuous pleasure.  Sacrifice 
aims to integrate the irreconcilable aspects of existence into a harmonious whole, 
mysterious, but replete with eschatological significance.     
 
This, the level of experience, is even in ordinary life the realm where all life‘s 
irreconcilable aspects become integrated.  The recalcitrance and drudgery of 
everyday existence induce us to flee into a sphere of illusion where we think 
we are going to come face to face with the beautiful in distilled form.  And yet 
we know that it is only the overcoming of workday rigours and perseverance in 
them that will hew out the precious stone which has to emerge from the rough 
block of existence.  The really beautiful shines from the place where the real 
has itself acquired form, where the seductive opposition between illusion and 
disillusion has been transcended.  The totality of existence remains a mystery, 
but one the form of whose appearance is not a strange enigma for the 
experienced person who has been tested by existence; for him it is a luminous 
space which he has embraced.  By having experienced existence the person 





In short, for Balthasar, as for Giussani, beauty makes its surprising appearance when 
fatigue is overcome, disillusion is transcended, difficult circumstances are 
confronted, and dreaming is tempered by realism.  For Giussani, this non-sentimental 
beauty is authenticated when, amidst the hurly-burly, the subject strives to use the 
faces of his/her fellows to see the face of Christ, i.e., to seek the traces of the 
humanizing presence of the Christian community ―in everything that happens and in 
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Just as truth is the object of the intellect, and the good the object of the will, 
so beauty is the object of the heart.  For Giussani and Balthasar, introducing 
affectivity through beauty repairs the errant attempt to escape from the body; for 
whereas religious belief and practice could accentuate both knowing (intellect) and 
doing (will), so beauty accentuates loving (heart).  Beauty, then, assigns special 
importance to the heart in deciding and acting, and carries special implications for 
the act of faith.  The heart, moreover, is linked to the sense faculty of perception.  
The connection between seeing and feeling is described by Giussani as between the 
gaze and the heart: ―in the journey to faith, the gaze uncovers a presence by which 
the heart is struck‖ (AD, 333).  And yet, both Giussani and Balthasar are weary of 
confusing feeling with sentiment.  Balthasar writes: ―We are not referring primarily 
to a ‗feeling‘ considered as a third act which is mostly below the level of spirit and 
distinct from the spiritual acts of the intellect and the will [...], but primarily to the 
heart of human wholeness, where all man‘s faculties (potentiae) appear rooted in the 
unity of his forma substantialis, regardless of whether these faculties are of a 
spiritual, a sensitive, or a vegetative kind.‖
63
   The rationale, Balthasar explains, is 
thus: ―What is termed ‗feeling,‘ in contradistinction to intellect and will, lies neither 
‗beside‘ nor ‗beneath‘ the spiritual faculties.  This is evident already from the fact 
that animals are not men from whom intellect and will have been removed.  [...] 
Otherwise, feeling and disposition would be primarily sub-human and we could no 
longer understand why Sacred Scripture characterizes the ‗heart‘ and even the 
‗bowels‘ (from which is derived, ‗to have mercy‘) as the seat both of man‘s deepest 
personal reactions and God‘s own most profound attitude with regard to the world.‖
64
  
In this connection, Giussani, arguably more than Balthasar, presupposes an original 
intuition into reality on which subsequent truth claims are based.
 65 
 Both authors 
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struggle differently, however, to define with precision the interior and exterior 
grounds of faith.  And yet, both authors maintain the necessity of the heart in the act 
of judgement, while apprising also the importance of the intellect and the will.            
 
The usefulness of these categories to Giussani: 
The account of beauty, including the categories of gazing, asceticism, and the 
heart, which involves the transformation of the subject-object relation into the I-
Thou relation, not to mention the intuitive perception of the ground of all being, 
explicitly engages a question about the act of faith.  In the second chapter of The 
Religious Sense, Giussani states that his enquiry is motivated by the need to recover 
the ―adequate reasons‖ for religious belief and practice (RS,12-22 ).  When he goes 
on to expand his definition of reasonableness it becomes clear he is navigating a 
tension between acting for reasons (on the one hand) and trusting the authority of an 
other (on the other hand).  The beauty of a presence captured through the gaze 
introduces a new feature into that act, namely appetite, rooted in the heart and 
expressed through affection and sympathy, which operates in conjunction with 
understanding and action.  But the relation between heart, intellect, and will is a 
difficult one to navigate.  How does Giussani understand the relationship between the 
faculty of the intellect and the faculty of the will, in the first place, that leads him, 
along with Balthasar, to posit the third affective faculty, the heart?  The answer, I 
believe, can be excavated in one of Giussani‘s sources, Pierre Rousselot, SJ (1846-
1924), as indicated by two clues: Giussani‘s use of the word ―reasonable,‖ and a 
quotation in At the Origins of the Christian Claim from Rousselot‘s The Eyes of 
Faith,
66
 through which Giussani explains the significance of the Zacchaeus narrative: 
―What shook [Zacchaeus] and changed him?  Quite simply, he had been penetrated 
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and captured by a gaze that recognized and loved him for what he was.  The ability 
to take hold of the heart of a man is the greatest, most persuasive miracle of all.  
[Quoting Roussellot]: ‗Jesus imposes himself upon the conscience.  He is at home in 
the innermost self of others [...] He does not limit himself to declaring a doctrine that 
is his through knowledge, that he has learned through Revelation: his concern, it 
might be said, is a personal affair‘ (OCC, 54).‖  Here, ―personal affair‖ (une affaire 
personnelle) does not mean ―private,‖ but rather the relation and relevance of faith to 
the personhood of the believer, encompassing intellect, will, and sensibility.  This 
personal relation constitutes the dynamism of the act of faith, the stages of which are 
summarized by one author as follows: ―First, the subject is inspired by and brought 
over to the object in beauty; then the subject, in full freedom, can reject or give 
assent (and in the rich dramatic sense of the good, he can strive, fail, sin, misjudge, 
surrender, suffer loss, and so forth); finally, then, as a result of the mutual acts of 
object and subject, truth is born.‖
67
  In the act of faith, therefore, the relation of the 
object to truth is more than the adequation of the thing to the intellect (adequatio rei 
ad intellectum), it is the subject‘s perceiving and giving assent to the relation of a 
part to the whole.
68
 
At the heart of the relation of part to whole is the notion that perceiving and 
giving assent are one and the same act: ―perceiving the connection [between the parts 
and therefore seeing them as parts] and giving one‟s assent are one and the same 
thing.‖
69
  Thus, Rousselot iterates, ―[i]t is because man wills that he sees the truth.  It 
is because man sees the truth that he wills.‖
70
  To frame the dynamic act of faith as 
such is, for him, to show necessarily that both statements simultaneously constitute 
the subject‘s existential ‗yes‘ – a ‗yes‘ that is, paradoxically, a free affirmation of a 
proposition (on the one hand), while being an obedient submission to certitude (on 
the other).  Lest the statements ―to will in order to see the truth‖ and ―to see the truth 
in order to will‖ should, in being conjoined in a simultaneous act, cancel each other 
out, Rousselot observes a further paradoxical act in which ―each brings the other into 
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reality as a condition of its own realization.‖
71
  That paradox is the simultaneity of 
love and knowledge: ―Love arouses the faculty of knowing, and by the same stroke, 
knowledge justifies that love.‖
72
  At least two problems remain.
73
  (1) In uniting 
intellect and will there is risk of collapsing the separation, distinction, and complex 
relation between them. (2) Knowledge that is pure love of being posits being as an 
appetitive good reducing the intellect to will.  The subject‘s striving for and going 
out toward the object eliminates receptivity from the movement.  Thus the object has 
no opportunity to strike the subject.  This logic reproduces itself in determinism, 
mechanism, and various types of ideology and preconception.  Rousselot‘s theory 
does not resolve this problem, but helpfully identifies the need of a third to mediate 
the relation of the intellect and the will in order that the two faculties remain 
separate, distinct, and in complex relation.  That third is posited by Giussani and 
Balthasar as the faculty of the heart, the proper object of which, as we have seen 
above, is beauty. 
                
LEADING TENDENCIES 
In his article ―Drama and the Ends of Modernity,‖ Ben Quash traces the 
Hegelian lineaments in Balthasar‘s Theodramatics.
74
  Quash‘s Hegel takes two 
competing approaches to reality: On the one hand, he observes Hegel‘s project as a 
―quest for absolute knowledge;‖ on the other hand, he finds Hegel to be ―a most 
nuanced student of embodied particulars.‖
75
  The tension between these two poles 
translates into the relation between universals and particulars.  When applied to 
narrative styles and ways of looking at reality, Quash argues that the preference for 
universals and the tendency to seek absolute knowledge participates in the ―epic‖ 
genre. The prototypical dénouement of epic literature ties loose ends into a 
harmonious whole; life‘s tensions are resolved and ambiguity is clarified.  Calmer 
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waters and brighter weather, so to speak, leave the reader by the end with a sense of 
smooth sailing up ahead.  Balthasar, overall, participates in the epic genre, according 
to Quash.  Meanwhile, with the prototypical  dénouement of lyric literature there 
remains, in the end, a residue of tension  and uncertainty, which prevails over the 
protagonists‘ best efforts to resolve problems for all peoples, at all times, in all 
places.  The gray scripted into a lyric conclusion invites the reader to read reality 
―from the middle,‖ as it were, where certainty and uncertainty cohabitate, at times in 
tension, resulting in ambiguity, rather than absolute certainty.  The reader closes the 
book asking how, given the particularity of the circumstances in which he finds 
himself (different from those in which other readers will find themselves), the good 
he wants to achieve may be achieved.   
Quash extends his thesis on Balthasar to the whole of modernity, pointing to 
the intellectual quest for certainty.  He cites a similar thesis argued by Stephen 
Toulmin in his survey of Western thought and culture.
76
  The modern period, from 
the 17
th
 century on, versus the Middle Ages and Renaissance, was characterized 
overall by the quest for absolute knowledge.  Quash holds that the modern preference 
for harmonious resolutions, rather than untidy endings, resulted with a shift in the 
17
th
 century from practical knowledge to theoretical knowledge.  Theoretical 
knowledge exhibits a preference for the written over the oral, the universal over the 
particular, the general over the local, the timeless over the timely.
77
  These 
tendencies abide in Balthasar‘s notion of drama – reproduced, that is, unwittingly 
and not without a sustained attempt, through many theological tomes, to attend, in 
the lyric mode, to the practical concerns of his audience.  Consider, for instance, his 
sustained polemic against the Kantian-styled schematism of ―sawdust Thomism‖ as 
an attempt to recover the relevant (read: practical) aspects of theology.    
The epic tendencies exhibited in Giussani‘s account of beauty have particular 
manifestations.  The following already stand out on a superficial reading: a) the 
author‘s recommendation to follow the universal methodology expounded in The 
Religious Sense; b) the habit of universalizing particular problems and resolving 
them with general answers; c) the preference for tidy endings rather than ―reading 
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from the middle.‖  I should like, in this section, to focus primarily on the second and 
third of these so-called Hegelian manifestations.
78
  The following analysis is divided 
into two sections.  First, I consider the role and importance of ―the Mystery,‖ in 
Giussani‘s account of beauty, both in terms of its deployment as a proper noun and a 
common noun, viz., in either case, by highlighting its causal role in resolving life‘s 
provisionally ill-fated, incomprehensible, and irreconcilable conflicts harmoniously.  
Second, I consider Giussani‘s notion of sacrifice with respect to the attainment of 
harmonious resolutions.  We will see that the account of Christian hope, which 
applies to the first, and asceticism, which applies to the second, are unconventional.  
While Giussani latches on to certain patristic understandings of hope and ascesis, 
eclectically, to buttress his own account of drama qua beauty, he is actually more in 
line with Balthasar‘s production of epic theology, which sees (from a God‘s-eye 
view) the unfolding drama in human history, and in the lives of individual actors, 
harmoniously reconciled and perfectly consolidated here and now.  By this means, 
Giussani leads his readers to a comfortable and familiar ―inner space‖ of tidy and 
resolute endings.
79
   
Giussani‘s tidy resolutions play out before the backdrop of the overarching 
Mystery.  The term Mystery is used in many different ways.  According to one sense, 
Mystery refers to God.  It is an apt term for God, for Giussani, insofar as God, who is 
infinite, can never be known exhaustively by rational beings, limited as they are in 
their apprehension of infinity.  There is, however, a great deal already known about 
God, which He Himself has revealed to us about Himself, insofar as the Scriptures 
record and as reason has helped us to understand.  When Giussani calls God ―the 
Mystery‖ he is referring, in one sense, to the inexhaustible mystery, the ―essence,‖ in 
Thomistic terminology, which is God‘s being.  In another sense, he is referring to 
God as the author of everything that is known and knowable about creation, as well 
as to God‘s authorship of everything that is unknown and unknowable.  The 
unknown and unknowable, however, are not synonymous with uncertainty, for 
Giussani.  Rather, ―the Mystery,‖ in another important sense, implies God‘s design, 
the destiny of the world, of every individual being in the world, and of the 
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purposefulness of everything that happens.  In cosmology, soteriology, and ethics, 
Giussani shows how ―the Mystery‖ delivers the possibility of beauty, which cannot 
but lead the person who takes life‘s meaning and purpose seriously to absolute 
knowledge about himself and the human conditions of loss, tragedy, and sadness.  
An analysis of Giussani‘s cosmology, soteriology, and ethics ought, therefore, to 
demonstrate the tendency to treat beauty not only as a transcendental in the 
traditional Thomist sense, but as an ending in the Hegelian sense. 
 
Cosmological application 
Mystery, for Giussani, does not necessarily compete with epistemological 
methods that seek to anchor knowledge in actual experience.  The rationalist quest 
for certainty is a goal worth pursuing, he confirms, as long as the method used is 
adequate to the object of investigation (RS, 3).  Giussani suggests that there are 
several kinds of certainty.  His interest lies in questions that pertain to ―moral 
certainty,‖ and not mathematical certainty or the supposedly harder proofs of science 
(RS, 21-22).  In seeking moral certainty, it is not always inappropriate – and may 
indeed be most appropriate – to view the problem or object that provokes the 
subject‘s response from one‘s original posture of awe before the created universe 
(RS, 100-103).  In a second movement, Giussani suggests, the subject may reflect 
first on the moral certainty yielded through awe as it relates to the object‘s primeval 
origins, and second on its significance for a particular individual with regards to his 
particular destiny (AD, 308-309).  Giussani‘s notion of ―moral certainty,‖ in 
summary, is directed first to knowing God through his effects (―provocazioni‖), and 
second to knowing the significance of those effects personally.  St. Thomas Aquinas 
expounds a similar doctrine concerning effective causality with greater nuance than 
Giussani in De Trinitate 1257-1258/59.
80
  He also advances it as the third argument – 
from contingency – for God‘s existence in the Summa Theologiae, I-II, q. 2, a. 3.  
Given that effects are related to their cause, which may not be immediately apparent, 
Giussani recommends the gaze (la tenerezza dello sguardo) as a way of reading God 
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out of creation, or of perceiving the eternal significance of events in space and time 
as effects are related to their cause (referring, ultimately, to the First Cause).   
The created universe, in this regard, may be looked upon superficially as an 
appearance, or, profoundly, as a sign.  When it is looked upon as a sign, it is treated 
as an effect, the cause of which is to be determined by further enquiry.  In enquiring 
from effect to cause, God comes more clearly into view, from beyond the 
appearance, as the ―adequate‖ or ―reasonable‖ hypothesis to the ultimate question of 
the first cause (RS, 19-20; 133-134).  Now the prime mover, the uncreated cause, 
remains ―faceless,‖ an ―unknown presence,‖ the ―Mystery,‖ according to Giussani, 
until religious tradition teaches us to know that it is God (RS, 106).  And yet, in 
advance of tradition, ―to be conscious of oneself right to the core is to perceive, at the 
depths of the self, an Other,‖ which leads to the awareness: ―I am you who make me‖ 
(RS, 106).  Similarly, when we consider the feeling of human dissatisfaction as an 
effect of longing for a greater fulfilment for which the human heart gropes, we come 
to realize that ―[a]ll of the movement of humanity, all of the endeavour of this 
‗laborious force which wearies us by keeping motion,‘ is the [quest for the] 
knowledge of God (RS, 28-29, 133).‖   
There is, of course, an important difference to mark between (on the one 
hand) positing an inner knowledge of God‘s existence that merely awaits external 
confirmation, as Giussani seems at times to do, and (on the other hand) enquiring 
into the causes of things and human longing as a consequence of God‘s existence, as 
Thomas Aquinas does, by presupposing God‘s existence on the authority of 
Scripture.  Giussani does not actually begin with the same kind of Thomistic 
presupposition, but rather with the ―hypothesis‖ of the Christian claim, which is 
tested through experience.  But to recognize Giussani‘s Other in our depths as the 
cause of which our very self and our every longing is the effect is already to operate 
on the basis of having already learned something quite particular about ourselves and 
the God-man relation.  As Scripture teaches, ―I will give them a heart to know that I 
am the LORD; and they shall be my people and I will be their God, for they shall 
return to me with their whole heart.‖
81
  Put differently, it is because God has revealed 
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to us that our hearts are made to know him that we may think and speak of ourselves 
as attending His discovery for our fulfilment.        
 
Soteriological application 
For Giussani, drawing eternal significance out of time and space, however 
inopportune, is a primary operation of the gaze (AD, 314).  Eternal significance, it 
turns out, involves the reconciliation of binaries into a harmonious whole.  It is with 
regards to the subject‘s perceiving eternal significance or attending harmonious 
reconciliations that two senses of mystery are invoked.  First, mystery refers most 
simply to the unintelligibles of a situation as they relate to God‘s providence, 
foreknowledge, and divine assistance: e.g., what path reconciliation will take and 
how it will look when it is accomplished, not to mention, how, at the present time 
and place, it informs individuals with redemptive insight (AD, 308-309).  Second, 
mystery refers to God‘s mysterious, but real, presence in all circumstances, and the 
adequation of the circumstances, through mysterious but real signs, to the subject‘s 
intellectual grasping of his Presence (cf. AD, 309).  Both senses of mystery 
presuppose an account of operative and cooperative grace.  Giussani never speaks in 
these terms.  Instead he borrows a phrase from T. S. Eliot‘s (1888-1965) Choruses 
from the Rock, with additional references to Henri Bergson (1859-1941) and Hans 
Urs von Balthasar, to highlight the significance of action (viz., Christian action) in 
space and time.
82
  The tenor of these passages indicates Giussani‘s attempt to inspire 
his audience to become ―protagonists‖ for the building of God‘s kingdom (il 
tempio...) on earth (...nel tempo) (AD, 311, 181, 314).
83
  He seems, to that end, to 
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adopt Heidegger‘s (1889-1976) terminology (acquired through the influence of 
Hannah Arendt), not only in order to speak of space and time, but to refer to the 
world as a ―dwelling‖ (dimora), by which he designates the significance of that 
which is ―ready-to-hand,‖ viz., over and against a certain kind of philosophical 
proclivity to theorize and render abstract that which is at once concrete.  In 
theological terms, Heidegger‘s terminology amounts to the building of God‘s 
kingdom with ―bricks and mortar,‖ so to speak; viz., the ascetical sublimation of 
human energy under the preponderance of the procreative aim to achieve a 
transcendent end – which is to act in ways other than to construct what is ―dreamt of 
in philosophy.‖
84
   
The theology that underlies Giussani‘s theory of protagonism, however, is far 
more indebted to St. Augustine‘s City of God and St. Thomas Aquinas‘s account of 
grace than to any of these modern authors.  Apart from the paradigm of two cities – 
an earthly city and a heavenly one – Giussani‘s promotion of God‘s kingdom on 
earth, a mere shadow of the kingdom which is to come, presupposes God‘s salvific 
plan for creation from eternity.  Concretely, the sanctification of the world relies both 
on God‘s ability to move minds and hearts in conformity with his plan (operative 
grace),
85
 and the soul‘s free will to perform meritorious deeds in conformity with 
God‘s plan (cooperative grace).
86
  While Giussani does not speak in these terms, 
there is enough evidence to suggest the function of operative and cooperative grace 
as underlying principles in his texts.  I will return to this point below. 
When it comes to describing the connection between the gaze and 
protagonism, it is the subject‘s freedom and the subject‘s nature and teleological 
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relationship with God that comes dramatically into play.  For Giussani, as for 
Thomas, everything that is (quod est) has significance and there is no such thing as 
chance.
87
  For this reason, the subject is always charged with the responsibility of 
judging the object of apprehension by probing its contingency (i.e., to treat it as 
meaningful is to see it as the effect of a cause, or as the part of a whole).  For 
Giussani, God is not a disinterested governor and judge of the world, but a presence 
at the intersection of space and time (AD, 309).  Thomas makes several affirmations 
concerning God‘s ―providential presence‖ – if I may provisionally put it that way – 
which are implied when Giussani speaks of the Mystery‘s continual becoming in this 
world.
 88  
Just as the term ―presence‖ implies something able to be encountered, so 
―positivity‖ refers to the notional relation between being and the Source of all being.  
Both with respect to ―positivity‖ and ―encounter‖ the most important human dynamic 
is freedom: the freedom human beings have to accept or reject the truth that emerges 
from the encounter. 
So as to provide a method by which to interpret the meaning and significance 
of events from the faith-perspective (i.e., ―gazing at reality with the eyes of faith‖), 
Giussani allows himself to be guided by the hope of God‘s salvific plan and the 
operation of grace in history.  He recommends certain practices, such as ascetical 
detachment, in order that God‘s salvific plan and the operations of grace might be 
perceived through or read out of particular circumstances.  For Giussani, the intrinsic 
nature of being and the operation of grace on free will provide important foundations 
for the proper understanding of how human beings relate to reality, the proper mode 
of which is openness, as characterized by affection (i.e., affezione e dimora).  The 
proper object of affection, beauty, has to be determined in relation to the proper 
object of the intellect, truth, and the proper object of the will, goodness.  Without an 
account of being and free will, the account of beauty, viz., the affective component 
of the philosophical approach to God, cannot lead to the kind of protagonism 
displayed in the Acts of the Apostles, which being neither intellectualistic nor 
moralistic is the very protagonism Giussani recommends universally.  It is here that 
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presuppositions about God‘s foreknowledge and divine providence – however 
unsystematic and fleeting in Giussani‘s texts – become immensely important to 
evaluating the significance attached to extracting meaning for the ―I‖ from the world.   
Below, I will organize a network of ideas from Giussani‘s text related to 
grace and free will under the heading Gestalt.  The ensemble of these ideas does not 
pose any grave problems when cited abstractly.  It is their application to a deeper and 
more disconcerting set of particular questions, e.g., concerning untidy endings in 
human history, that raises the contentious issue of whether it is possible to read God 
out of all the effects of human agency insofar as all effects are connected to the first 
cause according to the principle of efficient causality.  Does a defective effect born 
of a deficient humanly cause merely appear to be bad, or is it actually bad and so 
unwilled by God?  How much does God actually will to happen in history that would 
require us to say not only that they were willed by God but intended specifically to 
be the fodder of contemplation for our sanctification?  These are ponderous 
questions.  Giussani confronts them unsystematically as he attempts to furnish his 
audience with practical theories to live by.  Here, Giussani‘s readers are faced with 
the vaguenesses that result from conflating practical theories to live by (marked by 
attentiveness to particulars) with impersonal accounts (marked by a preference for 
the whole).  His preference, in the end, is for the impersonal account, i.e., typified by 
the epic tenor of his authorship and his diminishing of the lyric – a tendency which 
unwittingly mitigates the pragmatic purport of his writings. 
Before examining the latter, I should like to rehearse Giussani‘s framing of 
Gestalt according to its plain sense meaning.  I am not going to analyse the concept 
yet, but organize materials scattered across Giussani‘s text to obtain as complete an 
account as possible with which to conduct the analysis of tendencies that will follow. 
  The discussion that follows organizes Giussani‘s work according to 
Balthasar‘s use of the term Gestalt.  As I will show, the term Gestalt denotes: (a) the 
whole that is made up of the sum of its parts; (b) the act of grasping the universal 
essence from a particular manifestation; and (c) that the positivity of being, always 




brimming over with perceptible significance and unintelligible mystery, is significant 
vis-à-vis ultimate questions and the God-man relation.
89
   
a) Giussani introduces the notional relation between ―whole‖ and ―part‖ in his 
idea of grasping the ―religious phenomenon‖ from the ―totality of factors.‖  
The ―religious fact‖ is not only a datum of language (the markings on a 
page of Scripture), but many data of the natural world that encompass and 
exceed the cosmos while fitting into God‘s divine plan.   
There is an ―order‖ that ensures the ―harmony‖ of the parts and of the 
parts to the whole, which Thomists call the ―order of being.‖  ―Harmony‖ 
(l‟armonia generale), in Giussani‘s vocabulary, denotes an intrinsic moral 
order – also applicable in evaluating affective ties, such a friendship (AD, 
149 and 154) – in which i) the part ought never to replace the whole (e.g., 
one ought never to love some creature more than God), and ii) the whole 
ought never to replace the identity of its parts (e.g., an individual‘s 
intellectual autonomy ought never to be sacrificed to general opinion).  
Giussani bases these rules on two ontological axioms of Thomas Aquinas, 
summarized as follows:  ―The first principle of being itself determines that 
everything is oriented as part of a whole toward the good of its own being 
and toward the good of the whole.‖  ―The first principle and final end of all 




b) Since being is always positive, anything that is encountered, everything that 
is, even the apparently negative, has only to be seen properly (with the 
gaze) in order for its significance vis-à-vis the meaning and purpose of life 
to be understood and utilized.  The meaning of ―everything that happens‖ 
(tutto che ti accade) is at once mystery and resolution: the relation of the 
part to the whole is as the relation between individual events and God‘s 
divine plan conceived from all eternity (AD, 150).  The whole or totality 
falls under Giussani‘s two uses of the term ―mystery‖: viz.,  1) grace as the 
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cause of good will (Divine Mystery)
91
 and 2) the primacy and autonomy of 
divine favour over human will (The Mystery)  (AD, 150).
92
   Every created 
―factor,‖  which belongs to the whole, and gestures at its objective reality, 
is intrinsically good, as God affirms in Genesis 1:1-11, or ―positive,‖ as 
Giussani affirms in the vocabulary of Thomist ontology (AD, 181).  The 
Gestalt is always operating as the whole in which discrete parts and their 
particularities belong to the whole, i.e., God‘s divine plan.  To understand 
Gestalt by incorporating mystery gives ontology a practical role in living 
ethically.  The whole makes sense of problems that arise in the parts, such 
as sin and division, resolving moments of uncertainty, void, and untidiness 
in the lives of individuals.  The Gestalt situates ―everything that happens‖ 
in God‘s providential design, in order that ―the agonies of the void might be 
quelled.‖
93
   
The gaze, which looks deeply (lo sguardo profondo) into the world, 
operates by breaking through (sfonda) the surface appearance not only to 
see the awesomeness of the parts in relation to the whole, but to penetrate 
the many layers of hidden meaning beneath the surface.  The point of 
gazing is to arrive at the overarching mystery of the cosmos, the Source and 
Ground of being itself.  Just as a deceptive encrustation blocks the radiation 
of truth from the centre, so the gaze breaks through to the underlying 
significance.  To be struck by what radiates from the centre is in some way 
to be affected personally, transformed, and reoriented, as John and Andrew 
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were directed onto a new path through their meeting with Jesus.  The gaze 
is the instrument through which the person comes through moments of 
ambiguity and darkness to a bedrock of clarity, resolution, and certainty in 
the present.   That courage which undergirds the journey from darkness to 
light, from experience to truth, is the mark of a ―mature‖ or ―serious‖ 
person, Giussani maintains.  Since beauty is the affective dimension of that 
bedrock‘s phenomenology, we may say with Giussani, for brevity‘s sake, 
that the object of the gaze, like the heart, is beauty-in-the-present.  This 
conception of beauty announces the primordial Gestalt (l‟armonia 
generale), which is the form that anticipates the synthesis of the parts, even 
before the encounter occurs, leaving the subject in a state of eschatological 
anticipation (AD, 150).  Since reaching the bedrock of certainty is an ideal 
of human existence in the present, the perception of beauty is the only 
appropriate means to ―serious living,‖ the attempt to take ultimate 
questions seriously.     
c) Giussani maintains that since the relationship between the parts themselves 
and the notional relation between part and whole is itself a ―mystery,‖ 
concealed in God‘s divine intellect and unable to be determined by social 
science, moral agency, in response to the desire for beauty, demands a 
certain ascetical distance from the object to ensure both the object‘s 
spontaneous self-revelation and to determine the subject‘s proper grasp of it 
in relation to the whole (AD, 84).  Any manner of relating to the object, 
other than to regard it as both significant and mysterious, which is to attend 
its self-revelation from a respectful distance, involves the imposition of a 
preconception, resulting in oppression (AD, 350).  The subject‘s openness, 
therefore, is foreclosed; his perception of reality is distorted; the nature of 
his affection is misconstrued; ultimately, the object itself is violated by 
being objectified.   
When the subject‘s approach to an object respects the ―distance‖ 
required of the ―order,‖ the presence that is encountered radiates a 
―positivity‖ from its centre that is proper to being and its harmony with the 
whole, constituting the primal phenomenon of Gestalt.  The point at which 




the object is met is the point at which the object is seen as a positive 
presence and becomes addressable as a ―Thou‖ (AD, 91).  This moment is 
constitutive of an ―event,‖ for Giussani, the concrete character of which 
exhibits charity.  John and Andrew‘s encounter with Jesus, Giussani 
explains, provokes the subject because of its positive content (cf. AD, 166).  
As that content is processed by the intellect and, above all, by the heart (the 
use of the singular gestures at the intrinsic likeness of minds and hearts 
presupposed by Giussani), their gaze is redirected, their eyes become fixed 
anew on a focal point more adequate to their ―I‖ and to the ―I‖ of others.  If 
they consent to the effects of the experience, they will find themselves 
oriented toward God, according to the literal sense of the word conversion 
(con-vertere).   
 
Analysis 
While the immanent role and function of Gestalt in the life of the individual 
person is not yet a fully developed theory of God‘s providential design in history, 
there are sufficient indications in Giussani‘s text to suggest the operation of 
categories pertaining to history, such as God‘s will, human freedom, and sin.  Any 
account of these categories would, of course, bear crucially on the perspective 
Giussani takes with regards to time.  Giussani, however, does not develop an account 
of time, except to recommend hope as an attitudinal disposition with which to attend 
clarity, resolution, and certainty, which is what he means by invoking the idea of il 
tempio nel tempo, or by quoting  Bergson‘s idea of duration (durata), the extension 
of the present moment in space (AD, 314), or by invoking Balthasar‘s idea of drama 
(AD, 181), the delivery of a future security against the present void that arises from 
existential angst.
94
   
There are two competing tendencies operating in Giussani‘s notion of Gestalt: to 
attend (on the one hand) to the present in its particularity, and to look (on the other 
hand) to the future as a redeemed whole.  The struggle between them exhibits itself 
in two ways: 1) Since the consummation ultimately anticipates the mysterious 
resolution of the void into a harmonious whole, the extension of the present moment 
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into the future is marked by the eschatological apprehension of already and not yet.  
2) Insofar as Giussani follows Balthasar‘s lead in resolving harmoniously the 
traumatic questions of life‘s meaning and significance, both authors continue the 
programme of Quash‘s Hegel; viz., of modernity‘s quest for absolute knowledge and 
also, ironically, of its nuanced study of embodied particulars, and the dramatic 
interchange of human beings in their shared existence.
95
  Particulars, in this 
modern/Hegelian programme, are not the proper object of Giussani‘s gaze.  The 
whole that is greater than the sum of its parts is its proper object.  The activity of the 
judgement, the evaluation of the ―totality of factors‖ (to use Giussani‘s terminology), 
refers all particulars to the overarching system, i.e., God‘s salvific plan, ―the 
mystery.‖  Giussani speaks of the ―totality of factors‖ as an interpretive tool by 
which to know and understand the particulars according to their participation in the 
overarching whole.   And the whole refers to the epic resolution of unresolved 
tensions attended patiently, not only in the general (epic), but in the particular (lyric), 
i.e., both in respect of the person‘s final end, God, and of the satisfaction of her 
particular desires as they relate to God‘s ends.  The logic of Gestalt, thus, implies 
slightly more than Giussani lets on, perhaps more than that of which he is even aware 
in terms of its philosophical sources.  This will need a little more spelling out, 
particularly as certain traditional axioms of Catholic theology are disentangled from 
the author‘s modern expectations.  Following Ben Quash, I take modern expectations 
here to derive from Hegel‘s legacy to theology.  The concluding discussion on 
soteriology is divided into two parts: Thomist Axioms and Hegelian Resolutions. 
 
Thomist Axioms  
Written into Giussani‘s account of Gestalt are traditional theological 
presuppositions concerning the relationship between God and man, such as grace, 
predestination, sin and redemption.  Giussani does not develop these philosophico-
theological approaches into an explicit system, but frequently relies on certain 
aspects of them to answer questions that arise in daily life from the faith-perspective.  
I have reconstructed and logically organized them according to Lonergan‘s account 
of the operation of grace in St. Thomas Aquinas, which I used as a diagnostic 
                                                 
95
 Quash, ―Drama and the Ends of Modernity,‖ 145.  






  The following are the canons in Thomas‘s account of the relationship 
between God and man, which are central to Giussani‘s account of the unfolding of 
history and the anticipation of harmonious resolutions called ―mystery‖ (cf. AD, 
151). 
i) God necessarily controls all created activity.97 
ii) This control is exercised by the designs of Divine Providence...98 
iii) ... and is immanent in the dynamic cosmos as a fate.99 
iv) The operation of the creature is ―in virtue of the operation of the creator as 
the art of a craftsman in his tools.‖
100
 
v) We know God‘s work is salvific and that the movements of creatures are 
all directed in love to this one end by a divine decree.
101
 
vi) And yet, a pure passivity cannot be free.  
vii) Rational beings are free insofar as they are masters and makers of their 
own judgement.  They are potential co-creators with God when their wills 
conform to God‘s divine will; meanwhile, as voluntary agents, they are 
free to withdraw from the divine intellect by pursuing their own ends rather 




At this point, the discussion in Lonergan‘s text breaks off into a presentation of 
Thomas‘s doctrine of grace and the controversy concerning grace and freedom, 
which Giussani does not consider at all: viz., if voluntary agents, endowed with the 
ability to discern and judge rightly, are able to act accordingly, what need is there of 
grace?
103
  Or if we suppose that the conditions of original sin make it exceedingly 
difficult to act rightly without grace, then what limitations does the operation of 
grace on the will impose on human freedom?
104
  What Giussani does engage, as 
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already implied in the presuppositions above, pertains to the God-man relationship in 
the broadest sense.  Relying on the human capacity both to understand through the 
senses and to reflect self-reflexively on his own experience, the concept of fate 
(destino) is developed alongside Giussani‘s epistemology of the heart.   
Fate, here, follows the Thomist configuration ―virtus artis divinae in universo 
instrumentali.‖
105
  Three distinct categories are presupposed within that formula, 
directly bearing on Giussani‘s understanding of the historical process, insofar as he 
presupposes one to exist:     
1.   What God wills to take place. 
2.   What God wills not to take place. 
3.   What God permits to take place. 
These correspond to: 
1. What God effects (―objectively positive truth‖).  
2. What God does not effect (―negative truth‖). 
3. What God neither effects nor does not effect (―objective falsity‖). 
The first two categories fall under God‘s providential plan of salvation.  The third 
raises the problem of sin en face of that plan and introduces the concept of 
responsibility.  Giussani develops the third category, ―objective falsity,‖ under the 
rubric negatività.  Objective falsity is negative in three ways, according to Giussani: 
―menzogna‖ – the absence of truth in some proposition or action (AD, 66); 
―negatività‖ proper  – nonconformity of human action with the divine intellect, or, 
conversely, non-participation of divine intelligibility with human action (AD, 166); 
and ―resistenza‖ – the negation of an object of intelligence and understanding (AD, 
66).  Giussani‘s predominant tendency is to expound the first two categories, and to 
limit the third simply to the acknowledgement of sin.  The third category raises 
important questions, however, concerning God‘s plan in relation to sin and the 
shadow of sin, uncertainty, and untidy endings.           
 
Hegelian Resolutions 
Giussani‘s focus on 1 and 2 inclines him to say that there is nothing that 
happens that is without purpose (AD, 234).  While he does not formally allow sin to 
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be regarded positively, such as he allows of real existents, he suggests practically that 
an attempt be undertaken to extract meaning and purpose from sin which, once 
uncovered, ought to be referred to clarifying the purpose of life, as Augustine‘s sin 
reminds him of his infinite longing for God.
106
  The third category, then, reverts to 
the content of the first and second, without bringing the concept of responsibility to 
full development.  Following Quash, I should like to show that the reversion to 1 and 
2 follows a tendency – derived from Hegel, not Augustine – to elide impersonal 
account and practical-theory-to-live-by.  What I label impersonal account 
corresponds to Quash‘s epic genre, and what I label practical-theory-to-live-by 
corresponds to his lyric genre.  The basic differences may be delineated as follows, 
with help from Stephen Toulmin, whose categories Quash imports into his article on 
Balthasar.  While the former values the soundness and validity of arguments based 
on the logic of internal relations, the latter references arguments to the questions they 
were crafted to answer.  While the former is concerned with comprehensive moral 
theory, the latter always respects detailed circumstances of specific kinds of a case.  
While the former generalizes the cases of its application, the latter retains their 
concrete diversity.  While the former delivers solutions that hold good for all times, 
the latter considers what might be appropriate for the moment at hand.
107
 
The elision Giussani effects, similar to Balthasar‘s, is not perfectly balanced 
between epic and lyric, but inclines toward the epic, aligning him more with Hegel 
than with Augustine, according to Quash‘s diagnostic.  Its effects are manifested in 
the following ways:  Giussani acknowledges the untidiness of spiritual and 
psychological infirmity, and roots the tendency to act sinfully in a fallen human 
nature, but fails to account for sins‘ effects on the individual and, especially, society, 
even after contrition, absolution, and expiation.  Contrastingly, Dante (c.1265-1321), 
in line with other medieval thinkers, dealt with the effects of sin, highlighting their 
destructive impact on the body politic, through his relegation of traitors (e.g., of 
family, friends, homeland, political party, guests, and benefactors) to the lowest rung 
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  Giussani is reluctant to demure on the sometimes irreparable 
repercussions of sin (in this life) for which the sinner is responsible.  The attempt to 
evade this untidiness is compounded by the ontological emphasis on ―positivity‖ 
(positività) through which the category of beauty is expounded in the order of the 
transcendentals: to stress that human beings are masters and makers of their own 
judgement; to exhibit the epistemological functions of the heart in relation to the 
phenomena of the world; to specify action as participation in the divine plan; to 
exhibit God‘s providential plan in the particular destiny of each person; to anticipate, 
mystically, that everything that gives itself is gift to be encountered and that all 
objects point to the overarching (Divine) whole.
109
   
It is, of course, doctrinally sound to include 1 and 2 in any account that takes 
God‘s creative power seriously, such as Thomas does.  Moreover, it is strategically 
interesting to expound the act of faith as an encounter that is willed by the maker of 
the universe as part of a beautiful design, a gift, universally and individually 
significant, to which one has only to consent in order to participate.   It is quite 
another matter to apply 1 and 2 to practical problems that arise, such as Giussani also 
tends to do.   I shall return below to observing the effect of this tendency.  Since the 
tendency to apply 1 and 2 to problems that arise requires emptying them of their 
particularity, in order that they may be transformed into universal types amenable to 
general solutions, the final subsection to deal with Hegelian resolutions will exhibit 
how Giussani‘s theory translates in practice when it comes to dealing with real 
problems, which are always problems for someone, i.e., before they are thought of as 
problems for everyone.    
     
Ethical Application 
The quotation below exhibits the tendency, discussed above, to theorize 
particular problems, treating them as universals that attend general solutions.  
 
You await a deeper rapport with the Mystery of your life, that is, with Christ; 
with the man John and Andrew met, who is your destiny.  This is clear as day.  
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It is lack of clarity regarding this point that leads us to make so many futile 
efforts: and that is because we prefer particular solutions to this certainty: the 
temptation to foresee particular movements, particular changes, in short, to fix 
for ourselves what might happen tomorrow, to imagine ourselves what 
tomorrow should be all about.  Instead, in front of that certainty, we never 
know what might happen, except one thing.  We are called to affirm only one 
thing, because it alone happens without question: a deeper relationship with 
Christ (AD, 58-59)   
 
The concept of sacrifice recommends an approach to life that anticipates the 
harmonious resolution of conflict in a fully dramatic sense.  It is dramatic precisely 
because the journey to truth is fraught with the free interplay of rational beings 
whose actions range from sin, error, and outright rejection of the Divine, to 
repentance, reparation, and loving acceptance.  Beauty, linked to sacrifice, is the 
object of perception in every circumstance.  I call this formula general, because it 
applies to all men, at all times, in all places, and abstract, because it does not stem 
from actual problems that arise.   
The following exchange between Giussani and a member of Memores Domini 
exhibits how the general and the abstract are used to answer the concrete and 
particular.  The issue in question concerns whether reading significance out of 
existence can be applied to a case of dissatisfaction concerning the interrogator‘s 
place of work.               
 
[Audience:] There‘s something I‘d like to understand better.  Last time you 
mentioned that communality is the place where a person‘s personality comes to 
light, begins to move itself, to be moved, to be stirred.  I can relate to this when 
I think of a friendly reality [realtà amica], such as the house [of the Memores 
Domini].  But, at other times, I can‘t understand how a reality can touch my ‗I‘ 
as affectivity [possa toccare il mio io come affettività]: for example, at work 
(AD, 131).        
 
The questioner has learned from Giussani that the subject can grow more into her 
personality through an experience of ―communality.‖  ―Communality,‖ for Giussani, 
refers to the process of deriving energy for Christian/humanizing action from a 
community that inspires such action.  The method for generating this energy, as 
taught in the present text, involves looking at reality with a gaze of affection for 
being and is itself open to being provoked in love by that reality (reiterating that 




being is made intrinsically for self-giving and receiving).  The questioner‘s 
experience of life in the community where she lives has legitimated this rule through 
empirical experience.  But the same rule applied to her work in a secular milieu, i.e., 
outside the community of Memores Domini, has produced a different result, leaving 
her dissatisfied and unfulfilled, affecting her sense of identity.  The questioner wants 
to understand why the rule does not seem to work in the same way in her other 
milieu of action.  The recommended solution is as follows:  
 
[Giussani:] The presupposition of Christianity is this: Being is good.  The 
Being from which you were created is good, thus whatever else with which you 
come into contact is good.  If it starts to go bad that‘s because something in 
you has either forgotten that from which you were made, or because it has 
become the object of a tempestuous fury, a trap, that is, a temptation.  In such a 
case, that which is good from its nature does not ‗become bad,‘ but ‗draws you 
[to it] in some way that‘s wrong‘: it is the manner in which it calls to you that 
is wrong.  Therefore, you should not leave, abandon, cut; rather, take note, 
redeem, heal, save.  [...] the greatest sin we can commit is to be indifferent to 
the world (to say, ‗let them save themselves‘), an absence of mission or – what 
amounts to the same thing – an absence of witness.  The Resurrection is in fact 
the historical event that takes mission and witness seriously (AD, 131).      
 
The notion of sacrifice is applied to a problem concerning dissatisfaction in the 
workplace.  There is no situation that sacrifice, conjoined to the possibility of beauty, 
cannot redeem, according to Giussani.  Here, the beautiful is the synthesis of life‘s 
experiences, not just the beauty of the created world that intimates God‘s existence 
such as a work of art intimates the genius of the Master Craftsman.  Beauty gestures 
at the meaning, purpose, and destiny of the created word, rendering every event 
eternally significant before the backdrop of the divine plan.   The beautiful, in this 
way, is connected to the primal phenomenon of the Gestalt, the primary character of 
which is not only providential gift, but ontological positivity.  And every event, even 
the most tragic, is an invitation to contemplate the whole.  As Giussani says, ―That is 
why the [CL] Movement has always sought to underscore a positive outlook: 
whatever you come up against, whatever you encounter, is an invitation.  The object 
[before you] is a vocation: it calls you; that of which you are made is what calls you.  
This is so true that it corresponds to you.  The more it corresponds to you, the more it 
becomes the object of an attachment (AD, 131).‖  Ontological openness leads, by 




some unchartable process, to the ontologically positive, the harmonious resolution of 
life‘s unresolved conflicts.  What is significant along the way is not the minutiae that 
set up the opposing poles of a dilemma, but the process that leads to the integration 
of binaries in the whole and, of course, the whole itself, which incorporates every 
particular to which we may assign a universal value.     
Therefore, Giussani‘s anticipation of beauty is a fundamentally theoretical 
approach to ethics, which, nevertheless, aspires to be practical.  Its formulations are 
in the form of generalizations, and its prescriptions are those of intention rather than 
extension, formally stated in terms of natures and properties.
110
  Giussani is 
concerned with the universal deliveries of his various methods as paradigmatic 
formulae, rather than a spectrum of experience and individual variations within that 
spectrum, each requiring different, well-discerned responses.  His theory begins with 
human nature, rather than human beings inducted in language, culture, and history.  
Whereas Giussani can only address his interrogator‘s questions by speaking of the 
nature of faith and of the nature of the human person in universal concepts, the 
interrogator‘s question reminds us that we can speak of faith and the human person 
only as a phenomenal range of experience having an inner diversity as well as an 
external generality.  That each person may require a unique solution does not exclude 
the experience of having shared meanings and symbolic language. And yet Giussani 
treats diversity as though it were only incidental, when in fact it is ethically 
significant and not to be confused with relativism.  And since there is nothing after 
language, Giussani‘s attempt to relate common elements to particular experience 
actually insinuates a common language, going further, quite possibly, than he himself 
intended.   
 
The Turn to the Subject 
Giussani‘s tendency to prefer tidy endings was viewed above in light of 
Hegel‘s ―quest for absolute knowledge.‖  The discovery of this proclivity is in line 
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with Quash‘s excavation of modern tendencies in Balthasar‘s theology insofar as 
intellectual and artistic movements in modernity have concentrated on the 
reconciliation of binaries.  At the same time, Giussani‘s ethical approach, which 
strongly accentuates affection and, therefore, inter-personal relationships, also opts 
for an existential and, ultimately, personalist approach to the problem of religious 
belief and practice, setting up the ―humanizing process‖ as a universal goal, rather 
than moral obedience to God‘s law, as traditional invocations of Catholic ethics have 
done, risking the charge of moralism.  The importance assigned to the individual, as 
exhibited, for instance, in Giussani‘s development of the concept of correspondence, 
configures the act of faith according to the subject‘s cognitive and affective 
relationship to what is known, rather than according to the content of what is known.    
Symptoms of this shift away from ―moralism,‖ consistent with the emphasis 
on relationship, exhibit a tendency to root the subject‘s response to an object of 
apprehension in the heart, rather than in the mind or the will.  In the context of 
Giussani‘s text on beauty, stemming as it does from the author‘s interest in the act of 
faith and the new conditions of belief and practice in post-industrial Milan (mainly 
secularism and anti-clericalism), the emphasis falls on the subject‘s existential ―yes.‖  
This ―yes,‖ on par with Mary‘s paradigmatic fiat, is predicated, for Giussani, on the 
ideal of authenticity, which underscores the human and spiritual journey to 
discovering and consolidating the ―I.‖  It is signalled by a turn to the concept of the 
subject, generally, and yet recovers the constitutive role of particularity by invoking 
the full dimension of interiority.  Thus, the longstanding emphasis on the 
transmission of doctrine, and its mature appropriation through the cultivation of 
virtue and the aid of grace, is replaced by the self-conscious discovery of an innate 
predisposition to the Infinite.  Giussani exhibits this new emphasis (attributed 
variously to St. Augustine and René Descartes), often in connection with references 
to Kierkegaard, through the development of the psychological categories of human 
dynamism, maturity, the authenticity of the ―I,‖ and the drama of choice.
111
    
The turn to the subject, despite the risk of individuality and atomization it 
entails, is directed to restoring faith and morals to civilization by appealing to the 
subject‘s will to be who he really is, to the recovery of the true self from its 
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immersion in the common mentality (la mentalità commune).  William Meissner, 
using Kierkegaard, has recovered the importance of the will in relation to the concept 
of choice and discussed its psychological impact on the personality: ―Through the 
medium of [choice], ethical choice in Kierekgaard, the person becomes an 
individual; he is detached from the crowd, he is made aware of himself as a vital 
centre of responsibility and selfhood.‖
112
  There is a good deal of congruity between 
Meissner and Giussani on the psychological significance of faith – its ability to call 
forth the authentic ―I‖ from the depths (TA, 230).  The basic conviction underscored 
by Giussani, reiterated here through Meissner, is that faith must make a difference to 
the cohesion of the personality and that grace must make a difference to living a fully 
Christian life.
113
  Rather than expound moral responsibility, as Thomas does, in the 
dimension of what God permits to take place (the sin for which the sinner is 
responsible, in contrast to what God wills to take place and what he wills not to take 
place), Giussani and Meissner consider responsibility under the lens of ethical 
maturity and its psychological correlates, appealing to the ideal of the authenticity of 
the ―I,‖ while allowing individual manifestations of the ―I‖ to be expressed diversely.  
Thus, the rhetoric of authenticity shifts quickly from epistemology to existence.  
Willing, choosing, loving, grasping, and striving become central acts of faith.   
Assent and obedience follow a choice that favours wanting to become one‘s true self.  
Indeed, faith both requires maturity and is an act that brings the person to full 
maturity (AC, 347).     
Choice, according to Meissner‘s psychoanalytic interpretation of 
Kierkegaard, is synonymous with passion, just as truth, for Giussani, is synonymous 
with beauty.  Kierkegaard writes: ―If you will understand me aright, I should like to 
say that in making a choice, it is not so much a question of choosing the right as of 
the energy, the earnestness, the pathos with which one chooses.  Thereby the 
personality announces its inner infinity, and thereby, in turn, the personality is 
consolidated.‖
114
  To clarify, Kierkegaard marks a difference between choice and 
deliberation.  He writes: ―here again you see how important it is that a choice be 
made, and the crucial thing is not deliberation, but the baptism of the will which lifts 
                                                 
112
 Meissner, Life and Faith (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1987), 97. 
113
 Meissner, Life and Faith, 7. 
114
 Søren Kierkegaard, Either/Or, vol. II (New York: Doubleday, 1959), 171. 




up the choice into the ethical.‖
115
  Deliberation is evaluation, but it follows taking a 
choice.  Similarly for Giussani, evaluation follows the experience of putting out into 
the deep and rarely takes the form of deliberation in advance of that step. 
The act of faith as conceived by Giussani differs in one important respect 
from Meissner‘s view.  Whereas Meissner takes care to note and discuss the 
―ambiguities of faith,‖ and systematically identifies stages in the developmental 
process that correspond to virtuous habits, Giussani sees the realm of faith, like 
Balthasar, as part and parcel of the quest for certainty, and omits any discussion of 
habit in the role of virtue formation.  The full implications of Giussani‘s perspective 
on certainty will be taken up in the section on observations.   For the time being, it is 
sufficient to note that, for Giussani, the decision to follow an Other, the leap of faith, 
as it were, eliminates the shadows of self-deception, projection, denial, illusion, 
doubt, and uncertainty, while for Meissner, the shadows remain, as do also their 
effects.
116
  Meissner, for all his reliance on psychoanalysis and its typically restless 
striving for resolutions, has, with Kierkegaard‘s help, integrated ambiguity and 
untidy endings in his dynamic account of the act of faith:  ―And while faith in a sense 
triumphs over dread, it cannot annihilate that dread.  Rather, the dread persists – 
modulated and suppressed, to be sure, but nonetheless remaining as a constant 
reminder of human fragility.‖ 
117
  Giussani, relying on Balthasar‘s theodramatics and 
its explicit engagement with Hegel, has moved in the opposite direction, anticipating 
the promise of final redemption in the present, emphasising the already of 
eschatological anticipation, rather than the not yet.     
 
OBSERVATIONS 
Beauty, for Giussani, is the object of a temporal and historical process, which 
relies on perception, but receives its full significance with respect to the heart, the 
locus of restless longings for infinite satisfaction.  Beauty stirs the memory of those 
longings and intimates their overabundant satisfaction as the telos of existence, 
namely destiny, unites both truth, in an abstract sense, and the good, in a concrete 
sense.  Truth implies universality, a claim that is recommended to everyone; whereas 
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goodness implies an aspect of particularity, an object that is interesting  for me.  
Giussani locates the possibility of synthesis and the individual poles of the 
universal/particular dialectic within the dynamic process of belief.  Put differently, 
beauty and belief are synonymous insofar as both posit the unity of truth and 
goodness in the heart, the affective faculty of synthetic judgement.  The 
distinguishing mark of beauty, then, as observed in the concept of destiny,
118
 is that it 
is a synthesis of universal and particular, immanent and transcendent, time and 
eternity, finite and infinite, and the means through which the individual is drawn into 
a closer relationship with Christ.  For this reason, Giussani places beauty first in the 
order of intellection, before understanding and striving, centralizing the role and 
importance of our innate reactions of respect and aversion in the act of faith.  At the 
same time, beauty corrects a tendency both to intellectualize and to moralise faith, 
establishing belief as an intrinsic facet of life and destiny.      
Ethically speaking, then, three terms are intrinsic to beauty, which extend to 
the process of deliberation: universals, particulars, and the syntheses of both.  The 
fact that Giussani does not explicate the dialectic, leads him to shift emphasis from 
the pole of universality to the pole of particularity, but this does not mean he wishes 
to privilege one over the other.  The concerns which shape his discussion range from 
radical individualism (remedied by universals), intellectualised or moralized 
religiosity (remedied by particulars), and the human composite of mind, will, and 
heart united in a truth, such as the ―Christian claim,‖ that receives individual 
expression (affirmed by the synthesis).  The dialectical relation between universals 
and particulars, however, raises other concerns, which Giussani does not address in 
his concept of synthesis.  I have identified two areas of vagueness in the text: 1) 
whether the idea of beauty as a synthesis, and the presupposition that there is a 
common heart, can resolve or make sense of disagreements between persons; and 2) 
whether harmonious resolutions, typical of transcendent aspirations, are within the 
reach of a fragile humanity.   
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1. Whether the idea of synthesis allows for disagreement 
The particulars are united in a universal called beauty.  The possibility of beauty 
is the possibility that previously unresolved tensions will find their harmonious 
resolution in ―the mystery‖ that unites incommensurables.  This possibility plays out 
as a theological drama, enacted by the God-man relation, the action of grace, the 
Mystery that makes the individual, the reality that is given, and the concept of fate 
(destiny).  Drama does not evade sin or the tendency to sin, however extraneous and 
complicating it may be.  The emphasis on sin wanes because it is considered in terms 
of its general cause, the withdrawal from beauty.  The affirmation of beauty, like 
truth and goodness, announces the person‘s return to the life of grace.  Thus, when 
disagreement between individuals arises over the nature of an object of 
apprehension, or when beauty is unapparent, say, in the midst of tragedy, the defect 
lies on the part of the individual, not in reality itself, which is gift (donum).  When 
sin and tragedy intrude on a situation, apparently spoiling beauty, Giussani 
recommends relinquishing the finite, and recovering a deeper meaning for existence, 
the infinite.        
Giussani‘s impersonal account holds up well as an account of ascetical 
practice, such as when it directs detachment to the possibility of an I-Thou relation.  
His impersonal account is badly posed, however, when it is recommended as a 
practical-theory-to-live-by.  For one, it forecloses on the possibility of practical 
deliberation and does away with many of the particulars that factor into prudential 
judgement, such as time, circumstance, intention, historical precedent, and foresight.   
Giussani, of course, is not interested in deliberation or prudence as categories 
of thought.  When confusion results over the pragmatic expectations of his readers, 
say, in a case of tension between freedom and authority, he assigns blame to some 
intrinsically disordered attachment or to the unrelenting influence of his main 
adversary, the common mentality.  Sin and the common mentality may indeed be 
blamed for a great deal of in-authenticity, not least of which is the secularist 
onslaught against religious traditions; but Giussani‘s solution goes further, carrying 
the impersonal account of beauty over to the arena of practical decision and action.  
The persistence of abstract theory in Giussani‘s own exposition, however, owes in 
part to this unwarranted transposition.  And deeper reason lies in his adoption of 




Balthasar‘s conception of drama and its epic conclusions, indebted as they are to 
Hegel‘s brand of drama.  For Giussani, there is no configuration of the God-man 
relation that does not promise the possibility of beauty in the present, where 
adherence to the Christian fact is lived seriously.   
 
2. The extent to which harmonious resolutions, typical of transcendent aspirations, 
are graspable under the inescapable conditions of human fragility.   
Epic endings announce the dawn of certainty and absolute knowledge on the 
ethical plane.  The possibility of beauty in Giussani‘s account of history, we have 
seen from our analysis above, participates in Balthasar‘s epic genre.  Meanwhile, 
Giussani‘s interlocutors complain persistently of a disparity between the impersonal 
account of the hundredfold and particular instances of loss which they suffer.  They 
are urged not to pose the problem in terms of a disparity between ideal and reality, a 
false dichotomy.  Contrastingly, even the greatest admirer of Abraham‘s faith, such 
as the pseudonymous author of Fear and Trembling, cannot but notice the shadows 
that accompanied Abraham‘s great act of obedience on Mount Moriah.
119
  We are 
dogged, in our fallen condition, by ―self-deception, projection, denial, illusion, doubt 
– in short, uncertainty.‖
120
  If authentic faith is to take root, the shadows must also be 
resigned.  And yet, resignation does not eliminate the recurrence of morally complex 
situations, the defective effects of deficient causes, and the possibility of untidy 
endings; nor does faith, in passing beyond resignation, eliminate them.  The 
difference I am underscoring here, relative to Giussani‘s explicit attempt to explain 
―how God writes straight with crooked lines,‖ if the matter may be put so crassly, 
concerns the fact that some endings, while fully dramatic, are effectively untidy.     
Giussani bypasses any consideration of the defective effects of deficient 
causes (cf. Thomas), or the shadows that remain after faith‘s resignation (cf. 
Kierkegaard), making it easier for him to anticipate tidy endings.  To conclude that 
Giussani is an unrelenting optimist would be, I think, to make a caricature of him: it 
                                                 
119
 Cf. ―Abraham I cannot understand, in a certain sense there is nothing I can learn from him but 
astonishment.  If people fancy that by considering the outcome of this story [of Abraham and Isaac] 
they might be moved to believe, they deceive themselves and want to swindle God out of the first 
movement of faith, the infinite resignation‖ (Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling [New York: 
Doubleday, 1954], 48).     
120
 Meissner, Life and Faith, 92. 




is not his intellectual convictions that lead him to say things in one way rather than 
another, but the conflation of genres that occurs in his attempt to address concerns – 
some of which are explicit, others implicit – and the logic of the argument he has 
crafted to address them.  His confrontation with ambiguity in the sphere of youth 
work must have challenged his quest for certainty more than once.  The reason the 
tendency persists, despite its being at odds with his pastoral experience, owes to 
historical and contextual pressures.  I refer mainly to the scientific pretentions of his 
interlocutors and the concept of freedom conceived as choice, compounded by the 
menacing influence of behaviourist psychology, the advance of secularism, and the 
persistence of anti-clericalism.  Older modes of evangelisation, such as apologetics, 
seemed outmoded in confronting these threats to Italian Catholicism.  The discovery 
of an intrinsic anthropological principle by which to ground the act of faith seemed 
crucially important to successful evangelization.   
Giussani‘s account of beauty participates in the quest for certainty in faith-





  The main features of this tendency are epic:   
First, he assumes his interlocutors to have the necessary human foundations 
on which to build the ethico-religious outlook on which he expects them to decide 
and act, whereas, in individual cases, this may not be so. Thus, Thomas asserts, grace 
builds on nature, it does not replace nature (gratia non tollit naturam, sed perficit).
123
   
But Giussani has difficulty meeting the existential and personalist concerns of his 
audience in a tone more sympathetic to human fragility because the expressed desire 
to do so demands a built-in tolerance for ambiguity and uncertainty that undermines 
the quest for certainty.  Giussani‘s logic and tone, as a result, are consistent with the 
ends of systematic theology, viz., the redescription of God‘s action in terms of 
abiding universal significance, and, by extension, the ends of the Magisterium, to 
teach, legislate, and judge.
124
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Second, the preference for epic conclusions leads him away from any 
practical consideration of the category of what God permits, i.e., the category of sin 
for which the sinner is responsible.  As a result, prudence and discursive reasoning 
are not required by his account of ―dwelling‖, i.e., the subject‘s relation to the world 
does not anticipate disagreement among individuals.  Instead, interlocutors are 
assumed to have the same questions, the same concerns, the same axioms.   
Third, Giussani can be rather weak when it comes to acknowledging the 
natural dependency that we have on one another for what we know.  He recognizes 
the indispensible influence of the education he received from his mother, on the one 
hand, but locates judgements in the heart, on the other hand.  In other words, he 
assumes that intuitions are first nature, rather than second nature, and that, insofar as 
they are indelibly stamped on the heart, they are universal, rather than particular.  He 
even goes so far as to claim that, among honest/mature men and based on the 
deliveries of the heart, there is agreement on what is meant by the ―I,‖ when, in fact, 
there is disagreement, which cannot be settled by recurrence to the heart.   
Balthasar, contrastingly, wrote beautifully about language, acknowledging 
our natural dependency, even in the spiritual realm of things.  Had Giussani been 
familiar with the following passage, he might not have insisted so strongly on the 
innateness of intuitions; rather, he may have tried to work out a logic for resolving 
practical problems that took full account of the fact that the subject‘s judgments, the 
contents of the ―I,‖ as it were, are inconceivable outside of tradition and culture:   
 
The child who awakens to consciousness does not enter into the world as a 
pure spirit in order to tackle the problem of expression from scratch.  Rather, 
the child awakens from subspiritual life, where there was already a natural 
relation of expression between inside and outside and where these natural 
correspondences between signification and the signified were always already 
saturated with human and spiritual expressive relations.  [...]  The living form 
of man‘s truth unfolds from a single seed as imperceptibly as the bodily 
organism grows up. [...]  It is sustained both by the energies of the subject, 
whose operation originates from within, and the influences of the objective, 
outside world and the environment, which gradually introduce the new being 
into humanity‘s traditions and commonly accepted expressive forms.  [...]  It 
is from the vantage point of this radical unity that we must see the 
relationship between man‘s consciousness and his world.
125
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One who has been influenced by the later Wittgenstein, and takes seriously the 
concerns he raised against the Cartesian paradigm of the man that ―even confronted 
with Christ turns away to consider the judgement of his own conscience and to hear 
the voice of his own reason,‖
126
 will be struck by Balthasar‘s interest in language.
127
  
Giussani was not at all attuned to this question.  A more pressing concern for 
Giussani was that his youngsters admit in their hearts that God could not but be 
known and loved and that the Catholic faith of their inheritance could not but be 
correspondent to the natural needs they felt within.  Giussani might very well have 
felt ill at ease with the idea of cultural-linguistic dependency attributed here to 
Balthasar.  The whole claim of language philosophy, after all, could be misconstrued 
as behaviourism – the theoretical counterpart of political ―systems‖ which threatened 
to undermine the intermediary institutions Giussani struggled to protect.   
Giussani did not seem to mind that, in spite of his theory of a universal heart, 
disagreement over universals recurred, nor did he ever tire of insisting that the heart 
already knew the religious and moral truth which it was tempted to evade.  While 
universal and timeless truths are intrinsic to Christian ethics, and while the world 
may be treated as a sign of the Creator, just as an effect points to its cause, universal 
agreement in morally difficult circumstances cannot be presupposed on the basis of 
the heart (or its corollary: the encounter), for beliefs refract differently through 
language, culture, history, and context, and prepare the expectations of subjects 
differently.  A theory which overlooks disagreement can also overlook, unwittingly, 
the importance of tradition and culture as tools for resolving disagreement, and this 
assumption, unfortunately, carries important pedagogical implications.   
 
CONCLUSION 
Modern consciousness, according to Giussani, seemed to be suffering a 
malaise of meaning and purpose which he, like Kierkegaard, blamed on the uncritical 
adoption of the herd mentality.  In expounding the ―possibility of beauty,‖ as in 
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recommending the ―method of The Religious Sense,‖ he meant to combat 
complacency, a variety of Kierkegaardian despair, teaching his interlocutors to 
evaluate different objects of apprehension in order that they might be able more 
personally to appropriate them.  Personal appropriation, for Giussani, meant judging 
objects in relation to the meaning and purpose of life.  To this end, his efforts went, 
above all, to strengthening religious belief and practice, rendering his reflections on 
the act of faith sympathetic to existential and personalist concerns.  Giussani‘s focus 
on personal appropriation, therefore, leads him to treat the ―religious phenomenon‖ 
with reference to its significance for me and for you.  For him, the subject‘s response 
to faith is an affective reflex, implying that reactions of respect and aversion to the 
object of the world are intrinsic to the heart‘s nature.  The roles of the intellect and 
the will manifest themselves only in a second movement.  Thus, Giussani redefined 
the point of entry into the mysteries of faith from teaching to experience.  No longer 
was authentic religious belief the rehearsal of doctrine, or obedience to the Ten 
Commandments, but the response to a phenomenological encounter commensurate 
with its ontological value.  Ultimately, it is the assimilation of subject and object that 
renders beauty a possibility.  Beauty, like the other transcendentals, presupposes the 
self-communicative structure of being, and the intrinsic reality of the world as a gift.  
It also points to its Maker, as an effect points to its cause.  Giussani, it seems, crafted 
the cure to the malaise of modern consciousness through beauty, using the idea of 
subject-response to waken his interlocutors from dormancy, to insist that there is 
more to reality than meets the eye.  Giussani used beauty (positività) to repair the 
negativity (negatività) caused by Nietzschean approaches to the struggle for freedom.  
He overextended beauty, however, to effect repairs in the realm of ethics, conflating 
practical-theories-to-live-by with impersonal accounts.  
This blend of ethics and epistemology in Giussani‘s account of beauty recurs 
also to his preoccupation with ―sawdust Thomism,‖ and the desire to render 
philosophical theology relevant to daily existence.  Following a certain strand of 
Transcendental Thomism pioneered in Leuven, beauty exemplifies Giussani‘s 
metaphysical approach to pragmatic questions.  The logic with which he expounds 
the concept, deriving indirectly from Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, through 
Balthasar, involves a theory of ethics, based on perception, that broadens the object 




of intellection from the strictly empirical to the metaphysical.  To this end, 
―everything that happens,‖ including moral quandaries, carries significance for the 
subject and brims over with meaning when viewed against the backdrop of destiny.  
The purpose of (ethical) reflection, then, would be to establish that meaning, which 
then gives shape to decision and action.  Ethics begins with the affective faculty, and 
integrates the intellect and will only in a second movement.   
The account of beauty, then, which is a theory of the subject‘s affective 
relation to truth and goodness, is also the source of concrete solutions to real 
problems.  At once concerned with the immediate, Giussani‘s answers consistently 
derive from the infinite.   His approach is to translate the subject from the realm of 
immanence to the realm of transcendence through an evaluation of an encounter 
through which one is struck.  But in order that an encounter may reorient (con-
vertere) the subject to a transcendent end through its impact on the affections – a 
case, par excellence, of the ―possibility of beauty‖ – the subject must first consent to 
being affected.  Being affected entails a priori taking a posture of openness toward 
the world, i.e., dwelling with affection (a recommendation that gestures at the title of 
his book, Affezione e dimora).  Giussani recommends this stance as a manner of 
―dwelling,‖ and identifies its proper operation as ―gazing.‖  Dwelling and gazing 
entail seeking correspondences with the heart by looking beneath surface 
appearances to the ultimate ground of reality.  What reverberates in the heart derives 
from the centre of being.  The concept of correspondence, then, at its most basic 
level, presupposes an ontology based on reciprocity and communion.  To close 
oneself off to such an ideal would be to go against the true ―I,‖ which is intrinsically 
made for self-giving and receiving.   
Certain tendencies, discussed above, compete with each other, affecting the 
overall clarity and coherence of Giussani‘s account.  The tendency to propound a 
theory for all men, at all times, and in all places exhibits the correlative tendency to 
address particular cases with general solutions.  But this compromises the pragmatic 
purport of the text insofar as method x may not be suited to resolving problem y.  
Methods, in other words, must be suited to their objects, as Giussani himself 
recommends (RS, 3).  The choice of a method, however, requires more than the 
phenomenological (read: essentially abstract) apprehension of an object, such as that 




to which Giussani appeals, unwittingly, using perception and beauty to address the 
problem of the act of faith.  A decisive decision regarding method must take stock of 
the act of faith for me and for you.  A general theory of perception, contrastingly, 
universalizes the problem of faith, rendering it impersonal and devoid of personal 
significance.  But this undermines Giussani‘s existential and personalist sensitivity.  
How does he foil his own explicit attempt to recover the importance of the 
individual‘s existential ―yes‖?  
I reply that particular cases are made up of questions and axioms which have 
contextual and historical roots.  Giussani recognizes the importance of the ―totality of 
factors,‖ including subjective and objective levels of meaning, but trades the 
historical and contextual grounding of a problem for its grounding in an intrinsic 
principle, be it the herd mentality or original sin.  Giussani‘s attempt to deliver 
particular solutions in light of the critique of ideology and the reality of sin is 
weakened by his quest for absolute knowledge.  He bypasses the possibility of 
uncertainty and ambiguity, recommending the possibility of beauty, positività, as the 
charism of CL and as a stance with which to face life.   
Uncertainty and ambiguity, however, play an important role in ethics insofar 
as they allow cases to be treated as variants attending particular solutions.  A 
fundamental stance of openness to being, which receives the world as gift and 
remains open to mystery, is not the same as referring a morally difficult circumstance 
to the concept of beauty.  The plurality of cases that results from the prior admission 
of uncertainty, however, threatens the quest for stability, which Giussani deems 
crucial to the ontological grounding of his argument – and rightly so, for ontology 
concerns the universal ground and structure of being.  Giussani‘s intuitionism, 
however, was inspired by the drive for ―moral certainty.‖  To this extent, it was 
inspired by the same Kantian drive for objectivity that spawned Transcendental 
Thomism.  To criticise Giussani for producing Cartesianisms for lack of awareness 
regarding the concerns of language philosophy seems unfair given that his original 
question had to do with the autonomous act of judgement regarding matters of faith.  
Giussani‘s concerns were pastoral, in other words, not philosophical, and his appeal 
to beauty was both an attempt to enliven in his students the love of truth and to 
ensure that the truth was pursued under the affective dimension of the heart that 




longed for satisfaction.  It might be pointed out, nevertheless, that Cartesianisms 
were something Giussani tried to get his students to overcome, and that the 
epistemology underpinning the concept of beauty prevented him from conveying this 










The House of the Salutation of the Mother of God at Smithfield does not appear to have 
been distinguished from its sisters during the fifteenth century by any superior degree of 
fervour.  Like them, however, it had preserved intact the essentials of the Carthusian 
way of life, and thus provides a striking example of the reward that comes to a body of 
men, perhaps of no remarkable virtue, who are faithful to the prescriptions of their 
Rule: the coals remain alight and, though dull, may be kindled to flame by a breath of 





The overarching goal of Giussani‘s writing, such as he himself expressed it, 
was to revitalize the Church so that it would be an incisive and transformative 
―presence‖ in society.  His main audience from the 1950s onward were university 
students from Milan and the outlying areas, many of whom were already inducted in 
the practices of ecclesiastical youth movements (initially Catholic Action and 
Gioventù Studentesca, ultimately Communion and Liberation).  The training 
Giussani had received at Venegono Seminary during the inter-war period, shaped 
variously through the writings of Rousselot, Blondel, Möhler, Newman, Guardini, 
and others (all controversial fonts of theology at the time), had convinced him that 
the centrality of Christian faith in modern times could only be restored by 
demonstrating its relevance to the concrete concerns and irritations of ordinary life.  
Giussani‘s attempt to articulate ―moral certainty‖ on ultimate questions (e.g., the 
meaning of work and the purpose of existence) was shaped by the desire to introduce 
younger generations of Catholics to an expression of faith that both provided 
solutions to real problems and was sympathetic to the human person in terms of his 
―needs and exigencies.‖  Romantic love, friendship, and family are, therefore, 
Giussani‘s point of departure.   
The problem facing the Church in modern times, namely secularism, was a 
matter of method, according to Giussani.  The methodological problem referred not 
so much to the Church‘s evangelization of a new generation of Catholics (though the 
moralistic, clerical, intellectualized, and pietistic approaches of the past were 
certainly up for revision), but to the absence of a method through which youngsters 
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could judge the Christian fact and the Church for themselves.  The problem, in other 
words, was epistemological (how to know the truth), and the reason it needed a 
solution, Giussani argued, was that it bore existentially and personally on questions 
very much at the heart of a young person: self-discovery, freedom, fulfillment, and 
authenticity.  In the age in which he lived and worked as a priest and educator what 
mattered to young people extended to social transformation, often expressed in 
efforts to redress injustice and relieve suffering and poverty.  While many of 
Giussani‘s colleagues, particularly in the universities, proposed political ideology 
(viz., Italian Communism) and the social sciences as sources of repair to social and 
human fragmentation, he proposed the act (if not the leap) of faith.   
The first order of education, then, was to introduce an epistemology that both 
broke down a priorism and preconceptual thought to allow objects, such as the 
Church, to show themselves for what they were.  The method of verification, called 
―correspondence,‖ presupposed that the answers of faith completed what otherwise 
seemed incomplete in the subject‘s self-reflective stance on the world.  Reality and 
doctrine were one and the same, Giussani argued, using literature, music, and art 
eclectically to demonstrate the ―religious sense‖ lurking beneath even the most 
secular of musings.       
Giussani‘s sensitivity to the institutional alienation felt by younger Catholics, 
seen from a different vantage point, moved him to take their attachment to modern 
ideals seriously.  Even in doing so, Giussani largely overlooked their philosophical 
sources in the Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment and so unwittingly embedded 
Cartesian-Kantian tendencies from which he had been trying to escape in his own 
writing.  His philosophical naiveté, nevertheless, does not take away from an 
otherwise noble goal.  Giussani believed he could achieve the best results for 
tradition and its longevity if individuals were somehow permitted, ideally with 
assistance, to attain their modern ends within the parameters of ecclesial communion.  
Within this process, where self-reflection plays a crucial role, the individual comes to 
realize that the deepest desires of his heart were implanted by God precisely that they 
might shape a person‘s life in determinate ways, and that their infinite nature was a 






God.  The method of judgment, and its emphasis on the heart, the seat of desire, 
purports to reconcile the polarities that typically disrupt the integral relation of life 
and faith: external truth and inner judgement, obedience and freedom, sacrifice and 
beauty, authority and friendship.   
The person formed in Giussani‘s method is one in whom the act of faith is 
prompted by a prior awareness of the infinite desire within.  The wish to know 
reality, to live out of a deep and abiding love for humanity, to perceive and be 
transformed by the beautiful, to love and be loved flow from this first act of self-
awareness which leaves one begging.  Loving obedience to the Magisterium, a 
second step, as it were, results from the insight, gleaned through years of experience, 
that doctrine is connatural with desire.  Giussani‘s self-reflective subject, therefore,  
discovers truth in correspondence with desire, freedom in correspondence with 
obedience, certainty and stability in correspondence with transcendent beauty, and 
identity in correspondence with friendship.  Correspondence, of course, also involves 
the assimilation between subjects and objects, such as doctrine and the ―I.‖  But I 
have argued that subjects and objects are actually separate, distinct, and in complex 
relation.  Through such an assimilation, however, Giussani believes the individual 
will be able to speak about truth, freedom, and beauty in a fully transcendent way, 
while responding with sensitivity to the affective and emotional dimension of the 
human person. The starting point of all reflection on desire and satisfaction, it is 
worth recalling, is the self.  
There is a great deal to admire in Giussani‘s approach.  At the same time, his 
attempt to deliver practical-theories-to-live-by is often overshadowed by the 
impersonal account of the thinking and knowing subject.  Moreover, the impersonal 
account itself lacks an adequate theoretical apparatus at its origin.  These weaknesses 
lead Giussani both to replicate the Cartesian-Kantian tendencies he seeks to escape 
and to produce the picture of a subject more dependent for his moral judgements on 
the inner experience produced by the encounter with the Movement than on his 
teachers in the tradition and the cultivation of virtue.     
These problems could perhaps be overlooked, given the inspiring content of 






inability of his account to give robust replies to some rather unavoidable moral 
questions that arise within his treatment of various themes.  Indeed, his optimistic 
and over-resolved approach to problems seems inclined to overlook the recurrence of 
certain pertinent questions: e.g., the problem of rival intuitions, the lingering effects 
of sin, the divergence of wills between friends, the inability to prevent uncertainty, 
ambiguity, and crisis.  At the conclusion of my chapters, I identified questions that 
stem from these problematic areas.  In my experience of attending the Schools of 
Community in Montreal, Edinburgh, and Toronto, these questions have also been 
posed by lay readers.  Can the heart err in judgement and if so how do communities 
of the faithful deal with disagreement and the divergence of opinions?  When the 
―communital phenomenon‖ is absent, as is the case when one must stand alone in the 
public square to defend the faith, what other sources provide the ―energy‖ needed for 
bravery and perseverance in the founding and maintenance of institutions?   Does the 
logic of beauty sufficiently resolve and restore order to life‘s unlovely situations and 
if so does the recurrence of uncertainty and crisis indicate a problem in one‘s outlook 
on reality (e.g., cynicism)?  Can friendship and community survive divergence of 
wills, injury, and betrayal by recurring to a common destiny of which there is but a 
faint memory in the midst of the turmoil of sin and division?  And if so how are 
charity and unity restored?   
My own writing was motivated by the frustration of readers who complained 
of difficulty understanding and applying Giussani‘s practical-theories-to-live-by to 
cases in ordinary life.  I traced this frustration to areas of vagueness in Giussani‘s 
work.  From the beginning, I have treated these areas aetiologically as symptomatic 
of the author‘s unarticulated worries.  Using Peter Ochs‘ method of pragmatic 
reading, making good use of historical context, intellectual biography, and the 
leading tendencies in Giussani‘s writing, I tried to reconstruct these unarticulated 
worries.  We began to see gradually how Giussani‘s writings stemmed from his 
attempt to meet the diverse expectations of two kinds of audience.  On the one hand, 
Giussani‘s ecclesiastical superiors expected him to attack modernity and defend the 
Magisterium; on the other hand, youngsters expected the Church‘s teachings to 






were to be at all worthy of appropriation and integration into life.  Giussani‘s attempt 
to provide the ultimate answer to a variety of practical questions touching on the 
moral life soon led him to universalize his claims.  The ―method‖ he pioneered for 
the youth in Milan was now incumbent on all peoples, of all times, and in all places.   
Giussani‘s universalizing tendency obstructs the view I have demonstrated, 
through the work of excavation, of a direct connection between his account and its 
historically-contingent origins in pastoral needs.  The pastoral needs of the Church, 
of course, precisely on account of their imbeddedness in time and context, are ever 
changing.  The critical observations of Giussani‘s texts within each of my chapters 
stem from the pastoral needs in the time and context in which I live and work as a 
Catholic educator.  They are motivated by a different set of concerns, therefore, than 
Giussani‘s: viz., a pervasive forgetfulness of our dependency on one another for who 
we are and what we become.  I have tried, nevertheless, to limit my critique only to 
the areas of inconsistency and philosophical weakness suggested by Giussani‘s 
account itself, which would affect the self-understanding of students under 
Giussani‘s programme of study as much as those under the programme I administer 
at The Francis de Sales Centre in Toronto.      
 Two areas cry out for determination in this regard, both affecting the 
revitalization of Christianity and the rehabilitation of the Church as a moral authority 
in Giussani‘s milieu and my own: viz., the role and importance of tradition and virtue 
in the formation of younger generations of Catholics.  The unconventional manner of 
Giussani‘s treatment of judgement, freedom, and beauty, particularly his emphasis on 
the heart, I believe, exhibits not so much his innovation, as his sensitivity to the 
ambivalent regard of youngsters to tradition and virtue-cultivation. The assiduous 
attempt to revitalize Christian faith by not recommending rule-following accounts for 
the role and importance Giussani assigns to the heart in the discovery of moral 
axioms and the proposition that God exists.   But insight into difficult moral 
circumstances and heroic action are not necessarily first nature, as Giussani argues.  
The moral agent is actually far more dependent on training in a tradition and the 
cultivation of virtue for the kinds of evaluations he makes and the actions to which 






turn to it for moral guidance, is itself shaped by education and habit.  The 
dependency of the heart for what we are able to say about moral questions or God 
raises the inescapable relationship between masters and novices in a tradition, 
including the role and importance of institutions in expounding and transmitting a 
tradition to successive generations.   
The cultural conditions in post-war Italy made it disadvantageous for 
Giussani to expound education in terms of the dependency of a pupil on his masters.  
For this reason, he adopts a heuristic approach to moral decision-making rooted in 
the intuitive, purportedly innate, deliveries of the heart.  Further, by framing decision 
and action as a risk, the ―risk of education,‖ as it were, rather than as the deliveries of 
one‘s prior induction in language, culture, and tradition, Giussani was able to play up 
the theme of freedom, which was important to his young interlocutors.  In this way, 
Giussani distanced himself from Stalinism and Fascism (including Nazism), not to 
mention the Church‘s prurient approach to sexuality and modernity.  His introduction 
of the concept of authority as friendship and of obedience within friendship – both 
rather late additions to his thought – clearly prevent his young interlocutors from 
entirely disengaging from the tradition and the communities to which they belong, 
venturing out on an unknown territory of self-discovery.     
An alternative route to obedience, unexplored by Giussani, where tradition 
would be the ordinary ambit of flourishing and the practice of virtue the means to 
flourishing, would not necessarily have had to resort to dogmatism.  A pupil receives 
from his masters the tools needed for the discovery and full development of his God-
given identity, which leaves him with a debt of gratitude similar to the moral debt 
incurred in friendship.  These tools are derived from the tradition‘s deepest sources 
of repair to life‘s most difficult and challenging questions.  The ability to appeal to 
tradition in this way awakens one‘s awareness of his dependency, and it is this 
awareness that provokes both gratitude and an acute awareness of the fact that we are 
both rational and dependent animals.  To treat tradition as a source of identity and 
repair, as opposed to viewing it either as a relic of a bygone era or as a seal stamped 
onto the practices of a community to announce papal fidelity, is to treat it as a living 






The pupil who is deeply travelled in tradition may, by various means, avail 
himself of memory (e.g., the life of Christ, the martyrology, hagiographies, 
ecclesiastical history, and moral precedents, etc.), narrative (e.g., accounts of truth, 
freedom, and beauty, etc.), and logic, a systematic way of making important 
distinctions (e.g., mercy and justice, freedom and responsibility, compassion and 
absolution).  Gradually deepening his understanding of tradition, the pupil becomes a 
more knowledgeable and responsible appropriator of truth, ready to face life‘s moral 
questions with deeper insight.  It may take time for him to come around to shared 
understandings of what tradition means and how it can help shape the decisions and 
actions of individuals and communities, but it remains a fact that his prior induction 
in a tradition (or a variety of traditions, as it were) is inescapable.  It follows that the 
deeper one‘s understanding is of the tradition to which one belongs the better and 
more robust will one‘s ability be to apply its wisdom to life.   
Throughout this thesis we have seen how the accounts of judgement, 
freedom, and beauty were based on Giussani‘s epistemology; how the heart‘s 
―needs‖ and ―exigencies,‖ in other words, were (a) the origin of man‘s ―religious 
sense;‖ (b) the criterion by which to judge external reality with ―moral certainty;‖ 
and (c) among the ―totality of factors‖ on which decision and action are based.  We 
have now also compared Giussani‘s picture of the self-reflective moral agent with 
the picture of a moral agent who is dependent on others for the needs and exigencies 
he brings to moral questions.  To a large extent, Giussani is claiming that moral 
precepts are connatural with the human person; that an innate goodness in the human 
person responds viscerally either with respect to the encounter with goodness or with 
aversion to the encounter with evil.  But this phenomenological ontology, as it were, 
is still a long way off from Giussani‘s further claim that the subtler deliveries of the 
heart in moral matters are innate.        
The dependency of pupils on masters in a tradition goes hand-in-hand with 
the argument that moral deliberation and virtuous action are enabled by the 
extensiveness of one‘s training in a tradition.  Aristotle‘s notion of phronesis (right 
practical reason) and Thomas Aquinas‘s notion of prudence are fruits of education.  






through Giussani‘s response to the new conditions obtaining for belief and practice 
in modernity.  Prudence, as described by Thomas in Summa Theologiae II-II q. 49, a. 
15, involves the application of universals to particulars and is moderated by the 
awareness that there are as many means to ends as there are variety of persons and 
cases.  The component parts of prudence are dependent on one‘s deep training in a 
tradition:  
(a) Memory: knowledge of history and historical precedent, for experience is 
a teacher of what is true in the majority of cases;  
(b) Intelligence: knowledge of universals, for the value of particular ends 
must be weighed against the value of ultimate ends;  
(c) Docility: the willingness to be taught the value of ends by elders, for 
experience has given them insight into principles;  
(d) Shrewdness: knowledge of how to make important and necessary 
connections, for to grasp quickly what ought to be done is to find the 
middle term of a syllogism;  
(e) Reason: the ability to reason from general to particular, for prudence 
requires the correct application of law-answers to wisdom-questions; 
(f) Foresight: the ability to anticipate the results of action in particular cases, 
for the ability to foresee the results of action on future contingents allows 
generative ends to be achieved and destructive ends to be averted; 
(g) Circumspection: the ability to apply remedies according to the variety of 
cases and the many combinations of circumstances they contain, for what 
is healing in one instance may be deleterious in another; 
(h) Caution: the ability to discern both the good and the evil in contingent 
matters of action, for just as what is false can be mingled with what is 
true, so what is good can be mingled with what is evil.                  
Thomas adds to this description the different realms of prudence (domestic, juridical, 
political, and military) and includes a description of the different applications of 
virtue to different circumstances.  In all events, the final judge to which one is bound, 
one‘s own conscience, is not the manifestation of a particular endowment from birth, 






matters of prudence man stands in very great need of being taught by others, 
especially old folk who have acquired a sense of understanding of the ends in 
particular matters.‖
2
  It is significant, of course, that the section which follows his 
discussion of prudence concerns good counsel and the Holy Spirit.                
In order to explain the implications that result from my assessment above, I 
wish to turn to an example from history, which illustrates some of the main points I 
wish to make about Giussani‘s work.  Since my concern lies with moral deliberation, 
and Aristotle thought that a man‘s true stature is revealed in unforeseen 
circumstances,
3
 the example I present below illustrates how the heroic action of an 
otherwise inconspicuous group of men depended on their deep training in a tradition.  
I refer to the events that transpired at the London Charterhouse, just before its 
dissolution in the sixteenth century.
4
  The material that I am about to introduce, 
which is both striking and new, can cloud things unnecessarily should its relevance 
to the assessment above be misplaced; however, I think it is desirable to consider this 
example as a way to understand the dramatic difference that tradition, virtue, and the 
life of prayer make on decision and action in addition to what Giussani already 
teaches about judgement, freedom, and beauty.   
When it is believed, for example, that the sources of moral criteria lie within, 
as Giussani argues, and that these are confirmed by their purported manifestation in 
all men of good will, e.g., as exhibited by original awe and the desire for infinite 
satisfaction, the result displaces the role of tradition and virtue in the formation of 
younger generations of Catholics, treating tradition (perhaps unwittingly) as an 
afterthought.  Rather than viewing tradition as inescapable in the formation of the 
heart, the idea that such deliveries are innate leads tradition to be tacked on to the 
practices of a community from the outside.  Tradition, consequently, can only avail 
itself as the outward manifestation of the community‘s desire to profess fidelity to 
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the Magisterium, embodied in the practice of following rubrics and customs, but not 
as a living and breathing source of wisdom.   
The point of contrasting Giussani‘s account with the London Charterhouse 
paradigm is to capture more precisely, through the real life of real men, how tradition 
and virtue habitually operate in unforeseen circumstances to affect rational thought 
and deliberative action, and to consider how the themes of the preceding chapters – 
judgement/heart, freedom/community, and beauty/sacrifice – actually depend on 
tradition for the results to which the Charterhouse example gestures as a paradigm of 
moral agency.  This example highlights, above all, the dependence of novices on 
masters and the role of tradition in the formation of consciences.  It illustrates how 
truth limits freedom, where freedom is defined as autonomy.  It also points to the 
reality of unlovely situations, the inability to control life and eliminate the possibility 
of crisis.  It dramatises that one‘s God-given identity is discovered and realized in the 
prayerful worship of the Church and the keeping of the Ten Commandments, and 
that it is meaningless to speak of identity without acknowledging the debt of 
gratitude owed to the teachers who contributed to the formation of the moral self.    
 In 1535 Westminster passed the Treason Act under the terms of which 
anyone who failed to acknowledge the king as ―the only supreme head on earth of 
the Church in England,‖
5
 was to be charged with treason and sentenced to death.  
Royal commissioners were sent to all the houses of religious orders, including the 
London Charterhouse, to obtain acknowledgment of the king‘s supremacy by 
administering an oath upon the gospels.  Those who failed to swear the oath were 
sent to the Tower of London for execution.  In retelling the story, David Knowles 
presents the picture of the prior, John Houghton, genuinely caught in the grips of a 
terrifying moral dilemma.  A matter of divine faith was at stake, on the one hand, but 
his chief anxiety lay with the younger members of the community, many of whom he 
himself had formed in the Carthusian Rule and whose vows he had received.  He 
feared for their perseverance if the house were suppressed, and considered outward 
compliance to save them from apostasy.  Knowing that their trial before the 
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commissioners was imminent, Houghton set aside three days to decide how he and 
his community were to respond to the oath required of them:  
 
On the first, all made a general confession; on the second all, led by Houghton 
himself, asked pardon of each of his brethren in turn for all offences; on the 
third, the prior sang a Mass of the Holy Spirit for guidance.  When he did so, 
and the moment came for the elevation of the consecrated Host, all felt in their 
hearts, and to some it seemed that they heard, either as a gust of wind or as an 
echo of harmony, a breath of the Spirit Whose counsel they had implored.  The 
celebrant was for some minutes unable to continue the Mass, and at the 
subsequent chapter he spoke of his experience thankfully indeed, but with an 
exhortation that all should abide in God‘s grace with prayer, humble and 
fearful.  His own constant prayer was that of Christ for his disciples: ‗Holy 




The monks were tried at Westminster Hall on 28-29 April, 1535.  They were 
pronounced guilty of the charge of high treason and sentenced to death: 
 
By the royal command they were executed in their monastic habits, with the 
hair shirts of their Rule beneath.  Each at the foot of the gallows was offered 
pardon if he would submit, and on their refusal the barbarous sentence was 
carried out with every circumstance of cruelty.  Houghton, the first to die, 
embraced his executioner and addressed the vast crowd, taking them to witness 
against the day of judgement that he died rather than deny the teachings of 
God‘s Church.  He bore the agony of the butchery, aggravated by the tough 
hair shirt, with what seemed a more than human patience; conscious to the end, 
he died invoking the Lord he had loved and followed to the Cross.  He was 




How the Carthusians went about deciding on the oath highlights the spiritual fonts of 
grace, including the liturgical prayer of the Church, and the dependency of each 
monk on the Carthusian Rule and on good teachers.  Knowles pays particular 
homage to the image of Houghton as a steward of tradition and the dutiful teacher of 
the younger members of the community:  
 
[...] the picture that emerges is of a man capable not only of inspiring devoted 
attachment, but of forming in others a calm judgement and a heroic constancy 
equal to his own.  He found himself head of a family in which youth was 
predominant; more than half the community were under the age of twenty-five 
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when he began his short rule; no doubt they were impressionable enough.  But 
it was not the most impressionable who followed him to the end of his journey; 
[...] the seventeen who did not fail had learnt from him to depend on no human 
guide, to fear neither sharp pain nor material want, and to be true, through all 
extremes of suffering and desolation, to the purpose of their profession.
8
      
 
What the philosopher may gather from the literature surrounding Houghton‘s life is 
that he was able to develop his character fully because of his observance of the 
Carthusian Rule.  Grace, we may say, built on the natural strength acquired in 
steadfast obedience to the Rule and the willingness to be taught by his own teachers.  
Thus, in a moment of terrible crisis, when either his nerve might have failed or the 
impulse to live might have beckoned him to take control of his life, Houghton stood 
by his conscience and surrendered his will to God.  With conviction and courage he 
accepted full responsibility for doing so.  Not all the monks who admired Houghton 
were prepared to follow him to the Tower of London.  The lures of the world, the 
attraction of ―false and flickering lights,‖ as Knowles puts it, led a few to follow their 
own hearts instead (if I may use the term ―heart‖ equivocally): those who delighted 
in honours and dreams, those who sought to escape from solitude and from 
themselves, and those whose irresponsible vagaries and treachery had compromised 
the integrity of the house that had sheltered them.
9
 Seventeen of the community‘s 
members, however – not a negligible number – succeeded in putting the purpose of 
their religious profession into practice when it counted the most.     
 How does the moral dilemma faced by these Carthusians enlighten the 
understanding we attained from Giussani regarding of judgement, freedom, and 
beauty?   
Judgement, I have already pointed out extensively, relies on a deep formation 
in tradition.  The rubrics, customs, and practices of the Church in various times and 
places (e.g., scriptural discernment, liturgical worship, lives of the saints, and 
obedience to the Ten Commandments, etc.) are themselves the criteria of judgement 
otherwise sought in the heart.  Gut reactions can be ascribed to the heart as well, 
along with the desire for satisfaction, while the basic intuitions we carry into a moral 
                                                 
8
 Knowles, The Religious Orders in England, vol. III, 224-225. 
9






dilemma are acquired through education and materialize in concrete forms of action 
through our recourse to tradition as a living and breathing source of wisdom.   
Freedom is freedom to seek and grasp the truth; but precisely for this reason 
the desire to act with others must at the same time not overtake the necessity of 
having to stand alone, should the circumstances require, even if doing so were to 
leave the legitimate need of companionship unfulfilled.   
Beauty is certainly one of the attributes of God, and its ability to stir our 
affections and emotions points to the manifestation of God‘s loving providence in the 
natural world.  But on this side of heaven, there is a whole category of events which 
God permits that he does not also command, such as the defective effects of deficient 
causes.  While it is always possible to read good out of evil, there is something of the 
fatalist in the person who maintains that God, in every case, redirects the course of 
deficient causes to yield redemptive effects.  Neither God‘s foreknowledge, nor his 
providence, nor his being the First Cause of creation, nor his being Love incarnate, 
presupposes that all events are intrinsic and necessary to his divine plan for salvation.  
Human beings are themselves capable of wreaking terrible destruction, even self-
destruction, and the freedom God gave the human creature underwrites this 
possibility, at least in part.   
The ensemble of points introduced by the Carthusian paradigm does not 
invalidate Giussani‘s thought.  Indeed, as seen through the importance Giussani 
accords both to obedience and the Magisterium (on the one hand), and the ―I,‖ 
freedom, and desire (on the other hand), the practice of turning to the heart for 
judgements concerning reality is actually meant to produce the best results for 
tradition and virtue.  The Carthusian paradigm illustrates, however, that when the 
heart, and not tradition and virtue, are the first point of departure in moral 
deliberation, the dependency of the person on tradition and virtue for practical 
wisdom remains unacknowledged and potentially undermined by the psychic powers 
of sin that threaten to undermine commitment to truth.  To underestimate our 
dependency on tradition and authority is to misrepresent the human person as an 
essentially autonomous moral deliberator.  Autonomy, moreover, lends itself to 






through the customs and practices of the tradition.  It is doubtful whether an heuristic 
approach to moral education can lead to true freedom within a living and breathing 
tradition.  As observed earlier, the testing of objects and ends for their intrinsic value 
against the heart sooner or later necessitates either the heavy-handed imposition of 
authority to prevent chaos, or the idea that one‘s participation in the practices of the 
Movement, namely testing hypotheses against the heart, is tantamount to one‘s deep 
formation in the Church.  Each of these tendencies responds to an historically-
contingent concern which Giussani sought to address.  At the same time, they are not 
entirely commensurable: the moral certainty of the heart needs to be proportioned to 
the authority of the practices of the Movement; and the freedom to determine one‘s 
―I‖ through the heart‘s desires needs to be proportioned to the role of the 
Magisterium as criterion of human authenticity.   
It remains a fact, however, that Giussani, in engaging modernity, was 
essentially a sensitive and dedicated teacher; that the unique features of his writings 
were determined by the nature of his engagement with modern philosophical 
concerns; and that his explicit attempt to lead youth in post-War Italy to closer 
proximity with Christianity and the Church by responding ―adequately‖ and 
―reasonably‖ to the exigencies of freedom and authenticity had a wide reach.  By the 
time of his death in 2005, Giussani had achieved international recognition as the 
founder of an influential new charism in the Catholic Church, sufficiently broad to be 
of interest also to the ecumenical movement.  The hallmark of the charism‘s 
openness continues to be its promotion of ―affection‖ for the human person.  As 
Giussani himself put it, commenting in L’Osservatore Romano: ―What enlivens us is 
love for our humanity, that is, for the expression of fullness that every man feels.‖
10
   
The re-presentation of the Church in the light of this humanizing ideal 
remains a point of attraction for the followers and proponents of CL whose focus is 
on identity and freedom.  It expresses itself in the practice of sympathy for the world, 
the Other, and the ―I,‖ and is interpreted from the perspective of a firm doxology, the 
―moral certainty,‖ as it were, of a personal God through, with, and in whom beauty 
and fullness emanate and become manifest in the concrete determination of history, 
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i.e., God‘s providential design (―destiny‖).  Many individuals, through their 
encounter with CL, have crossed the threshold of the Church and become more 
serious appropriators of the Catholic tradition.  Those formed most deeply by the 
charism of CL attest with their lives to the fact that Christ alone can make sense of 
human nonsense; that He alone is able to complete what is incomplete in the person; 
and that the communities to which we belong have their deepest significance when 
they themselves result from our affection for humanity based on the desire for 
satisfaction which only Christ can fill.                   
 
 












Interview by Robi Ronza 
 
Translated by Robert Di Pede 
 
Toward the mid-1950s, Italian society seemed fully balanced and continuous 
with its historical and cultural past.  I felt absolutely that a mentality was still 
prevalent which was neither disjointed nor opposed to that milieu and family-
oriented society in which I had been raised thirty years before.  But we were actually 
dealing with a false equilibrium, maintained only by a formal respect for laws and 
conventions in which we were no longer believers, and which, therefore, would soon 
be abandoned.  We were relying, then, only on a structural equilibrium: and this was 
unequivocally manifested by its hesitancy in education.  A society that is truly and 
generatively balanced, in fact, finds the first measure and first confirmation of its 
own vitality in the generous disposition and commitment of its young people.  In the 
Italy of the 1950s, instead, the better part of these remained enclosed in the modest 
perimeter of tiny hopes and tiny projects, individualized in their sphere of influence 
and bourgeois in formulation.   
Many of the livelier personalities, more conscientious of their modus vivendi, 
took up art and music, particularly jazz.  Theirs was an attempt – albeit naive – to 
flee the society in which they lived, or else to interpret it from an external vantage 
point.  Along the same lines, and with kindred hopes, their interests turned to 
phenomena such as „mondo-beat‟
2
 or the „happies‟ [sic.].  For a select few, the more 
serious ones, the greatest point of concern found expression in ideological-political 
commitment – one that was all but willing to give in to political conformity, and 
which was, therefore, all the more rigid in its schematization and forceful [in the 
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promotion] of its ideas.  There was a lot of talk about the Resistance, and yet, 
without the least glimmer or capacity for the sacrifice that it had demanded.
3
  The 
call to the Resistance was simply a ruse for appropriating or justifying the rhetoric 
of partisan politics, in the strictest sense of that term.   
 To the adoption of the most liberal aspects of American culture and the 
renewed struggle against fascism was added the ideal of freedom of conscience – 
also conceived rigidly [...] from which a corollary was made to be derived (very 
influential at the level of education) which said that youngsters could no longer be 
invited, first of all, to verify the cultural contents of tradition (of tradition, in general; 
not only its Christian component); rather, they were to experiment with all manner of 
expression and thought in order that they might arrive at truth in a documented and 
impartial manner.   Such were the hopes of the proponents of this pedagogy, which 
was formed according to the liberal-enlightenment mould. 
 During this period, I was lecturing at the Seminary of Venegono: teaching 
dogmatic theology to seminarians, and Oriental theology in the Faculty [of 
Theology];
4
 and I foresaw that I would very soon turn a new leaf, which, in fact, took 
place.  It all began with a little episode, destined, nevertheless, to transform my life: I 
had just set out for a vacation on the Adriatic coast.  I was on a train when, it so 
happened, I began to converse with a group of students whom I found frighteningly 
ignorant of the Church.  And constrained – out of loyalty [to the truth?], and for my 
own sanctification – to attribute that ignorance to their disgust and indifference 
toward the Church itself, I decided there and then to dedicate myself to the 
reestablishment of the Christian presence in the student milieu.
5
 
 Thus I requested and obtained from my superiors permission to leave 
Venegono and to come to Milan; and there I was sent to teach religion in the 
classical lycée G. Berchet.
6
  From the first days of my appointment to Berchet, my 
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first intuition, born of that encounter in the train, unfortunately proved true.  I 
interrogated a handful of students known for their involvement with Catholic Action 
or the Scouts, whom I used to encounter in the corridors or the stairwells between 
classes, and asked them explicitly: „Do you really believe in Christ?‟  They looked at 
me with eyes askance.  As far as I recall, not one ever responded “yes” with that 
spontaneity characteristic of the person who has within himself the true ground of 
faith.  And another question I used to pose to everyone in those early years was: „In 
your opinion, are Christianity and the Church present in school, do they have 
incidence in school?‟  The question was almost always met with stupor or a smirk.          
All of this took place around the mid-1950s, when it was commonly held that 
the Church was still a stable presence in Italian society; and a stable presence, 
indeed, it was, but only because the past had not yet been thwarted by an attack – its 
advance everywhere evident – [whose soldiers were] forged in those furnaces of new 
men, i.e., the schools and universities.  It became clear to me, at that time, that a 
tradition, or, generally, a human experience, could not challenge history, cannot 
subsist in the flux of time, if not according to that measure in which it strove to 
express itself and to transmit itself according to modalities with cultural dignity.        
 No one would deny that the Church‟s presence, in those years, was still stable 
and grounded, thanks to its past; but its weight and consistency depended mainly on 
two factors: first, participation, en masse, in Catholic devotions, owed frequently to 
the force of inertia; and, second (paradoxical to the first), a strictly political [kind 
of] power, misused from the ecclesial point of view, above all.  Indeed, everyone, be 
it the Church or those partisan organisations that were its political sleeve,
7
 
manifested complete unawareness of the importance of renewing cultural creativity, 
and hence of [addressing] the problem of education.  All resolutions were geared to 
the goal of increasing enrolment in official Catholic associations.  Life in those 
associations, apart from the occasional burst of enthusiasm, was levelled to the 
purest moralism: wherever they gathered, the vital complexity of the Christian 
experience was reduced to the dutiful observance of a few select precepts (and not 
even the Decalogue was invoked with the same level of determination).   
                                                 
7
 Giussani is likely referring to Azione Cattolica (AC), a movement of lay Catholics whose purpose 
was to exert influence on society, and Democrazia Cristiana (DC), the Christian Democratic Party in 






* * * 
 
In the same period, a process of radicalization lay siege to the secular sphere 
of culture, under the influence of the University of Pisa, to cite one example.
8
  The 
attack expressed itself through an increasingly systematic intolerance and 
aggression toward every kind of Christian idea; and, above all, for every kind of 
Christian presence.  My unambiguous opinion from the get-go was that lay scholars 
set out to capture the departmental chairs of greatest influence (e.g., history, Italian 
literature, philosophy) using them as a pulpit against the pulpits.  Numerous 
professors in many schools used their chairs as anti-Christian pulpits and they set 
their sights on destroying the faith of their believing pupils.  Almost always, they 
were individuals who had a preconceived notion of religious experience and treated 
religion with intolerance, completely contradicting that openness to ideas on which 
they prided themselves, seeking support from like-minded individuals.  According to 
these teachers, anything that derived from the Church was a priori inhuman, and 
there was no point at all in drawing Christians into a conversation.  [...]  In 1954, it 
was already apparent that professors of this kind were forming groups in the key 
schools of Italy‟s most important cities (in Lombardy, in fact, the better part 
gathered at the lycées and state schools in Milan) in a manner that was not sporadic, 
but deliberate.  The pseudo-democratic facade of the operation was sustained by 
equivocal statements on which the state‟s monopoly of public schools was founded.  
If those statements, in theory, fail to respect the individual‟s cultural identity, let 
alone that of the cohort – precisely because they pretend to view the world 
impartially from a limbo that stands „over and above the scuffle‟ – in practice, they 
paradoxically drug the conscience of youngsters so that they are docile to the 
cultural manipulation effected either by groups or teachers.  The anti-Catholic 
crusade waged by lay professors in the ‟50s went so far as to exclude parts of the 
Italian literary tradition in order to suppress a rich repository of Christian 
                                                 
8
 Giussani may be referring to attacks launched against university students involved in CL 
(Comunione e Liberazione Universitari [CLU]) from 1972 to 1973 at the universities in regions of 
Italy where there were high percentages of communist supporters, such as in Tuscany (e.g. Università 
di Pisa) and Emilia-Romagna (Università di Bologna).  See: Massimo Camisasca, Comunione e 





personalities.  It is significant that Gioventù Studentesca would eventually come to 
be embroiled in this polemic against secularization.
9
 
As the anti-Catholic crusade of the ‟50s waned (confirmed also by events), no 
one could ever have imagined that Marxism would take its place as the dominant 
culture of the intelligentsia, soon to become the curriculum of the modern „clerics.‟  
The whole thing seems even stranger considering the fact that those were the years 
of the Cold War and of the anti-Communist crusade.  It seemed clear to me that 
attacking Marxist culture as the lone enemy would have meant, above all, getting at 
its roots.  Marxist culture, in its opposition to religion and church, is none other than 
a theoretical and operative offshoot of the Enlightenment.  Secondly, the opposition 
with which Marxism was met was of the kind that was deaf to its own claims: i.e., it 
precluded the possibility of a potentially useful confrontation.   Meanwhile, that 
deafness was not only exhibited by Marxism‟s opponents:  Marxist culture itself, in 
those years, was in no way disposed to the kind of dialogue to which it opened itself 
ably and fruitfully several years later.  
Fascism, for its part, was razed and driven out from Italian society only 
“officially.”  In actual fact, it persisted as a style of thought far beyond the perimeter 
of the electorate and public diligence.  Its continued presence passed through 
individuals who had made the better part of their careers under Fascist rule and who 
could still be found in the upper classes, schools, bureaucracy, and the judiciary.  
Even if Fascism did not emerge as an explicit cultural position, the mentality 
survived in select quarters: gaining strength, clothing itself in the garb of despotism, 
taking full advantage of prevailing laws.  In other quarters, working its effects on 
youth – and precisely this quarter interested me most – Fascism manifested itself in 
the gathering call of a single-minded political agenda: the anti-communist crusade.  
I noticed among youth the diffusion of that pantheism influenced by Evola,
10
 which is 
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 Gioventù Studentesca (Student Youth) was the name given to the first group of students from Azione 
Cattolica who gathered around Giussani on a weekly basis to reflect openly on matters of life and 
faith.  
10
 Giulio Evola (1898-1974), Italian philosopher and spiritualist associated with radical antiegalitarian, 
antiliberal, antidemocratic, and antipopular political systems.  See: Franco Ferraresi, “The Radical 





ultimately a form of Vitalism.
11
  Occasionally it was explicitly referenced to Evola, 
but more frequently it appeared unwittingly in the cultural matrix, anonymously 
introduced by certain teachers.    
Political centrists, similarly gathered under the anti-Communist rallying cry, 
adopted a conservative logic.  They played the conservatist card used banally to 
justify so many governmental activities.
12
 The ruling class in those years was 
characterized by an absolute insensitivity to the cultural dimension.  Core 
leadership, being far more than crypto-fascist, was guilty of cultural insensitivity.  
And it is precisely the absence of cultural dignity that leads to the decline of public 
service at all levels, precipitating the fall to various kinds of Fascism.    
 
* * * 
 
With some notable exceptions, Christian educators – like the rest of the 
Catholic intelligentsia of that era – applied assiduously the principle of the 
substantial separation between religious and temporal spheres.
13
  Following some 
abstract ideal of the state of nature, they prided themselves on teaching without 
proposing any world vision, and failed to communicate what they were (or, for that 
matter, what they were not).  For this reason, they neither created nor encouraged a 
single stance that was cultural, or Christian, or respectful of Christianity.  Be not 
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 The doctrine that “life, and reality in so far as it is living, consists in movement and becoming, 
rather than in static being.” (M. J. Inwood, “Vitalism,” in The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, 2
nd
 
edition, edited by Ted Honderich [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005], 948). 
12
 Conservatism is a political philosophy, interested in culture and identity, that seeks to preserve 
institutions and encourages steady evolution over radical change.  While conservatism has many 
forms, there is a strong tradition of it in the United States.  In Italy, the movement largely formed as a 
reaction to communism.  See: Anthony O’Hear, “Conservatism,” in The Oxford Dictionary of 
Philosophy, 165-167. 
13
 Giussani is in line with the idea of uniting nature and grace, natural and supernatural, as proposed in 
Jacques Maritain’s (1882–1973) “integral humanism”: “[W]hat the world needs is a new humanism, 
a[n] … integral humanism that would consider man in all his natural grandeur and weakness, in the 
entirety of his wounded being inhabited by God, in the full reality of nature, sin, and sainthood. Such a 
humanism would recognize all that is irrational in man, in order to tame it to reason, and all that is 
suprarational, in order to have reason vivified by it and to open man to the descent of the divine into 
him. Its main work would be to cause the Gospel leaven and inspiration to penetrate the secular 
structures of life–a work of sanctification of the temporal order.”  (“Christian Humanism,” in The 
Social and Political Philosophy of Jacques Maritain: Selected Readings, edited by Joseph W. Evans 
and Leo R. Ward [Garden City, N.Y.: Image Books, 1965], 155-169; here 164-165).  Giussani, 
however, was also aware that some interpretations of Maritain’s idea were strongly dualistic, resulting 
in a strong separation of the two kingdoms, Christ’s and Caesar’s, through which the social doctrine of 
the Church could even be applied as a ruse for sometimes violent political activism.  Giussani, 





surprised that all this took place in the very city of Milan, at the main campus of 
l'Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, even if that university is the largest cultural 
institution in Italy for Catholics.  In those years, Sacro Cuore (going totally against 
its raison d‟être), while enjoying increased cultural prominence, successfully upheld 
and spread that principle of separation between the temporal and the religious 
which, in due course, nearly overshadowed the presence of Catholicism in Italy.  I 
was, therefore, perplexed by the simultaneous blossoming of Catholic associations.  
With their apparent power and ability to mobilize the masses, I asked why these 
organizations failed to have any impact in places where the better part of the 
population spent their days: factories, offices, schools; why the faith of students born 
into Catholic families, and connected to parishes, was declining; why faith-education 
was being formalized in schools when it no longer had the ability to understand how 
faith and Christian life could offer theoretical and existential answers to problems 
right in the schooling years as students travelled the path to full maturity.  High 
schools and universities, I believe, are free and open environments – which is well 
and good – where youngsters begin to take responsibility for themselves and to 
complete for themselves the verification of texts and criteria transmitted up until that 
point through their families.  In this [academic] environment, more than in any 
other, it is crucially important that faith prove itself more capable than any other 
formula of answering the new demands that press on the life of a maturing 
youngster.  Such an answer can‟t but reject the theses on which objections to the 
Christian experience are founded.  The one thing more important than anything else 
is that faith becomes a mentality: it is a mentality that creates, giving new form to 
things.  For those formed in Catholic associations, faith was hardly ever a Christian 
mentality.   
 
* * * 
 
 The initiative [of Communion and Liberation (CL)] was born in response to 
this crisis and to the absence of Christians in the most vital and concrete spheres of 
ordinary life.  Ours was a rebuttal (the best within our means) of a situation which 
saw Christians politely excusing themselves from public life, culture, popular 





and cultural forces which positioned themselves to replace them in the unfolding of 
our national life.  The intervention took the form of a structure, the stamp of a pre-
existing organization: Gioventù Studentesca (GS).  This name originated from the 
student branch of Gioventù Femminile dell'Azione Cattolica (GF), while the 
corresponding branch of male students went by other appellations, until they decided 
on Movimento Studenti di Azione Cattolica (AC).  [...]  One of Azione Cattolica’s 
mandates involved the specialized care [of souls] according to gender.  [...]  The 
fracturing of Azione Cattolica in all of its various branches had a sexophobic 
element, the inevitable fruit of moral schematism.  [...]  GS and the Movimento 
Studenti […] were created, therefore, for young students who were members of 
Azione Cattolica.  Their eventuality, however, did not identify with an urgent 
missionary mandate, one of the fundamental facets of the Christian fact.  Suffice it to 
say that in those years a letter from the Diocesan Youth Office was published in 
which parishes were asked to take up the care of university students; the presence of 
ecclesial life in the spheres of university life was deemed a compromise!  Therefore, 
the missionary element was completely forgotten as [the letter] focussed on 
protecting the fruits of an Oratory education.
14
 I began by saying that CL took its 
inspiration from these two organizations, which merged under the name Gioventù 
Studentesca; but the criteria that inspired CL were very different.   
I would say that CL is influenced by two great schools of Christian thought 
[i.e., St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas].  The existential and affective aspects 
that are dominant in the Augustinian vision, used to be, and still are expressed in 
rational exigencies  – viz., understanding and coherence – which belong to the 
Thomistic method.  But if I were to give a univocal account of their influence, I‟d say 
the Movement is Thomist (I said Thomist and not Neo-Thomist).  I refer to St. 
Thomas‟s definition of truth [adaequatio rei et intellectum], which, as I mentioned, 
constitutes one of the pillars on which our experience is founded; it is purely 
existentialist: thus, it already contains that which might be specifically recovered 
from Augustine.  Beyond these great classics, I‟d say that I‟ve drawn from Möhler‟s 
influence in ecclesiology, and above all from the thought of Newman: they were my 
favourite authors in the first years of theology.  Of the more modern influences, I 
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would cite, above all, Przywara, Guardini, and de Lubac.  Then I‟d add the literature 
of the contemporary great French converts: Péguy, Claudel, Bernanos; including 
also the pure existentialist thought of Gabriel Marcel. Of the great Italian precursors 
to the Conciliar movement [...] we read Don Milani [...]; his book  Lettera ad una 
professoressa,
15
 and the position of the Movement regarding education was generally 
influenced by all his works in education.
16
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 Lorenzo Milani (1923-1967), Italian priest, author, and educator, known especially for his solicitude 
for poor students, and highly controversial in the Catholic Church of Italy on account of apparently 
polemical writings against the establishment.  He advocated a method of education that taught poor 
students to practice critical evaluation of political, economic, and social legislation, and to use 
education, including the development of talents and skills, to make a difference in society.  The title of 
his most famous book, L'obbedienza non è più una virtù (Obedience is no longer a virtue), no matter 
what its thesis may have been, was highly inflammatory at the time of its publication in 1965 – 
particularly from the anti-modernist perspective of the Roman Curia.  Italy, in those years, was torn by 
fascist, democratic, and communist factions vying for power, and demonstrations by the agrarian and 
industrial classes were seen within the Church as highly subversive of tradition and social 
organization.  Cf. L'obbedienza non è più una virtù. Documenti del processo di Don Milani (Florence: 
Libreria Editrice Fiorentina, 1965).         
16
 See Milani, Lettera a una professoressa (Florence: Libreria Editrice Fiorentina, 1967). 
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